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AND

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EDITED BY

EDWARDS A. PARK AND GEORGE E. DAY,

WITH THE CO-OPERATION OF

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THE
BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

THE NATURAL SOURCES OF THEOLOGY.

BY REV. THOMAS HILL, D.D., LL.D., FORMERLY PRESIDENT OF HARVARD
COLLEGE.

WE propose to recapitulate, in the present Article, the sources of religious knowledge which, in our four preceding Articles, we have found trustworthy; and in order that the reader may carry away a positive impression of faith, rather than of controversy, doubt, and denial, we will, for the most part, omit in this recapitulation any allusion to the modern forms of unbelief, which in the previous Articles we have endeavored to show stand on wholly untenable foundations, drawing nearly all their conclusions from premises which attempt to define the infinite. Falsely accusing Christian theology of this logical absurdity, the opponents of faith in the Christian scriptures rush themselves headlong into the error which they condemn; arguing from the infinite, while acknowledging that we can safely argue only to it. We have in the preceding Articles shown this fundamental vice in the logic of unbelief, and will endeavor to avoid either alluding to it, or carelessly falling into it, in the present recapitulation.

The grand fundamental truth, on which all human philosophy and all human science must be built, is that man has the power of perceiving things and their relations; perceiving them either by outward sense, or by inward apprehension.

For this power of perception we may use the term sight ; we may say that we see whatever is perceived by the bodily senses, the eye, the ear, touch, smell, taste ; we see the external world and its sensible properties by outward sense ; and we may say that we see by inward sight that which is part of our own consciousness, or that which is abstract and known only by reflection, or conceived by the imagination.

We come into conscious being possessed of these powers of outward and inward sight. In our first survey of the universe we see the difference between our own self and the rest of the universe ; and the first grand division in our classifying the objects of perceptions, is into the me and the not-me ; myself and nature. Very early in our conscious life we again divide the not-me into my body and not my body. My body is subservient, in part, directly to my thought and wish ; what is not my body is in no case directly obedient. It obeys only on compulsion applied in some manner through my body. A further step is taken very early : we discover the existence of other selves in the world, each with its appropriate body, obedient to it, by which it obtains, as we do, a power of compelling a partial obedience of matter to its will. We thus learn the existence of our fellow-men, dwellers in organic forms, and partial lords of the material world. We see that the material world is more like the human body than like the soul. Nay, before adult age, we class the body in with matter, and make the primary division to be into matter and spirit. We recognize the fact that spirit is, to a great extent, lord over matter ; and we learn that the most careful experiments demonstrate matter to be wholly inert. Yet we see matter in motion when no human spirit is acting upon it : the very stars of heaven are in motion. We rise at once to the conception of a mighty spirit, ruling the world as we rule the small portions of it under our control ; and reason pushes us to the conclusion that there is no limit to his power—that he is not only mighty, but Almighty.

Thus readily is the human intellect led to perceive the existence of Almighty God, and the likeness to him in which

man is created. But the notion thus obtained is very meagre ; it presents the Deity only as the Almighty, and does not satisfy the longings of the heart after God. While man is in a rude and savage state, and his better affections are largely dormant ; while the bodily appetites and passions, together with the lust for power and the greed for wealth, fill constantly the sphere of his consciousness, he does not feel the need of any better idea of God than this rude symbol of a chieftain or king mightier than any earthly ruler.

But in the progress of higher culture, and especially in the culture of our Christian civilization, as it has been affected for centuries by the sublime teaching and humanizing influences of the gospel, men begin to desire some better knowledge of their Creator, and a longing for communion with him arises. They look eagerly in every direction for further light concerning his being and character. They would fain test and legitimate to themselves, if possible, the sweet words concerning God which they find attributed to Jesus, and to those who follow the light of that morning Star, that Sun of Righteousness. In this search for trustworthy natural sources of theological knowledge they look within ; they study their own intellectual and moral powers, and the control of the will ; in each department of their inner life they find some rays of this light for which they are longing.

The intellect, beginning with the consideration of that which is plainly known and thoroughly understood, can go but a few steps in any direction without finding itself confronted by an absolutely impenetrable wall of mystery. It recognizes the existence of spirit, yet finds that it knows spirit only by means of a few phenomena, the laws of which are but partially comprehended. There are indications that our own souls and minds are reservoirs of hidden, reserved, even of unknown, and perhaps even of unsuspected, powers. There are clear proofs that the soul within us undergoes many modifications, and accomplishes many effects which are not brought to the light of consciousness at all. Yet these hidden depths of our being, bringing up at length their effects to the

surface, show those effects to be reasonable, exactly as though our reason and understanding had worked within us much deeper than we knew. But we cannot ascribe the guidance of the motion in these abysses of our nature to our own wisdom; we find, therefore, in the rational results of the movement, evidence of a divine power within us, controlling to some extent, by laws hidden from our sight, the inmost springs and currents of our being.

Moreover, we find the intellect striving incessantly after the infinite; pushing its inquiries into the past and coming eternities, inward to the centre of the atom, outward beyond the physical universe. The intellect refuses to find any here or now. Here has no limits; it is anywhere, it is everywhere, and its limits are nowhere. Now has no duration; all time is past or future, and the past and the future have no limits, save as they limit each other by crowding against each other in the non-existent now. The intellect, thus refusing to be limited in thought, cannot believe itself limited in duration; it asserts its independence of time; its dwelling-place, whence it thus surveys the cycles of time, is in eternity; it asserts its own immortal and divine nature; yet it is humbled in the consciousness of its ignorance, and even with the vaguest recognition of the presence of thought in the universe, perceives that that thought infinitely transcends in wisdom all human powers. Thus the first survey of the intellectual powers discloses new testimony to the attributes of the Deity—He is allwise as well as Almighty.

Searching then the affections, we find them betraying the like infinite nature. The very passions and appetites of the body rage within us like stormy seas, and sometimes seem entirely too vast for the little frame in which they are implanted. But a closer examination shows this to be an illusion; we are blending spiritual powers with carnal affections, are deceiving ourselves, in attributing to the flesh, powers that come from the soul. Not so when we pass into the higher region of the affections—the love of truth, the love of beauty, the love of friends, charity towards men, reverence for men who are

great and good, gratitude toward our benefactors, or toward benefactors of the race. In these higher affections, which bind us to our fellow-men, we find no limits necessarily affixed. All the highest genius of our race has been exhausted in the vain endeavor to express the highest sentiments of our nature; and while we gratefully receive these attempts at the hands of the poet, the orator, the sculptor, the painter, the composer, and even bow with reverence before the genius that has expressed so much, we, nevertheless, all feel that within our hearts are glowing deeper things than any that have been uttered. We could not rival the man of genius in his utterance; but were his friends, instead of praising his manner of expressing himself, to praise his depth of feeling, we should instantly feel offended, and cry with Hamlet to the boasting Laertes:

"I too,
I loved Ophelia, forty thousand brothers
Could not make up my sum."

Nor forty thousand men of genius express all my feeling. No sculpture, no painting, no oratory, no poetry, not even any music, ever expressed all the depth of feeling in the human heart. Not even any music, do I say? not even the sacrifice of all personal hopes and happiness in the endurance of poverty, toil, suffering, and agonizing death, has expressed the whole depth of love in the hearts of many of those who have gladly endured all things for the sake of wife or husband, parent or child, or for country, or for humankind.

This heart, so strong in love toward others, has also an inextinguishable desire for love in return; it rejoices in the approval of good men, it is glad with the sympathy of its beloved; but it also looks trustingly up and longs for forgiveness and blessing from God. All its great tides, bearing up our hopes and joys and sorrows, flooding every inlet of our being, and daily renewing our whole life with their motions, are perpetual witnesses to the existence of the great centre of attraction, the Author and Inspirer of all forces. The love of God is the only fountain copious enough to supply such a sea.

The intellect, surveying these wondrous manifestations of the human heart, sees at once that it is absurd to ascribe such effects to any petty mechanical causes in the organization of the human body, and that the only rational conclusion is to refer them to a Being whose unfathomable love is commensurable only with his almighty power and his boundless wisdom.

But this survey of the internal world of consciousness, leading us from our recognition of the will to the recognition of the Almighty, and then from the nature of the intellect and the heart leading us, justly and with certainty, to ascribe wisdom and love to him, begins now to reveal to us features of the world within, and call our attention to points in the world without, which both confirm our first inductions and open to us new consequences and new aspects of the truth already attained.

We have seen that we are not alone in the universe, that there are other men around us, that there may be other conscious beings than men, and that certainly there is one Being above all, in whose likeness, to some extent, we have been formed; since he manifests power and wisdom and love unlimited, as we manifest them faintly and feebly. In the contemplation of this spiritual universe, this goodly company of men and angels, made in the image of God, we perceive that certain relations exist, and must exist, between them; that they have been made with reference to each other; and that out of this order of relation to each other and to their Maker, springs an obligation, a code of duty, binding us to certain courses of action, feeling, and thought; forbidding others. We thus perceive that there is a difference out-ranking in importance all those which we have previously considered; it is the difference between right and wrong. We demand of ourselves conformity to the right, we condemn ourselves if we choose the wrong. We carry this judgment of ourselves into our most secret thoughts and most private hours. We are ashamed of ourselves, and condemn ourselves for cherishing unworthy thoughts, even in solitude; feeling

that even for such secret sins we deserve, and shall receive, punishment. From whom? We push this question, and find that the voice of conscience must be considered the voice of God within us; it is his witness set in our hearts to remind us constantly of his perpetual knowledge of us, and the eternal justice of his dealing with us. The Being who created all things, whose existence and power are necessary as the first cause of all, whose wisdom is the only explanation of the myriad harmonies of the universe, and whose inspiration is the only source of holy affections; this God of wisdom, power, and love, must also have been the ordainer of those relations between spiritual beings, which first revealed to us the difference between right and wrong. God ordained those relations, gifted us with power to see them, with the moral sense that feels obligation, and reverences holiness; he must himself be all holy, and strict to mark iniquity.

Our powers are his gift, we can, therefore, neither see nor imagine aught greater than he. Stimulate our powers to the utmost, they cannot rise above the Being that made them, and as we can readily form the idea of perfection, that is of a being to whom no new excellence could be added, and in whom no existing excellence be increased, God, our Maker, must be perfect in holiness and in every attribute. He is, therefore, just, merciful, true, and faithful. Nor can our faith in these perfections of the Deity be readily shaken, they are held, explicitly or implicitly, by all men of sound mind as the very basis of all our daily thought and action. We once heard one of the leading mathematicians of the world declare that our only conception of the stability of nature was founded, unconsciously perhaps, in our faith in the divine veracity. "How do I know," said he, "that the sun will rise to-morrow? I know it as I know the invariableness of other natural laws, because I know that God is true. My conviction of the faithfulness of God is the basis on which I build my confidence in the permanence of the physical laws. God has made this world a schoolhouse for man, and man's education could not be well carried on if there were fluctuations in the order of nature."

In our survey within the soul, we discover that we have the power of seeing time and space. Their existence is implied in the first phenomenon of matter, that is, in motion; and, indeed, since both space and time are without bounds or parts or sensible properties, we should not have seen them but for motion, which calls our attention to them, and reveals to us our power of dividing both space and time into parts at our own will by a mental act, and considering the relations of those parts to each other. Then we discover that these intangible entities, having no power either of spirit or of matter, are so perfectly within the grasp of our intellect, that we can make symbols, or verbal propositions, defining perfectly certain of these relations, and from these definitions, answering perfectly to the reality in space, we deduce necessary consequences. Thus space becomes the subject-matter of geometry, and time of algebra, while the abstract relation of number furnishes arithmetic, the earliest branches of knowledge which attained a mathematical condition; using here the word mathematical in the sense given to it in Peirce's Linear Associative Algebra. Out of these was evolved a science of quantity and a science of quality, mathematically treated; that is, using perfect definitions, and thus drawing necessary conclusions. All these mathematical sciences of space, time, quantity, and quality are founded upon the direct sight of space and time—the sight of space and time, not in the world of matter, nor in the sphere of consciousness, but enfolding matter and finite consciousness, the conscious succession of thought calling our attention to the existence of time, and the motion of matter calling our attention to the existence of space; but space and time being themselves independent of matter and of our finite spirits.

Yet the conclusions mathematically reached, concerning space and time, may, in one sense, be called *a priori* truths; they rest upon a division of space and time by our power of thought; and not, to any great extent, upon the nature of space and time in themselves. In themselves, and undivided by thought, these elements are so devoid of interesting

properties that they give us few ideas. The conceptions of geometry and algebra, and of the various forms of the calculus can therefore be justly considered pure creations of the human intellect. The points in the circumference of a circle are distinguished from points within and points without the circle only by an intellectual act, fixing them at an intellectually appointed distance from an intellectually established centre. Thus with the points constituting any other geometric locus, or the instants constituting a pure algebraic equation. Yet some of these pure intellectual creations of the human mind have been found embodied in every atom of matter and in every combination thereof; many others are found embodied in special parts of the material world; some of them being of a high and difficult order. Furthermore, in very many parts of this physical creation we find ideas embodied, which, although not among those actually reached by the *a priori* road, are of the closest similarity to them; and in all parts of the universe we see manifest indications that ideas are there which may at some future day be grasped by human minds. The whole encyclopedia of the physical sciences is, indeed, only a statement, in human language, of the ideas which have already been discovered embodied in the physical universe. The whole army of scientific investigators are, whether consciously or unconsciously, pursuing no other end than the attempt to unfold ideas expressed in the material universe, and not yet read by man.

What is the meaning of this recurrence in nature of our *a priori* thought? There can be but one conclusion, that the Maker of the world made the soul in his own image, and gave us some feeble power of seeing space and time, quantity and quality, as he sees them; that our geometry is all included in his perfect knowledge of space.

But it is not the physical sciences alone that bear this glorious testimony to our divine kindred. The domain of science is extending beyond physics into political economy and government, education and psychology; and the aim of science is everywhere the same; she first seeks facts, then to

understand them, finally to be able to draw necessary conclusions ; she proceeds on the assumption that everything is intelligible, that everything is governed by some law which may be comprehended. But what is this assumption which every scientific student must make, and without which no science were possible, what is this assumption that everything can be comprehended, but an assumption that everything was comprehended before it was made ? Space and time and matter are as inert and powerless intellectually as physically, and the intelligible order of the creation could have sprung only from spirit, that is, from a Being to whom spirit is more akin than matter or space or time can be.

Science is the unfolding of the harmonies of creation, a reverent pointing out of the wisdom and self-consistence of the creative thoughts of God. The whole universe is, to science, a combination and expression of philosophical ideas ; these ideas include many of those which were once supposed to be their own pure creations ; they include also many which will probably be discovered by the *a priori* road before they are perceived in the world. Indeed, Whewell, one of the ablest of English writers on the philosophy of science, maintains, in a book of great learning, that this is always the actual process in the discovery of a natural law ; namely, that the facts never give the law, but only suggest it, sometimes very dimly, so that the mind really invents it as hypothesis and then verifies it by comparison with facts.

But the world is not only an expression of thought, it is an accomplishment of purposes ; it is an extensive system of means and ends. Certainly in organized beings, and, we think, in inorganic nature also, we find effects taking place, “not as the necessary consequences of what went before, but as the necessary conditions of what is to come after, thus demonstrating foresight, and therefore mind—a plan, and a mind working according to it.” The heavenly bodies accomplish changes on the earth, absolutely necessary for the vegetable and animal life upon our planet ; in imparting heat and light, electric and actinic forces, and distributing them

aright; in providing also for those movements in the ocean, and in the atmosphere, which produce the changes of the weather, the alternate sunshine and rain, so necessary for every form of terrestrial life. The parts of the earth itself are adapted to the same ends; the proportion of land and water, and of the various elements; the elevation and slope of the continents, the quantity of the atmosphere; these, and other adaptations, fit the earth precisely for the home of its living tribes. And not merely for animal life,—the nature and proportion of the elements fit the planet to be the abode of civilized and intellectual men; all is arranged in such a manner that this earth becomes a home, a workshop, a playground, a schoolroom, a temple, for the human race. Then, in the smaller field of organic structure, for the support of which all nature is adapted, we find the plants and animals subserve each others needs, the machinery for the continuance of each species after its kind is perfect, the parts of each individual make a harmonious whole; each part is a perfect means for accomplishing certain ends. Most marvellous among these ends is the conveyance, in the animal, of sensation to a conscious spirit; accomplished by the marvellous organs of the senses, among which the eye and the ear are complicated with many nice adjustments of parts to a common end.

Nor do we see how any sound logic can avoid the conclusion that these innumerable adaptations of means to ends were adaptations for those ends; that although it is impossible for us to reconcile the infinity of God with the conception of working in detail, of planning separate adaptations; yet the force of the facts is irresistible, and we must suppose the infinite God foresaw and predetermined these ends to be accomplished by these means.

Furthermore, we recognize, in general, an adaptation of the spiritual gift in each animal to its organization. The animals who are especially fond of flies, for example, are those which have especially good means for catching them; the swallow his swiftness, and the bristly corners of his

mouth; the bat similar means; the tortoise his flexible neck and the ability to move it with a sudden jerk; the toad his darting tongue; the dragon-fly his ability to back, rise, fall, or go sideways, instantly, while in flight; the spider his web; the ploiaria his sharp wrist-spurs and talons. Thus throughout the whole animal kingdom; thus in all the variety of national and individual character in man, in general, each one finds pleasure in success; likes to do what he can do well, and can do well that which he likes to do. This grand truth, illustrating both the wisdom and the loving-kindness of the Creator, is made only the more strikingly true by the occasional instances in which, in individual cases, the adaptation is not as perfect as usual.

The universe is the embodiment of ideas, and the adaptation of a system of means to ends; one of those ends is the furnishing to us men an opportunity for the exercise of our higher powers. Among our powers of perception we find special senses, giving us special reports concerning the world of matter and motion. The eye reports to us not only those motions which we recognize at once as motions; but also motions which, for many centuries, we called colors, without knowing that they are motions. Thus also the ear reports to us motions, which we called sounds, without knowing that they were merely modes of motion, although we knew that they were accompanied by motion. The general nerves distributed over the body reported to us still other vibrations which we called heat, and failed to recognize their character as movements. We cannot dispense with these names of light and color, heat, electricity, chemical action, and sound. These various modes of motion, although all motions, are various; each produces its specific effect not only upon our senses or feelings but upon sundry inanimate objects. The simple arithmetical idea of the ratio of four to five, combined with the idea of two series of equidistant pulses in the air, produces no effect upon us as mere ideas. We could not foresee on any *a priori* ground what the effect should be. But express these ideas not in words, but by actually making two

series of pulses, their absolute frequency being within the limits say of fifty and five thousand to a second, and the relative frequency in the ratio of four to five, and we at once obtain a peculiar effect upon the ear, a musical concord; an effect which cannot be represented to the mind as an arithmetical ratio nor as a mechanical pulsation; which cannot be imagined until heard, nor imagined other than as it was heard. In this chord of the major third we distinguish three kinds of beauty: first the beauty of tone, arising from the equidistance of the pulses; second, the beauty of the quality of tone arising from the form of the pulsations; thirdly, the beauty of the harmony, arising from the relative frequency of the pulsations in the two series. In exceedingly simple cases of beauty men have been able to discover part of the causes of beauty; as in the present case, that it arises from the expressions in the elastic tremors of the air of simple arithmetical and geometrical ideas not recognized by the ear as such, but only recognized as purity of tone, coloring, and concord. In more complicated cases of musical expression, where melody and progression of chords join in producing the effect, we are wholly without a clue to the meaning of the beauty or the cause of the expression. Yet we cannot esteem it accidental. The language of tone; the pathetic effect of one modulation, the joyous expression of another; the inspiriting power of martial strains, the touching emphasis of a song of the affections; these are acknowledged and felt by men of every nation; nay, even the animals are to some extent under their influence. No sound philosophy can put such facts aside as of no meaning. There is evidence here that the Creator of man knew how to produce the highest effects by the simplest means; in simple arithmetical ratios of vibration he has foreordained a means of pouring out all the varying depths of passion and sentiment from the thoughtless carelessness of our adopted national air, to the hellish fury of passages in Cherubini's *Medea*, or to the rapture of the ransomed worlds in Beethoven's *Mount of Olives*.

The same argument may be drawn from other forms of beauty, and other modes of expressing passion by means of art, as by form and color. They also are primarily simple forms of expressing geometrical and algebraic ideas, symmetry in space and time. But these ideas are not always recognized by us as such; they are deciphered into an intellectually intelligible form only in the simplest cases; in higher cases we feel the beauty, but do not recognize the law by which it is produced. And in all these cases man is not only capable of feeling the beauty, he is gifted with a subordinate power of reproducing it; first by copying the forms in which it is expressed by nature, and afterward by the creation of similar forms, guided by the spirit or feeling inspired by nature, but without an intellectual perception of her law. In the case of music, this production of new forms is carried to a point of perfection incomparably higher than that of the natural model; so that it is difficult to find in nature the original suggestions which have led to the sonata, the symphony, and the oratorio. This artistic genius which creates the statue, the picture, the overture, is in some senses a higher power than that of the intellect; it is in every sense a spiritual, exalted work, and commands reverence and affection toward the artist.

Now the universe is not only a combination of ideas and of means to ends, it is a work of art; and that of the highest order. Musical expression is by no means wanting in it; the winds and the waves, the cries of animals, the song of birds, all have their powerful musical expression. But in beauty and expressiveness of form and coloring the natural world far exceeds the best efforts of the painter and the sculptor. A glance of the living eye lighted by a living soul within, when that soul is filled with deep and earnest emotion, makes even the eyes of the wonderful child at Dresden dull. One October afternoon throwing its golden light over our New England hills surpasses all the possibilities of mere pigment under the hands of the highest conceivable genius. We cannot believe that these exquisite effects of the face of man and of the face of nature were not foreseen by the Creative

Mind. The perpetual presence of beauty in all the forms and coloring of natural objects and of the human face, most beautiful of all, bears perpetual testimony to a wise and loving God ; it calls upon us not only for reverence, but for gratitude and love toward him.

There are artists also in another sphere, who create ideal character, and hold in the drama, or the tale, the mirror up to human nature. The highest admiration is accorded to one who creates new personages, and by his life-like descriptions of them, or of their words and actions, makes them realities to us. The evidences of his skill are found in the unity of each character introduced into his work, in the excellence and the variety of these characters, and in the harmony with which the action of each contributes to one final result. But in all these respects human society and human history form together an artistic work of the highest character ; and the long course of ages exhibiting its innumerable individuals, many of wonderful excellence, and its numberless by-plots leading to separate issues of great interest, is still evidently ever tending toward some higher and higher final accomplishment worthy of the long delay, and to the production of which each of the various parts has been adapted. Herein, therefore, are marks of the creative wisdom, peculiar and altogether different from those to which we have heretofore alluded.

It is, however, vain to endeavor to condense into a single brief Article an enumeration of the varieties of argument, each capable of large expansion and illustration, by which this main doctrine of natural theology is established. That man is made in the image of his Creator, and may justly argue from his own thought and feeling, care being taken to argue soundly and justly, to the attributes and purposes of God ; this is a conclusion reached by many lines of induction, of which we have alluded to but a few, and against which we can find no solid or valid argument ; no argument which is not rendered worthless by the admission of infinity into the premises in an inadmissible manner. When from this con-

clusion, or from the purposes and attributes which we are, in conformity with it, led to assign to God, we attempt to draw inferences, then we must beware lest we also err in reasoning from the attributes of an infinite being. We must ever remember the distinct warning given us by the earliest of Christian philosophers, who, a full thousand years ago, warned us that the first and only thing that can be known of God, is that he cannot be known, and that "*Deus ipse nescit se, quid est, quia non est quid.*" We can say that he is wisdom and power and love only because all these dwell in him as their cause and essence; but all our conceptions of these attributes are but as nothing in respect to the infinite fulness of their being in him. In other words, the induction which correctly leads us to assign but one cause for the universe, and in that cause to place infinite perfections, and among them perfect wisdom, holiness, justice, and love, does not enable us to decide in all cases what those infinite attributes imply. They do imply that no action of God, no course of events in the universe, can, in the long-run, work injustice, or do a real injury to the children of God; but this conclusion is drawn from the nature of the attributes, not from their infinity. We may be certain that God can and will hear and answer prayer, and make all things work together for good to them who love and trust him, and accept his mercy offered in Christ our Lord. We may be certain also that he will not leave wickedness unpunished, but will render to every man the just deserts of his sin. Reason goes so far with unwavering step. But shall we argue from his infinite love that he must bring every creature finally to eternal happiness; or from his infinite justice that he must assign the incorrigibly wicked to eternal and infinite torment, we should be arguing from the infinite, and our argument would not be sound. The question of eternal punishment, or of future universal restoration, can be settled only by revelation, if settled at all.

The light of nature is in many respects clear, and leads to very valuable conclusions; and we may devoutly thank God

that it is so. But we are the children of the Infinite One, and we have within us illimitable desires; the clearer the light we have, the more we watch for the breaking of the perfect day. These inductions concerning our likeness to the Creator, and the inference of our own immortality which immediately flows from them, makes us long only the more earnestly for a closer communion with him; for a more direct spiritual contact with him dwelling in our hearts. We pray that he would guide our thoughts, purify our affections, awaken in us holier desires, inspire with new strength our feeble and corrupted will. Abundant reasons are given us for believing that these prayers are acceptable, and when offered in earnest sincerity are accepted, and bring holier influences into the suppliant's heart. And yet he is ever longing for more light, and trusting that, after the night of death, a morning shall come refulgent with more heavenly glory.

The Christian saints furthermore believe, and we devoutly believe with them, that this great light which is to break upon us when the shadows of death flee, has already dawned and spread its reviving light from over the hills of Galilee. They find in the person of Jesus of Nazareth a light clearer than the noonday sun, and revealing to us more truth than the light of nature ever could reveal. They recognize in him an image of God, answering far more perfectly than any ideal being whom we could portray to our best conceptions of perfection. The ineffable tenderness of his love towards men, the gentleness of his dealings with sinners, give men a confidence which no mere words could give, that the awful sacrifice on Calvary was indeed for the many, for the remission of their sins; and that he who thus suffered, rose again, to pour down upon his church the manifold gifts of the Spirit.

It has not pleased him to make further revelations of truth concerning God than was necessary for the salvation of sinners,—and upon those truths, or upon nearly all, we had a glimmering light before Christ came; but he has made the important truths plain and certain; such truths as these,

—that God is, through Christ, reconciling men unto himself, that he will forgive those who trust in Christ for forgiveness, and turn away from sin; that he will inspire such with a new power to live holy and useful lives; that both the Father and the Son dwell in the heart of a penitent believer and fill him with the Holy Spirit that leads to victory over the tempter, over sin and death. The history of the Christian church abundantly witnesses the truth of these promises. In that church, despite its manifold corruptions, failures, and sins, there has always been a large body of men distinguished for excellence of private character far beyond those who have been alien from the church. With this excellence of character has been joined clearness and strength of religious faith. And the last natural source of theological truth which we shall mention is the experience of saintly men. The fact that in all communions of the Christian world we find the holiest and purest men substantially agree on the great doctrines of religion and morality, and that the best and clearest thinkers of other great religions agree in the same essential doctrines of central Christianity, is in itself a very strong argument in support of those doctrines; an evidence both of the truth of these points in natural religion endorsed by Christ, and of the value of his endorsement.

ARTICLE II.

THE NATURAL BASIS OF OUR SPIRITUAL LANGUAGE.

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 "THE LAND AND THE BOOK."

NO. IV.—TYPES AND SYMBOLS.

THE above caption is sufficiently broad to include most of the topics that will now claim attention. It introduces a subject which is, of course, too large and comprehensive to be adequately developed in the space allowed to a single Article. The prophet-poets of the Bible, and poet-prophets as well, held most intimate communion with external nature, and were quick to discover the latent symbols and emblems of spiritual things, higher and holier than themselves, which lay enshrined in all the visible works of God. And, because they were wise, they gave good heed and sought out acceptable words for the thoughts and emotions that stirred within them. Hence they dealt largely and boldly in figure and type and emblem. They could not do otherwise. Mere verbal formulas were quite inadequate to express the marvellous revelations of things divine which they were commissioned to proclaim. They looked up through the clear, bright heavens of Palestine, and they declared the glory of God. Day unto day uttered speech, night unto night showed knowledge.

"Though nor real voice nor sound
 Amidst their radiant orbs be found,
 In reason's ear they all rejoice
 And utter forth a glorious voice;
 Forever singing as they shine
 The hand that made us is divine."

And so, too, does the wide and teeming earth and old ocean, with all that on and in them is. The wild storm has a

voice, and the sweet calm. Lightning and thunder and rain and snow,

“Seasons and months and weeks and days
Utter successive songs of praise.”

The beasts of the forest and cattle on a thousand hills, birds of the air and fish in the sea, all natural objects, in fact, hold within them, and reveal to eyes inspired, suggestive emblems and shadows of moral and religious truth; and so, of course, and in a higher sphere, do the ways and works and institutions of man. We are prepared therefore to find the book written, by nature's inspired interpreters, crowded with words and thoughts derived immediately from this exhaustless source. To show how and to what extent this has pervaded and permeated our spiritual vocabulary is the specific object of the present Article.

The existence of genuine biblical types is here assumed, and no special attempt will be made to establish this fact, nor to illustrate the legitimate method of their interpretation. The belief in them has formed part of the common heritage of the church in all ages. The devout student of the Bible has always recognized and accepted them, and greatly delighted to meditate upon and explain them. Doubtless this extreme fondness has often led commentators, preachers, and poets of mystic times and temper into wild, and even mischievous, extravagances. A fervent and unchastened imagination discovered, or invented, types and symbols and spiritual allegories, when nothing of the kind was intended by the sacred writers; and then these idle fancies were in turn subjected to such minute and childish manipulation as to lead in the end to results absurd, and frequently not a little injurious to the cause of divine truth. But these delusions and extravagances did not, in the least, diminish the influence which type and symbol have had in enriching our spiritual vocabulary. On the contrary, these very vagaries and puerile conceits have made the contributions from this source only the more abundant and valuable.

Now though types and symbols have been unduly multiplied,

yet we do not admit that they are few in number, or difficult to discover. The Bible is full of them. The entire Hebrew nation was in a true and vastly important sense a typical people. So also was the land of their inheritance, and their civil and religious institutions; and we shall ever so treat them as occasion offers in these Articles. There were also many *persons* in their eventful history who were truly typical; many acts, incidents, and offices that were divinely symbolic and prophetic. As was to be expected, these were the most numerous and of deepest significance in the earlier ages of human history and of divine revelation. This was the chosen, we may say the natural, and even the necessary, method of revealing to man the kingdom of heaven, and of teaching, at first, the great moral and spiritual truths which constitute its life. Many of these types were, in their nature, essentially prophetic—*acted* prophecy, so long as they continued to be observed. They looked onward to the future, and embodied precious promises of better things to come, when the Antitype should appear. They foreshadowed, dimly it may be, but truly, the entire scheme of human redemption. By their mere visible enactment they proclaimed, and ever repeated, the blessed promise of it through the long, weary ages of expectant delay. On the general subject of biblical symbolism and type an able writer has well said that “the *outward* (in the Mosaic economy) came into existence merely for the sake of the religious and moral elements in it, the spiritual lessons it conveyed, or the sentiments of godly fear and brotherly love which it served to awaken. In a word, *fleshy* ordinances were made, to a great extent, the channels of conveying spiritual instruction, and for bringing perpetually into remembrance the grand distinctions of the law respecting good and evil. It was the more necessary that this should be done, and spread out into a vast multiplicity of forms, as the dispensation (Mosaic) then set up admitted so very sparingly of direct instruction, and was comparatively stinted even in its supplies of inward grace; so that it was mainly through these symbolical transactions that the knowledge of the

divine will was to be acquired, and its demands kept fresh upon the conscience. Hence it was necessary that they should be carried beyond the strictly religious territory, and should pervade all the relations of life. The Israelite in the commonest circumstances rising up around him — in the very food he ate — must have something to remind him of the law of his God, and feel himself enclosed on every side with the signs and indications of that righteousness which it was his great duty, as a member of the covenant, to cherish and exemplify.”¹

The writer of the above was not pursuing our specific theme, and we now return to it with the remark that the entire series of biblical types and symbols has its basis in this land of the Bible, and was enunciated and wrought out mainly in connection with the Mosaic economy as here established, and for many generations of marvellous history carried into successful practice. But it is obvious that the system thus introduced and developed formed the essential prerequisite to the Christian dispensation. Without this antecedent symbolism many of our Lord’s most instructive discourses would have been impossible; or, if uttered in the form we now have them, quite incomprehensible. His whole life and mission would, in fact, have been inexplicable and unsolved mystery, were no light thrown upon them by this system of type and symbol. Neither could the apostles have taught and written as they did, if they had not possessed this inexhaustible source from whence to draw instruction, illustration, and confirmation. The importance of this matter in its bearing upon our theme is not easily exaggerated, and the list of sources whence flow our spiritual language would be strangely defective were this one omitted. Our business with it however is special, and limited to the contributions which type and symbol have made to the Christian vocabulary.

That a people who lived and moved and had their being in most intimate connection with typical institutions thus comprehensive and controlling, should be saturated, mind and

¹ Fairbairn on Typology, p. 219.

heart, with their influence in all directions, needs no proof; and that this all-pervading influence would manifest itself in their daily life, their manners, customs, ideas, and emotions, is equally clear. But what thus permeates and moulds the entire character must necessarily find its outward expression in names and words, phrases and proverbs, in the living language, in short, of the people thus circumstanced. Such has been the case pre-eminently in regard to the Hebrew nation, as their whole literature abundantly testifies. This needs no proof or illustration; but the additional fact may not occur at once, and to all, that God not only ordained and inaugurated these typical institutions, but with divine wisdom fitted up a theatre where they could be put into operation, and carried out securely and perfectly for long generations. Without this the entire scheme must have failed to accomplish the results intended, especially along the line pursued in our Articles. Many of these ordinances and institutions could not be rightly observed in the wilderness. They required settled habitations of a special and peculiar kind, a fruitful land, and a compact, well-protected territory. Even such fundamental matters as the Passover and circumcision had to be omitted during the forty years of wandering. The Lord, however, did not allow his purpose to be defeated for want of a suitable habitation. He provided beforehand the home that was needed for his people; and in this fact we discover delightful evidence that superhuman wisdom and power guided and controlled the Hebrew people, so as to secure infallibly the fulfilment of their unique mission. A careful inventory of the physical, geographical, and territorial requisites, implied in, and necessitated by the Mosaic economy, will be found to correspond wonderfully with the actual home of God's people, provided for them by the Most High, when he divided to the nations their inheritance, and set the bounds of the people according to the number of the children of Israel. This minute and marvellous correspondence between the institutions and the theatre on which they were to be put into practice could not have been fortuitous. No conceivable com-

bination of happy accidents can be accepted as an adequate explanation. The land itself, with its myriad phenomena and associated conditions, was as much the result of divine purpose and adaptation, as were the positive institutions of Sinai. The ordaining of the latter presupposes the existence of the former, and together they form a thousand-linked chain of evidence, to hold our faith fast anchored to the word of God. Such a scheme of revelation is superhuman and divine. Nothing short of infinite wisdom and almighty power could have at first devised, and subsequently realized, a system so complicated and mutually dependent.

Typically considered, Palestine was a sort of Eden, with a backward look toward the fall and expulsion, and, on the other hand, pointing onward and upward, as prophecy and promise, to a heavenly paradise. A large part of the biblical types and symbols rest upon, or spring directly from, natural phenomena or historic incidents and facts connected, nearly or more remotely, with the land of Canaan and adjacent countries and nations. The list of such facts and incidents is long and wonderfully varied. The deluge with its lesson of destruction, its ark of salvation, its dove of assurance, its bow of promise and hope. The call of Abraham, and his pilgrim life; the sacrifice of Isaac; the sale of Joseph; the descent into Egypt, the hard bondage, the deliverance and the deliverer; the burning bush, the signs and wonders in the land of Ham; the Passover, the passage through the Red Sea; the famine and the bread from heaven, the thirst and the river from the smitten rock; the brazen serpent, the fiery, cloudy pillar; Sinai and the giving of the law; the tabernacle with its various divisions and their furniture; sacrifices in all their variety, especially the great day of atonement; the Aaronic priesthood with its gorgeous robes, complicated ritual, and its awe-inspiring functions; the leprosy and its treatment; the cities of refuge; the year of jubilee, with all included or implied. Numerous as is this list, it does not exhaust the subject; yet is it abundantly sufficient for our present purpose; and we need only dwell very briefly on a

few of them, to show in what ways, and how largely they have contributed to enrich our spiritual vocabulary.

Our illustrations must be brief and general, rather than minute. Many important matters will be omitted altogether, and others merely glanced at. But this is the less to be regretted, since the analogies and suggestive lessons lie on the surface, so that he that runs may read them.

Let us turn to the descent of Jacob and his family into Egypt, with its concomitants and results. By this migration the entire church of God, his chosen people, were carried far away from the promised inheritance. By their prolonged sojourn there, the deep degradation into which they sank; the sad corruption, idolatrous and otherwise, which they contracted by intercourse with the Egyptians; the utter hopelessness of their ever being able to break the yoke of bondage, regain their liberty, and get possession of Canaan by their own efforts,—these, and many other things in their history and experience, were so arranged by Divine Providence as not merely to teach moral and religious lessons of utmost importance, but at the same time to give rise to the best verbal formulas by which they were to be enunciated. They constitute the natural basis of numberless words, names, and figurative phrases, which are admirably fitted for universal use in the household of faith. Amongst other great revelations they symbolize the awful descent of the whole human race into a moral and spiritual bondage, deeper and more disastrous than that of Egypt. That deliverance from this condition is, and ever must be, through the interposition of divine power and mercy. The history makes the fact only too plain, not only that the Hebrews could not have achieved their deliverance by their own efforts, but that they were in no sense worthy of liberty—were not fit to enjoy it. Nay more, they did not even desire it; and when, by a series of stupendous miracles, they were constrained to set out for the good land of their inheritance, they soon grew weary of the enterprise, longed to return, and repeatedly made the attempt to do so. Moses had abundant reason to

remind them that it was not for their righteousness, nor for the uprightness of their heart, that they went to possess the land, but that the Lord might perform the word which he swore unto their fathers, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Now, no student of the Bible needs to be reminded that by this complicated and long-protracted series of events which preceded, accompanied, and followed the descent, the bondage, and the delivery, the essential doctrines of gospel truth and grace are distinctly made known; and by a stupendous array of symbolic acts and facts most emphatically confirmed and illustrated. And what is more pertinent to our present purpose, the record of them was so guided as to suggest and evolve the very best words, figures, and phrases by which these fundamental doctrines can be set forth. These symbolic histories, acts, and facts, in connection with the typical institutions, rites, and ceremonies of the Mosaic economy, permeated the entire religious consciousness of the Hebrew nation, and gave birth, in ways innumerable, to spiritual ideas and emotions wholly peculiar, and to corresponding verbal formulas by which to give expression to them. This rich legacy was transmitted to the Christian church by the writers of the New Testament, and at this late day the whole household of faith think, speak, and write in a diction whose origin and true significance can only be found in these ancient histories and symbolic institutions.

A few additional examples will farther illustrate this matter. The difficulty is not in the paucity, but in the abundance, of material from which to select. Let us take the tabernacle, and its successor the temple. They were intended mainly to furnish the machinery, so to speak, for the regular ongoing and visible outworking of the Mosaic institutions, and were, therefore, the natural centre of the Old Testament economy. It is not necessary for our purpose to assume any particular theory in regard to the emblematic import of either the whole or of the different parts of these structures. It matters not whether they were a symbolic representation of the universe, as Philo, Josephus, and many of the Fathers fancied,

or something totally different. They may have been designedly so arranged as to admit legitimately of more than one interpretation. The main end and aim, we suppose, was to localize the Divine Presence. Such is man's nature that what is far off and out of sight produces but a feeble impression. It was, therefore, necessary to give a local habitation to this awful presence, and this was accomplished in and by the tabernacle and the temple. Going up thither, the pious Hebrews came consciously before the heart-searching God, who could not be deceived, and would not accept mere "bodily exercise," much less hypocritical homage. This felt presence gave tone, solemnity, and intensity to the verbal formulas of public worship. Indeed, the whole costume of the devotional and poetic portions of the Bible has been colored by this vivid consciousness.

To such an extent has this occurred that many unfriendly critics have asserted that the Hebrew writers represent the infinite Creator as exclusively occupied, not merely with this tiny planet of ours, but they give him about as much to do in managing the affairs of their own petty tribe as he can well get through with, and more than he has patience to bear. According to these objectors, Jehovah is himself made to complain, "after the manner of men," of the burden and the bother of managing them. This is, of course, mere cynical caricature and misrepresentation. But if we should admit that these writers did actually believe that the earth was the grand centre of the universe, and that all the stars that stud the spangled heavens were made for man's accommodation, this would constitute no solid objection to their writings in the domain of spiritual revelation. They could not know what modern science, with her instruments of marvellous power, has discovered; and had it been supernaturally revealed to them, there would not have been any language extant by which to teach the mechanism of the universe, nor people capable of comprehending such high discourse. But, recurring to our specific study, we learn from the saying of our Lord, "Destroy this temple, and in

three days I will raise it up again," that the tabernacle and the temple represented symbolically the human nature of the Word made flesh, and the work of human redemption wrought out in the temple of his body. Thus far we have sure warrant from sacred scripture.

Again, it is evident from many intimations in the Bible, that these structures typified the whole church of God, as constituting Christ's visible body on earth. Then, farther, as included in the universal, each individual member is regarded now as a living temple, and then, in another relation, as a separate stone in the edifice. These things are taken for granted by New Testament writers, and from them are deduced thoughts, words, phrases, similes, promises, exhortations, warnings, and the like, without number. Our religious literature is not merely tinged with them, but literally permeated by them. Our limited space obliges us to hand over this fruitful theme to the memory and the consciousness of the Christian reader, while we pass on to other topics. This, however, may be safely done, since the pious mind and heart is full-stored with these precious pearls.

We invite special attention to the many ideas, beautiful allusions, and instructive comparisons introduced into Christian literature and language, and notably into our hymnology, from the wilderness of wandering, and the numberless incidents which there occurred to the weary wanderers. Now God had created and spread out this desert between Sinai and Canaan in such a way that Israel could not possibly pass from the thunders of the one to the peace and rest of the other without traversing this land of the shadow of death. Let it not be forgotten, that though this journey was intensely real, and the record of it is true history, hard and terrible, yet was it also essentially emblematic and allegorical—a vast series of suggestive symbols, spread over forty years of a national life and experience without a parallel or possible repetition. Out of the multitude of facts mentioned in the narrative of this most momentous migration, we have room here to select a single specimen to illustrate our subject—

the pillar of cloud by day, of fire by night. That this was symbolic—a type of Christ, in short, and of his providential protection and guidance—has been the uniform belief of the church in all ages, and is so now, a few cold critics excepted. Christ is emphatically light—the true light of the world, of which that pillar was merely a faint shadow. This is the only light that can guide us across the dark wilderness of the world to the true land of promise—the Canaan that we love. It is almost superfluous to remind the pious reader of the familiar hymns which have come to us from out this gloomy wilderness; or of the instructive symbols and allegories that lie scattered thickly over the face of this dismal desert. In it were born the two sons of Abraham, one of the bondwoman, the other of the free. “Which things are an allegory; for these are the two covenants, the one from Mount Sinai, which gendereth to bondage, which is Agar; for this Agar is Mount Sinai in Arabia, and answereth to Jerusalem which now is, and is in bondage with her children,” etc., as the apostle teaches the church in Galatia. We may not linger long over this, or any other symbol or allegory; but must pass to other things which have also added largely to our spiritual ideas and language.

The Aaronic priesthood, as established and perpetuated for long ages in this land of the Bible, was in all its aspects and relations eminently symbolic and typical. The selection and consecration of the high-priest, the personal attributes and character required in the candidate, the manifold duties and functions of the high office, were all penetrated with spiritual significance; as also were the places, instruments, robes, offerings, and the like. As a natural and inevitable result, names, titles, figures, and symbolic phrases derived therefrom have been sown broadcast over the entire area of our religious literature. The most precious and significant names and official titles bestowed upon our blessed Lord come to us, without modification, from this source, as we learn from the Epistle to the Hebrews. They, along with multitudes of associated terms, have been transferred to the Christian church,

unchanged, from the Hebrew institutions and Mosaic economy. It is as needless, as it would be tedious, to enter into minute detail where almost everything was symbolic. It is sufficient merely to mention such suggestive things as the mercy-seat covering the ark, in which was deposited the stone-engraved law; the cherubim, beneath whose outspread wings ascended the cloud of sweet incense — the prayers of the saints, perfumed by the infinite merits of the great Mediator — rising visibly towards the throne of God. How many delightful thoughts gather about it! In how many humble prayers, how many glad songs of praise, is it the central idea! The Aaronic priesthood, acting out their sacred functions, did continually reveal and visibly interpret the deep mystery of available mediation between God and man. Every member of the Hebrew hierarchy was a typical mediator; but more especially was the high-priest the representative type of Him who ever liveth to make intercession. It is not necessary to pursue this theme any farther; it may safely be left to the memory and the heart of the Christian believer to expand and develop the familiar theme. The prayers lisped at the mother's knee, the infant hymns learnt and sung then and there, and every conscious act of worship in riper years, will help to fill out the picture here drawn in faintest outline.

We will now turn to an illustration somewhat different, but yet fairly belonging to our argument. It was in this land of the Bible, and in vital connection with its institutions, that the day of rest, the weekly Sabbath was ordained, observed, and carried out faithfully for many long centuries, transfusing its manifold influences for good through the entire religious life of the nation. In no other land save this, and under no other known conditions of human society, except that of the Hebrews, could this have been enforced and firmly established. Now, in addition to other important ends, the Sabbath was intended to be an ever recurring symbol of heaven, and a prophecy of "the rest that remaineth for the people of God." It is thus explained at large by inspired writers; and by those who accept the Bible as from God, this

statement will not be questioned. It is not essential to our purpose to determine whether or not this institution be still binding upon the Christian church; for whatever be the dogmatic theories of divines on this point, there can be no difference of opinion in reference to the permanent and vast influence it has exercised over her literature and language. As positive institution, prophetic type, or soothing symbol, the Sabbath has graven its name on the very heart of Christianity. Its sweet voice is heard in her hymns and psalms of praise. To unnumbered millions of her children it is the only practical foretaste of that blessed rest which it foreshadows, which the pious anticipate with longing hearts, and which no amount of cold criticism can induce them to forego or forget.

The *rest* which Joshua gave to the Hebrew nation by the conquest of Canaan, and the peaceful settlement of the tribes in this land of promise, was, in its higher significance, only a happy symbol of the true sabbath in that heavenly inheritance which remaineth for all the children of God. Many pages, yea, whole volumes, might be filled with the devout and joyful meditations of the saints on this subject. We might quote at large from numberless psalms and hymns and spiritual songs which were inspired by this hallowed source. But this is not needed. The children in every infant and Sabbath school can do the same; and the great congregation, with glad voices sounding loud, repeats the blissful theme from age to age:

“O hasten, Lord, the day when those
Who know thee here shall see thy face;
When suffering shall forever close,
And they shall reach their destined place;
Then shall they rest
Supremely blest,
Eternal debtors to thy grace.”

The change from the seventh to the first day of the week, and of the name from Sabbath to Lord's day, has added new and more precious significance to the institution. It is now not so much a season of physical repose from earthly care

and toil; not merely a religious festival; not simply commemorative of creation completed; not alone a symbol and promise of rest in reserve, better than any earthly Canaan could bestow. It is all these; but it is much more than these to the Christian. It is the steadfast witness, and ever recurring remembrancer of the finished work of redemption; of the triumphant resurrection of our Lord, and of his glorious ascension to the right hand of the Father, where he ever liveth in sabbatic blessedness — the forerunner and the pledge that we also shall rise.

“No longer let the mourners weep,
Nor call departed Christians dead;
For death is hallowed into sleep,
And every grave becomes a bed;
Now, once more,
Eden’s door
Open stands to mortal eyes,
For Christ hath risen, and men shall rise.”

There is no danger that the Sabbath will ever die out of the heart or the language of God’s people. While there remains on earth a living church, she will remember the Sabbath, and keep it holy.

“Day of all the week the best;
Emblem of eternal rest.”

In prosperity and in adversity, in sickness and in health, in life and in death, it will be remembered, and the sweet memories that cluster around it will continue to cheer, sustain, and comfort the solitary pilgrim through the dark valley and across the Jordan of death to

“Canaan’s fair and happy land.”

In thus magnifying the Sabbath we are not inventing new things; but we wish, in the interest of our present Article, to remind all those who need such prompting, that it is to this land of the Bible that we are indebted for the Sabbath, and its inspiring hopes and glorious promises. No matter when and where it was first ordained, it came to us from Palestine. Here it was formally established, enforced, and sanctioned,

even in the blood of ten times ten thousand martyrs who died in its defence. No wonder its hallowed influence has permeated the very soul and life and language of the kingdom of heaven.

It forms no part of our purpose to deal with the subject of biblical types any farther than is needed to illustrate their influence on our religious language. With this in mind, we call attention to the fact that there lived in Palestine, and in vital relation to and with the kingdom of heaven, a large number of typical *persons* — prominent individuals, raised up by God to fill important positions and to perform certain acts of a typical and symbolical character. The very names of these persons became the cherished inheritance of the Hebrew nation — household words in the common family of the faithful. Such worthies were Noah, Abraham, Jacob, Joseph, Melchizedek, Moses and Aaron, Joshua, David, Elijah, and many more, named in the eleventh of Hebrews and elsewhere. It would lead far away from our specific purpose to enter minutely into their remarkable histories; nor is this needed, for every reader of the Bible can readily recall the sacred narratives. The point to be made here is, that the writers of these narratives made large use of these historic names and incidents, and the church universal has done the same in all ages down to our own day. These names are exceedingly suggestive, and from them has been derived a multitude of words and phrases which have greatly enriched our spiritual language. Speak of Noah, and the mere name suggests the deluge, the ark, the dove and olive-leaf, the rainbow, and other incidents in the life of that second father of mankind. Abraham, father of the faithful, brings to mind the “call,” the pilgrimage, and long sojourn, with their symbolic sufferings, trials, and attending temptations. Hagar, and the birth and the story of Ishmael; Isaac and his typical sacrifice; circumcision and the covenants of promise; the destruction of Sodom and rescue of Lot; the meeting with Melchizedek, and other incidents too numerous to mention. They are scattered thickly over the entire field of Old Testament history. To develop their bearing upon our theme would

require a volume instead of this half-page at the end of our Article. We refer here to those typical persons "who through faith subdued kingdoms, wrought righteousness, obtained promises, stopped the mouth of lions," and did other noble deeds, by which they obtained a good report, and transmitted their names and fame to the whole church of God onward to the end of the world.

It may not be superfluous to remark in this connection that even those critics who reject altogether, or admit with extreme reserve and hesitation, the theory of spiritual types and prophetic symbols, will not question the *fact* that, from these things, thus understood and believed, has been drawn a vast contribution to our religious literature and language. Here we discover the natural underlying basis of this language. Recall, for example, the story of Moses, the dangers of infancy, his miraculous preservation, his rejection by those whom he was destined to redeem and save, his sojourn in Midian for forty years, his mighty deeds in Egypt, the triumphant deliverance of the Hebrew nation from bondage, the passage through the Red Sea, his connection with the marvellous scenes at Sinai, his mediatory intercessions in behalf of the rebellious tribes, his guidance of them through the wilderness, in a word, his marvellous birth, life, and death, crowded with incidents having close connection with the kingdom of heaven and its establishment among men, and we no longer marvel that there has gathered about his name and person a glorious galaxy of memories, second only to the great Antitype whom he so wonderfully symbolized and forehadowed. Here we find the source and basis of a large part of our spiritual language. Without the man, the life, and the history, these contributions would have been impossible. This will not be denied; and it includes and covers the whole argument and purport of the present Article.

"Language," says an eminent author, "is the amber in which a thousand precious and subtile thoughts have been safely embedded and preserved. It has arrested ten thousand lightning flashes of genius which, unless thus arrested and

fixed, might have been as bright, but would have also been as quickly passing and perishing as the lightning." Or, as another puts the matter: "Words convey the mental treasures of one period to the generations that follow; and, laden with their precious freight, they sail safely across gulfs of time in which empires have suffered shipwreck, and the languages of common life have sunk into oblivion." With considerations such as these, does Archbishop Trench enforce and illustrate the advantages to be derived from the study of words. If this be true in relation to mundane and temporal affairs, how much more important the study of those names and verbal formulas by which the thoughts of God have been embalmed, and sent safely across the wide gulfs of time, for our learning and comfort in matters of infinite and everlasting concernment. And in this study of our spiritual words and nomenclature, we are not perplexed and bewildered with the doubtful genesis of obscure terms. Set upon the right track, a mere child can readily trace back the genealogy of our religious language to the very root of the tree, and can also, with little help, explain the entire process by which the natural has been transformed and transfigured into the moral and the spiritual. We urge all to enter upon this delightful and profitable study; and shall be thankful if our Articles prompt any to begin it, or aid them in the successful prosecution of it.

ARTICLE III.

NEW TESTAMENT USE OF ΣΑΡΞ.

BY REV. EZRA P. GOULD, PROFESSOR IN NEWTON THEOLOGICAL INSTITUTION.

THAT which gives interest to this inquiry is the use of the word, specially by the Apostle Paul, to denote man's sinful nature, and the various and sometimes misleading explanations given of that use. And it is to present a view of the origin of that use that the writer has not seen elsewhere, and which, if warrantable, removes grave difficulties in the matter of New Testament psychology, that this Article has been prepared. A preliminary discussion of its other meanings is necessary, however.

And first, we have a class of passages in which σάρξ is used quite literally, or at least with no greater departure from the original meaning than is involved in the confusion of σάρξ and the wider σῶμα. The following is a full list of these passages; though it should be said here that in this matter of classification there is room for individual interpretation and for differences of opinion. Luke xxiv. 39; John vi. 51 sq., 63; viii. 15; Acts ii. 26, 31; Rom. ii. 28; iv. 1; 1 Cor. i. 29; vii. 28; 2 Cor. iv. 11; xii. 7; Gal. ii. 20; iii. 3; iv. 13; vi. 12, 13; Eph. ii. 11, 15; vi. 5; Phil. i. 22, 24; Col. i. 22; ii. 5; iii. 22; Heb. ix. 10, 13; x. 20; Jas. v. 3; 1 Pet. iii. 18, 21; iv. 1; 1 John ii. 16; Jude 7 sq.; Rev. xvii. 16; xix. 18, 21. In some of these passages the meaning is obscure or doubtful; but, on the whole, the primary signification has been assigned in them all. Thus the well-known verses in the sixth chapter of John in which Christ speaks of eating his flesh and drinking his blood, represent under that figure the reception by faith of the benefits of Christ's crucifixion. In Gal. ii. 20: "And what I now live in the flesh, in the faith of the Son of God I live," while the apostle refers strictly to

the bodily state, he probably intends to suggest the disabilities and disadvantages of that state. In Gal. iii. 3: "Having begun with spirit, are you now ending with flesh?" Paul probably intends that the term *σαρκί* shall represent rather than comprehensively state his thought. The primary reference seems to be to the fleshly rite of circumcision; but this stands in the apostle's mind for a whole class of outward observances. So in John viii. 15 we have the term *κατὰ σάρκα*: "You judge according to the flesh," used to describe exactly the case in hand; i.e. the Jews' understanding of the birth or origin of Christ (cf. vii. 52); but representing an entire class of merely outward things to which that belonged. In Heb. x. 20: "A way new and living, through the vail, that is his flesh," as in John vi., the reference is to crucifixion. His flesh is conceived of as the vail before the heavenly holy of holies, by the removal of which in crucifixion his people find entrance there. And it must be remembered, of course, that the representation is figurative, not exact. In Col. i. 22: "He reconciled in the body of his flesh through death," we find *σάρξ* emphasized as the material of Christ's body, in opposition to the purely spiritual nature of the angelic beings to whom the false teachers of the Epistle ascribed the work of atonement. Eph. vi. 5 and Col. iii. 22 enjoin on slaves obedience to their masters *κατὰ σάρκα*, which evidently stands opposed to the mastership of Christ *κατὰ πνεῦμα*; and there seems to be no necessity of extending the meaning to the entire human, temporal condition, as commentators do. In Jas. v. 3: "The rust of them will be a witness against you, and will eat your flesh as fire," *σάρξ* stands, in accordance with the entire figurative expression, for the persons themselves; but this use is determined by the figurative setting.

The meaning of the word which comes nearest to this original meaning, and might even be classed under it, is that which recognizes *σάρξ* as the basis of human descent and propagation, and so contrasted with the spiritual descent or relationship, or a divine sonship, frequently depicted in scripture. Thus the national is distinguished from the spiritual

Israel as Ἰσραὴλ κατὰ σάρκα (1 Cor. x. 18); Paul calls the Jews his συγγενεῖς κατὰ σάρκα (Rom. ix. 3), and μου τὴν σάρκα (Rom. xi. 14). The last passage is peculiar, as σάρκα is used to denote, not the ground of relationship, but by metonymy the relations themselves. In Gal. iv. 23, 29 κατὰ σάρκα is used to denote Ishmael's birth from the bondwoman Hagar, to distinguish it from that of Isaac, which is described as κατὰ πνεῦμα and διὰ τῆς ἐπαγγελίας. And this is peculiar, inasmuch as κατὰ σάρκα denotes not merely human birth by generation, but according to natural laws, without any divine intervention. The other passages under this head are Rom. i. 3; ix. 5, 8, and Heb. xii. 9. Those in Romans describe Christ's human descent. And the first deserves notice, as it contrasts his human and divine origin; the former being described as κατὰ σάρκα, and the latter as κατὰ πνεῦμα ἁγιοσύνης, *according to a spirit of holiness*. The κατὰ σάρκα, as we have seen in analogous cases of human descent, does not signify that the body, nor even the fleshly psychical nature, is the exclusive seat of Christ's humanity. But it recognizes, as in these analogous cases, the fleshly basis or origin of that which in itself includes the whole nature.

A third class of passages is one in which σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα, flesh and blood, is used as an equivalent for man, never the individual, but the *genus homo*. See Matt. xvi. 17; 1 Cor. xv. 50; Gal. i. 16; Eph. vi. 12. Also Heb. ii. 14; though this passage, which speaks of Christ as sharing the σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα of God's children, denotes by the phrase "human nature," rather than "man," and specially the corporeal part of that nature. It will be noticed that in all these passages man, described as σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα, stands contrasted with something greater, either in power or wisdom, even in the passage Eph. vi. 12, where the puny σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα is contrasted with the mighty world-rulers of this darkness. And we conclude, therefore, that this phrase is used to denote the weakness of man; probably because this is his corruptible part. We might expect to find a corresponding term in Hebrew. But there is no example of it in the Old Testament, though it is

found in later Jewish writings. See Cremer's *Biblico-Theological Lexicon of New Testament Greek*, Article *αἷμα*.

Another use of the word reveals the same tendency to denote by it, in one way or another, the entire man; viz. *μία σάρξ*, *one flesh*, used to denote the union of man and woman in marriage. This usage is found in the Old Testament (Gen. ii. 24). It originated probably from the scriptural view of marriage as in its essence a union founded on the sexual relations. And hence, while the scriptures recognize the union of spirits and affections in marriage, they use *μία σάρξ* to express the fundamental idea. The passages in which this occurs are Matt. xix. 5, 6; Mark x. 8; 1 Cor. vi. 16; Eph. v. 29, 31.

And now we come to the passages in which *σάρξ* is used for the human race or humanity, viz. Matt. xxiv. 22; Mark, xiii. 20; Luke iii. 6; John xvii. 2; Acts ii. 17; Rom. iii. 20; 1 Cor. i. 29; Gal. ii. 16; 1 Pet. i. 24. This also is a Hebrew use; but in the Old Testament it is, like the New Testament *σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα*, a disparaging term, expressing man's inferiority, while in the New Testament this use of *σάρξ* alone points in that direction only in 1 Pet. i. 24. We have seen in the preceding uses of the word the successive steps leading gradually to this widest meaning. The first is that which recognizes *σάρξ* as the medium of generation, and thus the basis of human descent and relationship, and the starting-point in human existence even. Then comes the use of *σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα* to denote man generically, but always disparagingly. And last the employment of *μία σάρξ* to express the union of marriage. But we do not need to make use of these approaches to connect this with the original meaning. For *σάρξ* evidently in the Hebrew mind stands in constant contrast with *πνεῦμα*. And man as habited in flesh, although endowed with spirit, is described by that which distinguishes him from the world of purely spiritual being, which engaged so much of the thought of this religious people.

In accordance with this use of the word it is employed to denote the humanity of Christ. John i. 14; 1 Tim. iii. 16;

Heb. v. 7; 1 John iv. 2 sq; 2 John vii. Under the same general head belongs also Phil. iii. 3 sq: "And do not trust in flesh, although I have reason to trust also in flesh"; where Paul means by flesh the natural human state before conversion. The contrast with πνεῦμα intended, is essentially the same as in the class of passages to be considered, in which σάρξ denotes the sinful human nature; only here the sinfulness is not emphasized as characteristic of this natural state. Here also belongs Philem. 16, "a brother beloved both in the flesh and in the Lord," in which ἐν σαρκί refers to human relations, and ἐν κυρίῳ to relations to the Lord.

And now, finally, we come to the most important use of σάρξ to denote man's sinful nature, meaning by that the entire man before conversion, or the sinful part, the "old man" after conversion. Matt. xxvi. 41; Mark xiv. 38; John iii. 6; Rom. vii. 5 sq; viii. 3-13; xiii. 14; 1 Cor. i. 26; v. 5; 2 Cor. i. 17; v. 16; vii. 5; x. 2 sq; xi. 18; Gal. v. 13-vi. 8; Eph. ii. 3; Col. ii. 11-23; 2 Pet. ii. 10, 18.

The common explanation of this use of the word is that which supposes the fleshly or sensual, as opposed to the spiritual, nature of man to be the seat, or at least the starting point, of his sin. This does not mean that sin is confined to this part; it is believed eventually to overspread the whole nature; but that it starts there, finding in that the vulnerable point from which it proceeds to attack the rest. The view has in its favor that it is the most obvious explanation of the usage in itself considered. And it has found credence, partly for that reason, and partly because it accords with a common view of the antagonism between flesh and spirit, or, in a wider range, between matter and spirit, the former of which is regarded as essentially evil. As corollaries from which view we have the mischievous idea that death, which frees the spirit from the encumbering flesh, frees it also, in degree at least, from sin; and that asceticism, or the renunciation of bodily appetites and pleasures, is a road to holiness.

This view has against it also that it involves an unwarranted and superficial psychology. And first as regards the origin

of sin in human nature. We have two sources from which to derive our knowledge or theory of this, viz. our observation of the earliest manifestations of sin in children, and the scriptural account of the fall of man. Now I think that a wide induction of facts would show that in children the sensual passions were the very last to be sinfully excited, and that the first outbreaks of sin were in the region of spiritual things, especially selfishness and anger. Then, as far as we can understand the probably allegorical account of the fall of man, it was not through his bodily appetites that the tempter reached him. Possibly the key of man's nature was pitched too high to be disturbed by such considerations. The appeal was rather to his spiritual nature, to which was offered the tempting bait of knowledge.

If we examine next the metaphysical, instead of the historical genesis of sin, and attempt to find a class of sins which generally lead to the rest, or in a still deeper analysis, that principle which we may regard as universally inherent in sin, and possibly the root of it, I think that we shall fail equally in supporting the charge against the flesh that it is pre-eminently the sinful part of man. It is true that these fleshly sins sometimes furnish the occasion for others, through which they reach their ends or revenge the thwarting of them. But such a relation as this is not fundamental enough to warrant the prominence given to σάρξ and lead to its use as a designation of man's sinful nature. Even if it were the usual fact that these fleshly sins formed the occasion of others, it would still be insufficient to account for such language as Paul uses: "I know that in me, that is in my flesh, dwells no good thing." For the mere occasion, constant though it may be, has no essential connection with the result. There is only a surface connection. And, as we should expect from the character of the relation, it is only occasional, by no means general.

But besides the origin of sin in man, the specially evil nature of certain sins may cause the part of human nature to which they belong to be called κατ' ἐξοχήν, *the sinful part*.

But who can say deliberately that sins of the flesh have such a distinctive pre-eminence? No Christian would attempt to palliate them, or to wink at them as venial vices. But if any pre-eminence is to be named, it belongs to such sins of the spirit, rather than the sensual nature, as selfishness, malice, revenge, and the like.

What, then, is the reason of this use of σάρξ, to denote man's sinful nature? I think that we may find the key to an explanation of it in the preceding discussion of its other uses. We have seen that it is used to denote humanity, both in the concrete and the abstract, partly at least because through it the race is propagated. Humanity, which on the natural side owes its continuance to the σάρξ, is itself called σάρξ. Natural and sarkikal are therefore convertible terms in reference to man. On the other side the spirit, πνεῦμα, is that through which man is connected with the divine and supernatural, and specially in the new birth. It is there that the Divine Spirit works, implanting the germs of a new life, and so spiritual and divine or supernatural, are also convertible terms in regard to man. To this, let it be added, that the natural man, connected with the race through the σάρξ, is sinful, while the new man, connected with God through the πνεῦμα, is holy, and does it seem strange that σάρξ should itself be used to denote the sinful natural man, and πνεῦμα the holy renewed man? It is simply resolved into this: the former is that through which man, in his natural state, is descended from a sinful race, and inherits a sinful nature, and it is used to denote that nature; while the latter, is that through which and in which God implants a new divine life of holiness, and it is used to denote that life.

ARTICLE IV.

HEINRICH AUGUST WILHELM MEYER.

BY REV. HENRY S. BURREAGE, PORTLAND, ME.

THE year 1822 marks the beginning of a new era in Germany in the history of the interpretation of the New Testament scriptures. Previously, even on the part of the best exegetical scholars, there had been in their study of the sacred word almost a total disregard of grammatical details. The few exceptions are worthy of mention. The first to call attention to the peculiarities of the New Testament diction was the philologist Sal. Glassius of Jena († 1656) in his *Philologia Sacra*, the third book of which is entitled *Grammatica Sacra*, and the fourth *Grammaticae Sacrae Appendix*; a work, however, since regarded as of little value. In 1650 appeared the *Dialectologia Sacra* by Casper Wyss († 1659), Professor in the Gymnasium in Zurich, in which was presented a more exact treatment of the idioms of the New Testament, with an estimate of grammatical Hebraisms very moderate for that time. George Pasor, Professor of Greek at Franeker († 1637), author of a small lexicon of the New Testament, prepared a *New Testament Grammar*, which, in 1655, after his death, was published by his son, Matthias Pasor, Professor of Theology at Gröningen († 1658), who added to the work improvements of his own.

These, for many years, were the standard text-books with the few who were interested in the study of New Testament Greek. At length, in 1815, Ph. H. Haab, pastor at Schweigern in Württemberg († 1833), published at Tübingen a *Hebrew-Greek Grammar*, of which Bengel said, "The work has been elaborated with so much industry, judgment, and accuracy, and evinces so minute and extensive a scholarship, as must obtain for it the most favorable reception among all

friends to sound New Testament interpretation." By others, however, a less favorable judgment was pronounced. One critic, supposed to be De Wette, concluded a review of Haab's Grammar with these words: "Seldom have we met a work which we were obliged to declare so complete a failure as this, and regarding the character of which the public should be so emphatically warned." And this seems to have been the general verdict of the best scholars into whose hands Haab's Grammar came.

There was one even then, however, who, better qualified for this task, had devoted himself to grammatical studies, especially with reference to the Greek of the New Testament, and was soon to present to the world the results of his investigations. We refer, of course, to George Benedict Winer of Leipzig, who, in 1822, published the first edition of his Grammar of the New Testament Diction. It was his object, he tells us,¹ "to put some check on the unbridled license with which the diction of the New Testament was still handled in commentaries and exegetical dissertations; and to apply, if possible, the results of an enlightened philology, as deduced and taught by Hermann and his school, to the critical study of the Greek scriptures." Imperfect as the work was, as Winer himself acknowledged, it was greatly in advance of its predecessors. By subsequent study, favored also by the suggestions of friendly and unfriendly critics, he was enabled in the second edition, which was published in 1828, to enlarge and improve his work. Others entered the same field of study, by whose labors his own investigations were greatly facilitated. A third, fourth, and fifth edition followed, each presenting yet added materials for a critical examination of the sacred word. In 1855 the sixth and last edition, prepared by Winer himself, appeared. He was at that time, on account of a nervous affection of the eyes, almost blind. But by the aid of friends, of whose services he makes grateful mention in the preface to his work, he was enabled to complete the task he had allotted to himself;

¹ Preface to the Sixth Edition.

and not long after, in 1858, full of years and full of honors, he passed from his work to his reward.

It would be impossible to overstate the influence of this Grammar, in its several editions, upon the minds of the many who, during the half century which has elapsed since the publication of the first edition, have devoted themselves to the interpretation of the New Testament, either as a whole, or in part. Commencing with Tholuck's Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, which appeared in 1824, and which, as Baur says, marks an epoch in the interpretation of that Epistle, we have an array of exegetical works on single passages, single sections, single books of the New Testament, and even on the entire New Testament writings, which makes the fifty years now gone, as compared with any previous half century since the days of Christ, the golden age of biblical interpretation. Turning to the commentaries of this period we find the names of Meyer, DeWette, Neander, Tholuck, Fritzsche, Lücke, Ewald, Olshausen, Bleek, Rückert, Philippi, Usteri, Baumgarten-Crusius, Huther, Hilgenfeld, Luthardt, Lange, Lechler, Lünemann, Glöckler, Stengel, Düsterdieck, Umbreit, Steinhofer, Platt, Bilroth, Hermann, Wieseler, Harless, Stier, Hölemann, Yunker, Bähr, Böhmer, Steiger, Dolmer, Meyerhoff, Koch, Mack, Klee, Stern, Thiersch, Sander, Arnaud, Driffel, Volkmar, and many others less widely known. Not all of these, as their writings bear witness, were willing to accept the philological views presented in the Grammar of the New Testament Diction, or to give up methods of interpretation which had had the sanction of good men in other days. Very few, however, can say less than Bishop Ellicott has said of what he calls "the admirable work of Winer," — we quote from the preface to the first edition of his Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians, — "It is a volume that I have studied with the closest attention, and to which I am under profound obligations."

The publication of Winer's Grammar marks, therefore, as has been said, a new epoch in the history of the interpretation of the New Testament scriptures. The Grammar, how-

ever, had its faults. Too great precision in the use of language on the part of the inspired writers was at times insisted upon. Moreover, Winer was not free from the charge of allowing, in certain passages, his doctrinal views to influence his grammatical conclusions. But he performed a distinguished service in emancipating "the New Testament writers from the bondage of a perverted philology, which, while it styled itself sacred, showed but scanty respect toward sacred authors and their maturely meditated phraseology."

Winer called his Grammar "the sure foundation of New Testament exegesis."¹ Already, when the first edition appeared with this confident claim, there were those who by careful classical culture, and by a hearty sympathy with the principles of interpretation announced by Winer, were prepared to build upon this foundation.

Prominent among these was the commentator, Heinrich August Wilhelm Meyer, whose unrivalled grammatical skill and precision, combined with rare exegetical tact, made him, by his writings, the teacher of biblical scholars in all lands, and whose labors, extending over almost the entire period embraced by the successive editions of Winer's Grammar, terminated only with his life. President Woolsey, in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* for April 1874, speaks of Meyer as *ὁ μακαρίτης*. He died June 21, 1873. Nobly he had wrought. How nobly we purpose briefly to show, noticing some of the more prominent facts in his life, and then the characteristic features of his work.

He was born January 10, 1800, in Gotha, the capital of the duchy of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, where his father was shoemaker to the court. His early childhood was passed amid stirring events. Napoleon, at that time, was moving his armies from one battle-field to another, bringing the German states under his mighty sway. One of Meyer's earliest recollections was of the prisoners who, in the autumn of 1806, after the battle of Jena, were brought to Gotha, and

¹ *Sichere Grundlage der neutestamentlichen Exegese.* Title-page of First Edition.

confined in the churches of the city. Later, in October 1813, after the battle of Leipzig, he witnessed the retreat of the French, as, pursued by the Cossacks, they pushed their way through Gotha, hurrying on to the Rhine.

In the gymnasium at Gotha he laid the foundations of a thorough classical culture. His teachers were well known scholars, among them Rost the grammarian, "whose memory I revere," wrote Meyer in 1872, in a note to the preface of the last edition of his Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans. Under the direction of these instructors Meyer devoted himself to classical studies with such success that in 1817, at the third centennial anniversary of the Reformation, he was selected to deliver the Latin address at the public services in the gymnasium at Gotha.

Six months later, at Easter in 1818, he closed his studies in the gymnasium as *primus omnium*, and entered the University of Jena as a student of theology. His allowance from his father, whose property had been reduced by long-continued wars and various misfortunes, was one hundred and sixty thalers a year, or about one hundred and twelve dollars in gold. "Those were different times from the present," Meyer was wont to say in his later years. "Everything was much more simple and less luxurious than to-day, when a course of study costs twice as much, and yet not twice as much is learned." High hopes of national unity at that time filled the hearts of the Jena students. During the preceding year they had held their celebrated *Wartburgfest*, and strengthened their cherished desires for a restored empire. Meyer at once joined the great *Burschenschaft*, and with spirit entered into the thoughts and purposes of his fellow-students. In March of the following year, however, occurred the assassination of Kotzebue by Karl Sand, a young Jena student,—an event that called down the wrath of the government upon the great *Burschenschaft*, and soon brought about its dissolution. Meyer had by no means neglected his studies hitherto; but as the excitement of political discussion died away in the university, he devoted himself with added interest

to his work. His instructors were Gabler, Schott, Danz, Baumgarten-Crusius, Kosegarten, Eichstädt, Fries, and Luden. Here, as in the gymnasium, philological studies were those that he loved best. The wide and important field of investigation, in which he was to find his life-work, more and more opened to his view; and he devoted himself with rare enthusiasm to the mastery of the ancient languages.

Meyer remained at the university until the autumn of 1820, when he left Jena, in order to accept a situation as tutor in an educational institution, under the charge of pastor Oppermann, at Grone, near Göttingen. It was not his purpose to give himself permanently to the work of teaching; but then, as now, in Germany a young man could not enter at once upon the duties of the pastoral office. Many must wait long years; Meyer was more fortunate. In 1821, at Easter, just three years accordingly from the time he entered the university at Jena, he passed his examination as a candidate for the ministry; and in December 1822, declining the offer of a position as instructor in the gymnasium at Gotha, he received an appointment as pastor at Osthausen, a small village about twenty-five miles southeast from Gotha. He entered upon his work in January of the following year, being at that time twenty-three years of age. Thither, six months later, he brought his young wife, the daughter of pastor Oppermann of Grone, and there, in the Thuringian forest, he established his home. His parish was not a large one, but it afforded him a field for active labor and quiet study. He soon became attached to his people by the tenderest of ties — ties that remained unbroken to the end of life. When called to higher and more responsible stations he never forgot the simple villagers to whom, at the beginning of his ministry, he preached the glad-tidings.

In his leisure hours he devoted himself to the critical study of the New Testament. As the first result of these studies he published, in 1829, the Greek Text of the New Testament, with a new German Translation. The work was issued by the house of Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht in Göttingen,

the well-known publishers of Meyer's works in all the years that have followed. In 1830 appeared his *Libri Symbolici Ecclesiae Lutheranae*, a timely publication, this being the third centennial year of the Augsburg Confession. His publications attracted attention, and as an acknowledgment of his growing reputation he received, not long after the appearance of the *Libri Symbolici*, an appointment as pastor at Harste, near Göttingen, in the kingdom of Hanover; and on the day after Christmas, 1830, his own tears mingling with the tears of his people, he left his Thuringian for his Hanoverian home.

Here, also, he devoted himself with all earnestness to the duties of his office. At the same time he returned to his exegetical work, having now increased facilities in his study of the sacred word, on account of the nearness of Harste to Göttingen. Early in 1832 appeared the first volume of his *Commentary*, embracing the Gospels of Matthew, Mark, and Luke, being the second part of his work entitled, "The Greek New Testament, critically edited, with a new German Translation, and a Critical and Exegetical Commentary." In accordance with Meyer's original design this part of his work was to be published in two volumes, one volume comprising the Gospels and the Acts of the Apostles, the other the remaining books of the New Testament. It was found impossible, however, to include in the first volume more than the Synoptical Gospels, and the original design was abandoned. When at length the entire work was completed, it had sixteen parts.

The first volume of the *Commentary* was received with marked favor. De Wette, who was afterwards to win for himself unfading laurels in the department of New Testament exegesis, — the first part of De Wette's *Handbook* appeared in 1836, — spoke of Meyer as a commentator "distinguished for thoroughness, correct perception, and sure judgment." His aim was one that especially commended the work to all who had adopted the grammatical principles of Winer. Meyer himself clearly stated that aim in the preface to his first volume, and we find an echo of his words, as then recorded,

in the introduction to his Commentaries for English readers, written just before he died, when speaking of his works, he said: "They aim at exactly ascertaining and establishing on due grounds the purely historical sense of scripture. This aim, so clear and lofty, that all the produce of one's own thoughts and subjective speculation must fall entirely into the background, and must not be allowed to mix up anything of its own with what objectively stands forth in the revelation of the New Testament, simply seeks to be understood just as it so stands. For exegesis is a historical science, because the sense of scripture, the investigation of which is its only task, can only be regarded and treated as a historical fact; as positively given it can only be known, proved, established, and set forth so as to be clearly and surely understood, by the positive method of studying the grammar, the *usus loquendi*, and the connection in detail as well as in its wider and widest sense." It was a difficult task which the young exegete undertook, but it was nobly accomplished, as all who have studied his Commentaries will readily acknowledge. The results of his studies not unfrequently led him to set aside interpretations cherished by the Lutheran church from the time of the great Reformer; but he would know the truth, and with mind singularly unprejudiced, and ever with the confession on his lips, "not as though I had already attained," he sought for it as for hid treasure.

In 1837 Meyer was appointed Superintendent at Hoya, where he remained four years. He then received a yet more distinguished recognition of his services as an exegete in his transfer to Hanover as Consistorialrath, Superintendent, and Pastor Primarius of the Neustädter St. Johanniskirche. Here was his future home, and here the chief part of his life-work was done. His official duties were by no means light. He preached every Sunday forenoon. Yet, by rising early and devoting the morning hours to work, he was enabled to resume his favorite studies, and with the hope of yet greater success. The library at Hanover now offered him its treasures. The most voluminous commentaries in Latin and Greek were

diligently studied; also commentaries in French, English, and Dutch. Every new work of especial value in the department of theology he examined in so far as it possessed exegetical interest. Monographs and review articles did not escape his notice. The richest stores of biblical knowledge were searched for materials with which to carry forward his great enterprise. Let one compare, for example, the first with the last edition of any of his commentaries, and the great amount of labor which was bestowed upon successive issues, in his review of contemporary literature, in his re-statement of old views, or in giving his reasons for new views, will at once be apparent.

In 1845, four years after his removal to Hanover, the university of Göttingen bestowed upon Meyer the degree of Doctor of Theology "*propter eximiam eruditionem artemque theologicam eamque præcipue editis excellentissimis doctissimisque in libros Novi Testamenti commentariis, quibus consensu omnium de ornanda et amplificanda hermeneutica sacra præclarissime meruit, comprobata.*"

Hitherto, with unimpaired vigor of body and of mind, he had devoted himself to his work. But at this time, and especially while in attendance at the church conference in Berlin, in 1846, burdens unusually heavy rested upon him. Near the close of February, in that year, he was seized with a violent abdominal affection, which for a long while it was thought would prove fatal. But at length the worst was over, and health gradually returned. The strength of other days, however, was gone. Not only was the physical energy wanting with which to perform his usual amount of labor, but he was daily obliged — something unknown before in his busy life — to take time for exercise from his study hours. Henceforth, between seven and eight o'clock, after having devoted the early morning to exegesis, he might be seen, in storm and in sunshine, renewing his strength under the open skies.

The years that followed were years of untiring devotion to his work, though his task was continued with difficulty. In 1848 finding his official labors too oppressive he relinquished

the pastoral oversight of the Neustädterkirche, retaining only his place in the consistory, receiving in 1861 the title of Oberconsistorialrath.

These were years also of bereavement. In 1847 death entered his family circle, and a son, seven years of age, was removed. In 1851 his aged mother, who with just pride had watched his upward way, and seen him crowned with distinguished honors, passed on to her rest. In 1858 another son, who as an instructor in the institution for the deaf and dumb at Hildesheim, gave promise of useful and honorable service, was suddenly cut off at the early age of twenty-three. And finally, in 1864, the loving wife, who had blessed his household in all the years which he had passed after entering upon his life-work, was stricken down at his side. He was then preparing for the press the fifth edition of his Commentary on Matthew. When he sent it forth to the world the preface contained this tender allusion to the departed: "During the preparation of this fifth edition severe trials were allotted to me. On account of broken health, attended with much pain, my task could be performed only slowly and with many interruptions; and at last, having sought relief from the healing waters at Homburg, where, strengthened in a measure, I was looking for a more complete restoration, the hand of the Lord appeared, and took from me my dear companion, who for forty years has shared with me the joys and the sorrows of life in a truly Christian fellowship. I bow myself to the counsel of the Almighty. My day, also, is far spent. The guardian care of my God, however, is over me, and the word of his promise to the sorrowing will not fail." His home from that time on to the end of life, was with his son, Dr. Gustav Meyer, who also resided in Hanover.

Meanwhile he had found it impossible to extend his work to the entire New Testament. Able scholars accordingly, were invited to assist him. Meyer's work closed with the ninth part of the Commentary, embracing the Epistles to the Philippians, the Colossians, and to Philemon. Dr. Lünemann prepared the Commentaries on the Epistles to the Thessalo-

nians and to the Hebrews ; Dr. Huther on the Pastoral and Catholic Epistles ; and Dr. Düsterdieck on the Apocalypse. The work of these assistants was performed on the same general plan as that of the other volumes ; but though marked by ability and exegetical skill, is regarded as inferior in value to that of Meyer.

In 1865, by reason of continued ill-health, Meyer was compelled to withdraw from the consistory, though for a while he attended the theological examinations, from a desire to retain his connection with associates loved and honored, to whom he was united in the service of a common Lord. But even the little he had hoped to do overtaxed his strength, and at length he was obliged to forego the pleasure which was afforded by even this slight participation in labors in which he had taken so deep an interest during so many years.

In his exegetical labors, moreover, he could not work with the rapidity of other days. Yet he did not relinquish the great task he had undertaken. When, in 1869, he wrote the preface to the fifth edition of his Commentary on the Gospel of John, — “That wonderful Gospel of John,” as he says, “with its fulness of grace, truth, peace, light, and life,” — he made this declaration : “So long as God shall preserve to me, in my old age, the necessary measure of strength, I shall continue my quiet labor, little as it is, in the service of biblical exegesis.” And so he toiled on, if with less strength, with all the ardor of earlier years.

The principles he had adopted at the outset of his exegetical career he still firmly maintained. In a note to the preface of the fifth edition of the Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans he says : “We theologians are far too much given to neglect a comprehensive and precise knowledge of Greek grammar. If the exegete of the present day supposes himself adequately furnished with such a grammar as that of Rost’s he is mistaken ; it is no longer sufficient. We ought not to overlook the progress of philology in the field of the classics, but should be diligent in turning to account for the

New Testament whatever the contributions of the present day furnish ; otherwise we neglect an important part of our duty. I cannot but here recommend very urgently to the theologian, in the interest of pure exegesis, the second edition of Kühner's Large Grammar (in two parts, 1869-72) — to which my citations will always henceforth refer — as the most complete and most solid work on the structure of the Greek language, regarded from the present stand-point of science. This entirely remodelled edition is a glorious monument of thorough and comprehensive erudition, and of clear and ripe familiarity with the genius of the language of classic Hellenism."

In 1866 occurred the war between Prussia and Austria. The king of Hanover, it will be remembered, chose to unite his fortunes with the latter power. It was an ill-advised step for king George ; and the result was that he lost his crown. Meyer, with every other loyal Hanoverian, could not but deeply sympathize with the unfortunate monarch ; yet in the events of that eventful year he caught a glimpse, he thought, of the dawning of a new day for the fatherland. And in 1870, when the yet greater war with France opened, when all Germany, with unbounded enthusiasm, rose up and hurried to the Rhine to repel invasion and to strike a blow for German unity, he was sure that that day had at length come. The fervid, patriotic feelings of his student days returned ; and with a thrill of joy, which stirred his soul in its lowest depths, he hailed the tidings which were brought from one battle-field after another. In his youth he had seen Germany in her humiliation ; he now saw her in her exaltation ; and with devout thankfulness of heart, he who had been born under the last emperor, a member of the house of Hapsburg, hailed the election of a new emperor, when, at Versailles, on the eighteenth of January 1871, the imperial government was re-organized, and the crown placed on the head of the grey-haired king of the house of Brandenburg.

About this time preparations were made for an English translation of Meyer's Commentary. Many copies of the

several German editions had found their way into England and America. But these were the prized possession of German readers. It was now thought that the numerous requests of English readers for a translation should be granted. The Messrs. Clark of Edinburgh, Scotland, undertook the publication. The translation, with Meyer's consent, was assigned to Dr. William P. Dickson, Professor of Divinity in the University of Glasgow. The Epistle to the Galatians appeared early in 1873. The first volume of the Epistle to the Romans appeared in the autumn of the same year. It was a translation of the fifth edition. In connection with this volume a general preface to the English edition was given, written by Meyer himself. "I earnestly wish," he said, "that the version thus undertaken may not fail to receive, in the new field of the English language, and of the science which it represents, an indulgent and kindly reception, such as, during a long series of years, has been accorded to the German work by the German theological public." And he closed the preface with these words: "May the gracious God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ accompany my humble labors on his word, as they are now going forth in the dress of another language to far distant brethren, with the blessing on which all success depends, that they may conduce to the knowledge of his truth, to the service of his church, and to the glory of his holy name,"

These words were written in March 1873. Meyer was then engaged in the preparation of a new edition of the ninth part of his Commentary, comprising the Epistles to the Philippians, the Colossians, and Philemon. One half of this revision he had sent to the press, and the other half lay on his desk marked, "ready for the press," when early in the morning of Monday, the sixteenth of June, he was suddenly taken ill. Devoutly recognizing the hand of the Lord, he declared his readiness to depart, desiring only a speedy and not too painful an end. On Thursday, the nineteenth, he seemed to revive, and for a short time there was a glimmer of hope that he might yet recover. "Gladly would I remain with you,"

he said to his children; "gladly would I depart if God calls me." God had called. Soon he knew it, and those who stood at his bedside knew it. For a while he remained in a half slumber, and as he thus lay, bright visions flitted across his mind. At first he saw a large page of the New Testament, and himself seated before it, as during so many years, in the early morning, when the light in his study was the only one in the neighborhood. The scene changed, and there lay spread out before him his dear fatherland; and he exclaimed: "Germany, Germany, above all else!" Again the scene changed, and the cross appeared, the central object in that scene which is presented in the New Testament scriptures, to the interpretation of which he had devoted his long and laborious life; and there the eye of faith rested, until the bright vision dissolved.

On the following day the end of life seemed near. Weaker and weaker he became; but night darkened the quiet chamber leaving him still among the loved ones who tenderly watched at his bedside. So passed the following day, Saturday the twenty-first, until shortly before ten o'clock in the evening, when, welcoming the divine messenger, he quietly folded his hands upon his breast and entered into rest. His prayer was answered.

On the twenty-fourth of June he was buried in the cemetery of the Neustädterkirche, where, in the days of his ministry, he had spoken words of consolation and hope at many an open grave. A simple memorial marks the spot, on which are inscribed the words of Rom. xiv. 8: "For whether we live, we live unto the Lord; and whether we die, we die unto the Lord; whether we live therefore, or die, we are the Lord's."

The most permanent memorial of the great exegete, however, is that which he himself reared in his critical, exegetical Commentary on the New Testament. It is not a theological Commentary like that of Hodge on Romans. It is not an exegetical, doctrinal, and homiletical Commentary like that of Lange, introduced to American readers by Dr. Philip

Schaff. Indeed, those who look into the volumes of Meyer for sermons, or for skeletons of sermons, are sure to be disappointed. As we have already seen they aim to secure other results, and are designed only for those who seek to know what the word of God really teaches. "We have always to receive what the scripture gives to us," said Meyer, "and never to give to it aught of our own."

In opening one of Meyer's Commentaries, after the preface, which no one should fail to read, we find an extended introduction. Thus, in the last edition of his Commentary on the Gospel of John there is first a biographical sketch of the apostle, then follows a discussion of the genuineness of the Gospel with especial reference to the views of Baur and his successors; the object of the Gospel is next presented; and the introduction closes with an account of the sources, time, and place of the composition of the Gospel. The introduction to John's Gospel, in the edition referred to above, occupies fifty-four pages.

Turning to the Commentary proper, we find at the commencement of each chapter a brief critical examination of the text. The different readings, with their manuscript authority, are presented, and their value discussed. To this part of his work Meyer gave very careful attention, and his remarks give evidence not only of independent study, but of great critical skill and sound judgment.

Preceding the notes in the Epistles we find at the beginning of each chapter, a condensed summary of the course of thought. Perhaps a better illustration of this part of Meyer's work cannot be given than that which introduces the notes on the fifth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans.

"Contents.—Paul has hitherto described the *δικαιοσύνη ἐκ πίστεως* in respect of its necessity (i. 18; iii. 21): of its nature (iii. 21–30): and of its relation to the law (iii. 31–iv. 25). *He now discusses the blessed assurance of salvation secured for the present and the future to the δικαιοθέντες ἐκ πίστεως* (ver. 1–11): and then—in order clearly to exhibit the greatness and certainty of salvation in Christ, more

especially in its *divine, world-wide* significance as the blissful epoch-forming counterpart of the Adamite ruin — he presents us with a detailed *parallel between this salvation and the misery which once came through Adam* (ver. 12–19), *and was necessarily augmented through the law* (ver. 20, 21).”¹

In the Gospels, and the Acts of the Apostles, the course of thought, when necessary, is given in connection with the notes.

In the notes themselves Meyer has ever in view the end he seeks to accomplish, “the elucidation of the true sense of scripture.” Especial attention is given to the particles, and the grammatical construction. Difficulties are not overlooked, as is too often the case on the part of commentators. Numerous references are made to parallel and other passages which aid in determining the interpretation of the passage in hand. The views of commentators, ancient and modern, and of writers on New Testament themes, are noticed in case they are thought to be erroneous; and though these must have less interest to the English than to the German reader, yet they are of value as indicating other interpretations which eminent scholars hold, or have held. A good illustration of Meyer’s method is afforded by his note on Romans i. 8. “Πρώτον μὲν] To that, which Paul desires *first of all* to write, there was meant to be subjoined *something further*, possibly by ἐπεῖτα δέ. But, amidst the ideas that now crowd upon him, he abandons this design, and thus the μὲν remains alone. Comp. iii. 2; and on Acts i. 1; 1 Cor. xi. 18; Schaefer, ad Dem. iv. p. 142; Hartung, Partikell ii. p. 410. — τῷ Θεῷ μου] οὗ εἰμὶ, ὃ καὶ λατρεύω, Acts xxvii. 23; comp. 1 Cor. i. 4; Phil. i. 3; iv. 19; Philem. 4. — διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ] These words — to be connected with εὐχαριστῶ, not with μου, as Koppe and Glöckler think, against which vii. 25 and Col. iii. 17 are clearly decisive — contain the *mediation, through which* the εὐχαριστῶ takes place. The apostle gives thanks not on his own part and independently of Christ, not δι’ ἑαυτοῦ, but is conscious of his thanksgiving *being conveyed*

¹ English Translation of the Fifth Edition, pp. 221, 222.

through Jesus Christ, as one who is present to his grateful thoughts ; in so far, namely, as that for which he thanks God is vividly perceived and felt by him to have been brought about through Christ. Comp. on Col. iii. 17 ; Eph. v. 20. Thus Christ is the mediating, *causal agent* of the thanksgiving. To regard him as its mediating *presenter* (Origen, Theophylact, Bengel, and others, including Hoffmann) cannot be justified from Paul's other writings, nor even by Heb. xiii. 15. Theodore of Mopsuestia well observes : τοῦ Χριστοῦ ταύτης ἡμῶν τῆς εὐχαριστίας τὴν αἰτίαν παρασχομένου. — ἡ πίστις ὑμῶν] quite simply : *your faith* (on Christ) ; the praiseworthy character of the πίστις is only set forth by the *context* (καταγγέλλ. ἐν ὅλῳ τ. κ.) afterwards : Everywhere one hears your faith openly spoken of. Comp. xvi. 19. Observe how this flattering expression of the apostle, and the *thanksgiving* coupled with it, as also the στηριχθῆναι κ.τ.λ. in vs. 11, 12, point to the church not as Jewish-Christian, but as *Pauline*. Mangold's reference to Phil. i. 15–18 in opposition to this inference, leaves out of view the quite different *personal situation* under which the latter was written. Comp. on Phil. i. 18, *note*. — ἐν ὅλῳ τ. κόσμῳ] a popular hyperbole, but how accordant with the position of the church in *that* city, towards which the eyes of the whole world were turned ! Comp. 1 Thess. i. 8. It is, moreover, obvious of itself, that the subjects of the καταγγέλλειν are the *believers*. As to the unbelievers, see Acts xxviii. 22.”¹

While, however, it was the aim of Meyer in his Commentaries to give simply the historical sense of the scriptures, brief remarks will be found here and there, which are exceedingly suggestive, and remind one of the pithy sentences of Bengel, of whom Meyer was a great admirer, and whom he frequently quotes. Thus, in his note on John v. 35 (5th ed., p. 238) we find the following : “ ὑμεῖς δὲ, etc., a striking characterization of fickle worldly-mindedness, which for a short time would find its delight in this new, noble appearance [of John the Baptist], instead of deriving therefrom instruc-

¹ English Translation of the Fifth Edition, pp. 56, 57.

tion unto salvation, and permitting the working upon itself of the entire moral force of the prophet. So the Jews flocked in great crowds to the Baptist (Matt. iii. 5; xi. 7 sq.) as to the harbinger of the near, glorious Messianic kingdom; yet instead of what they desired (*ἡθελῆσ.*) they found a preacher of repentance with the spirit of Elijah; and how soon the throng disappeared! In like manner the Athenians, on the appearance of Paul, desired to find a new and temporary diversion."

In the frequent revisions of his work Meyer found occasion here and there to modify his views, or to present other views different from those which he had hitherto held. Thus in 1 Cor. xi. 5, according to the note in the fourth and earlier editions of his work, Meyer found a reference to the general assemblies of the church, of the entire *ἐκκλησία*, in which indeed, praying and prophesying on the part of the women were not allowed. The apostle in this passage, he held, left unassailed, for the time, the custom prevailing in Corinth, and censured only the outward appearance of the women, as this only was in place here, reserving the prohibition to chapter xiv. 34. In the fifth edition, however, Meyer takes the view that in xi. 5 Paul has in mind small assemblies of Christians (*Andachtsversammlungen*), limited circles, which are spoken of in the New Testament as house-churches (1 Cor. xvi. 19; Rom. xvi. 5; Col. iv. 15; Philem. 2), and where he thinks praying and prophesying on the part of the women were allowed, while the "*taceat mulier in ecclesia*" had reference to the general assemblies.

It is also well known to those who have been acquainted with the Commentaries of Meyer that as he advanced in years he became more and more positive, or orthodox, as we are accustomed to say in America. The facts here, as Dr. Dickson has suggested, coincide with the well-known statement of Winer, that "the controversies among interpreters have usually led back to the admission that the old Protestant views of the meaning of scripture are the correct ones." Thus amid the conflicts of opinion by which all his life long

he was surrounded, Meyer clung ever closer to the Christ of the New Testament. With the mythological theorists he had no sympathy. He brought the views they held to the test of the divine word, and proved their worthlessness. In a note to the preface of the fourth edition of his Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, he says: "We older men have seen the day when Dr. Paulus and his devices were in vogue; he died without leaving a disciple behind him. We passed through the tempest raised by Strauss some thirty years ago; and with what a sense of solitariness might its author now celebrate his jubilee! We saw the constellation of Tübingen arise, and even before Baur departed hence its lustre had waned. A fresh and firmer basis for the truth which had been assailed, and a more complete apprehension of that truth — these were the blessings which the waves left behind; and so will it be when the present surge has passed away." We may add, that in securing these blessings no one, in the department of exegesis, did more effective service than Meyer.

Such are the Commentaries of Meyer. In their successive editions they have been received with increasing favor in Germany, and among German reading scholars in England and America. Bishop Ellicott, in the preface to the fourth part of his Commentary on the Epistles of St. Paul (p. x), says that to Meyer "I am greatly indebted for grammatical and exegetical details." Prof. Lightfoot, in the preface to his Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians (p. ix), says, "Among German writers, I am indebted especially to the tact and scholarship of Meyer." Dr. Schaff, in his Introduction to the Gospel of John in Lange's Commentary, (Am. ed.) calls Meyer "the ablest grammatical exegete of the age." Dr. Hackett said to one of his classes at Newton: "If you would understand the New Testament give your days and nights to Meyer." We would not intimate, in presenting these testimonies to the value of Meyer's Commentary, that the work has no defects. It is not scripture; it is only a help to the interpretation of scripture. As such it is to be

used not slavishly, but with the freedom which belongs to the Christian scholar, assured that its excellences far outnumber its defects.

It is to be hoped that the English edition, now in course of publication by T. and T. Clark, Edinburgh, will have a wide circulation in this country, securing for the great exegete, in the hearts of those whom in his introduction he calls "far distant brethren," a place as honored as that he has so long held in the hearts of his countrymen.

NOTE. — For most of the biographical information contained in this Article, the Author is indebted to the *Biographie* which Dr. Gustav Meyer, son of the exegete, published during the past year, as an introduction to the fourth edition of the ninth part of Meyer's Commentary.

ARTICLE V.

THE PHYSICAL VALUE OF PRAYER.

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HAS Prayer a positive physical value? Is it really able under all, or any, circumstances, to invoke effectually a "Power which checks and augments the descent of rain; which changes the force and direction of winds; which affects the growth of corn, and the health of men and cattle?"¹ Is the frail child of earth able thereby to "move the hand that moves the world?" or is he, indeed, notwithstanding all his boasted powers of thought and will, but the creature and the sport of blind, inflexible forces, either self-originated or long since utterly divorced from all control of the Great Intelligence, which, in the mysterious and chaotic foretime of the universe, set them in operation? What other question so momentous, so vitally related to its highest interests, saving alone the one great question of its own immortality, can a human mind propose to itself for solution? Can it be possible that, after the

¹ Prof. Tyndall, in *Contemporary Review*.

lapse of so many centuries, during which generation after generation has lived and acted and suffered, such a problem remains still unsolved? If so, the wonder surely is not that it should become occasionally the subject of earnest discussion in scientific clubs and literary magazines, but rather that the plough is not left in the furrow, the coin on the counter, the chemicals in the crucible, in short, every lesser human pursuit abandoned, while thinking men of all classes concentrate their utmost energies upon this one all-absorbing subject of inquiry. The problem cannot surely be in its nature insoluble. If there is in the universe such an Almighty and universal Sovereign as the praying Christian invokes, and if in his government of this world so wide a sweep and so resistless a potency are allotted to believing prayer as the Christian's Bible certainly claims for it, the facts must, from their very nature, be susceptible of proof,—not necessarily, perhaps, of such proof as would meet the comprehension of the careless, or compel the faith of the insincere inquirer; but proof ample to set at rest the doubts of every earnest seeker for truth. If to such a seeker, diligent, candid, and humble, such evidence is not forthcoming, it can only be because the thing to be proved has no existence in fact. If so divine a power exists within human reach, it can be shown to exist, inasmuch as men cannot wield it without both knowing that they do so, and affording to others the means of knowing it. It would seem almost superfluous to add that the evidence must, as a matter of course, be sought within the bounds of the true nature and lawful exercise of prayer. The application of this remark to some tests which have been seriously proposed will appear in another connection.

Let us suppose the planet Mercury to be inhabited by a race of beings equal or superior to man in the purely intellectual endowments, but entirely free from his persistent tendencies to a belief in supernatural causes, and his aspirations after communion with the spiritual and invisible. Let us suppose them to be acute and indefatigable in their search for knowledge; but, like ourselves, as some of us see ourselves,

possessed of no faculties for gaining it save such as lead them to rely wholly upon facts open to observation and experiment. Or rather, if, as we cannot but suspect, knowledge proper, offspring of generalization, would be wholly unattainable upon such a supposition, let their stock in trade of primary cognitions be of the smallest conceivable dimensions, confined entirely to an intuitive belief in those axioms and first truths which lie at the base of mathematics and the inductive logic. Should the granting of even these original standards of comparison appear to some to be inconsistent with the scientific principles upon which these pure intelligences are to be supposed to act, as introducing into all their conclusions a non-experimental and so non-provable element, we are unable to deny the impeachment, and can only plead in excuse the limitations of our powers of conception. Let those who can dispense in thought with such original elements by all means do so. We are anxious to imagine the nearest possible approach to a class of perfect philosophers of the positive type,—such philosophers as we may all hope to become when the true scientific stage of mental progress shall have been fully reached.

Let us suppose one of these intelligences, trained in his own native sphere to the highest degree of power and accuracy, both in the observation of phenomena and in the process of scientific generalization therefrom, taking up his position somewhere on the confines of our globe, prepared for a thorough course of investigation, in order to learn what may be learned of the nature and habits of the animal *homo*. In the course of his inquiries he reaches the phenomena of what we call prayer. True to the requirements of his system, he devotes ample time to the observation and classification of facts. He is struck, or would be, could emotion be generated in the dry light of his intellect, with the wonderful extent and variety of the strange practice, and its singular hold upon the reason and imagination of the human race. From pagan shrine, from moslem mosque and Hindoo pagoda, from stately cathedral and lowly meeting-house, from ten thousand

fireside altars and ten thousand cloistral chambers, in all the tongues and dialects of earth, he hears the voice of supplication constantly rising heavenward. His unbecclouded vision, let us farther suppose, has the power of readily discriminating between the reality and the form, the substance and the shadow. It instantaneously casts aside the incongruous and the superfluous, and goes directly to the true central type. It pierces the disguise of the hypocrite and the formalist, the accretions of ignorance and superstition and the incrustations of habit and tradition, till its scrutiny is fixed upon the hundreds of thousands of men and women of all classes and ages, high and low, rich and poor, learned and ignorant, wise and simple, famous and obscure, who daily, in the exercise of a genuine faith, stretch forth their hands to an invisible Deity. It penetrates the seclusion of ten thousand bed-chambers and secret groves and bolted closets, where individuals fondly resort to bend the knee where no eye sees them. And as he gazes, the tear-dimmed eye becomes alight with new-born hope, the beclouded face glows with a fresh celestial radiance, the heart that entered struggling in the clutches of an unbelieving despair, goes forth in the strength of an unconquerable resolve and an all-animating trust.

But our model student must not stop here. He must follow these praying men and women from the places of their devotions — church, family circle, or closet — into the out-door, matter-of-fact world, and learn, so far as he may, the effects of their petitions upon the events of their daily lives. He cannot fail soon to discover that many of them are, in the words of Prof. Tyndall, “a part of the very cream of the earth.” They are the peers in intelligence, in mental culture, in common sense, and in truthfulness of any other men and women in their respective classes. Many of them are those in whom a native keenness of perception has been sharpened, by long contact with the world of men and things into great practical shrewdness. Others are men of sound judgment and of studious and reflective habit, trained, it may be, to much patient investigation and sifting and balancing of

testimony. Numbers of them, in short, are as little likely as any other human beings to be the slaves of habit, or the life-long dupes of a baseless superstition, which they have daily opportunities of submitting to crucial practical tests. And yet he finds that in a great majority of cases the observation and experience of a life-time, so far from having in any degree shaken the confidence of these persons in the efficacy of prayer, have actually but served, day by day, to strengthen their faith in its power. They are ready to recount, with all the earnestness of perfect conviction, instance after instance, in their own personal histories, when, as they affirm, "The Lord has listened to the voice of their supplications," and sent unmistakable answers.

We shall not venture an assertion as to the extent to which the scientific investigator might be able, by actual comparison of facts and events with antecedent petitions, to verify or disprove this so prevalent faith in the physical efficacy of prayer. No one who has given any good degree of attention to the question can doubt that it would be easy to collect a vast mass of cumulative evidence in the shape of what must be regarded as, at least, very wonderful coincidences. The subject is certainly well worth investigating in this practical way, and a very interesting contribution to both science and religion might be made, would some careful student undertake the task of collecting, examining, and classifying the data afforded by reliable history, and by the experience and observation of a sufficient number of qualified and trustworthy witnesses. The phenomena of human thought and feeling, especially in their relation, real or fancied, to external results, are surely as real in themselves, and as well worth the attention of scientific men as any which pertain to the origin of species or the direction of currents in air and ocean. And we think we may safely add, that if convincing evidence could not thus be furnished to the dispassionate inquirer, there would be little ground for hoping to satisfy him by the result of any test devised especially for the purpose. Religion certainly ought to submit as cheerfully as science to any just

ordeal, though she may possibly have reason for resenting the cool assumption that hitherto her faith in prayer has been a mere figment of the imagination, utterly without verification, and for claiming that the unimpeachable records of past and current history afford the amplest materials for such verification, while free from many difficulties and objections inseparable from any specially devised experiment. In the absence, however, of such a record in such a shape as to command the assent of both parties, we dismiss this phase of the inquiry without strongly insisting upon the evidence of facts as such, apart from all questions of credibility and competency in the witnesses.

Having thus completed the first stage of his inquiry, our philosophic visitor would be in a position to sum up the positive side of the evidence. He would weigh well all the facts collected — the almost universal prevalence of prayer, the sincerity and solemnity of its public and private observance, the unfaltering and harmonious testimony borne in all ages by the faith of innumerable witnesses, many of these amongst the number of those best fitted by nature, education, and habit to judge in such a case. Though his investigations will have been somewhat embarrassed by the fact that a very large proportion of the blessings asked for have been of a purely subjective character, and so beyond the reach of his experimental tests, he will not fail to verify, as carefully as possible, the multitudes of alleged instances, vouched for by those whose veracity, at least, is undoubted, of marked and marvellous coincidence between petitions for definite and tangible events and the occurrence of those self-same events. Can it be doubted that the result of such a preliminary investigation must be to create a strong presumption in favor of the efficacy of prayer? The difficulties in the way of otherwise accounting, on philosophic principles, in the first place, for the origin of such a practice, and in the second, for its perpetuation through all the ages, would seem almost insuperable. Nor would the simple fact that, even in the more enlightened and scientific eras, an exceptional few have always been found

sceptical or disbelieving, militate strongly against such a conclusion. For their evidence, being merely negative, would be entitled to no real weight as against the positive testimony of others equally intelligent and well-informed. The question would always arise, too, as to their freedom from bias, and their having made use of the *right* means and *all* the means of arriving at the truth. And, still farther, the comparative fewness of their number would always form a presumption, more or less strong, against the correctness of their conclusions. Should it be urged, on the other hand, that prayer as believed in and practised by the masses in all ages, being addressed to gods admittedly false, and often prompted by motives demonstrably wrong, was really no prayer in the true sense, and consequently without efficacy in fact, or weight in argument, the seeming force of the objection is greatly lessened, if not wholly destroyed, by two considerations. First, the strength and persistence of the inborn impulse which prompts to prayer is thereby more strikingly illustrated, and the difficulty in accounting for it on sceptical principles proportionately increased. A writer¹ has recently pointed out with much clearness, and established by facts that can hardly be gainsaid, that there is in every creature's life a manifest purpose much deeper than the creature's consciousness—that the animal is constantly led by impulses whose proper meaning it cannot fathom, towards those acts and habits which are needful for the preservation of its race. How can we resist the application of the same reasoning to that ineradicable tendency in man towards dissatisfaction with self and surroundings? That impulse which in his better moments is ever prompting him to aspirations after something higher than ordinary every-day life affords, whether it take shape in cynicism, poetry, or prayer, and which, in the hour of sorrow or danger, sends him, in cringing terror, or chastened trustfulness, to his gods, is a fact beyond contradiction. It indicates a law of his nature. How can it be accounted for on scientific principles? If it exists without

¹ George Doyle Snow, "Natural Theology," in *Contemporary Review*.

any corresponding objective reality, no law of development can account for its origin; no principle of natural selection can explain its survival; no utilitarian theory of morals can account for man's perpetually stumbling into and persistently cherishing a belief utterly without foundation, and a longing that can never be satisfied. And, second, we cannot possibly say how far correct knowledge of the revealed attributes of the true God is essential to efficacious prayer. The possibility of such prayer being granted, it may reasonably be assumed to be subject to fixed laws of its own,—laws whose observance may not be necessarily incompatible with much ignorance of the true nature of the Great Will it invokes.

Let us then, for argument's sake, assume what most thinkers will probably admit, that a *prima facie* case has been made out in favor of prayer as a real power in the physical world. The next step will be to consider fairly the objections urged by those, comparatively few in number, though some of them of deservedly high repute as students and thinkers, who refuse to concede to it any such potency. We say, "comparatively few" advisedly, because we believe these words correctly express the numerical proportion between the classes in question. We cannot without proof, submit to the *odium intellecticum* attempted to be excited against believers in prayer, when Professor Beesly, for instance, in *The Fortnightly Review*, claims the "majority of educated persons," or Professor Tyndall in one of his articles "The great majority of sane persons," as in the ranks of disbelievers.

There is considerable difficulty in classifying the objections we are about to consider, owing to the conflicting views of those who formulate them. Many content themselves with pulling down, without any attempt at building up. Their creed is scepticism, pure and simple. Their choicest mental pabulum is found in negations of positive truth, and their favorite pastime is the search for defects in the arguments in favor of any positive doctrine of religion. They would ruthlessly batter to the ground the only stronghold of the soul which trusts in unseen realities, they would wrench asunder

at every joint its panoply of faith, and then expose it, naked and defenceless, to the assaults of passion and despair. Others, compelled by the logic of science to admit the possible or probable existence of a Great Will in nature, are yet quite unable to harmonize their conceptions of its operation with any view which affords scope for its being moved by any prayers of mortals. Others, again, with true fealty to the Comptian hypothesis, would content themselves with simply relegating all such notions to that vast realm of the unknown which transcends the sphere of legitimate inquiry. Professing to deal simply with phenomena, they actually confine their investigations to phenomena of a certain and somewhat narrow class. Every fact in nature outside that class, or in other words, every one which refuses to submit to the requirements of their system, is summarily and conveniently transported to those illimitable regions which their views have located beyond the Ultima Thule of human philosophy.

The most important of those objections may, we think, be fairly discussed under three general heads :

I. THE ALLEGED INFLEXIBILITY OF NATURAL LAW.

A great advantage possessed by our other-world philosopher would be his freedom from all prejudices of sect or school. Whatever might have been the complexion of his scientific or religious creed, as resulting from his investigations in his own sphere, he would be too true a philosopher to import any of them with himself in his advent to this world. He would utterly discard all preconceived opinions. If prevented, on the one hand, by the "positive" structure of his mind from accepting such a doctrine as that of design, and reasoning from the improbability of an instinct so deeply ingrained and so powerful as that which begets prayer, being implanted either to no purpose or only to prove a delusion and a snare to the intellect, he would, on the other, be fettered by no preconceived notions of so-called natural law, or supreme order, or of the non-existence of supernatural forces and influences. In the absence of higher faculties for the purpose,

he would, of course, be quite as incapable as any human student of attaining any absolute knowledge of cause and its mysterious relation to effect—quite as powerless to trace back any physical event to the point beyond the ken of human vision, of its actual origin and issuance from the producing force, much more to fathom the inner nature of that force itself. But the notions of *cause* and *force* he must have, and have as constant factors in all his reasonings, else he can be no judge in questions of human philosophy. Whether he shall conceive of them as physical or spiritual, — i.e. as belonging to and inhering in matter, or as emanating exclusively or in part, from a region of invisible realities and potencies, enfolding all the universe of matter and engendering its phenomena, — he must decide for himself. And his decision must clearly be in favor of the theory which best accounts, or which alone can account, as the case may be, for all the facts. Inflexible and blind necessity working out all the problems great and small of the world of men and things; the immediate presence and constant activity in matter and mind alike of an omniscient and almighty intelligence whose will constitutes the only law and the only force, or any combination of these, or subordination of one to the other, are alike open to the choice of our dispassionate philosopher, whom, for convenience sake, we shall now drop from our discussion, while endeavoring, as far as possible, to conduct it in accordance with principles he might be supposed to recognize as valid.

“An unerring order, which in our experience knows no exception.”¹ This is the great car of science which, in the opinion of many, is destined sooner or later to extinguish beneath its relentless wheels the last pulsations of the throbbing heart of faith. Every advance step in physical science reveals, we are told, more and more of the uniformity of that unvarying order, and the whole weight of the evidence presses us irresistibly towards the induction that the ultimate goal of

¹ Author of “Hints towards a Serious Attempt to Estimate the Value of Prayer for the Sick,” in *Contemporary Review*.

science is a sublime height, from which all nature will stand revealed as one vast realm under the sway of universal, unvarying law — an iron-bound necessity, — forbidding, as impious, the notion of the slightest variation to meet the wishes or whims of man. The argument in its cumulative form is clearly set forth in the following extracts from an article by the author of “Hints towards a Serious Attempt to Estimate the Value of Prayer for the Sick.”

“I believe I may safely assume that all will agree that certain events within everybody’s knowledge have always happened with such absolute regularity that no one would dream of petitioning heaven for any change in their modes of occurrence; events, the order of which has never been disturbed during the historic period. Let me instance the rising and setting of the sun, the movements of the tide, the decay and death of all organized bodies. Many more will suggest themselves to every mind.”

The writer then goes on to adduce reasons, satisfactory to himself, why variations in the order of these great “events” are not made objects of prayer, and thus continues :

“It suffices for our purpose that no sane and moderately intelligent person would dream of praying that the sun may appear on the morrow an hour sooner or later than his appointed time; that the action of the tide may be suspended or reversed, or that decay and consequent death may not take place in any given case. People pray for prolongation of life, or postponement of death; but no one thinks of asking that the event may never arrive. Why is this? And why does the practice of not praying for such things obtain among those who believe in the efficacy of petition for, let us call them, smaller matters? Simply because the person praying has an absolute conviction that the events in question are so fixed, unaltering, and unalterable that they are beyond the scope of prayer. So we see that practically and beyond all dispute the phenomena of the universe are ranged by people who fully believe in the efficacy of petition in two categories; a class, which I shall call number one, respecting which it is

quite useless, if not presumptuous, to pray; and a class, number two, of events which are the legitimate objects of prayer."

The author then observes that "some persons will place a much larger number of subjects in Class I. than others will, and *vice versa*," and proceeds to show, to his own apparent satisfaction, that with the progress of scientific knowledge, "Class I. grows larger day by day, while Class II. diminishes in like proportion;" that "the professed believer in petition must follow, drawn by inexorable power in the wake of advancing science, and after hard resistance, as always,—giving up one post after another, and resigning event after event, to be detached from the once great class of objects to be prayed for, and admitting their title of admission into the great class of settled and ordered events, not to be influenced by human interference,—capitulating with the best grace he may when forced to surrender." Hence follows, as the conclusion of the whole matter, "that what a man will pray for depends precisely on the extent of his intelligent acquaintance with the phenomena around and within him." And he who has the temerity to refuse to follow this reasoning to its obvious conclusion, still claiming a residuum of events for the second category, is "bound to define these categories," and "to say what may be prayed for and what must not be prayed for."

Two or three assumptions, it appears to us, underlie this whole course of reasoning, and determine its validity.

First, the assumption that because certain great phenomena of nature exhibit absolute uniformity, others which seem at first sight to be just as strongly marked by diversity must be found eventually to possess a like uniformity, is wholly gratuitous. The reader will not fail to note in passing, the illogical indefiniteness which applies the same term "event," to a single occurrence and to that which does not properly belong in the same category at all, but is simply the *expression of our conception* of an observed uniformity in certain characteristics of events, as, e.g. "the decay and death of all organized bodies." In this kind of ambiguity,—which, if we mistake

not, will be found characteristic not only of the article in question but of the class of arguments to which it belongs,—is enfolded the germ of many a monstrous fallacy. But, waiving this point, we claim, as we have tried to show in a previous Article,¹ to which the reader is respectfully referred for a fuller discussion of this phase of the subject, that the most striking and obvious fact in natural and psychical phenomena is that, not of uniformity, but of *variety*. Diversity, abounding, infinite, within the circumscribed spheres of certain great principles of uniformity is what manifests itself alike to the ordinary and the scientific eye. The whole vast world of being, so far as it is within reach of our explorations, and in its two great hemispheres of matter and mind, is an aggregation of individualisms. Synthesis, the only ladder by which science mounts to unity, is obliged to leave behind the many peculiarities of the individual while carefully retaining the similarities of the class. Those great threads of uniformity which run through all the works of nature are but the warp upon which she weaves her infinitely variegated patterns—the mighty chords from which the Allwise Musician educes with infinite skill the myriad notes which blend in the world's mysterious harmonies. If the sun has risen and set in rigid conformity with unvarying mathematical laws from the day of his creation until now, never, probably, in all his course have precisely the same effects of light and heat, color and cloud, been produced by two consecutive risings. Are the flux and reflux of tide adduced as examples of events “which have always happened with such absolute regularity that no one would dream of petitioning heaven for a change in their mode of occurrence”? When, we may rejoin, was ever ebb or flood characterized on two occasions by precisely the same degree of roughness or smoothness, the same features of wave and ripple? The power which ordinarily checks or augments the descent of rain, performs its operations in such a manner that the shower which fell yesterday differed in all probability, in quantity, locality, and a dozen other particulars

from any which ever fell before, or will ever fall in the future. Could it be shown that it was in every feature the exact counterpart of one which fell last week or last year, the wonder would be greater, scientific men themselves being judges, than that produced by a thousand variations. In short, as the Duke of Argyll has shown, so manifestly is *variety* a constant aim of the Creator in nature, that even Mr. Darwin himself, who professes to be shocked at so irreverent an idea, has been the very one "to fix upon an innate, universal tendency in all species to vary, as the cardinal fact upon which turns the origin of species, and the whole system on which organic life has been developed from the lowest to the highest forms And so Mr. Darwin has been led to accumulate a mass of evidence to show that an inherent tendency to variation is a great general law, of fundamental importance in the history of life, and furnishes the only and the sufficient key to the rise and progress of all its complicated structures." ¹

"But," it may be asked, "Should the truth and force of these remarks be admitted, whither are they carrying us? Are we to be landed in the belief that the world of men and things is *not* governed by law or predetermined necessity; but that, on the contrary, all events are determined singly by the will, or caprice, of an all-powerful being whose determinations have reference simply to the individual and the moment"? We reply we are not establishing a theory but examining one. We are simply asking whether those wondrous diversities which are, after all, the most conspicuous "outcome" of "the forces that exist," may not afford ample scope and conditions for the granting of all that the creature can ask or need. What, then, if the believer,—while, no less than the physicist, recognizing the existence of great underlying principles and unvarying laws in physical and moral spheres alike,—should, instead of regarding them as the blind agents of a blind necessity, ready to aid and to crush without discrimination, choose to regard them as the all-

¹ Variety as an Aim in Nature, in Contemporary Review.

flexible instruments in the hand of an Omniscient Father, so wielded as to enable him to accomplish with unerring precision, every right petition of his trusting child? The question is, whether, in view of existing facts, the one hypothesis is not at least as good, and as much in harmony with the evidence, as the other. May not the son who knows it would be equally useless and impious to ask his earthly parent to violate, for his pleasure, one of the commandments of the Decalogue, yet with perfect consistency and assurance petition him for bread to satisfy his hunger, or a helping hand to save him from impending danger? And yet, as we shall have occasion to show presently, the same course of reasoning which is used to show the impossibility of effectual prayer being addressed to an Infinite Will, is surely equally valid against any appeal to any will whatever.

But, assumption second, we are told that those who refuse to admit that Class I. is all-embracing, are bound to "define these categories," and "to say what may be prayed for, and what may not be prayed for." Bound, are they, to draw mathematical lines in moral planes,—to map out those ethereal regions which embrace and bound the inner and higher life of the spirit in semicircles and quadrangles, that may be measured by chain and theodolite? The men of science are fond of dealing with questions of sociology, and are doubtless doing much good by calling attention to the proximate causes of many moral and social ills. They will all agree, I presume, that there is such a thing as "culpable luxury," and that a reasonable limitation of the hours of toil of the laboring masses is much to be desired. May we not safely undertake to define the categories in question, as soon as sociologists shall have distinctly drawn and demonstrated the lines which separate between justifiable and culpable luxury, or between a day of reasonable and one of excessive toil.

But it may be said that this kind of retort, though it may silence an adversary, never explains a difficulty. To a certain extent it does. To meet one difficulty by placing beside it

others of the same class may savor too much of the *tu quoque* to satisfy an earnest inquirer after truth ; but, limited and conditioned as are our highest faculties for gaining knowledge, we are often obliged to rest satisfied with such a mode of explanation. The prince of analogical reasoners has long since made it clear, that to show that the difficulties connected with a certain alleged fact are precisely of the same kind as those characteristic of many other facts which are admittedly matters of experience, is to create a strong presumption in its favor. And is this not in close accord with our boasted scientific methods ? Who doubts the benefits of scientific classification, or the reality of the knowledge it conveys ? And yet, what better in the way of explanation does it afford than the simple arranging of one phenomenon, whose real cause is not understood, side by side with a thousand others equally incomprehensible ? It has often seemed to us surprising that so many writers should fall so readily into the trap set for their judgments by such arguments *ad ignorantiam* as that with which we are dealing. One, for instance, is quoted as saying, "Of course it would be useless to pray for recovery in the case of hydrophobia." Dr. Knight notably goes farther when he claims for prayer efficacy only in the sphere of spiritual, not in that of physical causation, though utterly failing, as has been pointed out by his critics, to show how it is possible to draw, even in thought, such a line between two spheres of influence, each of which is brought to consciousness only through the other, and cannot possibly be known to us at all, save through its relationship to, and interaction with, the other. Nor is the position very much improved, so far as we can see, when the formula is simply changed, as has been suggested by others, from "the Almighty cannot," to "the Immutable will not," vary his order and modes of operation.

But let us go farther. Let us look at the question from yet another point of view, though still without committing ourselves to any theory as to the true *rationale* of effectual prayer, but simply endeavoring to show from various con-

siderations the inconclusiveness of the arguments under discussion. We decline to admit as proved that there is *any* category of events beyond the possibility of being affected by petition. In such a classification there is involved, assumption third, that "the professed believer in prayer must hold to a distinction between *ordinary or physical forces* and *spiritual or supernatural ones*, which can by no means be proved." Such a distinction is no necessary element or background of the faith of the believer. If we mistake not, it is in ill-considered or indefinite language upon this point that many a difficulty and many a fallacy originate. What do we mean by such terms as "physical law" and "physical force?" Nothing short of a misty and incomprehensible materialism can suppose that matter—dead, inert matter—possesses in itself any active power by which it is able to operate either upon other matter, or upon mind. "Oh, of course," the more cautious and clear-sighted students of physical science will tell us, "these are merely convenient terms to denote uniformity of observed sequences, and are not intended to imply any hypothesis as to the nature of the unknown cause of the phenomena, or perhaps any notion of causation at all." But the trouble is—perhaps it inheres in the very nature of the operating mind—that they are pretty sure to go on presently to speak of "law" and "force" as if they were actual, though non-intelligent energies, imprisoned and perpetually active in material objects, as such, and to assume that will-power and spiritual energy, if any such exist, must belong to a totally different sphere, and either be incapable of affecting matter at all, or of affecting it only in some exceptional and extraordinary fashion. For instance, Professor Tyndall, as already quoted, speaks of prayer as invoking "a Power which, when appealed to under pressing circumstances, produces the precise effects *caused by physical energy* in the ordinary course of things." What is here meant by "physical energy?" "Energy," we find defined as "inherent power," active or potential. But it is exceedingly desirable in such questions to define, not only our terms, but the conceptions which govern their

applications. Does Professor Tyndall conceive of material substances as possessing and exerting a power *inherent in themselves* of producing certain effects? Is it not contradictory to every legitimate notion of energy to conceive of it as exerted by, rather than *through*, inanimate matter, organic or inorganic? And if so, may not the intelligent believer retort that in prayer he does but invoke the *same* Power and the *only* Power, which produces all effects, is the source of all causation? Some of the ablest minds, even amongst the most enthusiastic students of physical science, have clearly pointed out the fallacy under consideration. Dr. Carpenter, in a recent Article,¹ has uttered an energetic protest against the idea that there is even an agency, of any kind whatever, *intervening* between the First Cause and the phenomena of nature." He reiterates with emphasis and forcible argument a previously expressed opinion that science "*points to the origination of all power in mind.*" It can scarcely be denied that our first, our clearest, some would say, our only, conceptions of force or energy are derived from the testimony of consciousness to the exertion of will-power. As Dr. Carpenter further observes, "When we have once arrived at that conception of force as an expression of will, which we derive from our own experience of its production, the universal and constantly sustaining agency of the Deity is recognized in every phenomenon of the external universe, and we are thus led to feel that in the material creation itself we have the same distinct evidence of his personal existence and ceaseless activity, as we have of the agency of intelligent minds in the creations of artistic genius, or in the elaborate contrivances of mechanical skill, or in those written records of thought which arouse our physical nature into kindred activity."

It is probably true that this distinguished physiologist, even in the application of the formula "Government *according to* Laws" which he would substitute for the objectionable "Government *by* Laws," would fall into what we cannot but regard as the prevalent error of those whose studies are

¹ On Mind and Will in Nature, in *Contemporary Review*.

largely or exclusively confined to the tracing of method and the elaboration of system in any department of physical science. As he distrusts "*all* arguments based on those *individual* instances of adaptation of means to ends, on which Paley and his school built up their proofs of 'design,'" so, very likely he would, overlooking the ever-present individual variations and peculiarities in the events of human life, refuse to admit the existence of scope for any degree of *providential* — the literal meaning of the term is suggestive to one holding his views of the infinite foreknowledge and plan of Deity — adjustment and inter-adaptation. Still, admitting the irresistible tendency of the human mind, in its quest of truth, towards *unity*, the inquiry is, in itself, most important, whether it is more rational to seek that unity — referring it, as we instinctively do, to the underlying causes rather than to the observed effects — in some incomprehensible force imprisoned or inherent in single or combined particles of matter, or in the self-conditioned operation of an Infinite Mind, which

"Lives through all life, extends through all extent,
Spreads undivided, operates unspent."

But admit, as most minds will be impelled to do, that, in the words in which Martineau sums up the general inference, "science — abolishing her own plurality of natural powers and, as her latest act, delivering the universe to the disposal of One alone, various in its phases, but in its essence homogeneous," — admits as probable "that the distinction of forces into various kinds, is only apparent, not real; depending on the medium of their manifestation, not upon anything in their intrinsic nature; that all the force behind the changes of the world is *One*, whether it assumes the mask of this or that order of phenomena;"¹ and what follows? The praying Christian "invoking a Power which checks and augments the descent of rain," etc., is no longer invoking a different Power from that which ordinarily produces the same effects. The distinction, as commonly understood, between natural and supernatural causes vanishes. The course of events in each

¹ God in Nature, by James Martineau, in *Old and New*, August, 1872.

and all cases is shaped by one all determining cause. If that cause be intelligent and benevolent, who can show that appeal is not ever open and legitimate?

That the foregoing is the ordinary conception of the believer in prayer need not be claimed. The Christian is not necessarily a philosopher. The physical, as well as the moral, value of prayer is dependent upon conditions quite distinct from the views — necessarily very inadequate at the best — he may entertain of the *modus operandi* by which prayer is answered. “Is there, then,” it may be repeated, “no class of events which have always happened with such absolute regularity that no sane man would think of petitioning for a change in their modes of occurrence?” Our reply is, we object emphatically to the *principle* of such a classification. Prayer, considered as a means of producing or influencing physical results, *has*, undoubtedly, its conditions and limitations so infallibly defined as to prevent all possibility of any such catastrophes as those hinted at. What those limitations and conditions are, may be considered presently. They must evidently be sought for in the nature of the Power itself, and not in any assumed inflexibility in the operations of forces, which, if not figments of the scientific imagination, must at least operate on a lower plane, and so occupy a subordinate place in the economy of the universe. We pass to the consideration of

II. THE ALLEGED ABSURDITY OF SUPPOSING THAT THE DEITY CAN BE INFLUENCED BY THE SUGGESTION OR PERSUASION OF A CREATURE.

The author of the somewhat famous “prayer test,” in the *Contemporary Review*, expresses his conviction in the strongest terms. “I cannot express my repugnance at the notion that Supreme Intelligence can be influenced by the suggestion of any human mind, however great.” This is but the bold, bald statement of a view which we find continually outcropping, in more guarded language, in the writings of many of those advanced thinkers of the day, who, having out-

grown the swaddling bands of orthodoxy, yet retain some shadowy notion of a Supreme Intelligence. The first question which occurs to one, and which we would put in no offensive form, is, who is the "I" that speaks thus oracularly, and with such implied contempt, of the views and intuitions of the wise and good in all ages? One involuntarily accepts the implied appeal to authority, and a long train of the Platos, Lockes, Newtons, Hamiltons, Agassizs, of a score of centuries, pass in review before him. But then we are reminded that were the question one of authority, it could easily be answered in the words of one whose opinions would perhaps be entitled to great weight in the mind of the Author of Hints, etc. Professor Tyndall, under the wing of whose reputation he himself was brought before the public, says, in the very letter accompanying that in which the above expression is found :

"The theory that the system of nature is under the control of a Being who changes phenomena in compliance with the prayers of men, is, in my opinion, a perfectly legitimate one. It may, of course, be rendered futile by being associated with conceptions which contradict it, but such conceptions form no necessary part of the theory. It is a matter of experience that an earthly father, who is at the same time both wise and tender, listens to the requests of his children, and, if they do not ask amiss, takes pleasure in granting those requests. We also know that this compliance extends to the alteration, within certain limits, of the current of events on earth. With this suggestion offered by our experience, it is no departure from scientific method to place behind natural phenomena a Universal Father, who, in answer to the prayers of his children, alters the currents of those phenomena. Thus far theology and science go hand in hand. The conception of an ether, for instance, trembling with the waves of light, is suggested by the ordinary phenomena of wave-motion in water and in air; and in like manner the conception of personal volition in nature is suggested by the ordinary action of man upon earth. I therefore argue no impossibilities," etc.

In any sense in which these admirable remarks do not

furnish a complete answer, the argument is one with which the scientific writer, as such, has manifestly nothing to do; nay, further, one to which he is bound in consistency to attach no weight whatever. It removes the subject entirely from the low plane of experimental philosophy into a higher region and a different atmosphere. It involves an appeal from the decision of a jury of experts, whose decision must be based wholly upon the results of a kind of mechanical balancing of series of partially comprehended physical facts, to that of a bench of judges, skilled in the analysis of moral questions, trained to a subtle power of sifting evidence, and a keen insight into the mysterious workings of the human soul, with its instincts, affections, and aspirations. We could cheerfully grant the transfer. The believers in prayer would unhesitatingly submit the question to the intuitions of those best fitted by nature and habit to judge as to which is the loftier conception, and the one which finds readiest response in intellect and heart alike,—that which represents the “All Supreme” as simply an “unerring order, which in all our experience knows no exception,” though, for aught that appears, the inflexible march of that order may ever and anon crush the virtuous, torture the innocent, and exalt the vicious to luxury and honor; or that which places behind the phenomena of the world a Universal Father, ever ready to hear the cry of his feeblest child, and able to wield all the machinery of nature, human wills included, with so “perfect a mastery of all possible contingencies,” and so absolute a comprehension of the details of each individual case, as renders any miscarriage of absolute justice, any failure of perfect beneficence, any sacrifice of the one to the many, or the individual to the order, utterly and forever impossible. Of course such a test would, after all, be refused, and the tendency of weak humanity to anthropomorphism bewailed. As if the testimony of the human consciousness to the laws and modes of working of the mental organism, with its swift intuitions, its sense of will-power, and its irresistible tendency to moral judgments, did not afford at least as worthy a basis for an estimate of the

character and operations of the Supreme, as the testimony of sense to the forms, motions, and changes of material objects.

But, coming to more positive ground, we cannot fail to remark upon one marked and, as it appears to us, fallacious characteristic of all that class of reasonings of which the objection we are discussing is one specimen — the tendency to sink the *individual* in the mass. As the largest conceivable number in mathematics is but an aggregation of units, so the great sum total of human happiness or human misery is but the aggregation of the happiness and misery of individual men and women. Where one man of the keenest susceptibilities has enjoyed or suffered all of which his nature is capable, the acme of human bliss or human woe has been reached. Multiply the unit by millions, and you add nothing to the reality or the intensity of the joy or the pain. You but increase, so to speak, its arithmetical bulk. Now if there be at the roots of phenomena an Intelligent and Omnipotent Will, as is postulated by the view we are just now discussing, that Will must be under the influence of motive. We cannot otherwise conceive it. And its motives must manifestly have their origin in, or at least be closely related to, the creatures he has called into being. Even the attempt to evolve them all from the depths of his own infinite nature, thus resolving them, as has been irreverently said, into “infinite selfishness,” must signally fail, inasmuch as the moment they take objective shape, in products of creative energy of whatever kind, they become inextricably involved with the character and development of those products. Unless, indeed, we can conceive of the gratification sought as exhausted in the very act of creation, irrespective of the nature and fate of the thing created, and believe the latter instantaneously abandoned. But while we instinctively revolt from the impiety of such a conception, it is also self-contradictory, inasmuch as it at once destroys all possibility of proof that any such Will at present exists. And whence can motives worthy of influencing such a Will, whose infinite benevolence will be granted to be as susceptible of proof as its existence, be derived, if not from

the happiness or misery of intelligent creatures? But, taking up again the thread of our argument, it is clear that if the claim of *one* sensitive, suffering creature upon the benevolence or love of the Supreme is *zero*, then by no process of addition or multiplication can a positive value be assigned to that of myriads. "The greatest good of the greatest number," may be the wisest and best motto in human government; but it is the formula of imperfection and impotence. When the Creator and Governor of the universe has failed to secure the rights of one of his intelligent creatures, when he has failed to ward off undeserved or purposeless suffering from the feeblest child of humanity, he stands confessed a fallible ruler. The foundation of faith sinks beneath our feet; the light of hope flickers in our bosoms, and a night of horror and despair broods over our spirits. Either the Great Will in which we trusted is no longer supreme, or that prescience which we fondly called infinite has been miserably baffled. The mighty forces, of which we and all things are the outcome, are no longer under the control of intelligence,¹ but are rushing madly on, like the sun steeds in the hands of the child Phaethon, threatening universal rack and ruin. Grant even that the resistless sweep of these forces may be so guided as to be productive of wise and beneficial results on the whole. Can that console me so long as I am constantly and reasonably apprehensive that I, or those dear to me, may at any moment be crushed or swept into oblivion? Am I to lose sight of all personal and selfish thoughts in the "inexpressible sense of admiration which fills me," and in the act of tracing "the operation of a Supreme Intelligence," and "the symbols of originating mind in the happily untranslatable text which occupies the patient and humble seeker after fact?" If "to do my work unquestioningly and unsuggestingly," in the presence of such facts and possibilities, is my proper sphere, why, alas! did not the Author of that wondrous order fit me for my work by making me a simple intelligence. Why endow me with this will to be thwarted,

¹ Vis consili experts mole ruit sua. — Horace, Odes III. 4.

these nerves to be tortured, this heart to be lacerated, this soul to writhe in the agonies of baseless hopes and aspirations never to be satisfied? And then, what standard have I by which to judge or recognize the general good, or good at all, save that which I find in my own individual breast?

If we might venture upon a slight digression, we should suggest that there is danger of this tendency to deify the mass welded into a kind of unity, and belittle the individual, extending beyond the domain of natural into that of social science. Its baneful influence pervades to some extent the trades-union and international labor movements. The strength gained by union and concerted action, legitimate as it is in itself, and beneficent as it might be made in its results to the working man, is in danger of being counteracted by the paralyzing influence of an inert communism. In so far as the unions become merely mechanical, merging the man in the society, crushing out individuality by narrowing the scope for, and weakening the stimulus to, individual excellence, and unequally yoking energy and talent with sloth and mediocrity, the issues can be only harmful. The levellings will inevitably be downwards instead of upwards. The *one* chained down to the low level of the *mass* can use his energies for raising it much less effectively, than if permitted to use from above the lever of an elevating and stimulating example, while the dead weight of the mass may easily prevent his own rise. The serried ranks of the Macedonian phalanx or Roman testudo might, by dint of inertia, give an increase of resisting power, but for skilful manoeuvre and energetic advance, commend us to the modern battalion, in which every soldier is an intelligent unit, joined to the body by an intellectual, rather than a mechanical, bond. So, undoubtedly, the system which secures the fullest development of individual talent and energy will, in the long run, accomplish most for the social, intellectual, and moral progress of a class or people.

But, to return to the point of connection with our theme, all such forced uniformities, whether in workshop or school or social life, are contrary to nature, whose modes of working

ever afford the best hints and the safest models. Her rewards, her punishments, all her motives, primarily regard the individual. Her modes of operation are ever demonstrating to his reason what her voice is ever whispering to his conscience, that he has a being, a duty, and a destiny peculiarly his own, distinct from those of every other being in the universe; that upon him are thrown responsibilities of self-development, and to him entrusted elements of power and influence, which he can share with no other, and that upon his being true to himself hang tremendous and everlasting issues. The fact that this being, duty, and destiny are interwoven by ten thousand living fibres with those of hundreds of his fellow-men,—that they constitute in fact one link in the eternal chain of causation which runs through the centuries, and so forbid him, by all that is sacred or terrible, to allow self-love to degenerate into selfishness, and urge him, by all the loftier impulses of his nature, towards the fulfilment of the great sum of the second moiety of the moral law, — does but multiply to infinity the motives which bind him to make the most of himself. Is it, then, presumptuous to suppose that such a being, so endowed, and so related, and at the same time every moment conscious of a power within him to change or modify his own future, and so the whole order of events with which he is connected, however unable he may be to reconcile the fact with his own *ab extra* conceptions of the invariability of that order, — is it presumptuous to suppose that such a being should be afforded access to the Great Superintending Will; and have some appreciable weight in determining its motives? If, indeed, that will is either constantly determining, or has once for all predetermined, the eternal order of events, and if, as cannot be denied, the individual events in this eternal order, are so related that a divergence in the whole course for all time, may be brought about by the volition of one human unit in the train, how *can* the Omniscient Disposer disregard the slightest movement of that unit? This, however, suggests a few thoughts which can be more appropriately presented in

treating of the third objection to the physical value of prayer, arising from a view of

III. THE ALLEGED INEVITABLE CONTRADICTIONS WHICH MUST SPRING FROM THE CONFLICTING VIEWS, FEELINGS, AND WISHES OF SHORT-SIGHTED MEN.

Admit, it is in effect urged, the existence within the reach of frail and selfish man of a power by which he is enabled to lay hold upon the hand of Omnipotence, and bring about changes, or modifications, in the operation of existing forces, and you pave the way to endless confusion in the courses of natural phenomena. Farmer A., on the hillside, will be praying for rain, while his neighbour B., in the valley beneath, is intensely crying out for sunshine. C. will ask favorable winds for his outward-bound ship, and thus contravene the petitions of D. for prosperous gales for his on her homeward voyage. Two armies are facing one another on the eve of a great battle, and from hundreds of the pious in each, fervent supplications for victory are ascending to the Lord of Hosts. "Now," argue those who ply the objection under consideration, "it will not be claimed that even the Almighty can perform contradictories at one and the same moment." Thus is the "*reductio ad absurdum*" mercilessly applied.

First of all, let us here again protest against a misconception of the true bearings of the question. We quoted at the outset a part of a sentence from an article by Professor Tyndall, as a fair statement of that which must be claimed for prayer by believers in its efficacy in the physical sphere. Only, however, by omitting the closing portion of that sentence can it be so accepted. When the writer adds, "A Power, in short, which, when appealed to under pressing circumstances, produces the precise effects caused by physical energy in the ordinary course of things," he vitiates, unintentionally no doubt, the fairness of his statements by an explanation which can be accepted, we submit, by no intelligent defender of prayer as a power in the physical world. The views we have attempted to exhibit will be seen to sweep

away every shadow of foundation for any such distinction between the power which prayer invokes, and that which ordinarily produces the effects under consideration. There can be but *one* source of the energy which, in various forms of manifestation, and in countless modes of operation, produces the phenomena of nature. The great question, then, is as to the possibility of these correlated forms and modes being affected through the instrumentality of prayer, as they demonstrably are affected by other agencies within the reach of man.

We have already insisted, in effect, that the difficulty of reconciling the notion of effectual prayer with the alleged invariability of natural law, is not different in kind from that of reconciling the constant agency of human will, in a hundred other forms of exertion, with this same notion of invariability. Thus, as we have said, the abstract objection urged against the possible efficacy of any appeal to a Supreme Will is equally valid, and may be applied, *a fortiori*, against any appeal to any will whatever. Remove, if you please, the First and Intelligent Cause as far away as the most enthusiastic apostle of evolution could desire; confine his operations to the simple production of the original world-stuff, and the impressing upon it in chaos of those properties by virtue of which the grand unfolding has gone on from that day to this; attempt to explain, on any principle consistent with the presence in the development of either *a definite design* or an *unvarying order*, the constant activity of one, or of a billion of *free agents*,—agents not only capable of modifying, obstructing, or accelerating the movements of the machinery, but constituting, by nature and necessity, an important and vital part of it, and able at the same time to launch at any moment a consciously independent, if not absolutely new, force into the sphere,—and you are brought face to face with the theological problem of all the ages. We try the theory of the dominion of blind, inexorable forces. But shall we, or shall we not, attempt to leave any scope for true freedom to those intelligent agents? If not,—if they too, in all their volitions, energies,

and activities are but the inevitable "outcome of the forces that exist,"—then how absurd to discuss at all such questions as that under debate. How inconsistent of the physicist holding such a view, to make use of argument, or any other motive, with a view to effecting any change in that unvarying order, which must include, in its infinite sweep, every shape and shade of individual opinion? Who can resist necessity? The thinker's thoughts, the writer's words, the philosopher's reasonings and speculations, all alike must fall into rank amongst the other inevitable products, and can neither have nor need any other justification than that contained in the formula, "So wrought the forces." If my will is irresistibly determined to petition, then petition I must, and my petitioning becomes a part of the order, and so a real and necessary power in the determination of the event. But if, on the other hand, we claim that there is a real freedom, and hence an unpredictable element in the thoughts and volitions of these human agents, how can we escape the other horn of the dilemma? An unknown quantity, of incalculable value, is at once brought into the problem, and the ever-recurring paradox stares us in the face,—a paradox of which the theory in question affords no possible explanation.

It is interesting to find one of the broadest and clearest thinkers of the scientific school driven, by sheer stress of irresistible logic, to take refuge in a philosophical haven which bears a striking resemblance to that ancient one so clearly outlined in the theological charts of Paul and David. He finds, what most who revolve deeply the great problems must find, that we cannot interpret the facts of nature and human life otherwise than that not only the great general outlines of the history of matter and mind, but the motions of every atom and the events and impulses of every life, are in strict accordance with the most definite forecast, the most absolute determination. The universe is inconceivable else. A cosmos without a plan is as inconceivable as a creation without a Creator. Perfection absolute is necessary to any conception of Deity. While perfect wisdom implies perfect fore-

sight and precludes possible change, perfect justice forbids possible failure in details or possible sacrifice of the one to the many. But such a conception is in the most pronounced antithesis to the notion of an inexorable order, incapable of beneficent regard to individual persons and events. The most unlimited predetermination is simply the outcome of an infinite prescience, which only by voluntarily closing its eyes could fail to see the end from the beginning. And thus we find Dr. Carpenter, in the Article before quoted, discoursing of a Great Will whose "direct and immediate operation in the phenomena of the universe makes itself only known to us through the uniformities which we recognize in those phenomena, *our own expression of which*, so far as they have been discovered by us, we call the 'laws of nature,'—uniformities which are simply unchangeable, because, as they were originally devised by infinite wisdom, any change would be for the worse." This "idea of constancy and invariability in the Creator's plan," which simply *antedates* the exercise of his discerning love "by referring *all* those provisions for man's benefit which he has placed before us, either in possession or in prospect, to the period when this present system of things had a beginning," and which is consequently quite in harmony with the teachings of that book which declares "known unto God are all his works from the beginning of the world," however it fail, as fail it does and must, to enable us to understand *how* every movement of a free will can be foreknown, certainly removes one moiety of the whole sum total of difficulties, by giving us the *fact* that they are actually foreknown as a starting-point. The great paradox behind this—a paradox as clearly stated and as strongly insisted upon in scripture as it can possibly be in science, we make no attempt to resolve. Our aim is simply to show that we have given two series of facts—for the motions of these wills are certainly *facts* as familiar and as patent to observation and experiment as those of light or electricity,—and that in our most patient efforts to explain and reconcile these facts we are driven by the very logic of

science itself to the theory which best accords with the biblical one in question. For the whole class of difficulties we are now discussing, arising out of the supposed irreconcilability of human wants and wishes, as unfolded in prayer, manifestly resolves itself in the last analysis into the larger problem of the mysteries of the will. If the majestic plan of that discerning love which foresaw the end from the beginning, and which—we would say, “with a perfect mastery of all possible contingencies,” were not the word contingency as heterodox in science as in theology—arranged the minutest operation of all secondary causes, *human wills included*, was able to effect that all human volitions, all the apparent cross-purposes of finite beings, should contribute to the harmonious development of that plan, then the difficulties of the scheme are in no wise increased by assigning to the prayer of the creature a place and power. The intelligent thinker will no more feel bound to restrain prayer from a sense of its presumption or powerlessness than to forego the exercise of any other energy under the control of his volition. Instead of “submitting without suggesting limits or a definition to the plan he could never have devised and cannot compass, too glad to believe that all such order is not to be influenced by human interference,” he will, on the other hand, be doubly glad to believe and prove by happy experience that in that infinite and beneficent order there is a place and a value for his devout petitions.

One might suppose that the student of science would be the last to urge such an objection as that under review, especially when he has before him the recent discoveries in regard to the correlation of physical forces. Accustomed to experiment with that mysterious energy which, drawing constant supplies from the great “father of lights” and centre of the system, keeps the wondrous mechanism of the world in motion, and gaining every day new evidences of how indestructible in its nature, and how easily transmuted from one form to another, is the wondrous agent of whose operations he knows so much, and of whose nature so little, he must at

times have been ready to dread the direst consequences from man's ability to manipulate it and change its manifold forms. But as he proceeded and became more familiar with the constant round of distribution and assimilation, of repair and reproduction and counterbalancing, he must have lost all dread of catastrophe in a sense of admiration at the perfection of adjustment and the inexhaustibleness of supply. Coming from such a school to the study of the higher questions involved in the correlations of spiritual energies and their common subordination to and dependence upon the Father of spirits, he would not, one might suppose, be slow to conceive of the existence of some counterbalancing and re-adjusting agency by which infinite wisdom could direct the operations and preserve the equilibrium of spiritual or will forces.

Such a re-adjusting agency the enlightened student of scripture will not fail to discern in the very nature of prayer, in the dispositions of heart which underlie, beget, and permeate every genuine exercise of faith, and transmute into a harmonious unity the deepest breathings of apparently diverse petitions. Prayer—the prayer of faith, which alone has power—is not “always petition, and beyond petition nothing”; but it must of necessity begin with petition, and continue with much of petition. It originates necessarily just where the entrance into the kingdom originates,—in a sense of need, a genuine poverty of spirit. For its true character and scope we must ever look to the great model. Its twofold burden, the Creator's glory and the creature's good, is therein set forth by Him who alone fully realized its power and who proved it omnipotent, even amongst the lesser forces of nature and within the precincts of the king of terrors. Taught in such a school and inspired by such an example, the believer fears not to come reverently into the presence chamber of the I AM, and utter his petitions. He can see no reason why the Being who has made provision in his all-comprehensive scheme for the fullest play of the wills and energies of his intelligent creatures amongst and upon the forces of the physical world may not also have made a similar provision in the region of

spiritual forces. He is taught by experience that he may, without presumption, use effective means to intercept the lightning or refract the sunbeam for human amusement or behoof. Why should he doubt the possibility, or dread the presumption, of using another means to divert or collect other rays of blessing from the flood which is ever streaming earthward from the great Sun and Centre of the spiritual universe? He will hesitate to dogmatize about the *hows*, of whose inner nature he knows, at the best, so little. But he may be constrained by the instinct of faith to go even farther, and lay hold upon that same great generalization to which we have referred as possibly destined to prove the goal of dispassionate scientific inquiry, and refuse to recognize any but an artificial distinction between the two spheres of force. To him the will of the Father is the energy which moves matter and spirit alike. If the Great Will that sways the universe is the will of his Father, whence, he reverently asks, are motives to influence that Will more likely to be derived than from the finite wills and real necessities of children created, in some sense, in his own likeness? From what other possible source can they be derived? Are they inherent in his own nature; or are they the offspring of caprice? From the latter supposition we instinctively revolt, as utterly inconceivable as well as unworthy. And the former, which is also a scriptural one, involves, as we have before shown, the first, inasmuch as it is as impossible, in the case of a being perfect in all his attributes, to separate between the manifestation of those attributes in creation and the good of the creature as to draw a mathematical line between consciousness and the mental modification to which it testifies. The outcome of the Infinite Love is the happiness of its finite offspring. It is impossible, then, to conceive of the Infinite Mind, save as *related to* and *influenced by* the mind it has created. And if the manifestations of this Infinite Mind in nature are in accordance with general principles of uniformity which we may trace and generalize into what we call "laws," why should not also its manifestations in the world of mind

be capable of being similarly defined and expressed? And who can say, never having faithfully made the experiment, in the face, too, of the testimony of thousands who claim to have made it, that the doctrine of *believing prayer* may not be the very embodiment of the principle, the concise expression of the law, in accordance with which the Infinite Mind suffers itself to be acted upon by the finite, and reflects that action upon the movements of the physical and moral worlds?

Where, then, is the dividing line between the two categories before spoken of? It exists nowhere; or rather it is variable as the magnetic needle, yet, like it, ever tending to the pole, while shifting with the conditions of the case; i.e. with the spiritual state of the suppliant. If at any sublime crisis in the history of the world the two great ends of prayer could best be subserved by the staying of the sun in its course, or — its equivalent to us — some variation in the rotatory motion of the earth, who can say that the Great Mind may not have foreseen and provided for the emergency, just as it must have foreseen and provided for ten thousand times ten thousand variations of every-day occurrence, different only in degree?

But the "limitation" and the "self-adjusting agency" are there, no doubt, and in perfection, were our analysis but keen enough. We shall close this paper by rather hinting at than defining the direction in which they are to be sought. They inhere in the very nature of prayer:

1. *In the motives which prompt it.* — It may often and legitimately lay the wants, even the physical wants, of the individual at the foot of the throne. But a *merely* worldly, or *merely* selfish aim, true prayer can never have. In the fullest sense it must ever be prescribed and circumscribed by the two great precepts of the law of God. To love God with all the powers of the soul and one's neighbor as himself, must certainly put a most effectual check upon all those conflicting petitions which loom so large in some imaginations, by drying up the only sources from which they could spring, — the appetites and passions of unregulated selfishness. Suppose, as is clearly possible, the devout petitioner, through ignorance,

to utter a prayer whose literal answer would involve some contradiction to one or the other of those great principles — working, we will say, injury to a neighbor. Is it not evident that the *spirit* of the petition would be thwarted by its literal answer and subverted by refusal? This suggests the second grand limitation of prayer in,

2. *The faith which is its invariable condition.*—This, indeed, includes in itself all other limitations, though, for convenience sake, we may dissociate some of its elements. That faith which alone can render prayer effectual — without which there is no true prayer — has its basis in such conceptions of the perfect wisdom and goodness and love of the Supreme, as bring an unfaltering conviction that his will is always the highest good of all his creatures, the petitioner included. Its broad, unbounded loyalty conditions, in effect, every petition upon its harmony with the manifestation of those divine attributes. Within these limits true prayer is omnipotent. And from these it necessarily results that, in the words of the “Author of Hints,” etc., “The realization and final consummation of all prayer, all even of petition — last arrived at in man’s course — culmination of all natural piety, is expressed in the memorable ejaculation, ‘Thy will be done.’” If it be still asked: Where, then, is the place or the need for the creature’s *petition* at all? we think some hints, at least, at the true answer will be found in different places in the foregoing discussion. We shall not stay to argue farther that prayer has a justification because man is prompted to it by one of the deepest impulses of his nature, or because he is hampered in this by no greater paradox than that which encompasses *every exertion of his will* to shape or modify events that must have been predetermined ages before he had a beginning. We shall content ourselves with a remark which may convey an additional hint towards such solution as is possible to us of this and the many cognate mysteries of life. The culmination of all prayer in “Thy will be done,” reminds us of what we shall call its third limitation, as found in,

3. *Its divine origin.*—The spirit of true prayer must be

begotten from above. No breathing of desire can ascend to Heaven save that which first came down from Heaven. The scriptures teach expressly, in many forms, that the Spirit of God must prompt and direct all effectual prayer, just as it is manifest that if Deity carries out a plan, or predetermines issues, he must in some way or other, and on some righteous principle, to us inscrutable, rule and use and harmonize all subordinate wills and purposes. If then, when we know not what we should rightly pray for, the Spirit of wisdom is ready to teach us, and its teachings are necessary to give the prayer its true character as such, — what need to inquire farther how the catastrophes incident to the answering of conflicting petitions are to be averted. If these principles would seem likely to deprive of its distinctive claim to the title much that is called prayer, we can only refer every one for himself to the authoritative text-book to see whether it or the writer is responsible for the *criteria*. If, on the other hand, they should be held obnoxious to the ever ready objection that they strike at the root of real human freedom in prayer, as in every other act, we can only reply, as heretofore, that they can no more do so than any one class of established *facts* can have power to annihilate any other class of *facts* equally indisputable, simply because of our inability to trace the two seeming parallels to that point in the depths of infinite thought, where they must infallibly blend in eternal unity. And, coinciding to the fullest extent with the view of those who think so important a question should be capable of submission to some practical and crucial test, we venture, in closing, to propose one which has the advantage of being free from the necessity for any exact collation of facts by a plurality of observers, or any elaborate agreement of individuals upon a scheme full of inherent difficulties. It is a test which can be applied only by the individual, and *may* be applied by every individual so disposed. Above all, it has the sanction, and may be reverently characterized as the universal challenge, of the great Teacher of prayer: “If any man *will* do his will he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God.”

ARTICLE VI.

ON CERTAIN ERRONEOUS THEORIES OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SACRIFICE.

AN essential difference must necessarily exist between a religion adapted to a race of moral beings who have never sinned and a religion adapted to a race of beings that have sinned ; and this difference must lie mainly, if not exclusively, in the fact that a religion fitted to meet the wants of a sinful race must include a disclosure of the possibility of reconciliation with the offended power, and of the mode in which that reconciliation can be effected. No religious system meant for a sinful race could be considered as complete which lacked these features. A religion which claimed a divine origin would exhibit, as one of its chief characteristics, a statement of the possibility, and of the method, of such a reconciliation.

Antecedently to any direct revelation from God, thoughtful men would, not unnaturally, indulge in conjectures as to the practicability of any reconciliation with an offended Divinity. Arguing from what nature suggests as to the character of God, from what his providence discloses in regard to his benevolence ; in particular, from the way in which they are sometimes inclined to treat those by whom they have been offended ; still more from the method in which they have known that men of superior power, of extraordinary moral worth, and unusual magnanimity have conducted themselves towards such as have acted contrary to their will,—arguing from these premises, thoughtful men, as we may well imagine, might arrive at a presumption that, in some method and for some reasons, God might possibly avert from men the punishment which they were conscious was deserved by them.

All conjectures on the matter would, however, become the

more uncertain and the more unsatisfactory in proportion to the clearness of one's conceptions of the purity of God's character and the absolute perfection of his government. Men would speedily imagine, in the progress of such reflections as we have described, that the law proclaimed by the Almighty for the regulation of human conduct must be, precisely as it is affirmed in the Bible to be, holy and just and good. It prescribes only such conduct as is, even independently of all legal enactments, pure and holy, and proper to be demanded of moral beings such as men. Its requirements correspond with the utmost exactness to the powers of those whose conduct it aims to regulate; a correspondence which would not be any more exact if there were but one moral being to whom the law was addressed. Its penalty, as to its nature and severity, is adjusted with the same exactness to the particular circumstances of every offender. No mitigating considerations can be supposed possible to be urged in regard to any circumstances of any offender that were not present to the mind of God, and that were not allowed their whole legitimate influence in regulating the degree of severity with which that particular transgression should be punished. In short, as it already has been intimated, the divine law suits itself, as a matter of fact, and as, antecedently to all revelation on the subject, it would be supposed that it would suit itself, alike as to its precept and its penalty, to the capacities and the circumstances of every individual among the countless millions whom it controls with the same minute exactness as though literally addressed to a solitary moral being. And the conjectures of a thoughtful mind as to the possibility of pardon in the case of transgressors of such a law would become the more uncertain, the less worthy to be relied upon, very much in proportion, as has already been said, as one's conceptions of the law under which men live harmonize with the statements of the Bible in reference to the matter.

On what grounds, then, it may well be asked, could pardon, on the supposition of the existence of such a law as we have described, be expected to be granted? Not certainly on the

ground that the course of conduct prescribed was impracticable, and that transgressions could not be avoided; not on the ground that the offender was ignorant of the law to which his actions ought to have been conformed; not on the ground that the infliction of the full penalty in an individual case would conflict with some other and remote interest. Every consideration, of such a nature or of any other character, that can be conceived of as at all aptable to the case, or afford a reason for a relaxation of the law, we must suppose to have been in the mind of the Lawgiver in the beginning, and to have been influential in the adjustment of the law relatively to that specific instance of human conduct. Indeed the possibility of pardon, under such a government as that of God, must be admitted to be, prior to any special revelation, very faint.

It should be remembered that in the case of human governments instances of pardon are rare very nearly in precise proportion to the excellence of these governments. Pardon is really, in the majority of cases, a symptom of imperfection. The allegations on the strength of which pardon is wont to be asked indicate this very plainly. The law, which in general is admitted to be a good one, is, as is urged, in this particular case, inordinately strict. Its penalty is disproportionately heavy. There is reasonable doubt as to whether the alleged offender is really the offender. In reality it is not pardon which is asked for on such grounds. It is merely simple justice which it is asked may be exercised, and not mercy. The alleged crime is not really a crime, but a misfortune. Such allegations never could be put forward with any propriety except on the ground of imperfection, either in the law itself or the mode in which it was administered. Under the perfect government of God, pardon never could be anticipated as possible for any such reasons as these. It can, indeed, be looked upon as possible only when some expedient, by means of which the same ends are secured as the infliction of the penalty of the law is intended to promote, shall have become practicable.

We are to remember, now, that the final cause of the precept of the law and of its penalty are identical. This cause is the promotion of righteousness, the prevention of sin. And it is altogether wrong to suppose that the penalty of the law can be relaxed, except in cases in which an expedient can be employed equally adapted with the penalty to secure the proper purposes of the law; to maintain, to the same extent, the authority of the law. The death of Christ is represented in the scriptures as such an expedient. This death can be adequately explained only on the ground of its being such an expedient. It is a satisfactory atonement. It is a full equivalent for the infliction of the penalty. And on account of its serving as such an equivalent, it has been not unfitly denominated a "vicarious punishment." It supports the law not less than does the infliction of punishment. It is an expiatory sacrifice offered, to the Almighty with a view to appease his indignation, and it is indebted for its effectiveness in this direction to its power to accomplish the ends which have been referred to. It may be described as punishment in a modified sense of that term; the essential difference being that punishment, in its true significance, is evil inflicted by the proper authority on the actual offender. Only in a modified sense, therefore, is there any propriety in speaking of the sufferings of Christ as penal.

It is then, as it would appear, not an wholly unfounded presumption, that there would exist in our moral nature what may be called a correspondence to this method of salvation through the death of Christ, sufficiently strong to serve as an argument of some force in favor of the reality of that method. We are justified, we conceive, in supposing, antecedently to a divine revelation, that the gospel would have such characteristics as would cause it to commend itself to our conscience and, with equal force and clearness, to our reason. And we might not unreasonably suppose that this felt harmony between the gospel and our moral nature would betray its existence, in some form or other, at periods when, and among nations where, either no knowledge, or at most a very

imperfect knowledge, of such a gospel was possessed. We might anticipate there would be something in the religious usages of nations, or in the forms of worship which they practised, that would be capable of explanation only on the ground of this previously conscious harmony, and be more or less happily expressive of it. Such a manifestation of this harmony, we believe, may be found in the sacrificial rites which well nigh all nations have agreed in practising.

The proper idea of an expiatory sacrifice is, that it serves as an equivalent for the infliction of a legal penalty. The sufferings of Christ are the only proper and efficacious expiatory sacrifice. All sacrificial rites which men have practised have answered their proper end only to the extent in which they have been symbolical of this great sacrifice.

It is the purpose of the Article which follows to set forth the views of a number of writers on the subject of sacrifices, and the answers which they have given to certain important questions relative to the subject. Our ultimate purpose is to aid in establishing the true doctrine of expiatory sacrifice by exhibiting the falseness of certain antagonistic theories.

We begin by a brief exposition of that theory of sacrifice in which it is considered merely as a federal rite, as an expression of friendship between two parties that have been previously at variance with each other. This theory we have found exhibited with most fulness and particularity in a work by Dr. A. A. Sykes, entitled "An Essay on the Nature, Design, and Origin of Sacrifices." Dr. Sykes was a clergyman of the established church in England. He seems to have been a voluminous author; and some of his works, particularly one on Redemption, are occasionally seen at the present day. His Essay on Sacrifices was given to the world in 1748.

He complains, in the outset, that the question of the cause which has produced the universality of sacrifice has not been so fully considered as it ought to have been; and, after remarking that it may have been supposed to be impossible to find out what the cause is, he goes on to argue

that even if it be impracticable to reach absolute certainty on this subject, one may yet approximate towards a correct and satisfactory solution of the question under consideration.

Sacrifice is defined by Dr. Sykes, not improperly, as anything that is immediately given or offered to the Divinity in a solemn manner, and so as that, either in part or wholly, it is consumed. Sacrifices are carefully to be distinguished from the gifts of gold and silver and the like which were at times offered to Jehovah by the Jews. These offerings cannot be regarded as sacrifices, because they were never meant to be consumed, either wholly or partially.

It is insisted, again, and with much earnestness, that the acceptableness of a sacrifice depended on the mental condition of him by whom it was presented. "Sacrifices," Dr. Sykes affirms, "offered without moral virtues were always looked upon by God as of no worth or value; and all sacrifices were to be accompanied by such rites and ceremonies as properly represented the state of mind of the sacrificer." The priests and all those who took part in the service were required to preserve the utmost purity of person and dress. The sacrificer was in every instance to present his gift at the altar in his own person; and if the sacrificial material was an animal, he was to lay his hand upon its head. There were certain forms of prayer with which it was required to accompany every sacrificial observance. In certain instances parts of the victim were to be waved upward and downward, to the right hand and to the left, as a sort of symbol of the universal presence of God. These various ceremonies were prescribed, as we may suppose, on the ground that they indicated more or less directly the presence in the mind of the sacrificer of those sentiments and convictions on which the acceptableness of the sacrifice so much depended. They were meant, likewise, to keep the worshipper always in remembrance of the important fact, that no sacrifice would be efficacious if these sentiments were absent from the mind.

After these preliminary statements, Dr. Sykes proceeds to state more precisely his theory of the nature of sacrifices.

Sacrifices, he maintains, were federal rites. They implied the commencement of a friendship between two parties; or, if there had existed previously a state of alienation or positive hostility, they implied a restoration of amity — a return, on the part of the sacrificer, to that state of mind from which he had departed. "It was usual," he says, "when men of old contracted leagues or engaged in friendship, to do it by eating and drinking together." A familiar illustration of this is seen in the instance of the friendship contracted between Isaac and Abimelech, Jacob and Laban. The violation of a league thus formed was always regarded as a flagrant immorality. For this reason, the offering of a sacrifice, whether to the true God or to an idol, was looked upon as the same thing as entering into a friendship with the being to whom the offering was made. The saints are represented, in the fiftieth Psalm, as those who had entered into a covenant with God by sacrifice. The blood of the paschal lamb sprinkled on the door-post was a symbol of the covenant entered into between the Almighty and the Israelites. Paul, in the Epistle to the Corinthians, explicitly asserts, altogether in harmony (according to Dr. Sykes) with this principle, that men cannot at the same time eat of the Lord's table and of the table of devils; because to partake of the table of the Lord was an act strikingly significant of friendship with God, while to partake of the table of devils was equally significant of friendship with them; and it was obviously absurd to think of being in friendship at the same moment with beings so wholly unlike each other in character.

The attempt is also made to demonstrate, by a plentiful citation of passages from pagan writers, that the conception of the meaning of sacrifices as mere federal rites was a prevalent one among the pagans. Dr. Sykes is very confident that, in the admitted fact that eating and drinking together were among the ancients well-known and altogether common symbols of friendship, and of reconciliation between persons previously estranged from each other, he has dis-

covered the true origin of the custom of sacrifice. He maintains that this conception is countenanced by the fact that it was by no means a rare thing for heathen writers to represent the gods as eating and drinking along with men ; the gods in this way honoring those men and communities to whom they were willing to be considered as peculiarly friendly. Thus Homer, in a well-known passage, represents Jupiter as participating in a feast with the pious Ethiopians. On the other hand, he gives us distinctly to understand that Jupiter refused to eat of the sacrifice presented by the Trojans on a certain occasion, because he cherished towards them only sentiments of hostility. Citations of this character might be indefinitely multiplied. It is unnecessary, we think, to do this, because we do not suppose that any reader would be likely to question the correctness of Dr. Sykes's statement on this particular point.

This author is of opinion that his theory of the nature of sacrifices derives confirmation, likewise, from those passages in which, as in Lev. xxi. 6, 8, sacrifices are called the bread of God, or the food of the offering made by fire unto the Lord. In conformity with this notion, the temple was denominated the house of the Lord, the altar was spoken of as the table of the Lord, and the priests as his servants ; the idea of a palace as the abode of a sovereign, and of a feast to which many guests were invited, and to which none would come except those whom the sovereign wished to honor with his friendship, and who themselves were anxious to maintain such friendship, being preserved everywhere. Out of this conception of the nature of sacrifices, it is also insisted that the command grew, that no other animals besides those which were counted clean, and were ordinarily used as food, could properly be employed in sacrifice. On the same ground, as has been intimated before, rested the requirement that the utmost purity should characterize the person and apparel of the sacrificer. In the same spirit, salt was directed to be used in nearly all sacrifices, because salt was everywhere regarded as a symbol of friendship. It was so regarded

not by the Jews only, but also by pagans, as is demonstrated very clearly by the frequent allusions to this point in the writings of pagan authors. Other articles ordinarily used at feasts were as commonly used in sacrifices.

On these different grounds, which we imagine we have exhibited with sufficient particularity, Dr. Sykes judges that his theory of sacrifice is sufficiently well established. Sacrifices were festive observances, shared in at once by Jehovah and by men, in token of friendship, either such as had never been broken or such as had been restored after a period of mutual estrangement.

Let us now turn and consider the manner in which Dr. Sykes disposes of the theory that sacrifices were of a strictly expiatory character, designed either to be in themselves of the nature of vicarious punishment, or to be symbolical of a real vicarious atonement. He cheerfully admits that this theory has been very generally accepted. It has been received not only by Jews and Christians, but by pagans. But Dr. Sykes, without hesitation, rejects this theory. He contends that no intimation is anywhere given in the Old Testament that the life of the victim presented in sacrifice was meant to be a substitute for the life of him by whom it was offered. This notion, as he avers, came into vogue at a subsequent period. It has been, it is true, very commonly entertained, but it was entirely unknown to the writers of the Old Testament. The life of the animal was not required by the Almighty, under the notion of its constituting a proper atonement for the sin of the worshipper in every instance of sacrifice; and therefore, it is argued, this ought not to be conceived to be the case in any instance, unless an express declaration to that effect is made. But such an express declaration, Dr. Sykes maintains, can nowhere be found in the Bible; and for this reason, if no other, the orthodox theory of expiatory sacrifice cannot be thought to be countenanced by the scriptures.

It is also argued, that if the life of the sacrificial victim had been meant to be considered as a substitute for that of

the offender, then the act of sacrifice would have been complete as soon as the victim had ceased to live. There could have been no necessity for any of the numerous ceremonies with which all sacrificial observances were required to be attended. There could have been no propriety in any such ceremonies. Why should it have been ordained that the blood of the victim should be sprinkled in so many different places? Why should various parts of the victim have been waved hither and thither? Why should the flesh have been required to be burned, either in whole or in part? If the sacrifice was expiatory, if the life of the victim was a substitute for that of the transgressor, the entire significance, the whole value of the sacrifice, lay in the simple act of putting the victim to death. Nothing beyond this would have been required to be done.

It is not, in the judgment of Dr. Sykes, by any means a satisfactory answer to this last argument, to assert with Grotius and others, that blood is a convertible term for life, that the blood represents the life, and that the various things which were required to be done with the blood were only such as were needful to give complete efficacy to the act of slaying the victim. There were many other ceremonies practised, which cannot be at all satisfactorily explained on the theory of Grotius.

It is to be considered, besides, that nowhere in the scriptures are sacrifices directly defined as substitutes, or equivalents, or compensations. The vicarious import of sacrifice is a point not of positive and explicit affirmation, but altogether a matter of inference. His own theory of sacrifice, as Dr. Sykes conceives, if not directly laid down, is yet very plainly implied in the Bible; and it is not right, he says, to reject his theory, and set up another in its place, in regard to which so complete a silence is observed in the scriptures. The doctrine of expiatory sacrifice is of such a character; there is something in it so repugnant to all our finer instincts, indeed, to our whole moral nature, that it is not to be entertained except on the strength of the most positive arguments in its behalf.

We cannot but think now, in opposition to this reasoning of Dr. Sykes, that instead of there being an antecedent presumption against the theory of vicarious sacrifice on account of an alleged repugnance to our moral nature, the real presumption is altogether in its favor. On the supposition of the soundness of this theory of expiatory sacrifice, of its entire harmony with our finer sensibilities, the alleged absence of any positive inculcation of this doctrine by the sacred writers is precisely what we might have anticipated. The expiatory theory was assumed as true. It is not sufficient to prove that sacrifices are not positively declared in the scriptures to be of an expiatory character. Before this theory can be rejected, it must be positively asserted that sacrifices have not this expiatory nature. The burden of proof rests with the objector to this theory and not with its advocates.

There are, indeed, as is admitted by Dr. Sykes, a number of statements in the Levitical law, which might be supposed to imply the expiatory theory. It is said, for instance, in Deuteronomy xxi. that in the case of a man found slain by some unknown person, the elders of the city, nearest to the spot where the alleged murder was committed, were directed to sacrifice a heifer; and after they had made solemn affirmation over the lifeless body of the victim, that their hands were not stained with the blood of the murdered man, the sin of blood-guiltiness was considered as altogether removed from them and from the people of the city. Dr. Sykes disposes of this case by alleging that, properly speaking, no sacrifice was performed in this case. Though an animal was put to death, the essential feature of sacrifice does not appear. The animal neither in whole nor in part was offered on the altar. Another passage of similar import with the one just spoken of, occurs in the tenth chapter of Leviticus and the seventeenth verse. It is declared in this passage, that the sin-offering was given to bear the iniquity of the congregation, to make atonement for the congregation before the Lord. The ground taken in respect to this passage is, that the sin-offering here spoken of cannot be proved to be intended as a

substitute for the congregation. The phrase "bearing the iniquity of the congregation" signifies nothing more than removing this iniquity, taking it out of sight; and this is accomplished not by a transfer of the sin from the congregation to the victim, but, on the contrary, it was brought about by the repentance and the reformation of the evil-doer. There is no satisfactory evidence that bearing the sin of another, and taking upon one's self the punishment of the sin of another, can properly be regarded as convertible phrases.

The case of the scape-goat is generally regarded as a good illustration of the doctrine of expiatory sacrifice, and as one of the strongest arguments, perhaps, in its favor derived from the Bible which the advocates of this doctrine are in the habit of bringing forward. The sins of the children of Israel were represented as placed on this goat. It was said to bear all their iniquities to a land not inhabited. Dr. Sykes evades the whole force of this illustrative argument by the assertion that the scape-goat was in no proper sense a sacrifice. It lacked the indispensable feature of a sacrifice. Its life was not taken and its flesh was not consumed upon the altar. The act of bearing away the sins of the congregation was simply a parable acted out before the eye. It was merely the emblematic removal of their sins from sight. It was nothing but a sign that these sins were removed; that is to say, were forgiven. It was not a representation of an act of atonement, and of the pardon of sin on account of such an atonement.

In a word, Dr. Sykes is not willing to concede that any of the passages referring to sacrifice to be found in the Old Testament can properly be interpreted as inculcating the substitution of the sacrificial victim in the place of the offender's literal punishment. "When," he says, "a sacrifice was offered to Jehovah, with the constant attendants, repentance and confession, it did remove the anger or displeasure of God conceived against the sinner." But then, as he argues, it is not affirmed, it is not even implied, that in the case of sacrifice life was given for life, or blood for blood;

nor indeed is any explanation attempted of the method by which God's displeasure was averted from the transgressor. The scriptures content themselves with the mere statement of the fact, that displeasure had in some way been averted.

Still further on in his Essay, Dr. Sykes takes occasion again to deny that sacrifices were intended to serve as expiations, or that they were of the nature of equivalents or compensations. He alleges that while the weak or the ignorant might attribute to sacrifices such a nature, — might imagine their significance to be that of a prayer on the part of the offender, that the evil which he had merited might fall upon the head of the victim, — yet no sooner did this idea of the meaning of sacrifice come to prevail among the Jews, than the prophets condemned it in the most earnest and even pungent terms, and most sternly reproached the Jews for entertaining, even for a moment, an idea of the nature of sacrifice at once so unfounded and so pernicious. In cherishing this idea, they, in fact, left wholly out of sight the proper purposes of sacrifice. They attempted to establish a righteousness of their own, and refused to submit to the righteousness of God. They forgot that all sacrifices irrespective of the moral condition of the worshipper, or when regarded as anything else than expressions of penitence, of humility, of anxiety for the restoration to men of God's favor, were not only altogether inefficacious, but were positively most offensive to the Divinity. It was not, in any instance nor to any extent, the sacrifice in itself which served as the condition of pardon. It was the disposition of the sacrificer alone which had this effect.

It is urged again, in reference to the same point, that sacrifices do not have, and ought not to be expected to have, the effect of changing the mind of God, of appeasing his anger, of rendering him propitious and merciful when before he had been of an opposite temper; such an expectation, it is argued, dishonors Jehovah. It gives a wholly wrong idea of his character. It virtually denies to the Almighty one of the most conspicuous and glorious of his perfections. No

change can occur in the mind of Jehovah. The disposition which he cherishes at one time he cherishes at all times. His readiness to forgive the penitent offender no influence whatever can have the effect of strengthening, and no influence can weaken it. Whenever, therefore, a transgressor penitently acknowledged his sin, he was at once forgiven. He may, indeed, have offered a sacrifice; but the sacrifice was not the ground on which he was forgiven. The sacrifice was merely the expression of his willingness to be forgiven, to be again in friendship with his Maker. It was the feast which he had prepared to be participated in by his Maker and himself as a token of amity once broken, but now restored. The sacrifice had nothing in it of the nature of expiation. It derived its whole virtue from the character of the feeling which it betokened on the part of the worshipper. It did not produce, it was not intended to produce, any change in the mind of God. The only change of which it was even emblematic, was the change which had gone on in the mind of the sinner from a state of hostility to a state of love for his Maker.

The writer of this Article cannot help remarking in respect to this reasoning of Dr. Sykes that both of the erroneous notions which he so earnestly condemns are condemned just as earnestly and decidedly, and, we may add, just as consistently, by the advocates of the doctrine of expiatory sacrifice as they are by himself. No one supposes, not even the most strenuous upholder of the doctrine in question, that such sacrifices are of any efficacy whatever, unless they are accompanied by repentance and by humble confession of sin on the part of the worshipper. The pungent language of condemnation in which sacrifices and burnt-offerings are spoken of in the fiftieth Psalm, in the first chapter of Isaiah, and in other places, are as easy of explanation on the theory of expiatory sacrifice as they are on the opposite theory. They present no difficulty whatever. Sacrifices are not supposed, by any sober-minded theologian, to produce any change in the mind of God. Their only effect is, to render it consistent with

the character of God and the welfare of his government to give outward expression to feelings to which his mind had never, for a moment, been a stranger, to exhibit in act his readiness to forgive a penitent. In fine, we admit with the utmost readiness, that sacrifice unattended by penitence and reformation is altogether useless. We contend, however, with equal earnestness, that repentance and reformation, though complete, are, without expiatory sacrifice, just as worthless.

It is, we may go on to remark, a very obvious defect in this theory of sacrifices as developed by Dr. Sykes, that it fails to give any adequate account of the means by which an offender is reinstated in the favor of God, or of the connection sacrifice has with that reinstatement. Sacrifice is a festival partaken of by both parties in token of renewed friendship; but to the pertinent question of the means by which that friendship had been renewed it affords no answer whatever. Sacrifice, on Dr. Sykes's theory, is apparently a meaningless service. The death of an animal is not a proper method of expressing either repentance or desire for salvation. Indeed, we understand Dr. Sykes to admit that sacrifices, instead of having any true and valuable significance, instead of serving any important purpose, were simply allowed as a part of the Mosaic economy, as an accompaniment of all worship and of all petitions for forgiveness, not because there was any connection between sacrifice and the attainment of these blessings, growing either out of the intrinsic nature of sacrifice or out of that of which sacrifice is symbolical, but merely because sacrificial observances were prevalent throughout the world at the epoch of Moses, and the Israelites were allowed to conform themselves to this wide-spread usage. The doctrine of Dr. Sykes, on this point, seems to be altogether in harmony with that developed by Dr. Spencer in his work, *De Legibus Hebræorum*, an account of which has been given in a previous number of the *Bibliotheca Sacra*.

In the second place, it is, as it seems to us, a palpable defect in this theory of sacrifice, that it furnishes, neither

directly nor by implication, any satisfactory explanation of the death of Christ. Any theory of sacrifice is radically defective in which is not apparent a distinct reference to the death of Christ. Mosaic sacrifices were typical of that death; and surely no theory of the type can be accepted which fails to account for the antitype. Herein Dr. Sykes's theory is manifestly at fault. It does not explain the great sacrifice of Christ. It scarcely attempts any such explanation; and, indeed, the attempt to explain it could not have succeeded. Dr. Sykes's theory cannot be made to harmonize with the obvious significance of that death. Was the death of Christ a feast? Had it anything of the character of a festive occasion in which two parties, who had before been alienated, met and exchanged tokens of renewed friendship? Such an idea cannot for a moment be entertained.

In fine, the theory which we have now expounded, is, in our judgment, characterized by fatal defects; and, as set forth by Dr. Sykes, has not even the merit of being contended for with any special amount of earnestness or power; and we here dismiss it from our view.

There is still another theory in regard to the significance of sacrifice, which is not underserving of attention. It may not unfitly be denominated the gift-theory. We find it set forth at length in a work published in 1755, and written by a clergyman of the church of England by the name of Portall. The same theory was advocated by Taylor in the somewhat celebrated work entitled "Apology of Ben Mordecai." The theory is stated by Portall in this manner: "It became those" he says, "who, like men, had received many and great benefits at their Creator's hands, to present him back with some of his own gifts. They were thus presented back to him for an external expression of gratitude, acknowledgment of dependence, and with every pious sentiment." Men were led to accompany all their more special addresses to Jehovah, he goes on to remark, with sacrifices; and this, not only in the case of such addresses as required them to approach Jehovah with unusual demonstrations of reverence;

not only in the case of entreaties for special mercy in view of some rare necessity, whether of a secular or a religious nature, but even on all the ordinary occasions on which they had it in mind to worship the Almighty. They would be prompted particularly, to offer sacrifice when they were anxious to secure to themselves the pardon of sin. In view of such a want, they would naturally be solicitous to come before God in the manner most likely to recommend themselves to his favor. They could not address Jehovah for an object of greater moment than the forgiveness of a transgression of his law. And if sacrifices were a fitting accompaniment of their more common acts of worship, they would be especially so in the case of such petitions for pardon. "We are not then," Portall is careful to say, "to look upon the sacrifices on occasion of sin, offered before the law of Moses, as any other than men's pious endeavors, upon proper grounds and by proper means, for reconciling themselves to the offended Deity. Any other notion of these sacrifices, as including an actual atonement or pardon, would have been liable to many great inconveniences and most dangerous mistakes." Men would spontaneously imagine that gifts, offered in so solemn a manner and with such impressive rites as sacrifices were commonly attended by, could not fail to introduce their entreaties for pardon with a singular advantage before God. Their supplications would thus acquire a power with Jehovah of which they would otherwise be destitute.

The advocates of this theory of sacrifice make a very careful discrimination between the gifts which supplicants before God are wont to offer even when they petition for pardon, and anything which can be considered as a fine. It is very evident, they maintain, that the sacrifices offered by Abel and Noah, and which we know were regarded by the Almighty with so much favor, derived all their acceptableness from the singular honor which they were meant to render to Jehovah; from the penitence, the right feeling in general, which they implied as existing in the mind of the worshipper. There is

no intimation that these sacrifices were intended to serve as vicarious punishment, either actual or symbolical; that they were in any sense a penalty, a satisfaction, a compensation. Neither is there any hint afforded by Moses, in regard to the sin-offerings which he prescribed, as if they were intended to serve as a penalty, a satisfaction, a compensation. They are everywhere described merely as expressions of honor and reverence for Jehovah, such as one who pleads for so important a boon as forgiveness of sin would be at special pains to manifest. In the instance of propitiatory sacrifices, God accepted the devotion, the reverential feeling involved in them, as in themselves grateful to his heart, and particularly the humble confession of unworthiness, necessarily going along with all such sacrifices, as an adequate satisfaction for the offence. Such sacrifices were not accepted, they were not presented, under the notion of fines; but, on the contrary, the right feeling implied in them as gifts, was an adequate means of appeasing the wrath and disarming the justice of God; the value of the gift, moreover, being augmented by the moral worth characterizing the mediator or priest by whom the gift was presented.

It is scarcely worth while — such is the opinion of the advocates of the theory — to demonstrate that gifts have been esteemed, at all periods and everywhere, as appropriate expressions of honor. It has been customary, therefore, as every one knows, to honor even sovereigns with such gifts. In this latter case they were intended as tokens of subjection as well as of homage. The ancient Israelites are thus described as bringing gifts to their first king, Saul, and the conduct of a certain part of the people in withholding these gifts was viewed as a symptom of disaffection. Such gifts, to whomsoever made, were meant as signs of respect, as means of securing favor, very frequently as means of averting from the giver the indignation of one whom he had offended. The acceptableness of the gift may be said to arise from the circumstance, that he who received it was relieved thereby from a certain amount of labor, which but for these gifts

would have been necessary ; and that, on the other hand, a proportionate amount of labor in the preparation of these gifts was imposed on the maker of them ; and the more choice and intrinsically valuable the gift, the greater its effectiveness in gaining the purposes for which it may have been made. Sacrificial gifts, it is argued, were presented even to the Divinity on these grounds. They were tokens of homage, of anxiety for his favor, as means of propitiation. If their reception could not be affirmed to relieve him from toil, their preparation certainly imposed toil on the giver, and thus, in proportion to the toil, were the more effective means of good.

The sacrifices of Cain and Abel are represented, in consistency with Portall's theory, as gifts. The words used by Moses and other sacred writers in designating sacrifices have the significance of gifts. They frequently have this name applied to them in the New Testament and by the Saviour. He gives commands to those who would bring their gifts, their sacrifices, to the altar ; and in the Epistle to the Hebrews, it is said that "every priest is ordained to offer gifts and sacrifices ;" and they are spoken of as those who offer gifts according to the law. The acceptableness of these gifts depended, in no slight measure, on the character of him by whom they were made. It was the difference of character, in the instance of Cain and Abel, which gave rise to the very different respect entertained for their sacrifices by Jehovah. We see this strikingly exhibited in the sacrifice required of the three friends of Job. That sacrifice had to be presented by Job instead of themselves ; God was willing to hear him, and to accept an offering from him, on account of his moral worth, when he would not receive an offering from his friends because of their unlikeness to him in this respect. So, under the Mosaic law, it was the priest who was to make atonement before God, by means of a sacrificial gift, for the sins of the people. And it was most imperatively required of the priest that he should be pure, holy. Everything about him, even his dress, was to be marked by the utmost purity, so as to be emblematic in the highest degree of inward rightcousness.

On no other condition could he act the part of a mediator or intercessor with any hope of success. The sacrifice which he brought was, indeed, a means of rendering him a fit mediator ; but it could not have served this purpose except as his character was adorned by a true righteousness. The only medium through which, alike under the Christian and the Jewish dispensations, valuable blessings were conveyed to men, was the priesthood. And the priests were required to bring sacrificial gifts only as means of enforcing the intercessions which, as mediators, they were expected to make.

Still further, it is urged, that all the language employed in the Bible, when speaking of sacrifice, is entirely consistent with the gift theory. Is it said, for example, that the office of the priest was to make atonement by means of sacrifice ? It should be remembered, in reply to this question, that to make an atonement, and to appease, to reconcile, to be a means of procuring pardon, are convertible phrases. We are not to suppose that atonement can be made in but one way exclusively. Whatever has the required effect, whatever leads the Almighty to refrain from the infliction of punishment, — whether it be prayer, confession of sin, repentance, self-condemnation, or amendment on the part of the evil-doer, which prompts God to pardon, — that is atonement. In this manner, the intercession of another, especially if enforced by an appropriate sacrificial gift, becomes a true and proper atonement. Is it said, again, that the life of the flesh is in the blood, and that it is the blood which maketh an atonement for the soul ? We are not required, it is answered to this, to understand the terms of a ceremonial and typical institute, such as the Levitical law, in the most direct and literal sense. There is nothing in the words just cited that points necessarily to a vicarious shedding of blood ; for this shedding of blood was required only for the purpose of removing ceremonial impurity from inanimate objects. No sin, in any other than an altogether figurative significance, could attach to such objects, and consequently no guilt, no liableness to punishment, nothing, in a word, which could

possibly give a reason for an actual, literal atonement. In those sacrifices by which an atonement was said to be effected for a sin that had been committed, this atonement was made by the shedding of blood; not that this shedding of blood, however, represented a vicarious punishment. It atoned for sin on the ground of its being typical of the shedding of Christ's blood on the cross; and it was equally typical of that shedding of blood on whatever principle Christ's death may be thought to operate for the salvation of men. This same effusion of blood was required on the additional ground of its being emblematic of the shedding of the sinner's blood, the loss of life, the destruction which he merited for his transgression. And if the shedding of blood was symbolical of vicarious punishment, and in this way atoned for sin, and was consequently indispensable to that end, how could the bloody atoning sacrifice have been in any case whatever dispensed with, as we know that it was in the case of the poor? The shedding of blood, besides, was only one feature of the sacrifice. The beneficial effect of the sacrifice was not in any instance to be attributed to this feature alone. Such, however, should have been the fact, if the sacrifice was properly expiatory. On the contrary, the value of the sacrifice lay in the circumstance of its being a gift, an expression of right feeling. This value is, indeed, sometimes said to be in the shedding of the blood; but only for the reason that a sacrifice loses its character, as such, unless the blood of the animal is shed; and also for the reason that it was emblematic of Christ's death.

It is said again of the scape-goat, that he bore the sins of the congregation. This, however, as has been stated in another part of this Article, merely signifies the removal of sin from the sight or remembrance of God — its ceasing to be an object of resentment. The goat bore no punishment; nothing was borne by him which even was typical of punishment. In other parts of the Bible the phrase "bearing our sin," means the same as procuring forgiveness. Christ is affirmed to have borne the iniquities of the people, because by

means of his intercession, enforced as that intercession was by his death, he procures the pardon of these iniquities. We may thus see that the idea of sacrifice as being merely a gift, and having the effect of ingratiating a petitioner for any object with the ruler, and thereby rendering his suit successful, is altogether in harmony with the general import of biblical phraseology when alluding to sacrifices. This phraseology does not in any instance, as a matter of necessity, import a vicarious punishment; and such an import ought not to be attached to it unless such a necessity most manifestly exists.¹

We are next to inquire how the nature of the priestly office is to be understood in the light of the theory of sacrifice which we are now examining. Under the patriarchal dispensation the head of the family, as being the owner, strictly speaking, of the property from which the gifts were to be taken, was of course the one by whom they were to be offered in the sacrificial service. The very relation, also, in which he stood to his children and the household made it fitting that he should act as mediator in the presence of Jehovah. The sacrifices presented by these patriarchal priests were, in the strictest sense, their own gifts. Whatever amount of toil or expense or self-denial they involved were all the priest's. Identified, as the head of a family must necessarily be, with the family, its wants, its sufferings, its sins, and the duties consequent upon these, became, in a very important sense, his. In this way, when offering sacrifice in view of a transgression, perpetrated not indeed by himself literally, but by another, the patriarch might still be said to offer the sacrifice for himself, for a sin of his own; and thus the efficacy of the sacrifice in turning away the anger of God might be affirmed with the utmost propriety to be dependent on the state of mind cherished by himself while performing the sacrificial rites. Ordinarily, no sacrifices could be presented which did not involve more or less of

¹ It is hoped no reader will fail to observe that the writer of this Article is stating here the sentiments of another, and not his own.

pecuniary cost, more or less of suffering and self-denial. These were essential elements of a true and effective sacrifice; but, at the same time, they are not to be regarded as the real condition of its acceptableness. The state of the sacrificer's mind rather served as such a condition.

The priestly office, as it existed under the patriarchal dispensation, may be viewed as the type, the representative, of the priesthood of Christ, rather than of the priestly office under the Levitical dispensation, for the reason that the patriarchal priest was more nearly identified with those in whose behalf he acted. So the priestly office of Christ is represented in the Epistle to the Hebrews. He partook of our flesh and blood, that he might become in a higher and stronger sense our High-Priest.

The nature of the priestly office under the Mosaic dispensation was in some respects different. The office was transferred from the heads of the different households to one high-priest, or to a society of priests, who might be said thus to perform their priestly functions in the name of their head, and to act in his place. Between priests thus situated, and those in whose behalf they acted, there could not, of course, be that identity of interest which existed, as we have seen, under the patriarchal dispensation. The Levitical priests compensated for the lack of this natural qualification for their office, such as belonged to the patriarchal priests, by a variety of what may be spoken of as legal qualifications, which we need not, however, specify particularly in this place. And especially that qualification for the priestly office which grew out of excellence of private character was made to depend, in the case of the Levitical priests, on legal, ceremonial merit, such as might exist independently of private excellence. This merit the priest could always possess; so that the numerous families and tribes, as the representative of which he served, need sustain no loss on account of defect in his personal character. In short, the priests were the bearers of the sacrificial gifts from the congregation which were designed to enforce such intercessions as they

presented; and their chief qualification for this work was either their literal or their ceremonial purity.

All sacrifices, it should be carefully noted, are viewed in their proper aspect only when viewed as typical of the sacrifice of Christ. Those who contend that sacrifices are nothing but gifts are obliged to show that, even when thus defined, they are still properly typical of Christ's sacrifice. The advocates of this theory are not disposed to decline this task, however unsuccessful they may be in its execution. They argue, and argue logically enough, that God would devise no scheme for the deliverance of men from the consequences of their transgression that was not wholly in keeping with the reason of things,—that was positively abhorrent to our instinctive convictions as to what was becoming to the divine nature, to our own moral constitution, and our relations to Jehovah. They then affirm, what they think is a necessary inference from all this, that for God to seek any satisfaction for violations of his law in sufferings endured by another, and that other an innocent person, is altogether inconceivable. This is not the place for any argument in reference to the soundness of this reasoning. Our only task is to give a sketch of the arguments of others. We are not to suppose, they go on to argue, that God ordained the sacrifice of Christ as the means of human salvation because sacrifice had been one of the most prominent features of all previously existing forms of religious worship. On the contrary, the method of human salvation through the death of Christ was devised first, and the sacrifices, alike of the patriarchal and Levitical dispensations, were instituted that they might correspond to, and be typical of, that death. This divine method of salvation was devised, it may be added, because of its intrinsic fitness for the end in view, and altogether independently of every human scheme or preconception; and no features can in any way be supposed to belong to this method, except such as have this intrinsic adaptedness to the proposed purpose.

Hence we are, as it is argued, to regard the idea of the

substitution of the sufferings of Christ in the place of the punishment deserved by the sinner as being wholly out of harmony with what we know of God's character and with our own moral constitution. On the other hand, the conception of the sacrifices as gifts simply, — such as were intended to recommend to the divine favor the man who asks for the pardon of his own iniquities, or intercedes for the forgiveness of others, or such as were meant merely as an appropriate expression of right moral feeling, — this conception is wholly in unison with our moral convictions. All sacrifices, when we estimate their character through the medium of these convictions, are gifts of extraordinary value, acts of self-denial of unusual importance, such as indicate in us a consciousness of a more than ordinary need of the favor petitioned for, a wish for its bestowment more than commonly intense, or a conviction unusually deep of our unworthiness, and of the greatness of that mercy at whose prompting we anticipate that the favor will be given us.

The sacrifice of Christ thus explained, as in fact his mediation on our behalf, enforced, rendered acceptable by his pure character, and especially by his death, the *gift* of his life, is seen to be an altogether reasonable transaction; it is wholly in accord not only with the character of Jehovah, but with men's instinctive convictions. We do wrong, it is argued, to seek for any better explanation of it, to attempt to force it into harmony with a few evidently figurative expressions in a ceremonial law, or certain barbarous practices of ignorant pagans.

It has already been intimated that the patriarchal sacrifices and priesthood were a more exact image of the sacrifice of Christ than were the Mosaic sacrifices and priesthood. This thought may not improperly be somewhat expanded in this place. The real significance of sacrifice, it is alleged, is seen with more difficulty on account of certain forms of expression which were not known before the time of Moses, but which came into use along with the introduction of his ritual. Among these expressions those relating to the shed-

ding of blood, and making atonement by the means of blood, have been already alluded to. The shedding of blood is essential, indeed, to the performance of the sacrifice, it being, of course, impossible to sacrifice an animal without shedding its blood; but it is not to be considered as really an element of the significance, the effectiveness, of the sacrifice. Its effectiveness resulted exclusively from its nature as a gift. Now, because so much more is said by Moses in regard to the blood than is said about it in accounts of the patriarchal sacrifices, it has come, not unnaturally perhaps, to be felt that the shedding of the blood was the chief element of sacrifice. In this manner very erroneous ideas have been formed in regard to the fundamental idea of sacrifice; and, what is still more unfortunate, our views of the significance of Christ's death have come in many cases to be very erroneous. If the attention had been directed more exclusively to the patriarchal sacrifices, which are more generally represented as gifts, and in the description of which little comparatively is said of the treatment of the blood, these wrong conceptions would perhaps have been avoided, and the true meaning of the death of Christ would have been more clearly perceived. The writer of this Article can but remark here, that it would seem to be much more reasonable to regard the Mosaic ritual as designed to perfect the ritual of sacrifices as it existed in the patriarchal age, to clear up its obscurities and to remove the defects which rendered it ill adapted to an age somewhat more cultivated; and that, consequently, the new phraseology which is found incorporated in it, and the new and more varied rites which it prescribes, are to be regarded as signs of a more perfect religious system, rather than the reverse,—of one which developed more clearly the mind of Jehovah in relation to the methods of human redemption.

It should be particularly remembered, the advocates of the gift theory go on to argue, that the priests in the patriarchal ages offered sacrifices either for themselves individually or for those with whom, by virtue of natural ties, they might be considered as almost identical; while under the Levitical law

they acted in the name of many others, and presented the gifts of many others. This was an invariable feature of the Mosaic dispensation. Properly speaking, the sacrifice is the gift of the priest, offered by him with the view of rendering his mediation more effectual. Now the sacrifice and priesthood of Christ correspond much more nearly to the idea running through the patriarchal than to the idea of the Levitical priesthood. Having assumed our nature, he became, as it were, literally identified with men. He brings as a sacrificial gift that which was most emphatically his own gift; he offers up his own life, that by this means his intercessions may the more certainly prevail with the Almighty.

The advocates of the gift theory are at great pains, also, to show that the chief object of Christ's descent to the earth was not to reveal to men a new and better system of religious truth, nor to place before the mind a better example of moral goodness. There is surely no necessity of expanding the train of argument by which such positions as these are sustained. No controversy exists in regard to them. Orthodox divines are wholly in agreement with their opponents on such points as these. But very soon this agreement ceases to exist. The advocates of the gift theory contend, indeed, and with good reason, that the alleged purposes of Christ's incarnation were only the subordinate ones; that, comparatively speaking, his only errand on the earth was to act as an intercessor for men, or, to state the matter more accurately, to prepare himself thus to act. His death is to be regarded merely as a means to that end. It was the great argument, by means of which he could add effect to his mediation for men. The idea of his death's possessing aught of the nature of an atonement, in the significance ordinarily attached to that word in theological discourse, is considered as at once unscriptural and absurd. No necessity exists, as it is maintained, for anything being done which shall take the place under God's government of the punishment due to an offender. But in all this reasoning of the advocates of the gift theory, it appears to be forgotten that there are certain ends of which

the sinner's punishment is an indispensable condition ; and that an injury is done when that punishment is remitted, such as cannot be computed, unless some expedient shall be adopted whose moral effect shall be the same with that designed by the infliction of the penalty. The supposition that, under a literally perfect government, like that of Jehovah, repentance and amendment of life, enforced as they may be by supplications and by mere sacrificial gifts, however costly, are a proper equivalent for punishment, cannot for a moment be entertained.

Certain expressions occur not unfrequently in the Bible which merit a brief consideration on account of their bearing on the theory we are now examining. The sinner is said, for instance, to be redeemed or ransomed. Captives are redeemed from bondage by the payment of a sum of money. The ordinary meaning of this term is, indeed, too plain to be misunderstood by any one. We are said to be redeemed when we are delivered from some great calamity by the means of expense or suffering on the part of another. And, in the instance of an offender against God, the pregnant question is, by what means he can be redeemed from that anger to which he has become obnoxious. Now no one, it is alleged by the favorers of the gift-theory, can redeem a transgressor by enduring the penalty in his stead ; no one can give to the violated law a satisfaction in kind. The sinner cannot be reinstated in the divine favor on the ground of justice. It must be, it is argued, simply on the ground of favor. "A proper person, by means of intercession, accompanied with gifts or with proffers of service, must interpose"; and the measures which are thus used, whether they be mere labor or prayer or suffering, for the sinner's deliverance, these are the means of his redemption ; they are the sacrifice, the gift, by which that redemption is effected. The death of Christ redeems men from the curse of the law only on the principle that his death adds force to his intercession. That death is a sacrifice only in this way. God is strictly just in redeeming sinners in this method. Men are not ransomed

by the death of Christ directly, but only subordinately; it being simply a condition of the efficacy of his intercession. In truth, the death of Jesus plays only an inferior part in our salvation.

Another term is very frequently used, if not in the scriptures, at least in theological discussions, in reference to the point now in view. This term is "satisfaction." The proper significance of this term we understand to be this; those who are placed under a law satisfy that law when they fully comply with its preceptive part, or failing to do this, endure the penalty which it affixes to disobedience. Literal satisfaction cannot be rendered to a law except in one or the other of these forms. An adequate satisfaction is rendered by means of an atonement, of an act performed by another, whose effects shall be identical with the infliction of the penalty. Those who espouse the gift theory, however, maintain that if an offender against good law can avail himself of the intercession of another whose character and services shall be such as to give effect to his interposition, such a procedure satisfies the law. It constitutes a valid atonement. It is a sacrifice for sins in the only sense in which that term can be used properly, — that of giving valid reason for refraining from punishing an evil-doer.

The term "imputation" is explained by the advocates of the gift theory in this manner. Jesus Christ has assumed our nature, and by this means has become in effect one with us, and exhibits in his person a strictly spotless example of moral virtue. In the contemplation of a spectacle so pleasing as the unsullied purity of the man Christ Jesus, the sins of those who are united to Christ are relatively unnoticed. Those who share in the same nature with Christ are supposed to share in the same moral excellence. The righteousness of Christ may thus be said to be imputed to them; and on this ground it becomes strictly just in God to justify those who believe.

In respect to the affirmations of the Bible, that we are justified by Christ, that we are sprinkled by his blood and

thus washed from our sins, it is maintained that these are merely figurative expressions, or else are based on a theory of vicarious punishment for which no support can be found in the Bible. The actual significance of these various phrases is simply this, that we are saved from the consequences of our sin by the intercession of Christ; and, as the shedding of his blood was what gave special effect to his intercession, we are said to be saved by his blood; and, as the shedding of blood is an essential feature of a sacrifice, we are said to be saved indirectly by the sacrifice of Christ, just as really saved as if we had been always free from sin.

The remark may very fitly be made here, that if this mode of explaining the language of the Bible so as to make it harmonize with the gift theory is justifiable, it must be so on the principle that the orthodox theory is to be assumed as false and absurd, so that it is strictly impossible it should be taught in the scriptures. If the language employed in the scriptures does not teach the latter theory, no language can be found that shall teach it.

We bring this account of the gift theory to a close by simply saying, that our aim has been to exhibit that theory rather than to confute it. We may be thought also, as it is possible, to have gone farther into a discussion of the significance of Christ's death than was proper in an Article devoted to the subject of sacrifices. The very close connection of certain aspects of the gift theory with the mediatorial work of Christ will, perhaps, afford a sufficient excuse for what may seem to be a digression from our main subject. We hold to the canon which we have already laid down, that any true theory of sacrifice must harmonize with the significance of Christ's death. The true theory of the type cannot be in conflict with the true theory of the antitype.

We pass, in the next place, to a brief account of the views advanced by the late Frederic Dennison Maurice in reference to the nature of sacrifice. We must premise, however, that Maurice is one of that class of writers, the readers of whose pages are by no means always certain that they catch his

real meaning. Though possessed of eminent gifts, he seems to have lacked the power of always expressing himself clearly. Should any one, therefore, who reads what we have to say in reference to his theories, imagine that we have done him injustice, that we have imputed to him errors which he never held, we beg that our mistake, instead of being charged to a want of charity in us, may be charged to that peculiarity of Maurice's style to which we have just adverted. The work to which our remarks particularly relate is the one entitled *Sermons on Sacrifice*, published in 1854.

The object which Maurice proposes to himself in these sermons seems to be to trace the gradual development of the nature and significance of sacrifice, as brought out in the scriptures, from the sacrifice offered by Cain and Abel to the completion of the history in the crucifixion of Christ. We shall endeavor to follow him through some portions of this historical sketch that we may bring out to view some of his peculiar and, as we conceive, altogether groundless notions.

He starts, of course, with the sacrifice of Cain and Abel. His denial of the divine origin of sacrifice is very positive. No command to worship God in the use of sacrifice ever came from the lips of Jehovah. The silence of the scriptures as to any such command is an adequate ground for the belief that none was ever uttered. The fact that Cain and Abel were prompted to offer sacrifice is to be ascribed not to their having received any command to that effect, but to a suggestion,—to, what Maurice styles, a revelation in distinction from a decree,—which they in some indefinable manner recognized as divine, and to which, as enjoining what was in itself reasonable and in harmony with their moral sentiments, they were disposed to render prompt obedience. The distinction which Maurice draws between a divine command and a divine suggestion would not seem to be one of any very great importance. If in some intelligible form it was made known to Cain and Abel that they ought to offer sacrifice, then, we conceive, that a sufficient warrant for such a service had been given.

The offering presented by Abel was accepted by Jehovah ; that presented by Cain was not accepted. The ground of this distinction we are not to seek, as Maurice argues, in the circumstance that the material of Abel's sacrifice was such as he had been commanded to use, and the material of Cain's sacrifice was such as he had been commanded not to use. There is no allusion in the narrative to any command on the subject ; and we are not at liberty to assume its existence unless we are in some way assured of its having been uttered. Nor is there any warrant for the supposition, that prior to any explicit information on the subject,—information of which no trace is anywhere discernible,—the fruits of the earth might not have been regarded as equally proper with the flesh of animals to be offered in sacrifice. We cannot suppose that there is anything in the nature of these fruits by which they would be rendered unfit to be used as offerings ; especially as we know, that at a subsequent period, explicit commands were given for such a use of them. The difference in the material of the sacrifice, used respectively by Cain and Abel, is to be ascribed to no other cause than the difference of their occupations. There does not appear to have been any specific intention on the part of Abel to obey a divine command in respect to this, nor the lack of such an intention on the part of Cain.

The unlikeness in the acceptableness of their offerings at the hands of the Almighty we can explain, Maurice asserts, in an entirely different manner. Abel, in compliance with a heavenly suggestion, such as chimed in happily with his natural impulses, brought an offering of the firstlings of his flock. He presented it with a childlike confidence in God, as one who knew the helplessness of the creatures he had made, and who was ready to accept the homage which they rendered to him, whatever might be the outward form in which they were disposed to proffer it, so that it were only honest and sincere. Abel's distinct consciousness, that in all this he was acting an honest part, that he was expressing the grateful reverence of his mind for Jehovah in such a

form as he truly believed to be fitting, that he was trying to secure to himself the divine favor by such means as he had grounds for supposing were appropriate, took away from his mind all doubt in regard to the acceptableness of his sacrifice; and it was nothing but this consciousness which rendered his offering acceptable. This consciousness was his faith; and it was not, as it seems, a faith in God, not a faith in a future Redeemer; it was simply a faith in himself — his distinct recognition of his own inward rectitude.

Cain brought his offering with a very different temper. He brought it at the impulse of slavish fear. He felt that he had, in some way, to gain to himself the favor of God; but he knew not what method to adopt. He would have been glad to be relieved from the necessity of seeking help from any quarter and by any means. He shrank from the humiliating sense of dependence which such an effort implied. He was angry that he could not maintain a proud independence. He does not seem to have honestly believed that any method he could employ for gaining the favor of Jehovah would be really efficacious. He cherished no trust in his Maker. He felt that the mind of Jehovah was as empty of all good-will towards himself as he knew that his mind was empty of all true love and obedient sentiment towards his Maker. In this sullen, distrustful, angry mood, he presented his offering. Is it wonderful that a sacrifice presented in such a manner and in such a spirit should have been rejected? It is not at all surprising that Cain should have felt sure that his sacrifice would be rejected; and that, as the result of this conviction, his countenance fell and he became very wroth the instant that the fact of this rejection was made known to him.

Maurice would have us believe that the case of Cain and Abel is an impressive illustration of the truth that the consciousness of being helpless, the honest wish to render to the Almighty grateful homage, and the confidence one may cherish that his worship will be acceptable, make up all the qualification one needs who would rightfully worship God,

or would successfully ask for any help of which he may feel the want. Any gift presented at the impulse of such a spirit makes up a sacrifice with which God will without doubt be pleased. No other faith than what is implied in such a spirit can be required. It was the humble confession of dependence and trust in the Infinite Being from whom his life came, which, as Maurice insists, made Abel's offering so grateful to his Maker. Cain, on the contrary, was proud. He felt that he had something to give which even God ought to consider as valuable, and for which even God ought to cherish a species of gratitude, and render an adequate return. He regarded Jehovah merely as omnipotent, as having a control over his present condition and his future destiny from which he was vainly, as well as wickedly, anxious to free himself; and the only purpose which he aimed at was the selfish purpose of deriving aid from heaven. His temper, in a word, was wholly selfish and mercenary.

We are not, then, to imagine that the sacrifice of Cain and Abel had about it anything of an expiatory character. It had no particular reference to sin. It was not presented as a means of averting the displeasure of God. It implied no anticipation of the future advent of a Redeemer. There was nothing in it properly to be regarded as emblematic of the sacrifice of Christ. It was only a manifestation of reverence and gratitude, on the part of Abel certainly, to the divine Being, and of a desire to have the favor of that Being.

The sacrifice offered by Noah is to be regarded in no other light than as a manifestation of the very peculiar feelings which the extraordinary scenes through which he had just passed could not but call forth in such a mind as his. He had just witnessed, in the flood which had devastated the earth, a most impressive exhibition of Divine power and justice. These scenes could have had no other influence than greatly to deepen his fear of God, his consciousness of dependence, his wish henceforth to be and to do everything which he could even conjecture would be pleasing to the Divine Being. He must have felt, at this moment, as if he

was summoned with peculiar energy to render homage to Jehovah, and to render it not in his own name only, but in the name of the race to which he belonged. Almost the only survivor of that race, he must have conceived himself now to be emphatically its representative. In the solemn relation in which he was thus standing, he seems to have regarded it as among his chief duties to offer sacrifice. We are to consider the more elaborate preparation which was made for this sacrifice, especially the erection of an altar, as being demanded by the peculiar solemnity of the occasion, the offering of a sacrifice in the name of the entire race by one who now served as its representative. There would seem to have been required of Noah, and along with him of all men who were afterward to live upon the earth, in view of all which God had just done before their eyes, an entire and cordial surrender of themselves to the Almighty; and of such a surrender the sacrifice now offered by Noah was a fitting expression. It was an avowal, also, of his fixed purpose ever to cherish and to act out the reverent and obedient spirit which such a surrender necessarily implied. That the flood which had just devastated the earth was a manifestation of divine anger; that the sin which had led to that manifestation ought to be repented of; that, possibly, even the flood had not exhausted the anger of God towards human iniquities, and that another expression of that anger was to be feared, and should, if possible, be averted; and that this sacrifice of Noah was the best atonement he could present with a view to ward off the divine displeasure,—these were thoughts which, however spontaneously we might suppose they would occur to a devout mind, Maurice does not for a moment seem to have entertained. He intimates, indeed, that the offering of sacrifice was an act, in the general, in concurrence both with a divine suggestion and with the better instincts of our nature. But, it may well be asked, did no other sacrifice, than those simply expressive of reverent homage and cordial self-surrender suit with such a suggestion? No event could take place in the history of a human being

of a more startling character than the commission of sin — none in regard to which a deeper anxiety ought to be felt. It might surely be supposed that to offer sacrifice as an emblematic atonement would have been the first service to which Noah would have turned, and such the present writer believes to have been the fact. The emblematic atonement, presented, as we conceive it to have been, in the same spirit with which the sacrifice of Christ would have been regarded had it then taken place, was accepted by Jehovah. It answered the ends of a real atonement. The faith which was in the mind of the patriarch was equivalent to faith in Christ, and it was imputed to him for righteousness.

We pass next to a consideration of the remarkable sacrifice of Isaac. Its explanation, according to Maurice, is the following: For a very long period Abraham had waited for the birth of a son. That birth had at length taken place. The wish of the aged patriarch, cherished now for so many years, and every year becoming to human view more and more unlikely to be gratified, is at last realized in the birth of Isaac. In what form shall Abraham give vent to the strengthened confidence, to the warmer love, to the more operative sentiment of obligation which this event necessarily awakened in his heart? A divine suggestion came to him to the effect that the only suitable form in which to embody this new order of feelings of which he had become conscious was the sacrificing of that son on the altar. We cannot, of course, appreciate the horror which such a suggestion must have aroused in the patriarch's mind. Yet he did not shrink from compliance with the divine warning. The very trust which he had been wont to cherish with relation to the birth of Isaac irresistibly prompted him now to go forward, to sacrifice his son. He was resolved to see the end; confident that when it came it would be of force to confirm that faith in God with which it seemed to be, at first, in such hopeless conflict. He would learn, through the testimony of his senses, the meaning of Jehovah in the strange command which he had given. Excited at once by a species of doubt,

and at the same time by faith, he went on to make a complete surrender of himself to Jehovah in the act of preparing Isaac for immolation on the altar; and the sacrifice of the ram caught in the thicket was the appropriate symbol of that surrender which would have actually been made had Isaac been put to death. The writer of the present Article is not aware that, in the effort to deduce from the scriptures the doctrine of expiatory sacrifice any particular stress has been wont to be placed on this attempted sacrifice of Isaac; and he has been all the more willing to set forth at some length Maurice's explanation of it, that it might appear that the latter does not always interpret wrongly the sacrifices spoken of in the Bible.

The sacrifice of the passover, or the sacrifice of all males to the Lord, and the redemption of the first-born, which was required of the Israelites, comes next under review. This sacrifice, Maurice maintains, was meant to represent the consecration of the whole Jewish nation to Jehovah; the first-born of each household being very properly conceived to embody in itself the strength, as it were, the whole vitality of the nation, and in this manner to stand as the representative of the nation. He denies that it was the purpose of this sacrifice to turn from the people the indignation of God, or to procure for them any specific benefit. It was simply an act of consecration.

The idea, indeed, everywhere pervades this work of Maurice that sacrifice is never anything but an expression of certain religious feelings; and that it is indebted for its efficacy to the purity of the feeling which it represents, and not to any element of expiation which may be thought to inhere in it. That view of sacrifices which exhibits them as experiments or means, by whose use some benefit may be obtained which the Being to whom they are offered can alone give, or some evil warded off which that Being may bring upon us, is, in Maurice's estimation, a purely pagan conception. The scriptural doctrine of sacrifice, he says, is something wholly different from this. It is, as we have before

stated, a symbolical utterance of right feeling, a dedication of the sacrifice to the Almighty. Neither, again, is it the giving up of something outside of the man. It is rather the consecration of the man himself, — a full and entire surrender of man to God as the source of all life and of all right order. By such a sacrifice man reaches a oneness with God, and in this attainment finds the true end of his being. This is the only good after which men should ever pant; and in affirming that its attainment is the result of sacrifice, Maurice must be understood as saying, that this is its result not as a sacrifice formally considered, but merely of the inward sentiment of which it is the expression. Man's salvation, thus, is exclusively of works.

We think that a tolerably correct idea of the sacrificial theory of Maurice may be gained from what we have now said. We wish, however, to dwell for a moment on his exposition of Christ's sacrifice. Not only the general character of his theory, but its defects particularly, will thus become more manifest. The entire design of the incarnation and death of Christ, that is to say of his sacrifice, was to elevate man to moral purity. And thus, when Christ is said to redeem us from the curse of the law, we are to conceive the redemption, effected in this manner, as consisting alone in the moral influence which his example is fitted to exert upon our hearts. His sacrifice redeems us only as it weakens the power of sin, and so purifies us. In like manner, when Christ is set forth as a propitiation, we are not to suppose that the end sought for is to render God propitious when he was not so before; or, what this statement in reality means, to make it consistent for God to exercise grace towards offenders. God was never otherwise than propitious. At no time was there in God's character, or in the nature of his government, anything which presented an obstacle to such unrestrained manifestation of grace. When Christ is exhibited as a propitiation, nothing is meant but that God declares through Christ that he has made peace with men. Christ's sacrifice is the medium of this announcement; not

the means by which the peace was effected. And this announcement, it should carefully be noted, is not that God can now in harmony with his righteousness pardon the evil-doer ; but simply that he is righteous, and that because he is righteous, he can and will forgive. All the redemption which man needs, all he can receive, is simply a redemption from sinful dispositions, a deliverance from moral bondage. This is effected by the assurance given in the death of Christ of God's inclination to pardon. It is also effected by our being made to believe, what as sinners we had almost lost the consciousness of, that, despite our sinfulness, we are still the sons of God. Jesus Christ by his death proved himself to be the brother of the human race, and in this way demonstrated that men, being his brethren, were sons of God. To believe this, is to believe in Christ, and to gain thereby a perfect redemption alike from sin and its consequences. The idea of an expiation, of an atonement, the idea of the necessity of anything being done in order to set aside legal obstacles to our pardon, is, in Maurice's view, entirely foreign to the genius of the gospel. Sacrifice, neither in the Old Testament nor in the New, neither in the form of type and shadow, nor in its perfect realization in the death of Christ, is to be regarded as an atonement.

It cannot be needful to point out the strong contrast between this theory of sacrifice and the one set forth in the Bible. The contrast is too obvious to require anything of this sort. It is conceived that the best refutation of such a theory is a comparatively full statement of it.

ARTICLE VII.

ROTHER ON THE LIMITATIONS OF DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE.

BY PROF. J. P. LACROIX, OF THE WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY, OHIO.

THE omniscience of God is a doctrine which has always been held not only by all branches of the Christian church, but also by all mere theists. And it has generally been taken for granted that omniscience must include a knowledge of *all* that is future. The relation, however, in which this attribute of God stands to the future actions of imperfect moral creatures, has been a matter of controversy from the very beginning, and is far from being settled even yet. The two great currents of theology, the determinists and the libertarians, have taken a precisely opposite view of this relation. The former say, these actions take place because God foreknows them; the latter say, God foreknows them because they are going to take place. Both parties, with few exceptions, hold as unquestionable both that God does foreknow such actions, and that he knows them infallibly. The reasons respectively adduced by the two parties as to the possibility of such foreknowledge, are not, however, equally good. The determinist is strictly logical in saying: God can foreknow the future actions of imperfect mortal creatures, because these actions form a constituent part of his eternal world-plan. For there is here a clearly rational nexus between the subject and the object. But it is far from clear that the libertarian is logical in saying: God can foreknow such actions without thereby precluding their freedom, seeing that he foreknows them not as pre-determined but as free. Here the nexus between the subject and the object is not only not clear, but it is absolutely inconceivable,—at least for the human mind. Free-willists do not even attempt to discover this nexus, but admit it to be one of the points which will forever

baffle finite reason. But why do they persist in believing in the possibility of such foreknowledge? Manifestly because they are driven thereto by their unhesitating clinging to the doctrine of omniscience in its tacitly-assumed, traditionally-orthodox form.

So far, then, the determinists have the advantage of rational consistency over the free-willists. Unless some other interest calls for a change of base, they can rest in the confidence that their view enables them intelligibly to follow the whole sweep of cosmical development from creation to the final consummation of things.

But is not such an interest found in the doctrine of human freedom? If this doctrine is taken in full earnest, then the notion must be given up, that all the actions of human beings can form an organic part of the eternal world-plan of God. For such a foreknowledge precludes the conception of the freedom of such actions. Such, at least, is the position of respectable authorities. We will here cite but two. Weisse says: "God knows the future in so far as it follows with organic necessity out of the past and present, but he does not know it in so far as, while resting upon the general ground of this necessity, it is yet subject to the spontaneity of the intra-divine and extra-divine nature, that is, to the freedom of the intra-divine and the extra-divine will."¹ Also Lotze, in his "Mikrokosmos," takes the same position. Martensen says: "An unconditional foreknowledge is unquestionably inconsistent with the freedom of creatures in so far as freedom admits of discretionary choice; it unquestionably precludes the undetermined, which is in fact inseparable from the notion of a free development in time. Only that reality which is *per se* rational and necessary can be the object of an unconditional foreknowledge, but not that reality which might have been otherwise than as it is; for this latter can be fore-known only as a possibility, as an eventuality."² The position here taken by Weisse and Martensen is, that the sincere admission of freedom, not only excludes a nexus between the

¹ Philos. Dogmat., i. p. 609.

² Christl. Dogmat. (2d edition), p. 249.

future actions of free creatures and a foreknowledge of them on the part of God, but, in fact, renders such a nexus inconceivable and absurd. There does not exist any condition of things, any train of causes, any complex of fruitful germs, out of which such future actions spring, from any form of physical, rational, or moral necessity or certainty. For freedom necessarily involves the possibility and the liability of alternate choice. Hence a free action can be foreknown in no other manner than as an indeterminated one among the indefinite many choices to which the will may incline. So that to hold that God can infallibly foreknow the free actions of free creatures, is to hold that he can do that which is, in the nature of the case, impossible, and hence absurd.

The alternative with which we are confronted is, therefore, either to abandon the notion of real creatural freedom (in the sense of the possibility of alternate choice), or to abandon such a conception of divine omniscience as implies that God infallibly foreknows all the free actions of his creatures. And it is equally evident that it is the second alternative that is to be preferred. At least the matter has presented itself thus to a number of recent theologians, whose ability, impartiality, and evangelical character entitle their views to a candid hearing.

No one, so far as we know, has presented the view of the divine non-foreknowledge of the actions of free creatures with more cogency and earnestness than the late lamented Richard Rothe. And it is the main purpose of this Article to enable this eminent divine to present this subject for himself, and in his own peculiar manner (so far as translatable) to the English-reading public. Some little patience will be required for the first few pages, while he is dealing with general principles and laying his foundation, but in the end these generalities will be seen to form the necessary basis or back-ground for the views insisted upon. The following is a careful but condensed translation from the revised edition of Rothe's master-work, *Theological Ethics*.³ Rothe says:

¹ *Theologische Ethik*, 2. Auf., i. pp. 212-234. Wittenberg. 1867.

“In the sense of a teleological guidance of the world’s development, the divine world-government necessarily presupposes a world-plan, ideally sketched out by the divine mind, implying that God from the beginning thought and thinks the world as that which it definitively is to be, as well as also the way upon which it is to reach this goal. The forming of this world-plan is a purely *a-prioristic* or speculative thought-process. The divine world-positing (the divine *πρόθεσις*) is simply the world-idea as genetically constructed by God in virtue of absolute speculation. It is nothing more nor less than God’s eternal speculative thought or conception of the progression of the (as yet only chaotically existing) world toward its goal in its successive passage through all its essential stadia and stations; that is, it is the conception of the world’s development, as absolutely carried out through all its factors, in the divine thought. As such, however, it is the divine intuition, not of the concrete reality of the development of the world in full detail, but only of the idea or essential truth of the same, or of its sum and substance; that is, it is an entirely abstract formula, expressed in unknown quantities, receiving its concrete fulfillment solely through the divine world-administration in time. The material or elements wherein and whereout God concretely fulfills (realizes) this, his world-plan, are presented to him by the creature (*κτίσις*) in its process of self-development out of its own God-given capabilities. This material he works upon through his world-administration in order to the carrying out of his world-plan, that is, in order to the realization of the purpose impressed upon the world in his creating of it. His world-governing is simply his absolutely all-wise and almighty activity, whereby, in the development of the world out of itself, he so guides the play of the relatively-independent created potencies, especially of the personal ones, that his world-plan is carried out by the very means of this play; that is, that his eternal world-idea is infallibly realized in a constantly nearer approximation. As the divine world-plan rests upon immanent speculative necessity, it is absolutely unchangeable, and consequently

the course of the world's development is divinely predetermined. This predetermination, however, contains nothing more than what lies in the notion of the world-plan, which is an entirely abstract formula. This world-plan settles immutably the world-goal, as well as also the organic series of logically necessary stages and development crises through which the world can be brought to this goal. More than this is not predetermined.¹ Most emphatically the individual self-determination of personal creatures is not infringed upon by the divine world-plan. For in as far as the realization of the world-goal is mediated by the activity of the self-determining² personal creature, in other words, by the moral process, and consequently is expressly conceived and ordered by God himself as so mediated,—in *so far* it is left subject to the free play of personal creatures. Thus creatural self-development (freedom) finds all necessary scope for self-virtualization, and nevertheless the realization of the divine world-plan is infallibly assured, and that too in and by means of this freedom. This assurance lies in the divine world-government, that is, in the absolute activity of the all-wise and almighty God upon the world. However fortuitous and capricious may be the play of self-determining creatural causes in the world, nevertheless God (to whom nothing unprovided for or surprising can happen) constantly embraces with his all-comprehending vision, the whole complex web of individual volitions, beholds its bearing upon the plan of his world-

¹ Im. H. Fichte (*Spekul. Theol.*, p. 641) asks: "When would the idea of a divine world-government entirely preclude the notion of freedom in the finite spirit?" And answers: "Only when the notion of absolute predetermination were a necessary one, that is, when the divine world-plan were predetermined in the minutest details, when the world-government should be a mere unfolding of this plan, and when the finite creature should be nothing more than the ready-made product of divine omnipotence."

All the notes to this Article are from Rothe. — J. P. L.

² Ulrici (*Gott und die Natur*, p. 746) says: "The working of man appears in its greatest inferiority to the creative power of God, in the fact that it can produce absolutely nothing which bears in itself even the least degree of self-subsistency. Hence it is evident that the omnipotence of God, instead of being diminished or nullified by the relative self-subsistency, of creatures, evinces in fact, in this self-subsistency its greatest triumph."

government, and has it, at every moment and at every point, in the unlimited power of his omnipotence, so that he can irresistably turn and direct it, as a whole, as is, at any time, required by its teleological relation to his unchangable world-plan. While he concedes to personal creatures the free unfolding of the capacity of self-development as implanted in them by himself, he nevertheless retains them in the hand of his all-seeing omnipotence, wherefrom, notwithstanding their freedom, they cannot escape. The *definitive* total-product, the result-proper of the collective movement of all single creatures, self-determining ones included, is always the very result willed and predetermined by him,—is his work.

But more in detail. The relation of God to the already existing world, is usually expressed by the two notions of world-preservation (including the so-called co-operation) and of world-government or administration. But the notion of world-preservation, in the sense usually given it, must, we are fully persuaded, be abandoned. The relation of this world-preservation to creation and to the world-government involves insuperable difficulties. For so soon as creation is conceived of as beginningless [which Rothe has previously attempted to demonstrate], the preservation of the world is no longer distinguishable from its creation, inasmuch as this conception of preservation rests expressly on the distinguishing of the beginning of the creature (*κτίσις*) from its continuance. This would require the notion of world-preservation to be taken in its narrowest sense, (which, however, its supporters do not mean), so that it should be distinguished from the preservation of the creature (*κτίσις*) in general; for in this narrow sense the world has of course had a beginning.

The chief difficulty, however, is, that the notion of world-preservation is also not distinguishable from that of world-governing. For there is no such thing as a mere (unchanged) continued-existing of the world, but it persists in existing only in that it incessantly develops itself; but this, its self-developing, is essentially also a being-developed by God, that

is, a being-governed by God. Hence, *in concreto*, preserving is governing. Moreover the usual notion of preservation implies a relation between God and the world, in virtue of which the latter has *per se* no positive basis, but can be regarded only as a transient phase of the absolute essence of God. With such a view, there is strictly no significancy in the proposition, that God actually produced a world in the universe. This appears more evidently still in the notion of preservation as a *creatio continua*, which, when consequentially carried out, entirely denies the reality of creatural existence. The presupposition upon which this notion rests, is, that the positing of creatural being is in turn directly also an annihilating, — that it is the positing of a mere phantasm, a something that is *per se* absolutely null. According to such a mode of thinking, no single moment of the existence of the world is really connected with its earlier or later moments, and the world, with all its actual features, is at every present moment brought forth anew by God. And thereby the reality of the causal nexus between creatural things is as good as destroyed (and hence natural science is compelled earnestly to protest against such a view).

It is not to be overlooked, however, that the notion of world-preservation as a *creatio continua* rests obscurely on the correct consciousness, that, in fact, the already posited world incessantly continues (until its full completion) to be the object of a divine activity, which is indeed essentially of a creative character. But this continuous creative activity of God as bearing upon the existing world is not preservation, but governing. The interest of religion by no means requires us to reduce the being of the already created creature in its relation to God to a mere nullity. It does, however, imperatively demand the unconditional dependence of the world upon God, and that too in its continued existence. This, however, by no means precludes a real substantiality, a relative self-subsistence of the world; all that is required is simply that God should have this self-subsistent world absolutely within his power in all its points and moments, — which is in

fact unconditionally safeguarded by his [properly defined] omniscience and omnipotence.

Our conception of creation does not at all admit of the notion of a world-preserving, in the usual sense of the term. The creature, the world, is, in our view, a really posited entity, — has a real existence. Its perishableness we maintain also, but only as relative; that is to say, it is as material, and as not yet become spiritual, that the world is a *per se* relatively null, and hence perishable existence. It is not *per se*, and as such, — and especially not as essentially finite, — that the creature is perishable; but it is perishable as yet at that point of its development at which we have empirical cognizance of it, that is, as being as yet material, and hence not yet perfected. In its completion, that is, when it has really become spirit, it is imperishable, notwithstanding its ever-enduring finiteness, and ‘has life within itself.’ So soon as it has really become spirit, it has, thereby, attained to a real immanence of God in itself; and then manifestly there can be no longer any thought of its being in need of preservation.

But the creature, even while as yet material, is only relatively null and perishable. Each single material object in the world is evidently perishable; for the continued existence of the material world is a constant alternation of the birth and death of single existences. This birth and death, however, is the very life-process of the material world as a whole. The material world preserves itself in this continuous birth and death of its single parts out of itself, and indeed by virtue of this very process. All the single parts are preserved in the whole, and the whole in the parts, as is the case with every form of organism. The material world is in fact posited, by creation itself, essentially as nature (from *nascor*), that is, as continuously begetting itself out of itself, — as a nature-organism, as an organic and (in virtue of its organization) *per se* vital totality of materially-creatural existence. Thus conceived of, it does not need, in order to its continued existence, the preserving causality of God. It is true the creature (*κτίσις*) is, also as a whole, only relatively imperish-

able, and it develops itself out of itself only its definitely determined time; but the perishableness inherent in it in this respect is not counteracted by any preserving activity of God. The material world, in fact, does away with itself of necessity by its own life process, in that it eventually absolutely destroys its materiality, and potentiates itself into a spiritual world, which is then by its very nature absolutely imperishable, and no longer in need of preservation *ab extra*, — potentiates itself into spirituality in virtue of the moral process which takes place within itself. This self-destruction is, however, the express purpose whereunto God made it. This is, therefore, a perishableness against which the material world needs no preservation on the part of God. Did it not, however, hold together long enough actually to accomplish upon itself (under the general direction of the divine world-government) this God-designed self-development, it would be a faulty work, such as could not have come from the hand of God. Now, though the world, taken as a whole, offers no place for a preserving-activity of God, still this does not by any means imply that God retired from his world after creating it, and left it to run its own course. On the contrary, he carries within its sphere with his active causality, — not, however, as a preserving, but as a governing causality. And that for the simple reason that the continued existence of the world is not of a merely inert, unchanging character, but is a progressive self-development out of itself. This development of the world is *in concreto* its continued existence; and its guidance is the purpose of the progressively-creative activity of God, as still continuing with the sphere of the already created world. As the world develops itself strictly under God's determining influence, so that its self-development is absolutely under his control, hence there results its absolute dependence on him, even in its continued existence.

These views do not in the least conflict with the thought of world-preservation as a principle, but only with a specific form of this doctrine, namely, the ecclesiastically-traditional one. The Christian consciousness calls for the doctrine, un-

der some form. It requires, however, simply and only that the continuance of our own existence be referred directly to the divine causality. To the Christian consciousness it is absolutely certain that our earthly life is every moment received from, and preserved only by God. But it is also equally certain to the consciousness of the Christian individual that this does not hold good of his existence on the whole, but only of this his material or sensuous (inclusive of the psychical as such) existence, and that the destruction of his existence *per se*, in so far as it is not perishable by its very constitution, that is, in so far as it is "immortal," is in fact not even in God's power. This suggests the religious contents proper of the notion of the divine world-preservation. This conception relates exclusively to the existence of individual world-creatures, but not to that of the world-whole; and it relates only to such world-creatures as are as yet material, and to their existence only in so far as it is as yet not really spiritual. The continued existence of individual world-creatures, without exception, is, in so far as they are material, constantly within the scope of the free determination of God. Any moment he can annihilate or disorganize them, and thus resolve them into the general organism of the universe. Their existence is, indeed, within certain limits, guaranteed by the activity of the laws of nature; but the operation of these laws is dominated by God, and they stand so elastically under his power that he can at any moment by their means destroy the existence of any and every world-creature, in so far as it is merely material. This possibility is, moreover, plainly implied by the fact that no one of all the material world-creatures is an indispensable factor in the divine world-plan. Also the continued existence of every single material world-creature stands in unconditional dependence on God, and its continued existence is absolutely caused by God. Its continued existence as material arises from the fact that God does not negate, but affirms it. When, now, in the consciousness of our sinfulness and guilt, we deeply feel how unworthy we have made ourselves of the gift of life, then we have a

proper conception of the goodness of God toward us, in that he does not cast off our material life, but still affirms it for us. Now, it is just so much, and no more, that the pious consciousness calls for in the preservation of the world by God,—it simply requires that it be conceived of as a manifestation of the divine goodness. In this sense we also hold to a divine world-preservation; so viewed, however, it is only a special phase of God's world-governing, and it is not a peculiar divine activity co-ordinate to the governing and even also to the creating of the world.

The idea of a world-government we firmly hold fast to, but we cannot admit of its co-ordination to the notion of creation; for, in our view, creation embraces the collective and concurrent activity of God in general, (also his redeeming activity). The governing of the world by God, we regard as only a special phase of the creative activity, though of course an essential one. Without this doctrine we could not hold to the unconditional dependence of the world upon God,—namely, in view of our position, that the creature really has existence in itself, and that consequently, in its development, it really develops itself out of itself,¹ and does not simply mechanically uncoil a series of movements which were, in its original position, predisposed or predetermined by God as necessary. Along-side of this vital activity of the creature *per se* stands the thought of the divine world-government. The constantly-flowing movement of the world in the unfolding of the vital potency inherent in it as a living organism, is absolutely dominated, that is, teleologically guided by God,—it is, in virtue of his active guidance, a sure movement toward the definite goal set before it by him,—is a development of the world out of itself, such as constantly approximates it toward the goal implied by the very

¹ Dorner (Jahrb. für deutsche Theol., iii. p. 594) says: "In positing the living, God posits a self-positing object, a product which is itself productive, an act which is active; and instead of being true that God limits his omnipotence by imparting a causality to objects which he is not, he becomes, in fact, a productive causality only by this pretended self-limitation, which is however, really a virtualization of his power, and an enlarging of his scope of power."

constitution of its nature. Without the divine activity of God upon the natural development of the world it would not be capable of attaining to its God-set goal. Such is the idea of the divine world-government.

A difficulty presents itself, however, so soon as we apply the idea of the divine world-government to the actions of personal world-creatures (i.e. within the sphere of our earthly-world, to human beings),—in view of the fact that the actions of personal beings, in the very nature of the case, proceed from personal self-determination. For as the divine world-government presupposes a world-plan, and as such a plan implies a divine predetermination of the world's development, it would seem, at first view, that thereby the personal free self-determination of personal world-creatures were inevitably precluded. Such a predetermination, in the sense usually implied, manifestly precludes the possibility of effectual personal will-determinations in such creatures; and the impossibility of such will-determinations involves the psychological impossibility of personal will-determinations on the whole, at least, for all such as know of such divine predetermination. For, indeed, who would, with a clear consciousness, be willing to make efforts which he knows to be utterly superfluous and ineffectual! Now, the traditional but obsolete make-shift at this point is this, that God's eternal foreseeing of the future free actions of personal creatures is called in to the rescue. God is represented as basing his own eternal world-plan upon his certain eternal foreknowledge¹ of all the future workings and activities of his (yet to be created) creatures, and more especially of the future free actions of such of them as are personal. By this course, however, the knot is not disentangled, but only rendered the more perplexing. For it not only does not enable us to safeguard creatural freedom, but it forces us, at the same time, to sacrifice also the freedom of God himself, reducing him to a dependence on his personal

¹ The expression "foreknowledge of God," is not at all a happy one, as it is very liable to misapprehension and misapplication. There is a foreknowledge of God in no other sense than in that of a forethinking (*a priori* thinking), and relatively, of a foredetermining.

creatures, utterly inconsistent with his absolutism. In the case of a being such as the personal creature, and especially in the case of man, before having attained to his moral perfection, the divine foreknowledge of his actions necessarily¹ precludes his freedom, so soon as we take this term in its full sense (that is, as the capability of choosing between contradictory forms of self-determination). For in such personal creatures freedom has not as yet become absolutely identical with (moral) necessity (which it of course can become, and which it in fact is, in its true perfection, or as true freedom); in other words its character has not ripened to its definitive perfection, and consequently there must inevitably as yet cling to its freedom some degree of capriciousness. Any pretended freewill-act of such a creature, which can be foreseen with unconditional (and it is such alone that we here mean) certainty—even though the foreseeing one be God himself—becomes, by this very condition, an unfree, necessary one. So long as my freedom is not as yet ripened beyond all caprice or subjective discretion, I am really free only when I can say, I could, just as I am, and as precisely this same person, have chosen and acted, in this particular case, also otherwise than as I have done, though of course not with the same ease or, as the case may be, difficulty. If God infallibly foreknows with apodictic certainty, all the actions of men, then these actions must be absolutely certain beforehand; but (seeing that, as being partially discretionary, they cannot rest absolutely on inner necessity) they could be absolutely certain beforehand only through a divine predetermination; but this would not only preclude the free self-determination of man, but also make God the author of sin. That which in God's knowledge stands objec-

¹ Weisse (*Philos. Dogmat.*, i. p. 609) says: "The affirmation of an unconditional foreknowledge of everything yet to come, notwithstanding that it is made with as much assurance as by Augustine himself (*qui non est praescius omnium futurorum, non est utique Deus.* — *Civ. Dei.* v. p. 9), is, say what one will, nothing else than positive and glaring determinism, — a determinism which precludes the freedom of God, when the affirmation is applied to the future acts of God, and which annuls creatural freedom, when applied to all the acts of creatures."

tively fixed, cannot be for man, in his present unperfected state, a matter of free determination; the absolute foreknowing on the part of God of the actions of as yet not perfected personal creatures is unavoidably a predetermining of the same.¹ It is in vain to seek to evade this consequence by resorting to the formula, that God foreknows the free actions of creatures expressly as free.² This formula contains a self-contradictory assertion; for the free, in so far as it is as yet discretionarily (capriciously) free, can, as such, not possibly be foreknown in an absolute and infallible manner. It cannot at all be an object of a proper, that is, an unconditionally reliable foreknowledge, and consequently also not of the divine foreknowledge. Of course we do not mean that the free does not admit of any precalculation whatever. On the contrary, any intelligent judge can conjecture beforehand, of any given moral subject, the manner in which he will act under given circumstances, and that, too, with all the greater certainty the more accurately, on the one hand, he knows both the subject and his environment, and the more fully, on the other, the said subject has already approached the completion of his character-development. But so long as the subject has not attained to perfect completion, that is, to a perfectly ripened moral character, this calculation can never lead to anything but probabilities, greater or less; but not to an infallibly correct result, and consequently not to one that is apodictically certain. And of this latter alone we are here speaking. Such an approximate precalculation of the free actions of personal creatures lies, of course, in the capacity of God, and indeed to the highest degree, so that for him all possibility of deception as to the degree of the probability of such precalculation is precluded. And he undoubtedly puts

¹ Martensen (*Dogmat.*, p. 413): "Whatever can be an object of an eternal foreknowledge, must be based in a law of eternal necessity."

² Müller (*Sünde*, 3. Auf., p. 289) says: "If, in using this formula, the idea of freedom is taken in real earnest, then it does not solve the problem, but simply proposes it. For the real question is, in fact, this: Whether God can infallibly foresee the future actions of free creatures, or eternally foreknow them, without by that very circumstance making them necessary?"

this capacity into full application, both in the forming of his world-plan and in his world-governing; this, however, does not amount to a properly so-called, that is, to an apodictic, foreknowledge.

To the question, how indeed such a foreknowledge as to the future actions of creatures could be possible to God, no other answer has been found than a resort to the statement that the divine foreknowledge of the future is not of a calculating character, as with man, but is intuitive, and that it can be such for the reason that it is of an eternal, trans-temporal character. This answer, however, is entirely unsatisfactory; for the divine foreknowledge is of an intuitive beholding character only as being speculative. To say that it is not a calculated foreknowledge can only mean that the thinking whereby it is reached is not limited by a lapse of time. The difficulty remains, therefore, wholly unremoved; for, unquestionably, thought can foreknow with absolute certainty only the absolutely necessary. And it is equally inconclusive to say, that because the knowledge of God is eternal and trans-temporal, therefore an intuitive knowledge of the future is possible. For, if a trans-temporal knowledge is conceivable at all, it is so only as a knowing through pure, or speculative thinking. But if intuitive thinking is taken in such a sense as not to be a knowing through pure thinking, then any trans-temporal beholding or knowing is, to us, at least, a meaningless word.

We must, therefore, regard it as settled, that the as yet future actions of unperfected personal creatures cannot, in the very nature of the case, be the object of any infallible foreknowledge whatever. And for this reason it does not in the least detract from the absoluteness of God not to predicate of him an absolutely certain foreknowledge of such actions.¹

¹ Im. H. Fichte (*Spekul. Theol.* p. 644): "So certainly as a change in the world really takes place, it must be valid also for God, and for his consciousness, in so far as he is the highest intelligence; that is, he must know the past as past, and the future as to come." — Vatke (*Menschl. Freiheit*, p. 479): "Did not the antithesis of past and future exist for God, he would not be capable of knowing temporal things correctly; that is, he would not be omniscient."

Knowledge differs, necessarily, according to the degree of the difference of its objects. God knows, in virtue of his omniscience, only that which is *per se* a possible object of knowledge; just as, also, by virtue of his omnipotence he cannot do everything, but only that which in the nature of things is possible. Even as it is *per se* impossible to cause that that which has been shall not have been, etc., so is it *per se* impossible to know that which in the nature of the case cannot be known. This non-knowledge or non-ability is in no sense a defect or imperfection on the part of God, seeing that the pretended objects thereof do not belong to the possible objects of the divine omniscience and omnipotence. Such a foreknowledge as we here deny, would, in fact, on the contrary, introduce an untruthfulness into the knowledge of God. For truth is the agreement of a conception with its object. Whoever, therefore, conceives the as yet necessarily undetermined and not absolutely about-to-be as definitely and absolutely about to be, his conception has no objective truth. In fact, the denial of the freedom of God is an unavoidable consequence of the hitherto prevailing attempt to solve the difficulty here in question by a resort to the doctrine of the divine omniscience. For, if God foreknows absolutely, definitely, from all eternity, absolutely everything, then this involves the necessary assumption that from all eternity absolutely everything stands fast in an absolutely objective manner, and is consequently absolutely necessary. And, notwithstanding that it may be said that it is through God himself that absolutely everything stands thus from all eternity absolutely fast, still this does not safeguard the freedom of God; it simply declares that God himself has from all eternity subjected himself to an unchangeable necessity,—that he has himself enthroned a *fatum* above himself, and consequently has divested himself of that which is an essential attribute of his own nature. The fact is, free natural actions can be known in no other manner than as simply possible.

And it is as clear as the light of day that the attempt to

reconcile the eternal world-plan of God and the will-freedom of personal creatures by appealing to God's eternal, absolute foreknowledge of the free actions of such creatures, inevitably (however unintentionally) destroys the absolute independence of God. If we conceive of the freedom of personal creatures as really the capability of choosing among contraries, and if we conceive of God as determined in his forming of his world-plan by his foreknowledge of the manner in which they will choose, then we make the thinking and willing of God in laying this world-plan dependent on the (by nothing determined) discretionary choice of free creatures. According as we conceive of the choice of even a single free creature as in any single case deciding in this or in some other way, such choosing will condition an entirely different series of consequences, and hence occasion an entirely different course of world-history; and inasmuch as we, according as the world-course is different, must also conceive differently of the plan of the divine world-government (which cannot differ from the world-course), hence we manifestly make the plan of the world-government to be modified, thus or so, from eternity, by the free actions of creatures. This position is, in fact, taken in express words by the notorious formula whereby the attempt is made to safeguard the freedom of moral creatures by a resort to the divine *πρόγνωσις* and *πρόθεσις*: 'It is not because God has foreseen it that thou hast done this or that; but because God foresaw that thy free choice would decide for it, he has taken this thy action into his eternal counsel, and made it a part of his world-plan.' Now, this assumption really involves a total reversal of the relation of dependence between God and the creature.

Thus the attempt at safeguarding the absoluteness of God against a merely imaginary danger actually results in sacrificing it altogether. And, in general, this attempt is based on a view of the relation of God to the world which would imply that God had reserved to himself, during the entire course of world-history, only the tedious *rôle* of an idle spectator.¹

¹ Martensen (Dogmat., p. 193) remarks, that the view which excludes the con-
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The only possible reconciliation of the contradiction between the assumption of a predetermined divine world-plan and the presupposition of the freedom of the actions of personal creatures, affords, as we shall see, a perfect safeguard to the character of God. Now the actual removal of this contradiction can, of course, be effected only by relaxing somewhat from the strictness of the usual conception, either of creatural freedom, or of the divine foreknowledge. From creatural freedom, however, nothing can be given up without sacrificing it entirely; whereas, from the very nature of the case, and in the very interest of the idea of God itself, we are imperatively driven to make such a limitation of the foreknowledge of God as we have above indicated.

Moreover, the position we have here taken as to the divine world-plan and the divine world-government, is imperiously and directly called for by the very religious interest itself. For by the entertainment of any other view, the act of prayer becomes not only absurd but also a piece of thoughtlessness which would be, religiously, entirely inexcusable. The pious consciousness in its direct and absolute certainty of the real effectualness of true and properly so-called prayer, will and must, despite any and all seemingly consequent theology, unhesitatingly reject as false any and every conception of the divine world-government which admits of no scope for prayer,

ditional from the divine counsels, evinces itself thereby, "as unhistorical, in that it makes of history a merely passive reflex of the divine will." On p. 248 the same author writes: "As an unconditional foreknowledge annuls the conception of the freely-acting creature, so also it destroys the conception of God as freely-acting in history. The God who foreknows everything becomes thereby a mere spectator of the already eternally-settled and predetermined events of history, and is not the all-tempering ruler in a drama of freedom which he carries out in co-operation (or in conflict) with the freedom of his creation. Hence, unless we wish to preclude the free mutual-relation between God and the creation, we cannot regard the entire actual world-course as the contents of the divine foreknowledge, but only the eternal contents of the world-course, or the eternal truth developed therein." On p. 224, he says: "The antagonism which some have found between a free world-course whose ways are not God's ways, and the absolute dependence of creation upon the divine omnipotence, rests upon an ignoring of the truth that omnipotence is essentially an ethical, and hence a self-limiting power."

that is, which precludes the possibility of a really determining influence on our part upon the will of God and upon his guidance of the world."

Such is Rothe's presentation of the subject. The principal positions assumed may be briefly summarized thus :

1. The traditional view of divine world-preservation proceeds upon an erroneous conception of the substance of created things. Posited matter is not delusory but real. It is endowed with a relative self-subsistency, and does not, like the falling apple, need constantly to be supported by the divine hand in order not to fall back into nonentity.

2. The commonly-held notion of world-preserving should give place to that of world-governing. The world, as endowed with self-subsistency, is actively guided by God through its prescribed course of self-development toward its normal goal. This guidance is of the nature of a continued creation.

3. The creature (*κτίσις*), is perishable only so long as it remains merely natural or material, and has not as yet developed itself into spirit. When once it has passed entirely through its development-process, it will have become spirit, will be participant in the divine nature, and hence no longer perishable, nor even destructible *ab extra*.

4. The pious consciousness calls not for such a conception of the divine world-government as to imply that God actively upholds us in being at every moment, but only that he mercifully bears with our unworthiness in not actively destroying us ; in other words, that he affirms our being by not annulling the action of the organic laws in virtue of which he has endowed us with reality.

5. The notion of a divine predetermination of all things precludes effectual will-determinations on the part of the creature, and hence, renders earnest personal effort at such determinations a psychological impossibility.

6. The traditional make-shift to safeguard creatural freedom, namely, by saying that God foresees free actions *as* free, not only fails of its purpose, but also places God in an absurd relation of dependence on his supposed foreknowledge of the

manner in which creatures will act, in his constructing of his world-plan.

7. There are two essentially different phases of freedom: first, in morally imperfect beings; second, in the morally perfected. The actions of the second class can be absolutely foreseen by the Infinite Mind, for such beings will always act according to absolute right. Given a specific moral environment, and their actions will correspond thereto with moral necessity. There will no longer be any scope for discretion. They will always follow the highest motive. But the actions of the first class, so long as they have not as yet attained to absolute perfection in kind, are subject to subjective discretion or caprice, and hence can only be pre-conjectured.

8. The formula, that God foreknows future free actions *as free*, involves a self-contradiction. The free, in the sense of the discretionarily-free, cannot in the nature of the case be foreknown.

9. To predicate of God the non-knowing of future free creatural actions, is not to limit the divine omniscience. Even as omnipotence is not an ability to work the self-contradictory (e.g. that two units are as many as five), so omniscience is not an ability to know the *per se* unknowable. Omniscience knows all possible objects of knowledge; namely, all the past, all the present, and all the future so far as it is logically contained in causes now in operation, and which will not be interfered with in the future, — but nothing farther.

10. To presuppose the divine foreknowledge of absolutely everything, sacrifices the freedom of God. It implies that all that is to be is already absolutely objectively fixed, and hence, that God has absolutely chained his own hands from all eternity, having once and for all set the universe upon the grooves of necessary sequence, and having sketched out in an immutable scheme all the exercises of his freedom in which he will dare indulge himself in the whole scope of eternity.

11. The presupposition of a divine foreknowledge from eternity of absolutely everything, leaves to God, during the

lapse of the whole sweep of universal history, no other rôle than that of an idle spectator.

12. To make the divine world-plan dependent upon the foreseen actions of creatures, is to reverse the proper relation of dependence between God and the creature. This plan is, in this view, not a broad, solid road leading through the course of world-history, such as the Infinite Mind might have preferred it, but it is a narrow, tortuous, oft-interrupted outline, abounding in special provisions, trap-doors, ambuscades, checks, hedges, and other specifics, such as God foresaw would, from time to time, become necessary, in that he foresaw that here and there his creatures would choose this or that abnormal course of action.

13. The only possible method of solving the contradiction between the traditional form of the doctrine of omniscience and the real admission of creatural freedom is, to modify our conception of the doctrine of omniscience in such a manner as that it shall not include an absolute knowledge of so much of the future as depends on the choice of imperfect moral creatures.

14. The religious interest calls for this modification. On the hypothesis that the future fate of all men stands already objectively fixed in the foreknowledge of God, real and earnest prayer on the part of man becomes psychologically impossible.

A word or so in conclusion :

These views of Rothe, and of a number of other eminent theologians, must stand or fall on their own merits. It is not to be denied, however, that, on the supposition of their correctness, they shed a very wholesome light upon some of the shadowy phases of the divine world-economy.

These views save us from the lame make-shift of saying, that God foreknows free actions *as free*, without our being able to conceive how this can be possible. It thus dispels one of the *mysteria* with which theology has gratuitously burdened itself.

These views afford the strongest possible motive to earnest

personal effort in making our calling and election "sure." This calling is not sure already, neither objectively nor subjectively, neither in God's mind, nor in any other sense. It is as yet absolutely undecided. It hangs simply upon our own will. If we actually do what we can do, we shall be saved. The more we advance in virtue, the less the probability of our ultimately failing. Hence our interest in daily increasing that virtue. The work of each day makes the morrow doubly sure.

These views enable the Christian to feel, in a true and real sense, that he is a co-worker with God in the salvation of humanity. He can now give full scope to the religious instinct of prayer, and to his impulses of love in laboring to save sinners. He need no longer have the oppressive feeling that the ultimate fate of each and every individual is already fixed, in the certain foreknowledge of God, so that, do what he will, he is only helping to bring about that which is to be, anyhow. He may now have the inspiring thought that he can and may occasion souls to be saved which but for his discretionally-free activity would positively not have been saved. He now sees a new significancy in the representation that there is joy in heaven over a conversion upon earth. For this conversion is something new in the universe. It was conditioned — not *already*, and in the heavens above, — but *now*, and upon the earth, by the free action of the sinner himself in freely yielding to impressions which he might have resisted.

These views enable us to answer certain ugly questions which have puzzled and pained thoughtful Christians ever since the world began. Thus: If God foreknew that the race would fall, why did he create it? If he foreknew from eternity all the individuals who should persistently sin and be lost, why did he not prevent these from coming into being, or, at least, into sinful maturity? Why did he not let the frost of death nip all the innocent little human buds which he foreknew would, if let live, only make themselves wretched forever? The answer of Rothe is that this was not fore-

known, and that in the nature of the case it could not have been. Thus one of the darkest barriers to a rational theodicy is entirely dispelled at once.

These views help to explain the seeming changes of policy of God in the history of salvation. The Adamic covenant did not suffice to bring the race to God. When the free perverseness of man utterly baffled it in its general efficiency, God swept away the race, and made another trial in the Noachian covenant. And when this, also, had been defeated by man, he made a renewed attempt in the Abrahamic. In all these phases of history, the race is treated as a free factor. When it rejects one overture, divine mercy plans another.

Such are some of the many favorable phases of this seemingly new doctrine. It has a few apparently unfavorable ones, however, which will readily suggest themselves.

Julius Müller asked: "Will Rothe earnestly assume that the divine knowledge is subject to a constant increase, according to the will-determinations of man?" Rothe says: "I cheerfully and unhesitatingly answer, Yes!" God's knowledge is true knowledge. The sinner who has to-day yielded to grace has actually added an increment to the divine knowledge. God did not know him yesterday as a Christian; to-day, he does.

The most serious difficulty, however, is as to prophecy. How is prophecy possible, on the theory of Rothe? Several answers have been proposed. It has been urged that there is in all the prophecies of the Bible some degree of indefiniteness. Witness to this, the circumstance that many of the Old Testament prophecies are still diversely interpreted by commentators. Prophetic writings abound in symbols and figures which are of elastic application. Witness to this, the infinitely varied interpretation of the Apocalypse, even of those parts of it which relate, confessedly, to events already past. But, while prophecies usually avoid literal numbers and local details, they yet contain general and essential truth. Now, the theory of Rothe admits of a very close calculating

of the essential outlines of the future,—especially of great masses of men, of cities, nations, etc. The influences of material environment, of philosophical systems, of the dominant passions of man in general, and of the peculiarities of particular races, of literature, of art and science,—all these afford data for the general mapping out of the future, even though the future volitions of individuals lie beyond the limits of possible apodictic knowledge. Is, or is not, this enough to explain the possibility and the actuality of prophecy, and yet leave the view of Rothe intact?

But another hypothesis will be more satisfactory to many. It is this: God not only surveys through the pregnant actualities of the present the general scope of the future, but he also, as occasion requires, makes use of individuals—kings, military chieftains, etc.—as passive (and, in so far, not morally acting) instruments of his purposes. Compare the cases of Pharaoh, Balaam, Jonah, etc. That is, he providentially brings so many and such strong motives to bear upon them, that their actions fall, so to speak, for the time being, under the law of cause and effect; so that he can thus at any time, in the fulfilling of a specific purpose, bring about a specific event, or precipitate a general crisis. Thus the possibility of definite prophecies is fully given, and the field yet left entirely free for the doctrine of the non-foreknowledge of the future volitions of imperfect free creatures.

ARTICLE VIII.

DR. BIESENTHAL ON MATTHEW II. 23.¹

TRANSLATED BY CASPAR RENÉ GREGORY, LEIPZIG, GERMANY.

“And he came and dwelt in a city called Nazareth: that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the prophets, He shall be called a Nazarene (Ναζωραῖος κληθήσεται).”

“Though the synagogue has fallen, fallen deep, yet she was once in the possession of great knowledge. In her were many who waited for the consolation in Israel. And the understanding of her past, of her long vanished greatness, may afford the best means of reaching an understanding of the New Testament. The keys of the New Testament are in the synagogue, not in the profane writings of the Gentiles. Who would expect to gather grapes from thorns?”²

THERE are few theologians, or Bible readers in general, who might not be greatly embarrassed at one of the very first citations in the New Testament from the Old Testament; and that, too, a citation that should be found in several of the prophets (διὰ τῶν προφητῶν), for no trace of the passage occurs in the prophets. If this be the case with the learned or practical theologian, the embarrassment referred to increases for a missionary who wishes to preach the gospel to the Jews, and the more, because the latter are not accustomed to be easily satisfied with a half explanation, and always strike again at the plural form προφητῶν. Under such circumstances the writer may readily be excused for making a new attempt, not only, in fact, to authenticate in several ways in the “prophets” of the Old Testament these passages cited by the Evangelist, but also to dispose of still farther, and as yet less censured, linguistical difficulties, and thus, perhaps, to advance somewhat the solution of this question.

Meanwhile, before we take up the explanation of the passage,

¹ Dr. J. H. R. Biesenthal, the celebrated Rabbinical scholar, the friend and teacher of the translator, wrote this Article for a Jewish-Christian Monthly several years ago. A translation of it appeared in the Oxford Review. This is a new translation, made at the request of Dr. Biesenthal.

² From a letter by an English clergyman.

we shall attempt to present, with all brevity, the manifold efforts of those who have preceded us.

From Jerome and Chrysostom (Origen's Commentary begins only at xiii. 36) to the latest times, many attempts were made to give these words some possibly endurable meaning or suitable sense. Scarce one of the interpreters was entirely satisfied with the explanation offered by those before him; and no more with the explanation he himself gave. They conjectured that the book of the prophet in which Matthew's citation should be found was lost, and hence, that it is impossible to find it in the Old Testament canon. Farther, they suggested that the citation slipped into the Gospel through a misunderstanding of some passage in the Old Testament, or that Matthew took into account a prophetic tradition that was propagated orally, but never written down.

As for the first allegation, that a book which was in the canon of the Old Testament at the time of Matthew has since been lost, every one who is in the least acquainted with the course and history of the canon will easily perceive the untenableness of such a hypothesis. The Jews were not at all times faithful keepers of the spirit and substance, but they surely were, more than any other nation, the guardians and preservers of the word of the Old Testament. They have constantly, with the greatest self-denial and sacrifice, with the devotion of all the good things of life, yes, even of life itself, taken pains to preserve the books of the Old Testament. Countless precepts threaten the woes of hell to the copyist of the scriptures of the Old Testament if he should dare to add or leave out a syllable. "Never," says Eichhorn,¹ "has so great industry been expended upon a work of antiquity as, since the birth of Christ, upon the copies of the books of the Old Testament. Reverence for them, even in the earliest times, devised laws that the most patient industry has scarcely ever followed exactly, but which must have secured the Hebrew text from many dangers to which it would otherwise have been exposed. Without them the oldest and best among the new manuscripts would differ far more frequently from the reading which Jerome and Origen, in the third and fourth centuries, found in their manuscripts. Moreover, the industry and the exactness of the Jews cannot have been less acute and patient in

¹ Einleitung in das Alte Testament (4th edition). Göttingen, 1823, 1st part, p. 380 f.

the centuries before the birth of Christ. Genesis and Job have been copied, from the first, with such religious faithfulness that even yet the names of God, Jehovah and Elohim, in which interchange would have been so easy and pardonable, alternate most correctly; and in the later books of the Old Testament a new orthography rules, which in the probably older books of the Old Testament is not found at all." If the remark of Eichhorn upon single words be true and correct, who would be so credulous as to assume that this nation, which was so conscientious about consonants, syllables, and single words, would have let a whole book of a prophet perish? Then again, suppose that the original of the prophet from whom Matthew's citation was borrowed had perished, yet the translations of it, or at least the one by the seventy, would have preserved it among the many copies that have existed, especially of the latter. And if we passed this by, and were inclined to assume the impossible as a fact, the difficulty would be only in part removed, — the question would remain how the plural, *διὰ τῶν προφητῶν*, permits of explanation by a single book of a single prophet.

The second view — that Matthew took his citation from a prophetic tradition that was not committed to writing — is as little able to hold its ground. Long before the destruction of the Temple, the Jews with unrelenting strictness took care, not only that no apocryphal book should be bound with the twenty-four canonical books, but also that the former should by no means be laid in one and the same chest with the Old Testament. Books of this kind were seldom allowed to be in the house of a believing Jew. "He who brings into his house more than the twenty-four books of the canon, brings a destruction (*מחומה*) into his house": so reads the Talmud's saying as to Apocrypha. And in the Mishna it is expressly taught:¹ He who reads *ספרי הצוננים* (books that must be kept separate from the canonical ones) forfeits eternal life. Under such books the Talmud reckons even the Jesus, son of Sirach. With such strictness against uncanonical books, Matthew would hardly have dared to bring a citation from a book of that kind, into a Gospel which he had written in Hebrew, and, without doubt also, originally only for Hebrews.

¹ Tractatus Synhedrin, section 10, at the beginning (Berlin, 1863), Vol. iv. folio 104. The only possible correct meaning of the phrase *ספרי הצוננים* is, libri, qui extra scrinium librorum canonicorum conservandi sunt, and hence it differs from the phrase *ס' מינים* heretical books.

It is no better with the newer explanations. They say that the author of the Gospel considered the word נָצִיר in Isa. xi. 1 as equivalent to the Greek *ναζωπαῖος*. He who has the ability to write a book in the Hebrew language might well know, at least, so much as not to confound נָצִיר with *ναζωπαῖος*, and be guilty of such a mistake. Besides, this explanation does not remove the difficulty of the plural, διὰ τῶν προφητῶν.

We must notice one more method of explanation; namely, that the phrase "He shall be called a Nazarene" means the same as the words in the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah, "He shall be despised (נִבְזָה)," because all Nazarenes were despised; as Nathanael expresses it in John i. 46: "Can there any good thing come out of Nazareth?" Yet the fact of the contempt for Nazarenes may be doubted. Nathanael does not say this of Nazarenes in general; he merely suggests that, as the common belief was that the Messiah would be born in Bethlehem, no Messiah was to be expected from Nazareth. This, however, is not contempt, as expressed in the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah. Nor can we approve of the view which declares that *ναζωπαῖος* is to be derived from נָזִיר, because Christ was appointed to be a נָזִיר אֶחָדִי (Gen. xlix. 26). The fundamental idea of, and the laws for, a Nazarite are given in Num. vi. 1-21, and we find nothing in the life of Jesus to show that he fulfilled a single one of the duties of a Nazarite. Indeed, the opposite could easily be proved from Matt. xi. 19, where the Jews call him οἰνοπότης.

These difficulties are more or less felt by most expositors. Before giving our explanation, however, we take the liberty of calling attention to another difficulty, less commonly urged. We refer to the form *Naζωπαῖος*. Whether the name of the city be Nazrath, Nazzereth, or Nezer (נָזֶרֶת, נַזְרֶת, נִזְרֶת),¹ the reading *Naζωπαῖος*, which the most codices have, cannot be justified grammatically. The form נָזֶר or נַזֶּר as a segholate, has its definite modifications with suffixes; either נִזְרִי, like בְּנֵי בְּנֵי, or נַזְרִי, like מְלֵךְ מְלֵכִי, or finally נִזְרֵי, like נִבְרֵי נִבְרֵי. The ω in the form *ναζωπαῖος* cannot be explained from any of these forms.

¹ According to Hengstenberg, *Christologie des Alten Testaments*, Isa. xi. 1 (on Matt. ii. 23), Vol. ii. (2d edition, 1855), pp. 124-129, the home name of the place seems to have been נָזֶרֶת and not נַזְרֶת. And, in fact, in scripture use we find proper names of one and the same city with double endings, masculine and feminine. For example, Judg. xiv. 1, 2, הַמְּנַחֶה, and Gen. xxxviii. 12, which may come from the form הַמְּנַחֶה, and yet the Gentile noun is הַמְּנַחֶה as if it came from הַמְּנַחֶה.

Farther, before entering upon our attempted solution of the difficulties just mentioned in the passage before us, it may be permitted us to settle two points particularly. We mean, first, the importance of proper names, and the value laid on them both in Jewish and heathen antiquity; and second, the special proofs and signs of true Messiahship, which Christ vindicated for himself from the scriptures.

1. *Proper Names.*

The ancient nations showed great care in choosing and fixing the names of their children.¹ In the Old and in the New Testament we find touching and deeply moving sayings of the parents, their gushing joy, their raising their souls to the Giver of all things, at the sight of the new-born child. The name to be given to the new-born was a weighty thing, and not to be left to chance. The books of the Old and New Testament tell us that the angel of God had fixed the name before, or fixed it after, the birth of many persons who afterwards became famous. The ancient world was sublime, like her monuments, temples, statues, and symbols. All was powerful; and so, too, of necessity, were the signs and bearers of an idea, in order to express the sentiments, the faith, and the feeling in their whole fulness. It was an object of the greatest attention to make the character and being of the person correspond to his name. Hence it may be fairly asserted that in the whole Old Testament no occurrence and no person of any moment appears, whose name does not really have an especial importance, or in whose case the relator does not seek, at least for the chief persons, to make the sense of the name prominent so as to be able to weave it into the history. Not only among the ancient heathen nations, ran the saying, *Nomen et Omen*, but also much respect is paid to it in the Bible. Thus the son of Lamech received the name Noah (נֹחַ) as an omen: "This same shall comfort us concerning our work and toil of our hands, because of the ground which the Lord hath cursed" (Gen. v. 29). And Esau, in his grief at the loss of his blessing by means of his brother, cries out, "Is he not rightly named Jacob

¹ Arvieux gives us a remarkable instance in his Customs of the Bedouins and Arabians (pp. 128, 129, of German translation, Rosenmüller, 1789). The Arabians, like all Orientals, love their children very much, and even take the name of one of them. If a man named Mahomed has a son named Ali, he lays his own name aside and calls himself Abu-Ali, or Ali's father, and his wife, Ali's mother.

(יַעֲקֹב) ? For he hath supplanted me these two times ; he took away my birthright ; and, behold, now he hath taken away my blessing” (Gen. xxvii. 36). In this way, too, Abigail, the wife of the notorious Nabal the Carmelite, defends her husband to David with the words, “Let not my lord, I pray thee, regard this man of Belial, even Nabal (נָבָל) ; for as his name is, so is he : Nabal [i.e. fool] is his name, and folly is with him (וּנְבָלָה עִמּוֹ)” (1 Sam. xxv. 25). Grecian antiquity favored this view, too, and, Aeschylus, in his *Agamemnon*,¹ makes the chorus in alternate song proclaim solemnly the following weighty words :

Τίς ποτ' ὠνόμαξεν
 ᾧδ' ἐς τὸ πᾶν ἐτητύμως —
 μή τις, ὄντιν' οὐχ ὀρῶμεν,
 προνοίαισι τοῦ πεπρωμένου
 γλῶσσαν ἐν τύχῃ νέμω ; —
 τὰν δορίγαμβρον ἀμφινεικῇ
 δ' Ἑλέναν, ἐπεὶ πρεπόντως
 Ἑλένας, ἑλανδρος, ἐλέπτολις.
 ἐκ τῶν ἀβροτίμων
 προκαλυμμάτων ἔπλευσεν
 Ζεφύρου γίγαντος αὔρα.

It must by no means be supposed that this reverence for the favorable application of a name was cherished only by a few persons. On the contrary, we find in the history of classical antiquity countless traces, and sometimes detailed information, to show that the meaning of names played an important part on many and weighty public occasions. Tacitus² relates that the soothsayers prescribed many strange ceremonies at the renewal of the Capitol. Then he proceeds : “On the twenty-first of June, a bright day, the whole space set apart for the temple was surrounded with fillets and garlands. Soldiers with favorable names entered, bearing fortunate branches.”

In like manner they saw to it, that the first soldiers enrolled, and that the children used in the sacrifice-service, should have lucky names ; and, on the other hand, they dreaded the names which

¹ *Agamemnon*, line 689 sq. (edit. Enger, Leipzig, 1863), p. 47.

² *Historiæ*, iv. 53 ; *Opera* (edit. Haase, Leipzig, 1865), Vol. ii. p. 161. “Undecimo kalendas Julius serena luce, spatium omne, quod templo dicabatur, evinctum vittis coronisque ; ingressi milites, quis fausta nomina, felicibus ramis.” “Fausta nomina” were *Salvius* and *Satorius*, as, on the other hand, *Furius*, *Minutius*, and *Hostilius* were names of more evil import. Compare Lipsius in his note on this passage.

indicated sad and unpleasant things. But they went farther. The name of a man, or of a beast, who chanced to come by, often gave the turn in the weightiest matters of public business. Thus we read in Suetonius, that Augustus, as he was preparing himself to fight that memorable battle at Actium, met a man with an ass. He asked him what his name was, and received the answer that he was called Eutyclus, and his ass Nikon. Since he had the name of good-fortune, and his ass that of victory, both were honored by having their image in brass set in the temple which Augustus built upon his camping-ground after the victory was won.¹ Tacitus has preserved a like story about Vespasian. After Vespasian had finished his prayer in the temple of Serapis, it seemed to him that he saw behind him Basilides, one of the most distinguished Egyptians and the meaning of whose name, "king's son," was an omen to him that he should become emperor.²

Moreover, even in the earliest biblical antiquity we find the same reverence for proper names, and the same care of the parents at their choice is often remarked. God himself gave the first man the name Adam: "In the likeness of God made he him, male and female created he them; and blessed them, and called their name Adam" (Gen. v. 2). At other times, he fixed the name through an angel. Thus the angel announced to Hagar (Gen. xvi. 11) that she should call her son Ishmael, because the *Lord* had heard her affliction. Zacharias was to call his son John (Luke i. 13); Mary was to call hers Jesus (Matt. i. 21; Luke i. 31), because he should save his people from their sins. As men became worse, and the angels no longer stood in such direct intercourse with men about the cradles of their children, the parents themselves gave the children names, which, later, served also as family archives; for the position and the history of the parents were often expressed in these names. Jethro took the wife of Moses and her two sons "of which the name of the one was Gershom; for he [Moses] said, I have been an alien in a strange land; and the name of the other was Eliezer; for the God of my father, said he, was mine help" (Ex. xviii. 3, 4). But the mother often borrowed the name from mere accidents, when a

¹ Suetonius, Octav. Caes. Aug., cap. xcvi. 5 (edit. Jencker, Leipzig. 1734), p. 192. *Vitae Duodecim Caesarum*; "Utriusque simulacrum aeneum victor posuit in templo, in quod castrorum suorum locum vertit."

² Tacitus, *Historiae*, iv. 82, ut supra, Vol. ii. p. 177. "Tunc divinam speciem et vim responsi ex nomine Basilidis interpretatus est."

particularly prominent attribute of the child's bodily form was remarked, as in Gen. xxv. 25, or when something strange occurred in the birth, as in Gen. xxv. 26 and xxxviii. 29, 30. This custom, according to Seetzen's testimony,¹ is still retained among many nomadic Arabs. Thus he tells us, that if, for example, an Arabian woman gives birth to a child before the gate Bab-el-Duma at Damascus, she names the child Dumân, if it be a boy; Dumâh, if it be a girl. If an ass happens to be near at the birth, the boy is called Kurra, the girl Dshesh. If she observes at the birth a shooting-star, she names the boy Nidshem, the girl Nidshme; if it rains, the boy is called Mathor, the girl Mathrâ.

In the Old Testament prophets, too, the names were often full of meaning, and became symbols and signs of great events for the present, for the future, and often for both at once. Isaiah was commanded by God to name his son Maher-shalal-hash-baz, as a sign of the downfall of Damascus and Samaria, and, at the same time, as a type of great events in the future, the coming of the Son of God in the flesh (Isa. viii. 3, compare vii. 14 and Heb. ii. 13). The English Independents and Millenarians of Cromwell's time, afford us a parallel in later days. Hating everything that might recall Romanism and Catholicism, they gave their children whole sentences as first names, thus: Be-steadfast; Weep-not; Stand-fast-in-the-faith; If-Christ-had-not-died-for-me-I-should-have-been-damned. A certain Barebones had the last of these names.² Thus the spirit of the times mirrors itself, its wishes, its fears, its expectations, and its hopes, in the names. In want of historical monuments, these are often safe leaders. Judaism, especially in the later time, about the years 536-432 B.C., proves this. The proper names show us clearly what that age was doing, what it hoped and waited for with ardent desire. Their hope and their confidence in the Star of Jacob, that was promised to the fathers, expresses itself in names, such as פְּרִיָּה whom God Jehovah redeems, חֶסֶדְיָה the grace of Jehovah, רַפְּאֵלָה whom Jehovah will heal, נֶחֱמִיָּה the comfort of Jehovah, אֶלְיָהוּ unto Jehovah mine eyes (are directed), אֶלְיָשִׁיב whom may God lead back (to his native land), יוֹרְיִיב whose cause Jehovah may judge.³

¹ Beiträge zur Kenntniss der arabischen Völker-Stämme, in von Zach's Monatliche Correspondenz zur Beförderung der Erd- und Himmels-Kunde. (Gotha, 1809), 19 Bd. p. 214.

² Gesenius, Philologisch-kritischer und historischer Commentar über den Jesaja (Leipzig, 1821), 1ter Theil, 1te Abtheilung, p. 329.

Thus the names of later Hebraism appear full of hope and anticipation. They are documents of the most intimate and secret emotions. Their bearers look longingly to a time which, though still distant, seems about to open upon them, to the time when the angel announces concerning the child to be born of the virgin, "Thou shalt call his name Jesus; for he shall save his people from their sins." And in fact, at a time of vain self-righteousness, sensuality, and Pharisaic dominance, what more important could be announced than that the Redeemer would save them from their sins? To a nation, which on every occasion boasts of the merits of its father — which always says, "Abraham is our father"; to a nation which, blinded in self-righteousness, cherishes a dead sacrificial worship, and looks upon this as an *opus operatum*, the call from their "sins" must be, and that to every one that hears it, a fearful novelty and warning, and cause reflection. It is this meaning name that must be the mightiest trumpet to wake them from their sleep of sin, from their self-righteousness, to open their eyes and bring them to perceive that they were naked, and that, in spite of their temple and their many sacrifices, they were wanting in the righteousness which avails before God.

Thus the name Jesus was the first signal and the first sign that all had fallen under sin, that none of them remained untouched, that sin had the absolute mastery over them all, and that he would appear in the world to free all from this bondage. Meanwhile, this designation was not special enough to be understood by all. The means, the art, and the manner of salvation and of freeing from sin were given, yet not in the signification of the name. And now, to throw a little light over this, Matthew begins with the flight of Christ to Egypt and closes the first section of his account with the settlement of Joseph at Nazareth so that the words "of the prophets" should be fulfilled, "he shall be called a Nazorene."

2. *The Special Proofs and Marks of the true Messiahship, which Christ himself vindicated for himself from the Scriptures.*

We have attempted to show the great importance and the high value that all nations, and especially the Jews, laid upon proper names at the time of Christ. This we have done to justify the prominence of the name of Jesus, which Matthew strives for. This great importance extends, moreover, to the names of places. Classical, biblical, and Talmudical literature afford us remarkable

examples of the meaning of such names, and of the extension of it to the inhabitants. References to, and suggestions of, these names, and transfers of the meaning of the names of places to the moral, religious, or political condition of their inhabitants, are often found in the Old Testament. Thus, for example, in Micah i. 14, "The houses of Achzib shall be a lie" (בְּהֵרֵי אַחְזִיב לֹא־יִשָּׁב); in Zeph. ii. 4, "Ekron shall be rooted up" (עֲקָרוֹן הִתְעָקַר); and in Jer. xlviii. 2, "In Heshbon they have devised evil against it" (בְּחֶשְׁבוֹן הִשְׁבִּיחַ עֲלֶיהָ רָעָה).

Such allusions and explanations of proper names by paronomasia, which is peculiarly at home in the Hebrew language, were favored in the biblical age. In later times, after the Hebrew had ceased to be the language of the people, many dialects were formed under the influence of Syriac, Latin, and Greek. We wish to call particular attention here to a kind of speech which they named the wisdom-language (לשון חכמה). This was a manner of speech, now New-Hebraic, now Hebraeo-Aramaic, and now Aramaic, in which the speaker was accustomed purposely to conceal the thoughts that he wished to express under a poetical or some other odd disguise. It appears in the Talmuds only as a play on words, or a pun, and is, so far utterly different from the Grecian wisdom (חכמה יוונית), at once a secret speech and a secret written language. Proper names, both of persons and places, were especially used to make such a pun, sometimes to praise, sometimes to tease a person. In the tract Gittin, a rabbi compliments another named חסדא, by remarking, "Thy name is grace (חסדא) and thy speech is full of grace (חסדא מלן). In the Midrash¹ the question is offered: Why was the name of the prophet, Jeremiah? Because in his day Jerusalem was made an ἐρημία (desert). We may note the meaning of the name of a man from Gimso, a well-known city in the tribe of Judah, see 2 Chron. xxviii. 18. The question is thrown out: Why was the man from Gimso thus named? The answer is, because even in the hardest events and blows of life, in confidence on God, he never used to murmur; for he said, "This, too, is for good" = גַּם זֶה לְטִיבָה, because there is no misfortune that we cannot imagine that it might have been greater. Hence, from the words "This too" = גַּם זֶה, he received his title "from Gimso."

Thus we perceive a transfer of the attributes of a man to the meaning of the place of his birth. In order to approach the solution

¹ Midrash, Koheleth Rabba, at the beginning (Frankfort, 1623), folio 82.

ירמיה ולמה נקרא שמו ירמיה? שבימיו נעשרת ירושלים ארמיה.

of the theme we have undertaken, let us inquire into the Messianic marks in the scriptures, as Christ himself, and partly, too, his apostles, gave them.

Man sees with the eyes of the flesh, and finds it hard to comprehend the things of the Spirit. It is long before he accustoms himself to them and learns to grasp them. The Jews, as well as in part the disciples of Jesus, were surrounded by a Pharisaic world and ruled over by Jewish Romans; they could hope for "the salvation in Israel," for the "Star of Jacob," but never in the least were they able to hope and believe that the Saviour and Anointed of the God of Jacob would appear in poverty; and, least of all, that his end would be full of suffering and contempt. Hence we find, through the whole of the New Testament, that the Lord Jesus and his apostles had ever anew to point to his sufferings, because this passion, lasting and unbroken to its end,—yes, the fact that his end itself should be one of woe and despite,—had appeared to them altogether incomprehensible and strange.

In order to a clear view of this, we present here a number of the passages in which our Lord and his apostles treat of this point. We follow the order of the books.

Matthew: "From that time forth began Jesus to show unto his disciples how that he must go unto Jerusalem and suffer many things" (xvi. 21). "But I say unto you, that Elias is come already, and they knew him not, but have done unto him whatsoever they listed: likewise shall also the Son of man suffer of them" (xvii. 12).

Mark: "And he began to teach them that the Son of man must suffer many things" (viii. 31). "And he answered and said unto them, Elias verily cometh first, and restoreth all things; and how it is written of the Son of man that he must suffer many things" (ix. 12).

Luke: "But first must he suffer many things" (xvii. 25). "Then he said unto them, O fools, and slow of heart to believe all that the prophets have spoken; ought not Christ to have suffered these things, and to enter into his glory? *And beginning at Moses and all the prophets* (ἀπὸ πάντων τῶν προφητῶν), he expounded unto them in all the scriptures the things concerning himself" (xxiv. 25).

Acts: "But those things, which God before had showed by the mouth of all his prophets (πάντων τῶν προφητῶν), that Christ should suffer, he hath so fulfilled" (iii. 18). "I continue unto this day, saying none other things than those which the prophets (οἱ προ-

φῆται) and Moses did say should come; that Christ should suffer" (xxvi. 2).

2 Corinthians: "For as the sufferings of Christ abound in us, so our consolation also aboundeth by Christ" (i. 5).

Hebrews: "For in that he himself hath suffered being tempted, he is able to succor them that are tempted" (ii. 18; compare ix. 26 and xiii. 12).

1 Peter: "Because Christ also suffered for us" (ii. 21; compare iii. 18; iv. 13).

From these and many other passages it appears clearly, that Christ and his apostles did not declare that his miracles and wonders were foretold in Moses and all the prophets, but that his sufferings were thus given. This matter of the sufferings, the least evident and most difficult to make comprehensible to the Jews, had to be referred to again and again. How hard it was, in spite of all preaching, to make this truth evident to them appears from the seeming harshness and indignation of Him who would not break a bruised reed towards the men on the way to Emmaus. He called them "fools and slow of heart," though they only said, "But we trusted that it had been he which should have redeemed Israel."

Matthew seems to have collected the single occurrences of the life of Jesus, from his birth to his glorification, from this stand-point, in order to show how at his birth, his flight into Egypt, and his return to Nazareth, every link joins link to make a chain of suffering which should surround his whole life. Cornelius Nepos, in his biography of Atticus, boasts that the latter considered the first great gift of fortune to be his birth in the very city in which the dominion of the world should centre.¹ At least with equal right could Matthew designate the chance residence of Christ at Nazareth as the "first great misfortune," because from his chance residence many sufferings afterwards arose. It is true that in the expression of Nathanael, "Can there any good thing come out of Nazareth?" (John i. 46), we do not perceive a general contempt for all Nazarenes. At the same time, it is certain that his residence in that town, and in its province of Lower Galilee, would be of little service to him among the Jews, in recommending or strengthening the

¹ Cornelius Nepos, *Imperatorum Vitae*, Atticus, xxv. 3. 3 (edit. Tzschucke, Göttingen, 1804), p. 115. "Igitur primum illud munus fortunae, quod in ea potissimum urbe natus est, in qua domicilium orbis terrarum esset imperii ut eandem et patriam haberet et domum."

truth that he was the Messiah and Anointed of the God of Jacob. How different would it have been, humanly speaking, if the Lord had settled in Jerusalem! David himself, in the Holy Ghost, boasts of Zion: "And of Zion it shall be said, This and that man was born in her; and the Highest himself shall establish her" (Ps. lxxxvii. 5).

Thus the residence of the Lord in Nazareth was a misfortune to him, as his early flight into Egypt had been. Others, suffering in later or riper years, might at least find comfort in recalling the fortunate years of youth; but the fate of his earliest years took this comfort from him, so that the measure of his sufferings is not lightened by a consoling thought of youthful memory. The Aramaic and Syriac noun צַעַר is equivalent to the Hebrew צָעַב, pain, suffering: the verb from this in the Pael means "to bear pain or suffering" [?], to cause suffering.¹ According to analogy, as from the verb פָּחַל a proper name נִפְחָלִי is formed, so from the verb צַעַר can an adjective נִצְעָרִי be formed, with the meaning "laden with suffering and pain." Matthew, after the manner of the wisdom-language (לְשׁוֹן חֲכָמָה), that we mentioned above, seeks from the residence at Nazareth a play on the word נִצְעָרִי which sounds like נִצְרִי, so as to prove that the apparently chance residence of the Lord in Nazareth also forms a member in the great list of his sufferings, so that the words of the prophets, he shall be a pain-laden sufferer (נִצְעָרִי) may be fulfilled.

According to this view of his day, Matthew here puts great value on the proper name of the city Nazareth, so as to make a play with the word נִצְעָרִי, and thus to make prominent the sufferings as the most important mark of the Messiah, foretold in many passages of the prophets, as they were understood by Christ himself. He wished to make the beginning and the first parts of Christ's sufferings, and all to the very end, follow each other in logical order.

The Greek for *vaλῡπαῖος*, with ω, can be explained by this derivation of the adjective נִצְעָרִי from the Syriac and Aramaic verb צַעַר. It is well known that the Arameans and Syrians pronounce the Hebrew vowel "a," especially the long one, in an open syllable, always with their vowel Sekofo, the long "o." They write Odom

¹ Buxtorf, *Lexicon Chaldaicum* (Basle, 1639), pp. 1931, 1932. "צַעַרָא, צַעַרָא Dolor, Moeror anxietas, sollicitudo, afflictio et refertur tam ad corpus, quam ad animam. Respondet Hebr. צָעַב (in Pael); dolore, moerore afficere, affligere, cruciare, contumeliam officere."

for Adam, Abroham for Abraham, and Naphtoli for Naphtali. Likewise he who wishes to write such a word with Greek letters, must use the Greek ω to express the Syriac and Aramaic Sekofo. Since the whole structure of the word נִסְכֹּף is Syriac and Aramaic, we need no longer wonder that ω appears instead of the expected α in the name *vaλωπαίος*.

ARTICLE IX.

THE HOUSE OF PUDENS.

BY REV. EGBERT C. SMYTH, PROFESSOR IN ANDOVER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

Eubulus greeteth thee, and Pudens and Linus and Claudia. So writes the apostle Paul to Timothy. Of Eubulus nothing farther is known. Linus appears in the catalogues of Roman bishops. Around the names of Pudens and Claudia cluster many traditions and conjectures. Some of these it is worth while to consider.

According to Baronius, an eminent Roman Catholic historian of the sixteenth century, Pudens was of senatorial rank, and the father of two sons and two daughters, Novatus and Timotheus, Praxedis and Pudentiana. His house was situated at the foot of the Viminal hill, near the Esquiline, and was the place where Christians were in the habit of assembling.

In certain ancient documents, called the Acts of Pastor, it is recorded that Pudens, after the death of his wife, desired that his house should be consecrated as a church, and that this was done; that subsequently, at his daughters' request, a baptistery was constructed there; that these daughters gathered together their slaves, both from the city and from their country possessions, and gave liberty to those who were Christians, and exhorted those who were not to faith in the holy law of Christ, and that the act of manumission was celebrated in the *title* (church) established by Pudens; that there, also, in a time of persecution, Praxedis and Pudentiana sheltered those who through their instrumentality had become believers; and that afterwards, when the latter, and her brother Novatus also, were dead, his property, with the consent of Timotheus, passed into the hands of Praxedis, by whose request the *thermae*, or baths, of Novatus, which are described as spacious and no longer in use, were consecrated as a church, in the name of Pudentiana, by Pius (bishop of the church in Rome, A.D. 139-155). In this place, it is farther reported, Pius also consecrated a baptistery. Here, moreover, afterwards, when a great persecution arose, numbers of Christians were concealed by Praxedis, and nourished with

food and with the word of God. Pudens and his daughters, it is also narrated, were buried in the cemetery of Priscilla on the Via Salaria.

Anastasius, librarian of the Vatican in the ninth century, also asserts that Pius dedicated the *thermae* of Novatus as a church, in honor of Pudentiana. The same fact is said to be affirmed by Damasus in the latter part of the fourth century. These may be mere repetitions.

The Acts of Pastor locate the house of Pudens in the Vicus Patricius which corresponds with the modern Via di S. Pudentiana. On this street still stands a church, which is reputed to be the oldest in Rome. It is named Sta. Pudentiana, and is supposed to be located where Pudens and his family once dwelt.

The text of the Acts of Pastor is unsettled, and they are not free from anachronisms. They cannot have come in their present form, or forms rather, from their reputed author, or from the second century. Since Tillemont's learned criticism they have fallen into disrepute. The Bollandist writer in the *Acta Sanctorum* is compelled to propose alterations of the text without authority, and to suppose the existence of two persons, each named Pudens, one either the grandfather or the paternal uncle of the other. Nor does anything preserved in the interior of the present church of Pudentiana carry us back decisively to the first generations of Roman Christians.

In this state of the case light has been sought in other quarters. The poet Martial, who came to Rome about the year 66 of our era, and lived there nearly forty years, names among his acquaintances a Pudens, a Claudia — also called Claudia Rufina, and a Linus. "That Timothy and Martial should have each three friends bearing the same names at the same time and place is, at least, a very singular coincidence."

In 1723 a Latin inscription was found at Chichester, England, which proved the presence there, in the time of a native king named Cogidubnus, of a Pudens, who may have been the soldier mentioned by Martial. The poet's Claudia was from Britain. Welsh traditions connect Pudens, it is said, with the British royal family. Once on this track of happy hypothesis and ingenious combination of facts, and possibilities rapidly multiply.

Cogidubnus may have had a daughter. There would be nothing strange in her transference to Rome as a hostage, and perhaps to be educated. Her father, it appears from the Chichester marble, had taken the name of his patron, the emperor Tiberius Claudius. The daughter would inherit the title. If at Rome, what more natural than that she should be taken into the family of a recent Roman commander in Britain who had been aided by Cogidubnus. This legate's wife, Pomponia, belonged to a family, one branch of which had the cognomen Rufus. Martial's British maiden has the same cognomen, Claudia Rufina. If the latter was Pomponia's protégée, the additional name is readily explained. And this connection may give a clue, also, to her supposed adoption of the Christian

faith. For Pomponia, Tacitus tells us, was accused (A.D. 57 or 58) of having adopted a foreign superstition. She was tried, after an ancient custom, by her husband in the presence of her relatives, and acquitted. But she returned no more to the pomps and vanities of heathenism. Tacitus relates that she lived for forty years in mourning garb and perpetual sorrow, but that this anon turned to her glory. It is not improbable that her superstition was Christianity, and that Claudia, if connected with her and under her influence in the way supposed, was led by her to the same faith. When we read, in addition to all this, Martial's celebration of Claudia's personal attractions and of her nuptials with Pudens, it is evident that we have, at least, all the materials of a veritable romance — beginning, perhaps, with a shipwrecked soldier at the court of king Cogidubnus, early shifting its scene to the imperial city, reflecting awhile the gayeties and splendors of its highest circles of fashion, culture, and power, but soon deepening into the shadows of the coming conflict between the old religion, aided by the Roman state, and the new faith and the growing church, and then moving on through contrasts as impressive, and with events and motives as thrilling and inspiring, as any known to fiction or to history. Who will write for us the tale? Yet, however pleasing or exciting the romance, its historical verity is another thing. At best the story is one which, in view of the established coincidences, may fairly claim that it is not "a purely arbitrary fabric of hypothesis."¹

In the winter of 1870-71 the writer became acquainted, through the kindness of two English archaeologists, Mr. J. H. Parker and Mr. C. I. Hemans, and also of Chevalier de Rossi, Superintendent of the Roman Catacombs, with several facts respecting the house and family of Pudens, which confirm in part the Roman traditions, and are not without some slight interest in respect to the conjectural story just recited.² Strangers in Rome and foreign residents are accustomed to form parties under the guidance of some one versed in its antiquities, for the purpose of visiting and studying the more important ancient monuments. Such a party was made up at the time referred to, under Mr. Parker's direction, to examine the house of Pudens. We visited the church of St. Pudentiana, one of

¹ It is favored by Alford, Conybeare and Howson, Smith's, and also Fairbairn's Bible Dictionaries; discountenanced by Kitto's and the American edition of Smith's. Objections to the details of the story do not seem to be insuperable. The difficulty is that so much is pure conjecture. In the Acts of Pastor, the wife of Pudens, and mother of his children, is named Savinilla. The Welsh legends are said to affirm Pudens's marriage with Gladys, the daughter or niece of Caractacus.

² Some of these facts have been put into print by Mr. Parker. *The House of Pudens in Rome: A Lecture delivered to the Royal Archaeological Institute, June 2, 1871.* By John Henry Parker, C.B., F.S.A., etc. Reprinted from the *Archaeological Journal*.

whose priests in the year 499 attended a Roman synod, and was enrolled as *Presbyter Tituli Pudensis*, Presbyter of the church of Pudens. The building was repaired or rebuilt under Adrian I. (A.D. 772-795). But portions of an older structure remain. The north aisle runs back much beyond the choir and its apse. In its side toward the choir there is a slab with the inscription, SIRICIUS EPISCOPVS. Siricius was bishop A.D. 384-398. It is thought by Mr. Parker that at this time, and in that of Innocent I. (402-417), an old hall, or basilica, of a family mansion, which had been used as a church, and was called *Titulus Pudensis*, was taken down, and a new church constructed. One wall, however, was left standing, the one at the end of the north aisle, and in the rear of the choir. It is now the outer end wall of the church. To this we were next taken. According to Mr. Parker, a very competent judge, it is a construction of the first century, and a part of some "great palace." Its "large hall windows," as Mr. Parker describes them, can be readily distinguished. Made in the first century, they are now "filled up with brickwork of the second." At this time the hall seems to have been changed for some purpose distinct from its primary design. The present church "stands in the original hall of the palace." Probably long before its construction the hall itself was a place of assembly for Christians in Rome.

After pointing out the characteristics and relations of this wall behind the church, Mr. Parker conducted us to some subterranean chambers, which he is said to have first opened in 1865. The excavation was still incomplete. Climbing over piles of rubbish, and through low passages, we saw, by the light of our candles, three "long, narrow, vaulted" rooms, now opening into each other, but originally separated by brick walls. The walls are regarded as first century work; but the openings which throw together the three chambers were evidently made subsequently, and apparently in the second century. This is indicated by the construction of the arches. In the original, or first-century wall, could still be seen hot-air flues such as belong to *thermae*. The cutting the arches would have spoiled the baths. It secured an admirable arrangement for the meetings of a Christian church in troublous times. The combined chambers made a spacious room, remote from the street, and below its level. Its windows were apertures in the clere-story, and opened into an inner area. Worship could be conducted without attracting attention. The testimony of the walls and the bricks and the arches thus accords with the ancient tradition, that the disused baths of Novatus, the son of Pudens, were dedicated about the middle of the second century as a Christian church.

Mr. Parker expressed the opinion that in still another room of this subterranean portion of the traditional mansion of Pudens there was once a baptistery.

Tradition may present another point of contact with these baths. In
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Justin Martyr's examination by the Prefect of Rome (about 166 A.D.), the following dialogue is reported:

"Prefect: Where do you assemble?"

"Justin: Where each one chooses and can. . . . The God of the Christians is not circumscribed by place, but, being invisible, fills heaven and earth, and everywhere is worshipped and glorified by the faithful.

"Prefect: Say, where do you assemble, or into what place do you collect your disciples?"

"Justin: I dwell above one Martin's, at the *Timothe Bath*. . . . I know of no other meeting than his.

"Prefect: Are you not, then, a Christian?"

"Justin: Yes; I am a Christian."

In the Roman tradition the house of Pudens was the place where Christians coming to Rome were freely entertained; and in the baths of Novatus or Timotheus were held, in Justin's time, Christian assemblies.

On the Via Salaria is a cemetery called after Priscilla, the traditional mother of Pudens, which bears unmistakable signs of having been used by persons of wealth and standing belonging to the earliest generations of Roman Christians. These evidences are sufficiently indicated in Northcote and Brownlow's *Roma Sotteranea*, and need not here be specified. It may be added, however, that, in the lower story of this catacomb, imprints have been found of the seal of a PVDENS FELIX upon the cement which closes a loculus or grave.¹ The cognomen suits exactly the tradition that the Pudens family belonged to the gens Cornelia (Cornelius Sulla being the first who took the surname Felix), and the farther uniform tradition that this cemetery was their burial-place.

The traditions are thus confirmed which represent a Pudens family of wealth and distinction to have been very early connected with the Christian church in Rome. They increase so far the coincidences in favor of the identity of Martial's friends with the Pudens and Claudia of Paul's Epistle. The resemblance is one of family distinction, as well as of name, time, and place.

¹ De Rossi: *Images de la T. S. Vierge choisies dans les Catacombes de Rome*, p. 17. Rome. 1863.

ARTICLE X.

DR. BUSHNELL'S FORGIVENESS AND LAW.¹

BY REV. DANIEL T. FISKE, NEWBURYPORT, MASS.

THIS new volume on the atonement, from the pen of Dr. Bushnell, is due to "the unexpected arrival of fresh light," which required him to make a large revision of the latter part of his former treatise, *The Vicarious Sacrifice*. It is characterized by the author's well-known excellences and defects of style, and bears throughout his unmistakable image and superscription. It is valuable, if for nothing else, as a new testimony to the inadequacy of the "moral view" of the atonement which he has so ably advocated.

The central idea of the volume is developed in the first chapter, entitled, *Forgiveness and Propitiation without Expiation*. Here we find the principal modification which Dr. Bushnell has made of the doctrine of his *Vicarious Sacrifice*. Formerly he held that the atonement—including the whole work of Christ, his life and death—propitiated men only, not God. He now holds that it propitiated God as well as men. It did this, however, not by being vicarious punishment, satisfying justice, nor by being vicarious suffering, meeting an exigency of the divine government; but simply by moral reaction, or by the reflex influence of the sacrifice involved on the divine feelings. The analogon of this propitiation is found in human experience. Good men have certain moral resentments and indignations, awakened by the wrongs they suffer, which hinder them from forgiving, and which can be placated and overcome only by cost and sacrifice in behalf of the wrong-doer. "Human forgivenesses are possible to be consummated only by the help of some placation, or atonement, or cost-making." "Some alternative must be taken by the man who will truly forgive, that has power to liquefy the indifferences, or assuage the stern, overloaded displeasures of his moral, and morally injured, morally revolted, nature" (p. 48). There is a like obstacle to the divine forgiveness, which must be overcome in like manner. God "is put in arms against wrong-doers, just as we are, by his moral disgusts, displeasures, abhorrences, indignations, revulsions, and what is more than all, by his offended holiness." These antagonistic feelings are

¹ *Forgiveness and Law; Grounded on Principles interpreted by Human Analogies*. By Horace Bushnell. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Co. 1874.

placated by what God does in and through Christ to reclaim and save sinners. In propitiating them at great cost and sacrifice he is himself propitiated. Such is Dr. Bushnell's new theory of the atonement. Among the objections to it which readily suggest themselves, are the following :

1. It is not a fact that human forgiveness is universally and necessarily conditioned upon self-sacrifice. In cases of private wrong good men often forgive the wrong-doer instantly upon his repentance. They need nothing beyond Christian love to "liquefy their indifferences, and assuage the stern, overloaded displeasures of their moral nature." They do not let the sun go down on their wrath, even though the repetition of the offence and the penitence reach seventy times seven. This theory of the impossibility of complete forgiveness, except after and by means of cost and sacrifice, is a libel on the piety of some of the saintliest men and women who have ever lived to bless the world.

2. If it were a fact that men universally fail to forgive until propitiated by the reflex influence of their benevolent endeavors and sacrifices in behalf of those who have wronged them, the proper inference would be, not that the same is true of God, but that the best of men are weak and sinful, which is certainly the case. The difficulty with good men in exercising forgiveness results from their imperfections. Dr. Bushnell, himself, says that "the holiest men, who are the men most deeply wounded by wrong, forgive most easily" (p. 56). Were they still holier they would forgive still more easily ; and were they perfectly holy there would be nothing in their nature to prevent the instant and spontaneous outflow of forgiveness. Good men always feel self-condemned if they do not immediately and heartily forgive a penitent enemy, although they have done nothing to bring him to repentance. The three cases which our author brings forward in illustration of his point fail, because the difficulty which these men had in forgiving sprung from a wrong state of feeling, and their painstaking and sacrifice only served to put them into a right state of feeling. But God's feelings are never wrong, requiring to be set right by the expedient of self-sacrifice.

3. If this theory be true, it must be impossible, in many cases, for men to exercise forgiveness. We cannot always make sacrifices in behalf of those who have wronged us. We may have no opportunity to relieve their poverty, or minister to them in sickness. They may become penitent before it is in our power to show them the slightest kindness. Must we then forever retain our resentments towards them, and never from the heart forgive ?

4. This theory is based upon a false idea of forgiveness. Dr. Bushnell says that forgiveness "is a purely personal matter, — a strictly personal settlement, that, and that only." This may be true where the wrong is wholly private and personal ; but where the wrong is public, against

society, against government, a violation of law, then forgiveness includes not merely a pacification of personal resentments but the remission of deserved penalty. An earthly ruler may lay aside or overcome all those feelings of moral indignation which a certain crime awakened, and yet not be able to forgive the criminal, and open his prison-doors. The public good may demand of him the infliction of the incurred penalty. God is a ruler, and sin against him is more than a personal offence, it is a wrong to the universe; and the punishment which it deserves, the good of the universe may require to be inflicted. The divine forgiveness of sin includes then the non-infliction of the penalty annexed to the divine law, and is more than a personal settlement, and can be rightly exercised only when the public weal will not thereby be endangered. According to this view of forgiveness it is evident that the efficacy of the atonement in securing forgiveness consists not in its reflex influence on God, assuaging his resentments, so much as in its meeting an exigency of government, by making such a revelation of God that no harm shall come to the universe when he forgives penitent sinners—a revelation of God which answers the same moral ends as would be answered by the revelation of God made in the infliction of deserved punishment.

5. This theory of the atonement is dishonorable to God. Despite all that Dr. Bushnell so ingeniously says to the contrary, it virtually attributes to God moral weakness and imperfection. To say that he cannot forgive, owing to certain “unreducible sentiments that hinder his love in forgiveness he otherwise might bestow,” is really to say, either that his love is defective, or that he lacks self-control and ability to do as he would. If these sentiments are voluntary, and interfere with love, they are morally wrong; if they are involuntary, and yet interfere with love, they are an imperfection.

6. This theory of the atonement involves the worst elements of the “satisfaction theory,” which Dr. Bushnell so sharply and justly criticizes. What he calls the “moral disgusts, displeasures, abhorrences, indignations, and revulsions” which sin excites in God, old-school men would call retributive justice. Indeed, Dr. Bushnell himself, in one instance, calls the corresponding sentiments in man, “that unreducible something, that dumb agony of justice, that disallows forgiveness,” until “smoothed and soothed and taken away.” According to both theories, then, God cannot forgive sinners until in some way his retributive justice is appeased, assuaged, soothed, satisfied.

7. This theory of the atonement finds no support in the scriptures. Dr. Bushnell does not profess to have derived it from the scriptures. He first establishes his theory, as he thinks, by analogical reasoning, and then turns to the Bible to see if he can there find any confirmation of it. We may well be suspicious of the correctness of any view of the atonement which is not primarily suggested by the scriptures themselves. They are

our chief source of knowledge in regard to this whole subject. They set forth the great work of Christ, (*a*) by prophecies concerning him; (*b*) by sacrifices which foreshadowed him; (*c*) by the historic account of his life and death; (*d*) by dogmatic statements, literal and figurative; (*e*) by divinely chosen analogies. It is by studying these prophecies, these sacrifices, this history, these statements, and these analogies that we shall be likely to arrive at the truth in regard to the design and efficacy of the atonement.

Dr. Bushnell, of course, finds it very easy to prove what he once denied, — that the scriptures teach that “There is a propitiation (of God) accomplished in Christ’s life, and especially in his very tragic death, which prepares a way of forgiveness for the sins of the world.” Here he simply stands on common orthodox ground. But to prove the fact of propitiation is not to prove the *quo modo* of it. And not a particle of scriptural evidence is adduced to show that God is propitiated by the reflex influence of the cost and sacrifice involved in the life and death of Christ.

In the second chapter, entitled, Law and Commandment, Dr. Bushnell completes his revision of his former views of the atonement. This part of his revision, however, simply amounts to this, that “certain terms of our atonement language,” formerly discarded by him, now “get a qualified permission.”

In this chapter he discusses, in a very interesting, but unsatisfactory manner, the relation of the work of Christ to the law. He attempts to establish a distinction between law and commandment, but is no more successful than he was in his attempt in *The Vicarious Sacrifice* to establish a distinction between impersonal law and instituted government.

It was a singular fancy which led him to make the term “commandment” cover not only the express commandments of Christ, but “all that is commended to man’s conscience and feelings by his life and death.” In the proper sense of the word, a divine commandment, whether given by Christ or otherwise, is only a specific requirement of the law. Christ lays upon men nothing which is not included in his own summary of the law: “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and with all thy soul and with all thy mind and with all thy strength, and thy neighbor as thyself.” Love — holy, impartial, unselfish love — is the sum of what Christ requires of men, and this love, just so far as it is exercised, is the fulfilling of the law. The contrast which Dr. Bushnell draws, and somewhat exaggerates, is really between law and gospel, not between law and commandment.

The gospel gives to men no new standard of life and duty, but only restates and sets in a new and more attractive light the old standard of the law. That the gospel introduces new motives and influences to encourage and stimulate and help men in the exercise of that love which the law requires, is what no one denies. But, in emphasizing this point, Dr.

Bushnell makes what seem to be very rash and unwarranted statements concerning the law. "The law of God," he says, "is not a perfect institute in itself, and was never meant to be. . . . The law, by itself, is not expected or intended to result in any complete form of personal virtue or character" (pp. 107, 109). And yet the Psalmist declares: "The law of the Lord is perfect, converting the soul"; and Moses describeth the righteousness which is of the law: "The man that doeth these things shall live by them."

Again, Dr. Bushnell says the law "proposes to work only by penal enforcements, making their appeal to self-interested motive, and that only" (p. 109). And this is said of a law that appeals to reason and conscience and every innate sentiment of right and honor in man! He says, again, that the law "works for the most part, and must, by negative statutes, that forbid, and not by positive, that command." Whereas, according to our Saviour, the whole spirit and intent of the law is summed up in the two positive commandments, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart," and "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Dr. Bushnell furthermore says of the law, that "it brings no inspirations, and yokes its subjects to God by no faith climbing into the sense of his friendship." No inspirations for a good man in a law that embodies the idea of absolute right, and also the will of a perfect God! Did David find no inspirations in it when he wrote the one hundred and nineteenth Psalm? Did the heroes of the eleventh chapter of Hebrews find no inspirations in it? Do holy angels find no inspirations in it? There is no need to decry the law, in order to exalt the gospel. The law is "holy, just, and good." The trouble is, that men are so sinful that, with all its inspirations and appeals to their reason, love, hope, and fear, they will not obey it — will not obey it perfectly, even with all the new inspirational motivity furnished by the gospel.

The great object of this chapter is to show that "the law, broken by sin, is sufficiently consecrated by Christ, incarnated into and co-operating with it, in his life and cross; and that it is satisfied or fulfilled by the obedience rendered by those who become his disciples. With much that is true and eloquent in this discussion, there is not a little which seems fanciful and illogical.

We are surprised to see that Dr. Bushnell still misconceives and misrepresents the New England, or "governmental theory" of the atonement. He may characterize it, if he choose, as a "most sorry theologic invention"; but surely he ought better to understand it before caricaturing it as he does on page 145.

We regret that he should have gone out of his way to give even a footnote indorsement of the doctrine of the annihilation of the wicked, "at some remote period" (p. 147).

In the third chapter, entitled, *Justification by Faith*, we have a restate-

ment of the same defective views of justification found in *The Vicarious Sacrifice*. Dr. Bushnell is unquestionably right in emphasizing the moral element in justification, but wrong in wholly excluding the judicial element.

The fourth chapter, entitled, *Threefold Doctrine of Christ concerning Himself*, contains matter only remotely related to the main subject of the volume. It is really a separate discourse, founded on John xvi. 7-15. Dr. Bushnell, with "a little harmless egotism," claims to be the first man to set forth the true meaning of this passage; all the great interpreters for eighteen hundred years having, "by some unaccountable dulness, missed" it. He thinks that Christ, in announcing the advent of the Paraclete, as one "who will reprove the world of sin, of righteousness, and of judgment," gives a brief summation of what he has done for the world — the results of his life and death, which will be "the doctrinal outfit" of the Spirit who is to take his place, and through whom he is still to carry on his gracious work for mankind. We do not quite see how a simple declaration of what the Spirit will do is a statement of what Christ has done. Undoubtedly Christ, before his death, to some extent, did just these three things which he says the Spirit will do after his death; but it does not follow that the work of Christ and the work of the Spirit are in all respects the same; or, if you please, that the work which Christ accomplished in his own person in the flesh was in all respects the same as that which he accomplishes in the person of the Spirit. One part of redemption was finished on the cross, which we believe was something more than "reproving the world of sin, of righteousness, and of judgment to come." It is probably owing to some "unaccountable dulness" that we cannot quite accept the interpretation here given of this passage as the "threefold doctrine of Christ concerning himself."

Has Dr. Bushnell exactly hit the meaning of *Παράκλητος*? Is not the last part of the word — *κλητος* — passive, instead of active? And is not the Spirit thus designated as One "called near," rather than as a "Near Caller"?

If, in our notice of this volume, we have fallen into a strain of adverse criticism, it is not because we do not appreciate its many excellences, nor admire the genius and character of its distinguished author; but because we believe that it presents a one-sided and very inadequate treatment of the great central doctrine of the gospel. We trust that Dr. Bushnell's contributions to our religious literature are not ended, that a life so consecrated to earnest thought and earnest utterance may long be spared to the world, and that among the fruits it is yet to yield will be a revision of this revision, made necessary by the "unexpected arrival of fresh light"; for we are persuaded that there is still occasion for him, as well as for others, to repeat the opening sentences of the prayer with which *The Vicarious Sacrifice* concludes: "O thou God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, into what strange places, and how far away, hath our foolish

conceit been leading us. We thought we must needs make out for thy dear Son—dear, also, to us, because he hath come to bring us life—some wisely-framed doctrine, bearing the stamp of our own wise thought and science, not so familiar and so merely practical as thy choice words of sacrifice. But we have wearied ourselves in the greatness of our way. We have raised long controversies and held learned councils and contrived exact articles; and, though we have seemed to settle many things wisely, yet nothing is either settled or wise; but whatever we devise turns dry, looks empty, disappoints the craving of our wants, creating, after all, only such consent as consists in a common discord.”

ARTICLE XI.

NOTES ON EGYPTOLOGY.—NEW THEORY OF THE EXODUS BY PASHA BRUGSCH.

BY JOSEPH P. THOMPSON, D.D., LL.D., BERLIN.

BELIEVERS in the divine authority of the Hebrew scriptures should not be over eager in accepting the seeming confirmations of their story which from time to time are brought forward from Assyrian and Egyptian monuments, and from other collateral sources. Such confirmations undoubtedly exist, and in the progress of archaeological research we may confidently look for more. They are valuable chiefly as side-lights, illuminating certain incidental points in the biblical narrative, and by throwing these into clearer relief, giving an extraneous confirmation to the whole story with which these stand connected; but they should never be magnified as the central light of the story itself, the conclusive evidence of its authenticity. The trepidation of some biblical critics at the alleged antiquity of the zodiac of Denderah, and their subsequent exultation over its comparatively modern data and significance, were alike unseemly, and betrayed an undue sensitiveness to the value of such testimony upon either side. That the Pentateuch is steeped in the atmosphere of Egypt and of the desert, that its narratives breathe the air of Oriental life, and its laws and customs reflect, now the stable civilization of Egyptian society, and now the rude freedom and simplicity of the wilderness, are strong internal proofs of the historical truth of the

¹ La Sortie des Hébreux d'Égypte et les Monuments Égyptiens Conférence par Henri Brugsch-Bey, Vice-Président des Écoles Libres, Gratuites et Universelles de la Ville du Caire. Publiée sous les Auspices de S. A. le Prince Ibrahim-Pacha. 8vo. pp. 47. Alexandrie: A. Mourès. 1874.

books of Moses ; but when some single discovery, or chain of discoveries, in Egyptian archaeology is vaunted as settling the fact that the Hebrews were in Egypt, and made their exodus to Canaan by way of the desert, the exaggeration of such extraneous evidence seems to imply the previous dubiousness of the biblical narrative, and, moreover, rests its support upon what may prove to be a fancied analogy or the theory of an enthusiastic explorer. Thus the view of the Hebrew exodus lately propounded by Dr. Brugsch — formerly a Bey, now a Pasha of the Khedive — from Egyptian monuments, has been received by a portion of the religious press as if it were a new revelation accrediting the old ; and yet this theory can be maintained only by discrediting a portion of the narrative which it is adduced to confirm.

Whatever Dr. Brugsch may have to say upon such a question is deserving of most serious consideration. His *Geographische Inschriften Altägyptischer Denkmäler*, his *Recueil de Monuments Égyptiens*, his *Histoire d'Égypte*, and his translation of the Book of the Dead, *Das Todtenbuch der alten Aegypter* — the last two yet unfinished — have contributed indirectly to the elucidation of the Pentateuch, and have awakened much expectation for the promised work of the same author, *Bibel und Denkmäler*, in which he proposes to treat in detail of the relations between the Hebrew scriptures and the Egyptian monuments. The above-mentioned works, together with his *Hieroglyphisch-Demotisches Wörterbuch* and his *Hieroglyphische Grammatik*, place Dr. Brugsch in the first rank of Egyptologists, and justify his assumption of authority in matters of fact concerning the monuments and their inscriptions ; yet he has sometimes shown a propensity to theorize and to frame conclusions from insufficient data, and this causes one to hesitate in following his authority as an interpreter and leader, and to scrutinize his steps before accepting his results. His theory of the exodus, first broached in a popular lecture in Cairo, then published at Alexandria in French and in Arabic, and afterwards repeated before the Congress of Orientalists in London, has excited the hopeful interest of the religious world through the plausibility of its arguments, the seeming pertinency of its identifications and discoveries, and the fascination of its style. We are loath to dismiss it as only a theory, not borne out by the facts adduced in evidence, and for which important links are wanting ; and we are none the less grateful to the author for an attempt which we are constrained to pronounce premature and unsatisfactory.

Dr. Brugsch does not profess to have found upon Egyptian monuments any direct and positive reference to the exodus of the Hebrews ; on the contrary he clearly recognizes the improbability of the Egyptians recording upon public monuments for the information of posterity such a disaster to an Egyptian army as the Hebrew scriptures attribute to the intervention of Jehovah at that time. "Il n'est guère probable que les

Pharaons aient pris soin de rappeler, sur leurs monuments, des souvenirs qui auraient fait connaître à la postérité la défaite d'une armée égyptienne. La découverte d'une inscription quelconque qui raconterait les événements de l'Exode à l'égyptienne, ne renfermerait, probablement, que de gros mensonges."¹

Several years ago the writer of this Notice, alluding to the same point, said : " To the biblical account of the exodus itself it has been objected that there is no mention of it in Egyptian history ; but Egyptian history is as yet so far fragmentary that the absence of any clear and positive reference to such an event need excite no surprise. Moreover, nations are not accustomed to record and commemorate their own disasters ; and where the history of a nation is made up almost entirely of pictorial and monumental chronicles of its kings, prepared by their order, or that of their immediate successors, it is not likely that untoward events would find a place among the representations of victories and triumphant festivals. The galleries of Versailles exhibit the pictorial history of France in all its points of grandeur and triumph, but not in scenes of disaster. One sees there the coronation of Louis XVI., but not his decapitation ; the victories of Napoleon, his marriage, his coronation, but not his defeat at Waterloo, nor his confinement at St. Helena ; the coronation of Louis Philippe after the revolution of 1830, but not his flight from the revolution of 1848. Solferino is there ; but neither the surrender of Louis Napoleon at Sedan, nor the proclaiming William Emperor of Germany in the hall of mirrors, will ever find place upon those walls. The absence of any monument or record in Egyptian history touching the destruction of Pharaoh and his army in the Red Sea, would be no argument against the fact stated in the Hebrew scriptures. But that history is not altogether silent concerning the exodus of the Israelites."²

It is the *indirect* testimony of the Egyptian monuments to the exodus of the Hebrews that Dr. Brugsch attempts to weave together into a theory. The facts adduced are curious and significant ; some of these have been given in previous Notes in the Bibliotheca, others are of recent discovery ; Dr. Brugsch has combined them with dexterity ; but we cannot agree with him that the facts themselves " are of a character to satisfy entirely our curiosity " upon the question, nor can we accept his construction of them as conclusive. The points of the investigation are thus concisely stated by Dr. Brugsch : " First, Moses having obtained from the Pharaoh of his time permission for the Hebrews to go into the desert, there to celebrate a feast to Jehovah, set out with his people from the Egyptian city Ramsès ; secondly, he led them, station by station, through several places of Egypt to the sea ; thirdly, that the Hebrews

¹ pp. 7, 8.

² Lecture on Moses in the " Boston Lectures " for 1871, pp. 120, 121.

crossed the sea dry-shod, while the army of Pharaoh that pursued them, composed of chariots of war and horsemen, was swallowed up by the waters of the sea. And the question is, whether the Egyptian monuments and their inscriptions have preserved any traces that have reference to these events, and if so, whether such monumental traditions agree with the historical narrative given in the sacred books.”¹

Dr. Brugsch first turns his attention to the Pharaoh of the Exodus, whom he identifies with Menephtah I., the son and successor of Ramsès II., whose reign commenced about 1341 B.C.² The grounds of this identification have been brought to the notice of the readers of the *Bibliotheca Sacra* in previous numbers of these Notes, and it will be sufficient to summarize them here. (1) Ramsès II. built the city of Ramsès in the delta, near the water, between Egypt and Palestine. This capital rivalled Memphis and Thebes in the splendor of its temples and palaces and in the abundance of its luxuries.³ (2) The Hebrews are mentioned in sundry papyri as employed upon the public works at Ramsès, under the supervision of Ameneman, captain of the guard, who is known to have held this office under Ramsès II. The evidence upon which Dr. Brugsch here relies is the well-known series of reports, in the Museum at Leyden, concerning “the rations supplied to the soldiers and to the Apouriou (or Ebouriou) who haul stone for the great fortress of the city of Ramsès.”⁴ This text shows, certainly, that workmen of a foreign race were employed in building Ramsès; and another scrap of the papyrus says of these workmen that “they make their tale of bricks, day by day, without relaxing their toil.” Such allusions, taken in connection with the well-known picture of the brickmakers, working under taskmasters with whip in hand,⁵ vividly illustrate the story of the Hebrews, and show that the historian of the Exodus had before him a truly Egyptian scene. But the reading of *Apouriou* as the Egyptian transcript of *Hiberim* has not yet received a sufficient *consensus* of Hamitic and Semitic philologists to be accepted as final. The probabilities are that Messrs. Chabas and Brugsch are correct in regarding this as an explicit mention of the Hebrews at work in Ramsès, confirming in a remarkable manner the biblical narrative, that the Egyptians “did set over them taskmasters to afflict them with their burdens. And they built for Pharaoh treasure-cities,

¹ p. 7.

² See *His. Canon Chronologique* in Brugsch's *Histoire d'Égypte*, i. 291.

³ See the description of the city given by a poet who witnessed the entry of Ramsès II. into his new capital. — *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Vol. xxii. p. 686. Chabas, *Mélanges Égyptologiques*, No. 2, and Maspero, *Du Genre Épistolaire chez les Anciens Égyptiens*.

⁴ See *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Vol. xx. p. 882, and Vol. xxi. p. 666.

⁵ See plate in Wilkinson's *Ancient Egyptians*, Vol. ii. p. 99.

Pithom and Raamses.”¹ But we are not yet prepared for the confident and sweeping conclusion of Dr. Brugsch: “If Ramsès II. is the Pharaoh who built the city of Ramsès, he was necessarily the contemporary of Moses. The years of this king’s reign, numbering sixty-seven, accord perfectly with the age of the Jewish legislator, who, an old man of eighty, led forth the Hebrews under the reign of the son and successor of Ramsès II., Menephtah I. Thus indisputably do we identify Ramsès II. as the Pharaoh of the Exodus, as the founder of the city of Ramsès, and as the oppressor of the Hebrews, whom the texts of his epoch designate by the name of the Epriou.”² But, as Karnac at Thebes was the growth of successive reigns, so public works, requiring many laborers, may have been carried on at Ramsès long after the foundation of the city. Louis Napoleon built a new Paris; Victor Emanuel is creating a new Rome. Hence activity in building alone does not determine the reign of Ramsès II. as the date of the exodus. But the time of the exodus, and the Pharaoh under whom it took place, are here of secondary importance; it is the route of the Hebrews on their way out from Egypt with which Dr. Brugsch’s *brochure* is chiefly occupied.

Some of his proposed identifications are curious and striking. The first in order is that of Ramsès with Zân, the Zoan of the Hebrew scriptures. The Museum of Egyptian antiquities at Boulaq contains a number of statues and tablets, excavated, under the direction of Mariette-Bey, from the extensive field of ruins in the vicinity of Lake Menzaleh known under the name of San. Several of these represent Ramsès II. and record incidents of his reign; and there are two statues, in particular, covered with hieroglyphic texts which acquaint us with the fact that this king gave his name to Tanis, which he adopted as his capital. Zan was built upon both sides of the Tanitic branch of the Nile, which at that time was large enough to admit sea-going vessels to the harbor of the city. This identification sheds light upon a passage in the seventy-eighth Psalm: “Marvellous things did he in the sight of their fathers, in the land of Egypt, in the field of Zoan.”³ Zan was apparently the name of a nome or district, as well as of a city. If Ramsès was but a later name of Tanis, then we have ascertained the point of departure for the exodus⁴ considerably farther to the north than has been hitherto supposed, and a location which would require that the vast multitude of the Hebrews should cross the easternmost or Pelusiatic branch of the Nile on their first day’s march to Succoth. This is the second identification of Dr. Brugsch. To the east of Tanis, between this and the desert, was the district known to classic authors as Séthroïtès, and which appears upon Egyptian

¹ Exod. i. 11.

² p. 16.

³ Verse 12, and again verse 43, “wonders in the field of Zoan.”

⁴ Exod. xii. 37.

monuments under the name of Thuku or Thukut. Dr. Brugsch gives several examples of the change of the Egyptian sound of *th* into the sibilant of the Hebrews and the Greeks, e.g. Tebennuter = Sebennytyos; and hence he infers that Thukut was Soucoth or Succoth; and, curiously enough, this Egyptian district of Thukut had a chief city of the name of Pitom. And, as a coincidence still more striking, among the papyri in the British Museum known as the Anastasi collection, is one which reports the arrival of certain Bedouin tribes of Edom, to whom, in time of famine, permission had been given to settle on the border of the lakes of the city of Pitom in the district of Soucoth.¹

The next identification is so elaborate that it can be appreciated only by placing before the reader an exact translation of Dr. Brugsch's argument: "South of the two governmental districts, the capitals of which were Pitom and Ramsès, was a third district lying adjacent, which the Greeks called the Arabian nome, designating as its chief place a city called Phakusa, Phaccussa, Phacusai, or Phacussan. Arabian authors, retrenching the final syllable of this name, adopted the Greek appellation, and hence it is that, even to-day, this city figures on the map of modern Egypt under the name of Faqus. In the official lists engraved upon the monuments, especially on the foundations of the temples, this same city appears under the name Gosem, which in no way differs from the Goshen of the holy scriptures, which the Septuagint renders now by Gesen, then by Gesem, once with the addition Gesem of Arabia, that is to say, the Arabian district of the geographical lists. According to a usage of the Egyptian language long since recognized, it was allowable to supply geographical names designating cities and countries with the article of the masculine gender, Pha, as if we should say Caire and Le Caire. In this manner is to be explained the composition Pha-Gosem (*the* Gosem) of the Greek and Arabic names for the city Phacussan, -a, -ai — Faqus, which the Coptic books transcribe Qous, without the article."²

Though this identification of Faqus with Gosem is novel, and perhaps fanciful, the determination of the district of Goshen is not new to scholars; and so long ago as 1838 Dr. Robinson had collated the views of modern geographers to the effect that "the land of Goshen lay along the Pelusiæ arm of the Nile, on the east of the Delta, and was the part of Egypt nearest to Palestine,—though Goshen probably extended farther west and more into the Delta than has usually been supposed. This tract is now comprehended in the modern province esh-Shūrkiyeh."³ This identification of the Goshen district has every probability in its favor; but it creates a difficulty with Dr. Brugsch's previous identification of Ramsès, as will be seen by glancing at the map which accompanies his

¹ Bibliotheca Sacra, Vol. xxii. p. 686.

² pp. 24, 25.

³ Biblical Researches, Vol. i. sec. 2. For a good map of this district, see M. de Lesseps' Carte de l'Isthme de Suez, and Kiepert's Neuer Hand-atlas, No 34.

pamphlet. Faqus lies in latitude $30^{\circ} 45'$ longitude $29^{\circ} 27'$; and San almost due north in latitude 31° , being distant about fifteen geographical or eighteen statute miles. According to the Hebrew narrative Ramsès was the starting-point of the exodus, and probably Pharaoh was at that time residing in this capital. If the public works were unfinished, the presumption is that a large body of the Hebrew men were there as laborers. But what of the women and children? The district of Goshen was the abode of the Hebrews, and they were not confined to any one city; as, for example, Phaccussan, but "the land was filled with them." There is no evidence that the whole body of the people were deported out of Goshen to work upon a city in a district so far to the north as San; on the contrary, they were still in Goshen during the plagues;¹ and, though apparently near the capital, were living in villages in the open country, for they had flocks and herds.² In the plague of murrain "the Lord severed between the cattle of Israel and the cattle of Egypt,"³ and in the plague of hail, "in the land of Goshen, *where the children of Israel were*, was there no hail."⁴ The Hebrews had lambs for the passover, and they took with them from Egypt "flocks and herds, even very much cattle."⁵

It seems impossible to reconcile this condition of things with Dr. Brugsch's location of Ramsès. Here are the people, during all the plagues, and up to the night of the exodus, living in Goshen, in their accustomed houses, surrounded with their flocks and herds. We take Goshen to have been where he places it—the district lying south and east of the Pelusiatic branch of the Nile, of which Phaccussan was the capital. Now Zan, which is his Ramsès, was not in this district of Goshen, but in the nome Tanites, on the Tanitic branch, near Lake Menzaleh; so that to reach this *rendezvous* the whole multitude of men, women, and children, with their cattle, must have crossed the Pelusiatic Nile and have marched nearly twenty miles north; then, on the second day, they must have recrossed the Pelusiatic branch, marching in a southeasterly direction, to reach Dr. Brugsch's Pithom in Soucoth, another district exterior to Goshen. But all these improbabilities vanish when we keep Ramsès and Pithom where Dr. Brugsch located them conjecturally in 1857, in his *Karte des alten Aegypten*,⁶ that is, in Goshen itself, in the neighborhood of Heroöpolis, on the line of the old canal. Then we may conceive of the Hebrews as peopling the country contiguous to these two cities, and within easy reach of either.

The difficulties that meet us at the outset in Dr. Brugsch's theory of the exodus increase as we advance along his route. He shows, with

¹ Ex. i. 7; viii. 27, "I will sever the land of Goshen, in which my people dwell, that no swarms of flies shall be there."

² Ex. x. 24.

³ Ex. ix. 4.

⁴ Ex. ix. 26.

⁵ Ex. xii. 38.

⁶ See Geographische Inschriften, Vol. i.

good reason, that the main route from Egypt to Palestine began at Tanis, and that the Pharaohs' were accustomed to concentrate their armies at this point for an eastern campaign. From indications furnished by monuments and papyri, we learn that this route touched at Migdol,—the Magdolos of the Greek writers,—a fortress on the edge of the desert supplied with wells.¹ Along this highway he would lead the Hebrews, making their first halt at Soucoth, and their second at Khatom, the first station east of Lake Menzaleh, which he identifies with Etham. The same valuable series of papyri in the British Museum (the Anastasi) which we have so often quoted, contains a remarkable letter from an officer who went in pursuit of two slaves who had escaped from a nobleman then living at Ramsès. From this letter Dr. Brugsch gives the following extracts: "I have pursued the two servants, having quitted the hall of the royal palace on the ninth day of the month Epiphi, toward evening. On the tenth day of the month Epiphi I arrived at the enclosure of Succoth I came to the fort Khatom. There one told me that a groom arrived from the country had said, that they had passed by the Muraillé² to the north of the Migdol of king Seti Meneptah." Upon this letter Dr. Brugsch remarks: "the correspondence between these Egyptian stations Ramsès, Soucoth, Khatom (which certainly is identical with the Etham of the scriptures), and Migdol, and between the same places enumerated in the Book of Exodus, is too evident and too striking for us to waste one word upon their identity."³

Pihakhiroth Dr. Brugsch does not profess to have identified from Egyptian sources, so he falls back upon the statement of the Hebrew narrative, that it was "over against Baal-zephon, between Migdol and the sea";⁴ and he concentrates his attention upon the two inquiries, Where was Migdol? and, What was the sea? As to Migdol, classic authors recognized the name of this fort, which they transcribed as Magdolos or Magdolon, and which they fixed midway between Pelusium and Sile, which latter place corresponded nearly to the El-Kantara of to-day, at the point where the Suez canal pierces the neck between Lake Ballah and Lake Menzaleh. But Dr. Brugsch overlooks the evidence that the Egyptian Pharaohs had fortified at several points their eastern boundary, and that, Migdol being the common name for a fortified station,

¹ p. 20.

² This *Muraillé* (in Egyptian *ta-Aub*) appears to have been a walled district east of the Delta, on the confines of the desert.

³ p. 31. In a note, however, Dr. Brugsch argues that the roots *Khatom*, *Asham*, *Tam*, signify to seal up, to enclose. *Khatom*, in Egyptian, like *Atham*, *Etham*, in Hebrew, signifies an enclosed place, a fortress. But Jablonski, and others, make *Etham* signify "border of the sea."

⁴ Ex. xiv. 2.

there was probably more than one Migdol¹ in that quarter; and hence, his identification of Etham being problematical, we are not shut up to the Magdolon of Herodotus and Diodorus (which stood about twelve miles south of Pelusium, on the coast road between Egypt and Syro-Phenicia) as the Migdol of the exodus.

"As to the sea," continues Dr. Brugsch, "no one could think of the Red Sea. The Elohim texts of the sacred books never use the name of the Red Sea; while speaking habitually and simply of the sea, or of the Egyptian sea, which is none other, and could not be other, than the Mediterranean Sea."² We have searched the Hebrew scriptures in vain for an instance in which יַם־מִצְרַיִם (the sea of Egypt) is used for the Mediterranean. Where this name occurs, "the Lord shall utterly destroy the tongue of the Egyptian sea," it is impossible to understand it of the Mediterranean; it must either mean the Red Sea, or stand in parallelism with "the river," for the Nile is called "a sea"³ in the Old Testament, and at this day a common name for the Nile in Egypt is el-Bahr, "the sea." The Mediterranean is called "the sea," "the great sea," "the hinder or western sea," and once also "the sea of the Philistines," because it washed their whole coast; but it is not called the Egyptian sea. Dr. Brugsch, however, would shut up the Hebrews between Migdol and the Mediterranean. From this point, to carry out his theory, he requires both Moses and Pharaoh to commit a strategic blunder, of which we cannot believe either of them to have been capable. The Hebrew narrative informs us that "God led them not by the way of the land of the Philistines, although that was near; for God said, "Lest peradventure the people repent when they see war, and they return to Egypt." Dr. Brugsch quotes this as authority, and adds, that Moses had also a fear of the treaty for the rendition of fugitive slaves, which existed between Egypt and the Khétans of Syria.⁴ But how does Dr. Brugsch provide against this danger of falling into the hands of the Philistines? By leading the Israelites northward along the Mediterranean shore, where a march of two or three days would bring them directly upon the border of the Philistines, who by reason of this detour would have gained time to gather and dispute their march! His own map of the route causes this difficulty to stare us in the face. The reason for going by "the way of the wilderness," to avoid war with the Philistines, was given before the Hebrews had reached Migdol; and it was

¹ So small a country as Palestine had several fortified places called Migdol, Migdol-Eder (Gen. xxxv. 21), Migdol-el in Naphtali (Josh. xix. 38), Migdol-Gad (Josh. xv. 37).

² Isa. xi. 15.

³ Isa. xix. 5; Nah. iii. 8. Also, the Euphrates is called a sea (Isa. xxvii. 1).

⁴ Ex. xxiii. 31.

⁵ See this treaty in *Bibliotheca Sacra* for 1869, p. 186.

because of this that they "encamped in Etham, in the edge of the wilderness."¹ If Etham was identical with Khatom, and Migdol with Magdolon, as Dr. Brugsch believes, then the highway from Egypt to Syria lay in a direct line a little to the north of east from Etham through Migdol to el-Arisch, at which point it would first touch the Mediterranean. This route ran south of the ancient marsh known as the Serbonian lake. If the Hebrews quitted this route to avoid a collision with the Philistines, they must have turned to the south; but Dr. Brugsch sends them northward to the narrow and treacherous passage between the Mediterranean and Lake Serbonis, upon emerging from which, after a three days march from Etham, they must come again upon the direct "way of the land of the Philistines," and almost at their very door! We cannot be persuaded that Moses was so stupid a strategist, nor that the higher guidance to which he trusted was so blind to the obvious features of the country he was to traverse.

Again Dr. Brugsch makes that region of morass and quicksands, lying south of the Bay of Pelusium, which Herodotus, Diodorus, Strabo, and others name τὰ βάραθρα and Lacus Sirbonis, the seat of the disaster to Pharaoh and his host:

"That Serbonian bog
Betwixt Damatia and Mount Casius old
Where armies whole have sunk."²

Diodorus states that in this bog the Persian king, Artaxerxes, when invading Egypt, lost a great part of his army, through ignorance of the character of the region.³ That a foreign invader should have become entangled in this treacherous marsh is quite supposable; but that Egyptian generals accustomed to lead armies to the east, and who had built a military road to the south of this bog, should have been ignorant or unmindful of its dangers, and should have led an army around its borders to the very bars of quicksand that joined it to the Mediterranean, and were subject to overflow by stress of northerly winds, is as incredible a bit of strategy as that Moses should have led the Hebrews there to get out of the way of the Philistines. All these difficulties are avoided by fixing the point of departure farther to the south, and Etham upon the edge of the wilderness of the Red Sea, where the Hebrew narrative locates it. Dr. Brugsch seems to undervalue the testimony of the Hebrew scriptures concerning the Yom Suph as the scene of the disaster to Pharaoh, because the Elohist texts speak simply of "the sea," without employing this designation. "Aussi les textes Elohim des livres saints ne se servent jamais du nom de la Mer Rouge; en parlant toujours et simplement de la mer ou de la mer Égyptienne."⁴ It is true that nearly all the texts of the Pentateuch and the Book of Joshua in which the

¹ Ex. xiii. 17-20.² Paradise Lost, ii. 293.³ Dio. xvi. 46.⁴ p. 35.

"Red Sea" occurs are Jehovistic; e.g. Ex. x. 19; xv. 4, 22; xxiii. 31; Num. xiv. 25; xxi. 14; Deut. i. 40; xi. 4; Josh. ii. 10; xxiv. 6; in Josh. iv. 23 Jehovah-Elohim occur in combination. We do not enter here into the relative antiquity and authority of the Elohistie and Jehovistic texts; but admitting for the moment that the Jehovistic documents were later and supplementary, how shall we account for the fact that in all the traditions and the poetry of the Hebrews it is always the Red Sea that is named as that in which Pharaoh was overthrown?¹

But Dr. Brugsch has overlooked the significance of one text which should set the question at rest: "And it came to pass when Pharaoh had let the people go, that God [Elohim] led them not through the way of the land of the Philistines, although that was near; for God [Elohim] said, Lest peradventure the people repent when they see war, and they return to Egypt; but God [Elohim] led the people about through the way of the wilderness of the Red Sea [Yom Suph]." Ex. xiii. 17, 18; and Elohim occurs again in vs. 19, where the dying words of Joseph are cited. Here, then, is an Elohim document in which the Red Sea is expressly mentioned. In quoting this passage Dr. Brugsch omits the mention of the Red Sea—"Mais Dieu fit faire un circuit au peuple, par le chemin du désert"²—and overlooks the name Elohim; for it is on the very next page that he says "the Elohim texts never employ the name of the Red Sea." But here is an Elohistie text which does give that name; and this stands in such a connection that it must be taken as the key to the whole narrative.

Perhaps Dr. Brugsch would adopt the view of some Hebraists, that this passage, though in form Elohistie, was an interpolation from a later source; but he is debarred from this resort, inasmuch as he quotes vs. 18 as an authentic portion of the narrative, though he suppresses the mention of the Red Sea. Even if it were an interpolation, there would remain the difficulty, already mentioned, of explaining how the tradition of the Red Sea as the scene of Pharaoh's disaster, crept into all Hebrew song and story. Besides, how natural it was for Moses to lead the people in *that* "wilderness," from which he had just come, and with which he was so familiar—the desert of Sinai, which borders upon the Red Sea. Neither Knobel nor DeWette rejects the testimony of Ex. xiii. 18. DeWette translates it: "Und Gott liess das Volk sich wenden auf den Weg nach der Wüste am Schilfmeere"; and Knobel's comment is: "Gott führte es so, dass es um die Wüste, um die sinaitische Halbinsel und somit an dem Meere herumzog. Die Hebräer zogen nämlich in der Nähe des heroopolitanischen Meerbusens südwärts zum Sinai." Rabbi Hirsch has a remark upon the transition from Elohim to Jehovah in Ex. xiii. that is worth quoting: "Es wird diese Erzählung (vs. 17, 18) von dem gewöhnlichen Gottesnamen *Elohim* getragen und erst vs. 21, wo die

¹ See Miriam's song, Ps. cvi. and cxxxvi.; Acts vii. 36; Heb. xi. 29. ² p. 34.

ausserordentliche Führerschaft Gottes in den voranschreitenden Wolken- und-Feuersäulen ihren sichtbaren Ausdruck erhält, kehrt der Name dieser ausserordentlichen Führungen, *Jah*, wie bei den ausserordentlichen Wunderthaten in Egypten wieder.”¹

It is the moment of the exodus which is the point of departure of the text; the reason is given why the Hebrews did not take the direct course to Palestine, — the northeastern route skirting the southern edge of Lake Sirbonis — but, to avoid a collision with the Philistines, went as far as possible from their borders by marching in a southeasterly direction to “the wilderness of the Red Sea.” Hence Etham must have been in the edge of *that* wilderness, and the sea beside which they encamped could have been none other than the Red Sea. There is both geological and historical evidence that the neck of the Red Sea once extended farther north into the isthmus which is now pierced by the Suez canal; but is there any evidence that the name Yom Suph was ever applied to Lake Sirbonis? So sanguine is Dr. Brugsch over his theory, that he says in conclusion, “one could no more deny the facts established in this lecture, than he could dispute that A is A and B is B.” We would not disparage his discoveries, nor wholly reject his identifications; but, as yet, we do not see how it is possible to reconcile his view with the Hebrew text, nor with the conditions under which the exodus began; and we shall be grateful if he will attempt a solution of the difficulties we have raised in his promised *Bibel und Denkmäler*.

This theory of the route of the Israelites, which Dr. Brugsch propounds with so much confidence, is by no means new, and we are surprised that he makes no mention of the work of Dr. Schleiden, whom he follows, almost word for word, in his description of the route from Etham onward, in his references to the Mediterranean as the Egyptian sea, and to Sirbonis as the scene of Pharaoh’s disaster, and also in his comparative estimate of Elohistie and Jehovistic documents.² The only difference between Dr. Brugsch and Dr. Schleiden is in the location of Ramsès and Pithom, the starting-point of the Israelites for their march into the wilderness. In fixing the site of these cities Dr. Schleiden followed the authority of Dr. Brugsch himself, who, in 1857, placed them somewhere on the line of the Wadi Tumilat. In the first volume of his *Geographie des alten Aegyptens*,³ Brugsch identified Pithom with Heroöpolis, and added this remarkable passage: “Die Stadt Ramsès, welche die Israeliten nach 2 Buch Mos. 1, 11 nebst Pithom das wir für Heroonpolis halten, erbauen, oder vielmehr befestigen mussten, un³ von wo aus sie später ihren Auszug antraten (2 Buch Mos. 12, 37) findet sich in dem hierati-

¹ Der Pentateuch, von Samson Raphael Hirsch. Frankfurt am Main. 1869.

² Die Landenge von Suès, zur Beurtheilung des Canalprojects und des Auszugs der Israeliten aus Aegypten. von Dr. M. I. Schleiden. Leipzig. 1858.

³ p. 265.

schen Papyrus Anast. No. 5 p. 24 dicht hinter dem *pa-chtum n Ràmessu* (No. 1273) genannt als *ta-a-Rams-su Mr-n-amu* (1278) 'das Haus Ramses Miamuns,' woraus in der Volkssprache der abgekürztere Name *taaramessu* oder bloss *ramessu* entstehen konnte. So merkwürdig hat das Schicksal gewaltet, welches uns in einem zerbrechlichen, dünnen äg. Papyrus ein *gleichzeitiges* Denkmal des Auszuges aufbewahrt hat, in welchem sich jene Städte Pchtum und Ràmessu zusammen genannt finden, die in den heiligen Urkunden der Bibel eine so wichtige Rolle spielen!" The significance of this Papyrus Dr. Brugsch does not now qualify; though upon the ground of recent discoveries of Mariette-Bey, as before stated, he shifts the site of Ramsès from the Wadi Tumulât to Sîn. He has not yet published the hieroglyphic texts upon which he rests his new identification; but there is reason to suspect that these are not satisfactory to Lepsius and other Egyptologists. Meantime the Anast. Papyrus, which was such a wonderful godsend in 1857, remains in all its force, and admonishes us to be cautious in accepting the results of an interpreter who was then so confident over the discovery of Ramsès, and is now equally confident of finding it some forty miles away.

ARTICLE XII.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

THE PENTATEUCH IN ITS PROGRESSIVE REVELATIONS OF GOD TO MEN. Designed for both Pastors and People. By Rev. Henry Cowles, D.D. pp. 414. New York: D. Appleton and Co. 1874.

This work is not a continuous commentary upon the text, but a practical, popular, and to a considerable extent critical, discussion of the great themes of the five books of Moses. It is marked by the author's usual perspicuity and spirituality, and is, on the whole, to be highly commended. We have space but to notice what is, to us, the least satisfactory part of the work; viz. the author's treatment of the passages bearing on the method of creation, and chronology. Without going into the discussion too deeply it is sufficient to remark that, after our author has led his readers by legitimate steps to the conclusion that "it suffices if we make God's days of creative energy and of creative rest each and all *divine days*—all alike periods of indefinite length and, on the other hand, man's days of labor and his day of rest all *human days*, of the same sort with each other, from sun to sun,"¹ it is hardly in keeping to attempt a refutation of Darwinism by forcing upon the word יָמִים the restricted, technical sense of invariable kind.² Is it not enough if the

¹ p. 22.

² See p. 37 seq.

Bible emphasizes the fact and results of creation without going into the recondite methods of the creative act? Species, as man knows them, possess a practical invariability, whatever may have been the process of their formation. Even if the Darwinian hypothesis regarding the method of the creation of species should be proved true, we should neither lose the evidence of individuality nor of parental relationship, which our author somewhat boldly assumes to be the final cause of the limits and degrees of variability that regulate the life of organic beings.¹

On the subject of chronology Dr. Cowles, is in some danger of being accused of playing fast and loose with the Septuagint—accepting it as authority where it lengthens the periods of early history, as between Adam and Abraham, and rejecting it where its chronology is short, as in the lapse of time between the call of Abraham and the departure of Israel from Egypt.² The chief defect, however, if there be any at this point, is negative. Our author neglects to discuss, where such discussion is eminently fitting, not to say demanded, the general question concerning the true design of the genealogies, and their consequent reliability for purposes of chronology. He concedes an abridged genealogy in Ex. vi. 16–20. Why not inquire if similar abridgments be out of the question in Gen. v. 3–32 and xi. 10–26? We are inclined to look with favor upon the language of a writer in the British and Foreign Evangelical Review: “Most of those [tables of genealogies] which afford any opportunity of being tested by fuller historical notices are proved to be abridged. May not a different principle lie at the basis of these two tables likewise, than the bald historical one? Gaps and intervals of the widest kind may occur, though the truthfulness of each separate figure remain unimpeached. For instance, in regard to the tables of the antediluvians, may it not have been the most eminent for piety who were chosen on the one hand, and the most notorious for ungodliness on the other? In short, let these slight tracings of the men before the flood tell of God’s covenant rather than of man’s pedigree, and they come to be possessed of new and more vital interest.”³

G. F. W.

THE KINGDOM OF CHRIST ON EARTH: Twelve Lectures delivered before the Students of the Theological Seminary, Andover. By Samuel Harris, Dwight Professor of Systematic Theology in Yale College. 8vo. pp. 255. Andover: W. F. Draper. 1874.

This is, indeed, a book of “sweetness and light”; such as can only be the fruit of many years of Christian study and experience. Beginning with a statement of the essential idea of the kingdom of Christ, it touches upon the most important principles of theology and of morals; furnishing an illustration of the fact, that every one of the few grand doctrines involves every other, and cannot be treated thoroughly and

¹ p. 41. ² See pp. 62–71. ³ Malcom White. See Review for 1872, p. 135.

luminously without an exhibition, more or less complete, of the whole body of the truth. No system of formulas is, in an exclusive sense, "*the* system of truth taught in the scriptures"; but it is ever possible to exhibit the realities and principles of the gospel from some other point of view, and in other relations. Until we are able to comprehend the whole from every point at once, and to put our thought into words, we must content ourselves, as painters are obliged to do, with giving one prospect and one aspect at a time.

The present work, while not aspiring to the dignity of a complete, methodical, and scientific treatise, is a real help, not only to the comprehension of a single doctrine, but of all the rest in connection with that. Moreover, it has a freshness and a warmth, a clearness of outline and a tenderness of atmosphere, which are delightful. It is a book well worthy the attention of thoughtful readers of whatever school of belief or unbelief; and is to be commended as much to those students who, through an absorption in the contemplation of mere nature, have weakened by disuse their very faculty of spiritual apprehension, so as to be almost unable to conceive of a *rational history* of man and of the universe, as to those others in whose experience much of the divine truth is a joyous intuition.

The essential idea of the kingdom of Christ is unfolded very clearly in the beginning of the first Lecture. It is justly claimed that "this doctrine gives the point, significance, and consistency, of his particular discourses and conversations," as well as "of his ministry as a whole." And here the author takes occasion to mark the distinction between the method of our Lord and that of "philosophers, lawgivers, and reformers," and to indicate the reason why "his teaching, considered as a system either of sociology, ethics, philosophy, or theology, was so fragmentary and incomplete." The astonishing character of his conception and his plan is impressively brought out. A little further on (p. 17), the "visionary" extravagance of such a plan, upon every other supposition save the one that Jesus was really "Redeemer and Lord," is presented with much beauty and force.

We have been struck, likewise, with the felicity with which the "essential evil" of sin is exhibited (pp. 25-35) as the opposite of that love which is righteousness. In the development of this part of his subject, the author contrives to throw light upon the great theological question of the atonement, as also upon the nature of virtue, and the necessity and the benevolence of punishment. He also calls attention to the fact, that the antagonism of Christ's kingdom to "the world" (i.e. the realm of selfishness) is the antagonism of love, not of hate; and in this connection criticises a habit of statement into which, not only Edwards, whom he quotes, but also many others of our preachers and divines have fallen.

The fourth Lecture enters upon a consideration of the *origin* of the kingdom of Christ; which is found, not in a "spontaneous development of humanity," but in the descent of "a redeeming power" "from God," "quickening men to spiritual life, and transforming society"—a view repugnant to the so-called rationalism, the naturalism, of our times. Here is found the starting-point of the divergence between this and the Christian system. "Christianity is not, primarily, doctrine, but history; not philosophy or ethics, but the historical action of the divine love redeeming men from sin." The author gives us, just here, an admirable contrast between this kind of rationalism and Christianity; in the course of which he is led into an interesting discussion of miracles.

The truly catholic view of the church is brought out with clearness, in opposition to the pernicious Roman inversion of it. The whole treatment of this grand topic is nobly scriptural and ecumenical. The reader finds himself breathing the free, sweet air of the kingdom of God, rather than the stifled and exasperating atmosphere of a sect. The organization is seen flowing from the life, ever subordinated to it, ever dependent upon it. "Where the spirit is, there is the church."

In the principle involved in his view of the origin of the kingdom of heaven among men, viz. in the descent of God to save men, and, generally, in the stooping of the higher to lift the lower, our author finds "a constituent principle of the universe"—directly opposed to the theory of development, which labors to show us how from *next* to nothing everything comes. The manner in which he exhibits this contrast is extremely interesting.

But we have not room here to invite attention to all of even the most striking of Dr. Harris's presentations. As peculiarly pertinent to our own times, we must not omit to mention, however, his chapter on The Christian Law of Service, which might well be published as a tract for business men, and all other men and women; and his treatment of Millenarianism, an exception to very much that is written on the topic, since it is both able and brief.

We suppose that the plan of our author did not suggest particular care in giving precision and comprehensiveness to definitions. Strictly speaking, "love" is something more than the bare "choice of universal being as the supreme end, in preference to self." And yet here the important point is emphasized—that the love which is possessed of moral quality is personal, a free act.

The definition of a church, also, given on the ninetieth page,—"A church is an organized association of persons renewed by the Holy Spirit,"—is quite imperfect. Another (p. 99)—"An association of Christians, by their own covenant in fellowship in Christ, for their mutual edification in the Christian life and co-operation in the Christian work,"—is very much better, but still incomplete.

But logical completeness in a treatise of this description might easily be made an encumbrance. The examination which we have been able to bestow upon the book leaves us in no mood for criticism. We welcome it as a valuable addition to our theological and philosophical literature. It seems to us a genuine expression of the mind of Christ's true church — something of quality large and sweet poured into the currents of the times.

We earnestly wish these Lectures the widest circulation.

D. P. N.

CHRISTIANITY AND SCIENCE. A Series of Lectures delivered in New York, in 1874, on the Ely Foundation of the Union Theological Seminary. By Andrew P. Peabody, D.D., LL.D, Professor of Christian Morals in Harvard University. 12mo. pp. 257. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers. 1874.

This is an extremely valuable work. It makes no pretensions to originality; none certainly which in its execution it does not fully justify. It proceeds on the ground that there is no necessity of abandoning any of the old bulwarks of the faith. These were once considered as impregnable, and they are impregnable still. And yet the work is, in a very good sense, altogether original. Its author has evidently mastered the subject as fully as though no one had ever traversed the field before himself. He has examined with his own eyes the nature of the positions which he wishes to maintain. He indeed puts forth arguments which have been put forth before. He could not have done otherwise if he would effect what he wishes to effect. But he uses these arguments with a force and skill which could not have been greater had they never been used before. We have been exceedingly struck with the unusual force and pertinency of the illustrations which he employs.

None of Dr. Peabody's adversaries can complain of the manner in which they have been treated by him, unless it can be made to appear that a thorough defeat is a mode of ill-treatment. They are uniformly treated with all the courtesy and fairness which a routed enemy can possibly claim. Every concession is made, even to Darwinism, which the strictest justice and candor can possibly demand.

"Science and Christianity have in common three sources of proof or evidence: testimony, experiment (or experience), and intuition." Dr. Peabody undertakes to develop in this order the evidences to be drawn from these three sources. The one first named occupies, of course, the larger portion of the book. We hesitate to institute a comparison between one portion of this book and another. The argument drawn from the character of Christ is set forth with unusual power; and the discussion of the subject of miracles is, in our judgment, not less happy. The argument in favor of Christianity from experience is also presented in a manner peculiarly felicitous.

The work is written throughout in a very vigorous style, yet entirely clear and sufficiently elegant. We trust the book will be widely read, and that its excellent author will meet with that recompense, valuable beyond all others, the consciousness that his work has overcome the doubts of many sceptics.

THE BEST METHODS OF COUNTERACTING MODERN INFIDELITY. A Paper read before the General Conference of the Evangelical Alliance, New York, October 6, 1873. By Theodor Christlieb, Ph.D., D.D., Professor of Theology and University Preacher at Bonn, Prussia. 18mo. pp. 89. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1874.

It is somewhat late in the day for us to express an opinion of the merit of this book. We have not seen any notice of it as yet which in our judgment gives an exaggerated idea of its value. We are particularly pleased to see that Dr. Christlieb maintains that the great "battle against unbelief can be no other than to overcome the opponent by moral and spiritual means." Inconclusive as we think the scientific objections to the divine origin of the Bible to be, we question whether scientific arguments are of themselves ever of force to win over the objector to a religious belief. We admire the courage with which Dr. Christlieb presses his assault on the strongholds of infidelity — a courage which is anything but blind and unintelligent. Are we wrong in indulging the thought that his residence of seven years in England, and the acquaintance he thus gained with English modes of thought, were among the influences which fitted him to appear with such success as a champion in behalf of Christianity?

MANUAL OF UNIVERSAL CHURCH HISTORY. By the Rev. Dr. John Alzog, Professor of Theology at the University of Freiburg. Translated with additions from the ninth, and last, German edition, by F. J. Pabisch, Doctor of Theology, of Canon and of Civil Law, President of the Provincial Seminary of Mount St. Mary's of the West, Cincinnati; and Rev. Thomas S. Byrne, Professor at Mount St. Mary's Seminary. In three volumes; with three Chronological Tables and three Ecclesiastico-Geographical Maps. Vol. I. 8vo. pp. 765. Cincinnati: Robert Clarke and Co. 1874.

We suppose there may be in our language other authoritative church histories by Catholic authors besides this, but no one has ever chanced to fall into our hands. It seems to us in every way desirable that Protestant scholars in our country should become conversant with the works of Catholic historians, as we are quite confident that in the field of history important victories may be easily won, such as will tend very powerfully to the triumph of the true faith.

The work of Alzog seems to be a superior one of its class. It evidently stands very high in the estimation of Catholic scholars. We judge so

from this fact, if from no other, that within the compass of about thirty years it has passed through nine editions in German and four in French. It is used as a text-book in all the Catholic seminaries in Europe. There are in it manifest indications of thorough research. It abounds in references to authorities, so that readers are enabled to verify, if they see fit, any questionable positions on which the eye may fall. We notice, however, that, in regard to quite a number of important points, references to the works of the Fathers are more frequent, by far, than to the scriptures; these latter, indeed, in a good many cases being almost entirely wanting, even when one would naturally expect them. We are glad to see that Protestant as well as Catholic writers are referred to. We notice, among others, the names of Gieseler, Neander, Carl Hase, and Dr. Schaff. Catholic readers, we trust, will observe with pleasure that "the author always manifests the most submissive obedience to the supreme authorities of the church, whose teachings are the rule and standard of all ecclesiastical science"

No one, of course, will be surprised to find it laid down in the outset that the declarations of the church are infallible. We should have been glad if the arguments on which this position rests had been given; and some of its attendant difficulties been, if possible, removed. We should like, for example, to know if the reader of the Bible is at liberty to decide by his own private judgment whether or not this doctrine of infallibility is taught in the Bible; or whether we are to accept the doctrine simply on the authority of the *ecclesia docens*. If the latter is the case, where is the evidence that the church teaches infallibly the truth on this point; if the former, then, as the strength of a chain, even of arguments, is as the strength of the weakest link, the whole structure of Romanism seems to rest on nothing stronger than the private judgment of each Christian in regard to the meaning of the word of God. The reader of this history finds himself not seldom involved in difficulties similar to this; and we are obliged to add that he will search the book in vain for a satisfactory solution of them.

EVANGELICAL ALLIANCE CONFERENCE, 1873. History, Essays, Orations, and other Documents of the Sixth General Conference of the Evangelical Alliance, held in New York, October 2 to 12, 1873. Edited by Rev. Philip Schaff, D.D., and Rev. S. Irenaeus Prime, D.D. 8vo. pp. 773. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1874.

It was not to be supposed that the late meeting of the Christian Alliance could have been looked forward to with other than the most elevated expectations. The most valuable results were confidently anticipated. The actual results, so far as it is practicable to give them in a tangible form, are spread out in the portly volume whose title is given above; and we are quite sure that they exceed, rather than fall below, the general

anticipations of the Christian public. Almost as a matter of course, we have been most interested in that portion of the volume which bears upon the great contest now going on between Christianity and scepticism. The view taken of this contest, sad though it may be in some respects, is, on the whole, very inspiring. The whole volume, it is well-nigh superfluous for us to say, is of great worth, and its influence cannot be otherwise than most powerful and salutary.

THE SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY, BIOGRAPHICAL, EXPOSITORY, CRITICAL.

From Hutcheson to Hamilton. By James McCosh, D.D., LL.D., President of the College of New Jersey, Princeton. 8vo. pp. 460. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers. 1875.

We can very easily credit Dr. McCosh when he says that "this work has been with him a labor of love." Few men, in our country at least, could say this with so much truth, and certainly very few men, if any, could have executed the task in a manner so thorough and satisfactory.

The Scottish philosophy is characterized by unity in its method, its doctrines, and its spirit. It proceeds in the method of observation professedly and really. It employs self-consciousness as the instrument of observation. In following out this method of inquiry, it reaches principles which are prior to, and independent of, experience. The Scottish school will be acknowledged by most students of philosophy to have achieved results of very great value, not as it regards philosophy alone, but the more vital and momentous interests of morals and theology.

We cannot but think that Dr. McCosh had a more important end in view while preparing this book than barely to enlighten his readers by sketches of the lives and opinions of a series of eminent authors. He must have had an eye to the sceptical tendencies of our day, and have meant this book to serve as a corrective to these so destructive tendencies. It was with a view to this, we imagine, that he devotes so large a space to the works of David Hume. He says that he did this, partly because few persons now read, or, in fact, ever did read through, his weighty volumes; and still more, on account of the relation of Hume's philosophy to certain modern systems, more particularly that of Comte. The appearance of this book, in this point of view, is very timely. It is characterized throughout by singular impartiality — a feature the more noticeable from the fact that its author is at once a Scotchman and a Scottish philosopher. He is not blind to the defects of those — Dr. Reid, for instance, and Dugald Stewart and Thomas Brown — of whom Scotland has most reason to be proud. He dwells, too, with much emphasis on the fact that many of the most eminent Scottish philosophers, while representing in exalted terms, and yet not in terms that were absolutely too exalted, the dignity of human nature, have failed to notice, in any fitting manner, the depravity into which that nature has everywhere fallen.

Most readers, we think, will be interested in learning that "in a sense, Kant's philosophy was transplanted from the Scottish soil. Kant's grandfather, named Cant, a saddler, emigrated from Scotland; and some think that he thence derived hereditarily his high conception of moral law" (p. 273).

THEOLOGICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY. Edited by Henry B. Smith, D.D., and Philip Schaff, D.D. *Christian Dogmatics: A Text-book for Academical Instruction and Private Study.* By J. J. Van Oosterzee, D.D., Professor of Theology in the University of Utrecht. Translated from the Dutch by John Watson, B.A., Vicar of Newburgh, Lancaster; and Maurice J. Evans, B.A., Stratford-upon-Avon. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. 810. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Co. 1874.

The first part of the work, of which these volumes are a translation, was published in 1870; the second part was published in 1872. We are not able to judge in regard to the faithfulness of the translation. We know, however, no reason for supposing it otherwise than thoroughly faithful; but every one, we think, will give to the translation the merit of being peculiarly readable. Unless one were apprised of the fact beforehand, he would hardly suspect that it was a translation.

We have no space for such a notice of these volumes as they deserve. Of such books *much* or *little* needs to be said. They will be welcomed by all lovers of a sound theology. They will tend to elevate the style of thinking which prevails at the present day. They form a most valuable addition to the Series of Philosophical and Theological works which Professors Smith and Schaff are now editing.

MEMORIAL OF SAMUEL MILLS CAPRON. Edited by [Rev.] J. H. Twichell. Small 4to. pp. 120. Hartford. 1874.

This small, elegant volume is an affectionate tribute to the memory of a man of singular ability, purity of character, and professional success. His brother, the Rev. W. B. Capron of the Madura Mission, Prof. Thacher of Yale College, Miss Blythe, some time an associate teacher, the editor, and others, portray the man, the scholar, the teacher, the Christian, in contributions which, though somewhat repetitious, together form a charming biography. It is good, in these days of pretension and self-assertion, to record the life and study the character of this modest, well-poised, well-educated man — "a quiet man," he thought, "who did not make much stir in the world," faithfully teaching twenty years in a single school in Hartford, doing day by day, without show or apparent ambition of applause, a great work. This book, prepared primarily for personal friends, will be sought by teachers, and all who desire healthy literature for the young.

MINUTES OF THE SESSIONS OF THE WESTMINSTER ASSEMBLY OF DIVINES while engaged in preparing their Directory of Church Government, Confession of Faith, and Catechisms (November 1644 to March 1649). From Transcripts of the Originals procured by a Committee of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland. Edited for the Committee by the Rev. Alexander F. Mitchell, D.D., Professor of Ecclesiastical History in the University of St. Andrews, and the Rev. John Struthers, LL.D., Minister of Prestonpans. 8vo. pp. 556. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons. 1874.

"The Manuscript Minutes of the Assembly of Divines, of which a transcript has been made for the Church of Scotland, are at present contained in three volumes, of not quite equal-sized foolscap folio, and are in custody of the trustees of Dr. Williams's Library, lately removed to Grafton Street, Fitzroy Square, London" (Preface p. v). The present volume of Dr. Mitchell is mainly devoted to the *doctrinal* standards prepared by the Assembly. Its numerous quotations tend to show that the Westminster Confession does not stand "at an extreme point in the development of Calvinism," but that it avoids the extreme statements, and sanctions the more moderate views of the Calvinists living and writing in that day. "In fact, it was not till several years after the Confession was completed, and the star of Owen was in the ascendant, that, under the spell of a genius and learning only second to Calvin's, English Puritanism so generally identified itself with what is termed the less liberal view. This, I am inclined to think, may be attributed more to Owen's influence than to the direct teaching of the Confession; and among the English Presbyterians there were not wanting several who adhered to the views of Calamy and Arrowsmith" (p. xx), who were ranked among the more liberal Calvinists. "Some time ago," says Professor Mitchell, "I endeavored to show that the Assembly's Confession was not derived from foreign sources, either German or Dutch, but that, both in its general plan and in the tenor of its more important articles, it was drawn from native sources other than Scotch; and, in particular, from those confessedly Augustinian or Calvinistic Articles, which, even before the Synod of Dort was summoned, or the Arminian controversy had become so embittered, had been adopted by the Convocation of the Irish church." In the Articles adopted by the Irish church, and embodying the mature opinions of the renowned Archbishop Ussher, "we have, as it humbly appears to me, the main source of our Confession of Faith, and almost its exact prototype in its statement of all the more important and essential doctrines of Christianity. In the order and titles of many of its chapters, as well as in the language of whole sections or subdivisions of chapters, and in many single phrases and *voces signatae* occurring throughout their Confession, the Westminster divines appear to have followed very closely in the footsteps of Ussher and his Irish brethren" (pp. xlv, xlvii). Professor Mitchell

illustrates and confirms these statements by various quotations from the Irish articles. He also shows that the Westminster Assembly did not intend to make definite propositions in regard to the metaphysical questions in dispute between the more liberal and the less liberal schools of the Calvinists belonging to the Assembly; but it intended to make such general statements as would gain the approval of both schools. His volume is one of remarkable interest and value, as it explains the meaning of the Westminster Confession and Catechisms, illustrates the kind and degree of authority belonging to those documents, and suggests instructive hints in regard to the manner in which councils, convocations, and assemblies have framed creeds for the churches. We hope that the volume will be read extensively in our own country, as well as in our fatherland. Had these Minutes been published a half century ago, they would have precluded much profitless, bitter discussion.

THE LIFE OF CHRIST. By Frederic W. Farrar, D.D., F.R.S., Late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, Master of Marlborough College, and Chaplain in Ordinary to the Queen. Two Vols. 12mo. Vol. I. pp. 480. New York: E. P. Dutton and Co. 1874.

The merits of these elegantly printed volumes are great. We are, indeed, sometimes inclined to sympathize with Herder in his question as quoted in Neander's *Life of Christ*, "Who could venture after John to write the life of Christ?" We are afraid that sometimes instead of removing the difficulties which readers find in the gospel narrative, the writers of the life of Jesus at once multiply and aggravate them. This accusation cannot be urged against Dr. Farrar. His work is not written with any special view to unbelievers. A Christian himself, he has written for his fellow-Christians. The tone of the work is decidedly evangelical; and no person who comes to the reading of it, with the same end in view as the one sought by the author, can fail to be greatly benefited. Some possibly may think that infidelity is now and then treated with too great lenity; and especially may find fault with what seems to be a disposition to question the reality of demoniacal possessions. As a whole, and relatively to its avowed purpose, the work is one of very great excellence.

LIFE OF ANDREW HULL FOOTE, Rear-Admiral United States Navy. By James Mason Hoppin, Professor in Yale College. With a Portrait and Illustrations. 8vo. pp. 411. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1874.

The accurate and well-written life of an eminent man is always a valuable addition to the literature of the country. Professor Hoppin has given to us a minute account of the life of an officer who is known to us chiefly by his exploits in the late war. Admiral Foote was born in New Haven, Connecticut, in the year 1806. His father had been

governor of Connecticut and senator of the United States, where he was the mover of the celebrated "Foote's Resolutions." The subject of this memoir early chose the navy as his profession, and went to sea when comparatively a child. During his first voyage he became converted, and remained an earnest, working Christian man to the end of his days. His first cruise lasted four years, during which Foote thoroughly learned his profession, and rendered assistance to the missionaries at the Sandwich Islands and Tahiti. After superintending for a short time the Naval Asylum at Philadelphia, he was appointed to the command of a vessel, and cruised upon the coast of Africa, where he was most determined and successful in his efforts to break up the slave-trade. Soon afterwards, while off the coast of China, his vessel was fired upon by the natives, upon which he immediately attacked and took their fortifications, commonly known as the Barrier Forts. This action caused the American flag to be respected, and paved the way for advantageous treaties between our country and China. Upon returning home, Foote did duty for a few months at the Brooklyn Navy Yard; but, upon the breaking out of the war of the Rebellion, he was appointed superintendent of our naval operations at the West. Henceforth this son of the ocean distinguished himself upon rivers. With amazing promptness and energy he organized a flotilla of river gunboats, and was the first who used, if he did not invent, this formidable vessel. The admiral's subsequent exploits are so well known that we will not give particulars. His splendid success at Forts Henry, Donelson, and Island No. Ten broke the power of the rebels in the West, and paved the way for the subsequent victories of Grant and Sherman. Professor Hoppin has given us most graphic accounts of these naval actions, for which we must refer our readers to his book. The admiral did not live to see the full results of his victories. Wounded at Fort Donelson, and worn by incessant labors, he was compelled to resign his command, received the enthusiastic plaudits of his countrymen, and died in Washington, in 1863.

The admiral had the character peculiar to New England — cautious in preparation, daring in action, in principles a Puritan, a strict disciplinarian, and an earnest reformer. He accomplished a great work in the American navy for religion and temperance.

Professor Hoppin's work is characterized by minute research, delicacy of expression, and purity of style. We regard it as a very valuable contribution to the history of the late war. It will enhance the already high reputation of the author. The typography of the work reflects credit on the publishers.

THE

BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

PRINCIPLES OF TEXTUAL CRITICISM.

BY REV. FREDERIC GARDINER, D.D., PROFESSOR IN THE BERKELEY DIVINITY
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FROM the earliest times there is found to have been a difference in the reading of the text of the New Testament. Quotations are made, by different Fathers of the same passage, slightly differing in language, and often under circumstances which forbid the explanation of loose citation; and, as soon as attention was directed to such matters, the earliest critics frequently mention differences of reading in different copies. The earliest versions, too, made as they were with scrupulous fidelity, show the same sort of variation. The most ancient manuscripts now extant are not perfectly agreed together, nor do any of them exactly accord with manuscripts themselves later, but perhaps copied from others of a still earlier date. Most of these variations, it is true, are of little consequence, often mere differences in spelling, or unimportant changes in the order of the words. There are other variations, however, of greater interest; and careful examination of the less important readings is the best training for the determination of the more important. It is, indeed, more than probable that some variations occurred in the very first transcription of the several books, or that, if the author himself prepared more than one copy, these did not

quite verbally agree. In such cases it is, of course, impossible to determine the true text; for both texts are equally true. Yet it is obvious that, as time rolled on, and copies were copied and re-copied again, the tendency, notwithstanding the utmost care, was to multiply errors, until, when the invention of printing came, the variations were many and sometimes considerable, and it became a matter of no small difficulty to decide among them.

The earliest printed edition of the whole Greek New Testament was in 1514, in the magnificent work of Cardinal Ximenes, known as the "Complutensian Polyglot." It was prepared from inferior MSS., and as it was not *published* until eight years later, when the ground was already occupied by the editions of Erasmus, it has never been of much importance, except in the book of the Apocalypse. Meantime the German publisher, Froben, anxious to anticipate its publication, prevailed upon Erasmus to undertake the editing of a New Testament in Greek. Erasmus was at the time fully occupied upon an edition of the works of Jerome and other literary labors, but succeeded in bringing out his first hasty edition in 1516, and his second, with more leisure and care, three years later. It was the work of a scholar of great learning and ability, but bore evident marks of a first essay upon untrodden ground. Four manuscripts were used in its preparation; but, unfortunately, the only one of great value (the cursive MS. 1) differed so much from the others that Erasmus became suspicious of it, and made comparatively little use of its readings. He was much influenced, too, by the estimation in which the Latin Vulgate was then held, and did not hesitate to translate from it into Greek, passages which he found wanting in all his MSS. This was very freely done in the Apocalypse, of which he had but one defective and inferior MS.; but there are various instances, also, in the other books, as, for example, in Acts viii. 37 and ix. 5, 6. Thus many clauses which Erasmus says he translated from the Latin because they were not in the Greek have passed into our common Greek Testaments, and through them into the

English and other modern versions. The first edition of Erasmus was soon reprinted at Venice, in connection with the Aldine Septuagint, and corrected many errors of Froben's press. Erasmus, unconscious of its origin, used it in the correction of his third edition, which differed in more than five hundred places from his first. In his fourth edition the Apocalypse was largely, but not completely, corrected from the Complutensian, which had now at last appeared; but in other respects this edition and the fifth, in 1535, differ but little from the third. These last editions became the basis of the Greek text now commonly received. As yet it rested on a narrow basis of manuscript authority, and there was little opportunity for a critical determination of the true reading. Still, a noble work had been accomplished, and it exerted a powerful influence for good.

Some ten years after the death of Erasmus, Robert Stephens began a series of editions. In the first two of these he undertook to combine the texts of the Complutensian edition and of Erasmus. Later, in 1550, he published his great edition in folio, in which he abandoned this plan, and returned very nearly to the text of Erasmus. He gave, however, in the margin nearly half of the various readings of the Complutensian, and also a selection from the readings of fifteen additional MSS. The collation was executed by his son, then at the age of eighteen, and is neither complete nor accurate; nevertheless, the advantage gained was great. His fourth edition has the same text, but is divided into verses, in which it has been most unfortunately copied by our English and many other versions. It is still referred to by some writers as the *Textus Receptus*.

Between 1565 and the close of the century Theodore Beza published five editions. Generally following the text of Stephens, he yet often mentions various readings in his annotations, and sometimes introduces changes in the text on manuscript authority. He had in his possession two valuable MSS., both marked D, one of the Gospels and Acts, the other of the Pauline Epistles, and also the Stephens' collation.

He appears, also, to have afterward made further examination of the MSS. for himself. His first edition of 1565 is likewise sometimes intended by the expression *Textus Receptus*.

After another quarter of a century the Elzevirs, famous printers of Leyden, published several convenient and beautifully-executed editions, which came rapidly into use. There was no known editor. It is supposed that the printers took the folio edition of Stephens, and corrected it partially by that of Beza; sometimes they varied from both; for what reason, or whether only accidentally, is not known. The preface of the Elzevir edition of 1624 declares that its text was then *ab omnibus receptus*. This is the origin of the name "*Textus Receptus*," which has come to be generally applied to this edition. Our own authorized version follows sometimes this and sometimes the edition of Beza; but it does not hesitate to deviate from both, as for instance, in Matt. ii. 2, where it had better manuscript authority; thus showing conclusively that this text was not then considered as a final standard. Translation, however, rather than criticism, was the business of the translators, and they generally follow with fidelity one or other of the forms of the *Textus Receptus* mentioned above.

The *Textus Receptus* thus represents a stage in the progress of effort to reproduce an accurate copy of the Greek New Testament. It was a great advance on the first crude text of Erasmus, but still it marks only an early stage when comparatively few MSS. were known, and the art of collating even these was imperfectly understood; when the text of the Vulgate was corrupt, and but little examination had been made of its earlier MSS.; when the value of the Oriental versions was unknown; and when the multitudinous quotations and discussions of the text in the Fathers had been scarcely at all considered. It is plain that a text so formed can have no critical value in our day. There are, indeed, scholars who still cling to it; and undoubtedly its readings are entitled to hold their place until other readings can be shown to be better supported. But this is simply as a matter of

convenience ; the text itself can have no higher authority than the MSS. from which it is known to have been formed, and with which it was collated. To these the labors of critics have now added more than fifty times as many MSS., and among them several far more ancient, and bearing evidence of more careful preparation, than any known to Erasmus or Stephens or Beza ; they have examined carefully the early MSS. of the Latin version ; and have investigated the readings which must have been received by the translators of the Oriental versions of the second and third centuries ; and they have studied the early Lectionaries of the church, and the writings of her scholars in days before the Papacy arose. Withal, a system of criticism, carefully elaborated by experience and thought, has been brought to bear upon this immense mass of material with such effect that, while some points remain still undetermined, there is now an agreement among the critics of different lands and different schools of thought, which, if still somewhat less close, may very well be compared with the agreement between the different forms of the so-called *Textus Receptus* itself.

For a long period after the Elzevirs their text continued to be reprinted without change, but materials for an improvement were constantly and laboriously accumulated. Walton's *Polyglot*, in 1657, still retained the same text, but added a valuable *Apparatus Criticus*. Sixteen fresh MSS. were collated for it under the direction of Archbishop Usher, and a few more by other persons. Several important versions were printed in parallel columns with the Greek text, and the prolegomena were a valuable aid in critical study. Bishop Fell, of Oxford, in an edition twenty years later, continued the work of collating MSS. ; and Mill, in 1707, completed his work of thirty years, reproducing, indeed, the text of Stephens, but accompanied with thirty thousand various readings, compiled from a still more extensive examination of MSS., large citations from the Fathers, and a comparison of the principal Oriental versions. Subsequently, Bentley made large preparations for a critical edition, which was never published ; but his collection of materials was of use to those who were to follow him.

Thus far the criticism of the sacred text had been chiefly carried on by English scholars ; the work now passed over to the continent, and it was almost a century before it was again resumed in the mother country. On the continent, Bengel in 1725 and Wetstein in 1751, issued editions which greatly advanced the work of criticism. By this time a distinction had come to be introduced among the readings, those approved by the editor being marked in the margin. A classification of the MSS. was also introduced, and discussion began in regard to their comparative value. The notation of MSS.,—the uncials (i.e. those written in capital letters) by Roman capitals, the cursives by Arabic numerals,—which is still in use, was introduced by Wetstein. Wetstein also collected vast stores of material ; but his want of critical sagacity and his devotion to erroneous theories rather retarded than advanced the work to which his life was devoted.

With Griesbach, in 1774, texts which are really critical may be said to begin. His editions extending to the year 1805, and those of his contemporaries and successors are too well known to require description in this brief historical sketch. During the last half century the textual criticism of the New Testament has been in the hands of able and, for the most part, devout scholars, both on the continent and in England. The collection of MSS. is already all that can reasonably be hoped for, and nearly all the uncials have been printed with great care. The attention given to the early Latin MSS. leaves little to be desired in that quarter, and something of importance has been accomplished in the way of critical editions of the Oriental versions. In this last respect much yet remains to be done, and also in careful editions of the Fathers. In the printed copies of their works the quotations of the New Testament have too often been made to conform to the received text of the time, and their value in criticism is thereby greatly diminished. The principles of criticism are now pretty well established, so that the facts being given, the same conclusion would generally be drawn from them by any competent critic. The exceptions to this will be spoken of presently.

Before considering these principles it is necessary to have a clear idea of the origin of differences of reading. That such differences will always arise in the copying of any manuscript is notorious, and can be abundantly substantiated by the testimony of any proof-reader. The copy of an already vitiated copy will be still more incorrect, and so with each successive rewriting the text will become more and more altered from the original. It does not follow, however, that the progress of deterioration will always be in proportion to the lateness of the date of any given manuscript; for one of the twelfth century, for example, may have been copied directly from another of the fourth, while one of the tenth may only have been copied from a contemporary. The whole number of MSS. of the New Testament, or of parts of it, is above fifteen hundred, and of these no two precisely agree. Most of them have been produced in monasteries, and in earlier times by professional copyists. It has been questioned whether they were ever multiplied by *dictation*; certainly it was so seldom done, if at all, that no errors peculiar to this process need to be considered. The copy when made was always re-compared with the original and carefully revised, and sometimes was compared a second time with some other standard copy. The corrections were usually made mechanically, and with little intelligence, the spelling of the same word being corrected differently in different parts even of the Codex Vaticanus (B); but sometimes a MS. has passed into the hands of a learned person, who has compared it with other MSS. and noted the difference. Thus the Codex Sinaiticus (α) bears the marks of twelve different correctors, from the fourth to the twelfth centuries. A single MS. with its corrections thus sometimes combines the testimony of two, or of several, each more ancient than itself. Often the owner of a MS. has inserted some explanation in the margin which a subsequent copyist, considering a correction, has embodied in the text. This is one of the most common of all sources of error.

The following convenient classification of these sources is given by writers on the subject. Errors of sight, of sound,

and of memory, which are all unintentional. These include the exchange of similar letters, and sometimes of words; the wrong division and connection of words which is very common in cursives copied from uncials which were written continuously without any marks of division between the words, and can be appreciated by any one who has attempted to copy the readings of an uncial; the omission of letters or words, and their careless transposition; the faulty repetition of letters or syllables, and sometimes even of words; and the assimilation of the terminations of neighboring words. The incorporation into the text of marginal glosses can scarcely be called *intentional*, being due to the ignorance of the transcriber. Among intentional errors are the following: the change of harsh or unusual forms of expression to those more familiar to the scribe, the alteration of the spelling being especially common; change in the text to bring it into supposed harmony with another passage, especially the assimilation of parallel passages in the different Gospels; changes to complete a quotation, or to clear up a supposed difficulty; and and finally, insertions from the familiar language of the Liturgy. To illustrate these, one or two instances under each head are selected from Mr. Hammond's recent convenient little manual.¹ Under errors of sight belong omissions from what is technically called *Homoioteleuton*. Thus, in Codex C, the words *τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν τὸ θέλημα τοῦ πέμψαντός με* are omitted in John vi. 39, because the last three words had occurred immediately before, and the eye of the scribe passed on from their first to their second occurrence. This happens especially when the same words occur at the end of consecutive lines. To the same head belong the many instances, more generally in the uncial MSS., arising from the confusion of similar letters such as A, Λ, Δ; or E, C, Θ. From this arose the well-known and well-disputed reading in 1 Tim. iii. 16. Similar letters or syllables are sometimes omitted and sometimes

¹ Outlines of Textual Criticism applied to the New Testament. By C. E. Hammond, M.A. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1872. From this work much of the present paper has been abridged.

inserted; thus in Matt. xxvi. 39 for ΠΡΟΕΛΘΩΝ Cod. B has ΠΡΟΕΛΘΩΝ, and in Luke ix. 49 Cod. H has ἐκβάλλοντα δαιμόνια for ἐκβάλλοντα δαιμόνια. Letters, too, are sometimes transposed, so that in Acts xiii. 23 for ᾤΠΑΙΝ (σωτήρα Ἰησοῦν), Codd. H and L read ᾤΠΑΙΝ (σωτήριαν). The number of errors from this source is very large, as the margin of any critical edition will readily show.

Under errors of sound are to be classed, not so much errors arising from actual hearing, as from the scribe mentally repeating the word to himself, and writing it as it would have sounded had it been pronounced. In this way vowels and diphthongs are frequently interchanged. One of the most common is that between *I* and *EI*, as στρατεία for στρατιά, (Acts vii. 42), in Codd. A, B, and D; so also *AI* and *E* are confused, as ὑποτάσσετε for ὑποτάσσεται (Luke x. 20), in B; and so of *A* for *E*, *I* for *H*, *O* for *Ω* (the last, later and less frequent), in many instances, in many of the best mss. An instance of confusion of sound, of a little different kind, is the καίπερ ἐστίν of many cursives in Rev. xvii. 8, for καὶ πάρεσται. This has been followed in the Textus Receptus. When there are several words of similar termination, a word or two among them of a not very different ending is sometimes assimilated; as in Rev. i. 1, Cod. A reads τοῦ ἀγγέλου αὐτοῦ τοῦ δούλου αὐτοῦ for τοῦ ἀγγέλου αὐτοῦ τῷ δούλῳ αὐτοῦ. One kind of error might be ranked either with errors of sight or of sound, and so belonging to both has a double chance of repetition — the confusion between double and single consonants. A good instance is found in Codd. A and B in 1 Thess. ii. 7, ἐγενήθημεν νήπιοι for ἐγενήθημεν ἡπιοι.

Errors of memory are such as might occur from the scribe looking at a whole line in his exemplar, and then writing it out in his copy without substantiating its accuracy word by word. Thus the small particles καὶ, δέ, τὲ, came to be frequently interchanged, and sometimes omitted or inserted. So, too, synonymous words were often substituted for one another, ἔφη for εἶπεν, and either for λέγει, ὁράω for θεωρέω, and *vice versa*, etc. To this cause is attributed the substitu-

tion of *μιμηταὶ* for *ζηλωταὶ* in K and L in 1 Pet. iii. 13. To this source also must be attributed many of the assimilations of the wording of one Gospel to that of another in parallel places, the familiar language of the other Gospel having a stronger hold on the memory of the scribe than the line he was actually copying.

The incorporation of marginal glosses into the text is an evidence rather of the fidelity than of the carelessness of the scribe, since he undoubtedly looked upon them as omissions in his exemplar supplied in the margin. One of the most important and most unfortunate of these is in John v., where the whole passage, *ἐκδεχομένων τὴν τοῦ ὕδατος κίνησιν. ἄγγελος γὰρ κατὰ καιρὸν κατέβαινεν ἐν τῇ κολυμβήθρᾳ, καὶ ἐτάρασσε τὸ ὕδωρ· ὁ οὖν πρῶτος ἐμβὰς μετὰ τὴν ταραχὴν τοῦ ὕδατος, ὑγίης ἐγένετο, ᾧ δὴποτε κατείχετο νοσήματι*, probably owes its place in the text to this cause. Acts xv. 34, *ἔδοξε δὲ τῷ Σίλλᾳ ἐπιμείναι αὐτοῦ*, omitted in most of the best MSS., has probably crept into the text in the same way. There is a curious instance in 2 Cor. viii. 4, at the end of which verse many of the cursives add the words (which have passed into the Text. Rec.) *δέξασθαι ἡμᾶς*; to these words there appears to have been added in the margin the note *ἐν πολλαῖς τῶν ἀντιγράφων οὕτως εὔρηται*, which in one cursive is copied bodily into the text along with the *δέξασθαι ἡμᾶς*. It always seemed safer to the scribe to insert than to omit, and hence the settled canon, other things being equal, *lectio praeferatur brevior*.

There are other classes of errors which must be considered intentional on the part of the scribe; yet not intentional in the sense of his meaning to alter the text, but only of correcting what he supposed to be obvious errors. In the best and earliest MSS. are many unclassical forms of words and expressions which in the later ones are changed to conform to the classical standard. Such are the constant insertion of the *μ* in the parts of *λαμβάνω* and its derivatives, as *λήμφομαι*, etc.; the non-assimilation and retention of the *ν* in words compounded with *ἐν* and *συν*, as *συνσταυρώω*, *συνζητέω*, *ἐνγε-*

γραμμένος, etc.; the almost constant retention of the final *ς* of οὕτως, and of *ν* ἐφέλκυστικόν before consonants; peculiar spelling, as τεσσεράκοντα for τεσσαράκοντα; 2d Aorist forms with 1st Aorist terminations, called the Alexandrian Aorist, as εἶδα, ἦλθα, εἶπα, etc.; together with many harsh grammatical constructions. It was probably an effort to avoid the last which led to the transposition in Acts xiii. 20 of καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα, which has occasioned so much difficulty to chronologists, and which ought to come *after*, instead of *before*, ὡς ἔτεσι τετρακοσίοις καὶ πενήκοντα.

Instances of alteration of one Gospel to make it conform to the parallel passage in another are of frequent occurrence, even in the best mss. An unusually striking instance of this is found in Mark xiv., where all reference to the second crowing of the cock, in connection with Peter's threefold denial, is omitted; in vs. 30 δις is left out, and in vs. 68 καὶ ἀλέκτωρ ἐφώνησε, and in vs. 72 ἐκ δευτέρου. More frequently words are supplied from a parallel passage, as in Acts ix. 5 in E, σκληρόν σοι πρὸς κέντρα λακτίζειν, from xxvi. 14. It is also very common to fill out quotations from the Old Testament.

As we are now accustomed in citing a passage to put with it the nominative supplied by the context, or some clause necessary to the completeness of our quotation, so in the Lectionaries of the early church—the passages selected for public reading as Lessons, or Epistles, or Gospels,—it was customary, whenever necessary, to prefix the words ὁ Ἰησοῦς, εἶπε δὲ ὁ Κύριος (Luke vii. 31), etc.; and these, becoming familiar to the scribe, he very naturally inserted them in copying the passage, although they were unnecessary when the context was there.

The same familiarity with ecclesiastical forms must be held to account for the insertion of the doxology at the close of the Lord's prayer (Matt. vi. 13); and this has also been supposed to explain the insertion of Acts viii. 37, which must, without doubt, be considered as not a part of the original text.

Of errors purposely introduced by the scribes with a doc-

trinal motive, there is really no instance in reliable MSS. Several such have from time to time been alleged (as *θεός* for *υἱός*, John i. 18) ; but they all admit of explanation under some of the sources of error mentioned above.

There is, however, one farther remark of importance to be made in regard to the character of these errors : that while in the frequent repetition of the process of copying errors will be multiplied, yet those errors will have a certain family likeness, from the fact that they have arisen from the operation of the same causes under similar circumstances. Hence we are to look rather to the earliest MSS. for strong individual characteristics ; while the later, though differing much in detail, will have, as compared with the earlier MSS., a decided family likeness among themselves.

The manuscripts of the New Testament are classified as uncials or cursives, written respectively in capital or in ordinary letters. The distinction is one of importance as broadly indicating their date. *Uncial* was the common form of writing until the middle of the tenth century, and this style was retained for service-books about a century later. The earliest *dated* New Testament MS. is an uncial of the Gospels, S, with the date 949. Cursive writing came into use towards the close of the ninth century, and from the eleventh onwards was the common style. The earliest New Testament cursive (Gospels, 14) is dated 964. As a class, therefore, the uncials are older than the cursives, and the change from the one to the other form became general in the course of the tenth century. A few of the cursives have been copied from very ancient exemplars and are therefore of much value in determining the text ; but this applies to less than *one per cent* of the enormous mass of them. Almost always the authority of two or three MSS. of the fourth and fifth centuries will be found of more value than that of as many hundreds written from five to eight or ten centuries later. The first great step in the criticism of the text was made when MSS. came to be classified, and weight of authority conceded to them in proportion to their value rather than to

their number. It is obvious that a gloss in the margin of a MS. of the sixth century might easily appear in the text of a thousand cursives; but if not found in any authority of the fourth or fifth centuries it would be unhesitatingly condemned as spurious.

The uncials are designated by capital letters, first of the Roman alphabet, then by the unlike letters of the Greek, and finally the Codex Sinaiticus by the Hebrew א. Cursives are designated by Arabic numerals. There are also between two and three hundred "Lectionaries," or copies of selected passages prepared for public reading in the churches. There are both uncial and cursive MSS. of these. When the selections are from the Gospels they are called *Evangelistaria* (uncial fifty-eight, cursive about one hundred and eighty); when from the Gospels and Acts, *Praxapostoli* (πραξαπόστολοι; uncials seven, cursives sixty-five); and there are also a few from the Gospels and Epistles called ἀποστολοευαγγέλια. When these are cited, it is as Lectionaries, and they are not included in the system of designation of the MSS. proper.

With the single exception of א, none of the uncials, and comparatively few of the cursives ("twenty-seven in all out of the vast mass of extant documents," says Scrivener) contain the whole New Testament complete. Several others, as A, B, C, etc., originally contained the whole, but have suffered more or less mutilation. Some are mere fragments of scattered verses, as F^a, composed of strips recovered from the back of the binding of a later book. A number, of which the most important are C, R, Z, Ξ, are *palimpsests*. In these the original writing was removed that the parchment might be used for the transcription of other works—a practice dating from a very early period. In the lapse of time the original writing has reappeared in faint lines below the later text, and has been read, either just as it is, or by removing the later writing with chemical appliances. There still remain a few passages in some of the palimpsests partially or wholly illegible. Other uncials originally contained only certain books of the New Testament, most frequently the

Gospels, as K and M; but occasionally the Catholic or the Pauline Epistles. It has happened that when an uncial containing only a part of the New Testament has received a certain designation, another and totally different uncial, as supplying in whole or in part the deficiency of the former, has received the same designation. Thus E in the Gospels is a MS. of the eighth century; in the Acts, it is a different MS. of the sixth century; while in the Pauline Epistles it is a mere transcript of D, of uncertain age, of no critical value, and seldom cited at all. To avoid confusion it has been proposed (and the plan will here be followed) to mark the different MSS. bearing the same letter with figures in accordance with the order of the books contained in them; thus B is the famous Vatican Codex of the fourth century, extending to Heb. ix. 14; B₂ is the Vatican MS. No. 2066, of the fifth century, containing the Apocalypse. D of the sixth century contains the Gospels, Acts, and 3 John; D₂ is a different MS., belonging to the same century, and containing the Pauline Epistles. On the other hand, some of the cursive MSS., which are really continuous have been cited under different numbers in different parts of the New Testament. Thus one of the most valuable of them is 33 in the Gospels, 13 in the Acts, and 17 in the Pauline Epistles. There are also a very few of the uncials the designation of which has been changed by the later critics. Thus the letter J is no longer used, and the several MSS. once cited under that designation have since, in part, been differently marked; in the Gospels the letter N has uniformly replaced J; but in the Acts and Catholic Epistles G₂ was for a time generally, and continues still to be sometimes used; in the Pauline Epistles L₂ has been generally accepted, and the same designation has also been used for the Acts and Catholic Epistles, while G₂ is appropriated to another small fragment of the Acts. There are several other variations between recent critical editors in regard chiefly to the smaller fragmentary MSS. The notation is uniform in regard to the more complete and important codices, but in using critical editions of the text it is important to observe

the notation adopted in regard to the lesser and more recently discovered fragments.

There is still another point to be borne in mind in connection with the citation of MSS. As soon as a MS. was completed, at least in early times, it was subjected to a careful revision. The person, or persons, by whom this was done was called *ὁ ἀντιβάλλων* or *ὁ διορθωτής*. The corrections of these contemporary examiners are of the greatest importance. Other corrections were made at various ages by various hands, so that the Codex Sinaiticus, as already mentioned, has been corrected as late as the twelfth century. The work of the various correctors is identified and their age determined by certain peculiarities. For example: in Codex B when the original writing had faded from age, it was inked over, letter by letter, accents added, and corrections made from a copy in use at the time. It is plain that this inking, the addition of the accents, and the corrections were by the same hand, because the corrector often omits to ink over letters or syllables which he thought ought to be omitted, and in such cases the accents are not inserted. Generally when he adds anything, he imitates the ancient letters; but sometimes, when pressed for room, he uses abbreviations or forms of letters belonging to the tenth and eleventh centuries; sometimes an abbreviation of this sort occurs in connection with the omission to ink over some letters. Thus Matt. xvi. 19, the original reading was *δωσω σοι τας κλειδας*: the scribe wished to change it to *καὶ δώσω σοὶ τὰς κλεῖς*; he accomplished it by prefixing *καὶ* in the abbreviated form *Ca*, neglecting to ink over the syllable *-δας* and writing *σ* above it in the late cursive instead of the uncial form. In the citation of MSS. reference is often made to these corrections. The original text is cited simply by the letter or by the letter with an asterisk (*), as D or D*. The several correctors in the order of their antiquity are marked by small figures at the right hand upper corner of the letters, as C¹, C², C³, etc. In the case of *Σ*, Tischendorf has used small letters, as *Σ^a*, *Σ^b*, *Σ^c*.

No MS. earlier than the tenth century bears a date, but

there are various indications by which a practised eye is able to determine with certainty, and generally within the limits of half a century, the period when they were written. Besides the broad distinction between uncials and cursives already mentioned, much may be determined from the form of the letters. In Egyptian papyri and in those found at Pompeii, which are earlier than any of the New Testament codices, we have the primitive type of Greek writing. The text is in columns, rudely divided, without punctuation or division of words; what afterwards became *iota subscript* is either *adscript* or altogether omitted; and there are no accents or breathings; the letters are upright, square, and simple. To these characteristics the earlier New Testament codices closely conform. Later, the characters became more narrow, oblong, and leaning, and were marked by more elaborateness in style. Initial letters of larger size were introduced; and punctuation marks, at first a simple dot to mark division of sentences (which was in common use before the beginning of the fifth century) gradually became more complex. The interrogation mark (;) came into use in the ninth century. The contractions in the older MSS. are confined to a few frequently recurring words, as $\overline{\Theta C}$, $\overline{IC}$, $\overline{XC}$, $\overline{KC}$, $\overline{YC}$, $\overline{IHP}$, $\overline{AAD}$, etc. ($\theta\epsilon\acute{o}s$, $\text{'I}\eta\sigma\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$, $\chi\rho\iota\sigma\tau\acute{o}s$, $\kappa\acute{\upsilon}\rho\iota\omicron>s$, $\nu\acute{\iota}\omicron>s$, $\pi\alpha\tau\acute{\eta}\rho$, $\Delta\alpha\upsilon\epsilon\acute{\iota}\delta$) while later these are increased in number. Iota adscript is rare in the earlier, more common in the later, uncials. Accents are not found earlier than the eighth century. The material on which the characters were written, as well as the characters themselves, underwent a gradual change. The earliest codices that have come down to us are on the thinnest and finest vellum; later, the parchment becomes thick and coarse.

Another indication of age is in the various marks of division of the books found, or not found, in the different MSS. The oldest extant system of division is found only in Codices B and Ξ , and is a division according to the sense, a fresh section commencing whenever a new subject is introduced. These paragraphs are marked in Tregelles' edition of the Greek New Testament. In the Pauline Epistles these sections are

numbered continuously throughout, as if forming one book, and it is interesting to note that according to these numbers the Epistle to the Hebrews is placed between the Epistles to the Galatians and the Ephesians. In codex B it is actually placed just after 2 Thessalonians and thus the mutilation which took away the latter part of Hebrews removed also the Pastoral Epistles; but in the numbering, the last section of Galatians is 58, the first of Hebrews 59, the end of Hebrews is lost, but the first section of Ephesians is 70, leaving, no doubt, that the numbering originally ran on continuously from Galatians through Hebrews to Ephesians. There are three systems of division of especial value in determining the date of a codex: the so-called Ammonian sections with the Eusebian canons; the *στίχοι* of Euthalius; and the *τίτλοι*, often improperly called *κεφάλαια*.

1. The Ammonian sections. Ammonius, a scholar of Alexandria of the third century, constructed a Harmony of the Gospels on the basis of Matthew, with which he grouped the parallel passages of the other Gospels. We know his system, however, only as modified by Eusebius of Caesarea (fourth century) in connection with whose "canons" the Ammonian sections are recorded. Eusebius seems to have had in mind not so much a harmony as a system of passages in the Gospels illustrative of one another, — a sort of combination of a harmony with a reference Bible; e.g. the miraculous draught of fishes after the resurrection (John. xxi. 1-6) is combined with the like miracle near the beginning of our Lord's ministry (Luke v. 4-7). Ammonius necessarily interrupted the order of the last three Gospels; Eusebius arranged tables of numbers by which the assimilated passages of the several Gospels were simply indicated. Each Gospel is divided into sections, numbered continuously throughout. Matthew has 355 sections; Mark, 233 (to xvi. 8; the last twelve verses not being included in the sections); Luke, 342; John, 232. Eusebius formed ten tables, called "Canons." The first contains a list of all the passages (seventy-one in number) contained in all four Gospels; the sections of Matthew contained in the list are set down

in one column according to the order of their numbers, and then, in separate columns — one for each of the other Gospels — are set over against these the number of the corresponding section in the Gospel to which the column belongs. The canons 2, 3, and 4, contain lists of the sections common to three of the Gospels; No. 2 grouping the first three Gospels; No. 3, the first two with the fourth; and No. 4, the last three. Canons 5–9 contain lists of the sections in which any two of the Gospels agree; while canon 10 is a list of sixty-two passages peculiar to some one of the Gospels. It was the custom to affix the numbers for the sections and canons in their proper place in the margin of the MSS., the number for the section above, and that for the canon below. Thus, in the Gospel of Matthew, $\frac{329}{4}$ indicates that the passage to which it is attached is section 329 in that Gospel, and by looking at canon 4 will be found over against that number the corresponding sections of Mark and John, viz. 207 of the former and 187 of the latter. The passages in this case are Matt. xxvii. 27–29; Mark xv. 16–19; John xix. 5. These sections and canons are given in several of the critical editions of the Greek New Testament; in Tischendorf they are marked by small Arabic numerals, inserted in the text, and in Tregelles by the old Greek letter numerals, placed in the margin. The oldest codex in which these are found is α , and they appear to have been affixed either by the original scribe or by a contemporary hand. In the palimpsests C, R, P, Q, Z, the sections are given, but the canons, which were usually marked in vermilion (*κιννάβαρις*), if originally there, would have been wholly washed out in the preparation of the parchment for a second use, and are no longer found. Both are wanting in B. These numbers not only show that the codex containing them *a prima manu* cannot be older than Eusebius, but also have an important bearing upon the opinion of Eusebius in regard to the genuineness of some disputed passages of the Gospels.

2. The *στίχοι* of Euthalius was a device to assist in making proper pauses in the public reading of the scriptures, and consists of an arrangement of each sentence, or considerable

part of a sentence, in a separate line. The idea was suggested by the arrangement of the parallel clauses of the poetical books of the Old Testament in the LXX. The Gospels were probably divided in this way before Euthalius; he applied the plan to the Pauline Epistles in 458, and to the Acts and Catholic Epistles in 490. As the *στίχοι* were of quite unequal length, the arrangement was rather extravagant of vellum, and the fashion soon passed away. The chief examples of it are D and D₂ and H₃. But the enumeration of the *στίχοι* was preserved in many MSS. after this form of writing had itself been abandoned, and helps to determine the date.

3. The third method of division mentioned above was into *τίτλοι* or *κεφάλαια*, the former term belonging more strictly to the Gospels, the latter to the remaining books. The *τίτλος* is a short descriptive heading of the first or principal subject contained in the section. It is sometimes placed in the margin, sometimes at the top or bottom of the page, and a list of these *τίτλοι*, or headings, is usually prefixed to each book. They appear to have come into general use just before the fifth century. No trace of them is found in *א* or B, but they appear in A, C, R, and Z. The average length of the *τίτλοι* is a little more than double that of the sections in B. They are given in full from the principal uncials containing them in Tregelles' Greek New Testament, and for each of the principal parts of the volume are placed at the end of that part. The Apocalypse was divided into sections by Andreas of Caesarea about A.D. 500. The whole book was arranged in twenty-four *λόγοι*, each consisting of three *κεφάλαια*.

There are many other indications of the antiquity of MSS. quite independent of the character of their readings. In the cursives, the material, the character of the letters, and the abbreviations are especially valuable indications. Many of these are distinctly dated. In the later MSS. the corrections, as in 67 (Epp.), are often of more value than the original text. One interesting fact must not be passed over. In A.D. 331, Eusebius was ordered by the emperor Constantine

to have fifty handsome and well-written copies of the scriptures prepared for the use of the churches in his new capital, Constantinople. Eusebius (Vit. Const. iv. 36, 37) records that this was done, and that the sheets were arranged in sets of *three or four*: “cum nos in voluminibus magnifice exornatis *terniones et quaterniones* ad eum misissemus.” There are but two extant codices, **Æ** and B, of sufficient antiquity to have been possibly among this number; but of these B is excluded, from the fact that its sheets are arranged in sets of *five* (quiniones), and it remains probable that **Æ**, corresponding in every respect to the description, and written on the finest vellum, was one of these very copies.

While all the uncials have been collated, and nearly all published, with the utmost care, comparatively few of the cursives have been thoroughly examined by competent scholars, nor is it likely that the mass of them ever will be, since after selecting much less than one hundred of them, the rest are of exceedingly little critical value in comparison with the others. Still there remains a considerable number never yet carefully collated throughout, which might repay the labor. It is impossible to form any tolerably accurate estimate of the whole number of various readings which have already been collected. Westcott (Smith's Dict., Art. New Testament, § 30) says, “they cannot be less than one hundred and twenty thousand in all, though of these a very large proportion consist of differences of spelling and isolated aberrations of scribes, and of the remainder comparatively few alterations are sufficiently well supported to create reasonable doubt as to the final judgment. Probably there are not more than from sixteen hundred to two thousand places in which the true reading is a matter of uncertainty, even if we include in this, questions of order, inflection, and orthography. The doubtful readings by which the sense is in any way affected are very much fewer, and those of dogmatic importance can be easily numbered.”

Besides manuscripts, there are two other chief sources of information in regard to the true reading of the original text:

Versions and Patristic quotations. It will be necessary to say something of each of them. The wide spread of the Greek language and literature obviated for a little time in most countries the necessity of translations of the New Testament; but as soon as Christians not familiar with Greek began to multiply in any country, the sacred books, both of the Old and the New Testament, were at once translated into the vernacular. These translations were of necessity preserved in manuscripts in the same way as the original, and with quite as much liability to error in the process of repeated transcription, in addition to any errors of translation. Of some of the ancient versions, many and ancient mss. have been preserved, and have been carefully collated; of others there are but few remains, and those still but imperfectly investigated. While, therefore, something of critical value still remains to reward the labors of the student, very much of the highest importance has already been made accessible. Notwithstanding the common liability of the Greek mss., and of those of all versions, to error, it is in the highest degree unlikely that they would all vary in the same way in the same passages. Hence, when a reading is found in a few of the earliest Greek mss., and is confirmed by an ancient version, there is strong evidence of the early prevalence of the reading; if a second and a third of the other ancient versions also concur, the evidence in its favor is exceedingly strong.

The evidence of the versions, in the nature of the case, is of very different weight in regard to different classes of readings, and, in some points, in regard to the language of the version. Some languages are evidently capable of more fully representing the exact Greek forms than others — the Semitic tongues, e.g. being able to give but slight evidence of the tenses of the Greek verb or of the cases of the noun. In regard to the omission or insertion of words and clauses, versions may give as clear evidence as the Greek mss. themselves; and even in case of inaccuracy in the translation, the very mistake often indicates the reading from which it must have been derived. In general the very early versions slav-

ishly followed their Greek text, to the neglect not only of the vernacular idiom, but even of grammatical construction, the *Genitive* absolute, e.g. often appearing in the Latin instead of the Ablative. The earliest Latin versions, indeed, were so absolutely servile as often to show the order of the Greek words in opposition to the requirements of their own tongue. The amount of assistance to be obtained from the versions in the criticism of the text is far greater than was imagined before their careful study was entered upon, and greater than could now be supposed possible by one who has not carefully examined the evidence.

Of all the versions, at once the most important and the most carefully examined is the Latin. This was not made in Italy. The church of Rome during the first two centuries "was essentially Greek. The Roman bishops bear Greek names; the earliest Roman liturgy was Greek; the few remains of the Christian literature of Rome are Greek. The same remark holds true of Gaul." Fortunately, the need of a Latin version was first felt where the uncouth Latinity of an exceedingly literal version would not be offensive,—in Northern Africa. Of its origin no distinct knowledge has been preserved; but in the time of Tertullian, at the close of the second century, it was old enough and in sufficiently extensive use to exert a moulding influence upon the current language of Christians (adv. Prax. 5). The Latin translator of Irenaeus, probably a contemporary of Tertullian, was familiar with it, and it is old enough not to have included originally the Epistle to the Hebrews, that of James, and 2 Peter. It is considered settled that it had already received a definite shape soon after the middle of the second century. The Gospels are placed in it in the following order: Matthew, John, Luke, Mark. The codices of this version are cited by small Roman letters; but unfortunately there is more variation in the use of these letters than in the case of the Greek. The letters given below are those used by Tregelles and Tischendorf; except for the first three, a different designation is given by Westcott (Art. Vulgate, in Smith's Dict.). The

following are the most important, but of them the first three are of far more weight than the others.

a	Codex Vercellensis.	Cent. IV.
b	Codex Veronensis.	Cent. IV. or V.
c	Codex Colbertinus.	Cent. IX.
h	Codex Claromontanus.	Cent. IV. or V.
i	Codex Vindobonensis.	Cent. V. or VI.
k	Codex Bobbiensis.	Cent. IV. or V.
m	Codex Mai's Speculum.	Cent. VI.

This version passed over from Africa to North Italy, where the roughness of its language led in the fourth century to a revision. This new version is known as the *Itala*, and is in better Latin, and is commended by Augustine for its accuracy and clearness. The best codex is f = Codex Briscianus, but ff¹ and ff² = Codices Corbeienses, and g¹, g² = Codices Sangermanenses, are also much cited. There are also a number of mss. of a recension of the Latin, independent of, and possibly partly prior to, the revision by Jerome. Westcott has proposed to designate these by the small Greek letters (α - κ) and has enumerated them in the article referred to above; but as yet not much critical use has been made of them. Besides the versions enumerated, there were a multitude of private translations into Latin (August. De doctr. Christ. ii. 16 (11)), and by the close of the fourth century there was so much confusion that Jerome was requested by Pope Damasus to undertake a new revision. He at once set about the task — not of making a new *translation* of the New Testament (as he did of the Old), but of *revising* the existing translation by comparison with the best Greek mss. to which he had access. His labor was chiefly spent upon the Gospels, where the existing texts were most variant and corrupt. It has even been questioned whether he revised the other books at all; it seems certain, however, that he did so, but hastily and imperfectly. The chief mss. of this version, with their designations, are: am. = cod. Amiatinus. Cent. vi. This is written with such accuracy, that in value as well as age it stands at the head of the authorities — contains the whole Latin Bible except Baruch (the New Testament is printed in

the margin of Tregelles' Greek Testament); fuld. = cod. Fuldensis, containing the whole New Testament, but the Gospels in harmony — its text is of nearly equal value with the preceding (it is printed at the foot of the page in Lachmann's Greek Testament); harl. = cod. Harleianus; for. = cod. Forojuliensis; and tol. = cod. Toletanus. The first two of these are much more important than the others; there are also several others, occasionally cited under simple abbreviations. Two centuries elapsed before Jerome's version came into general use, and by the end of two more there was need of a fresh revision. This was accomplished by Alcuin, at the request of Charlemagne, and was simply a revision by a comparison of the best Latin texts without reference to the Greek. It is occasionally referred to as *Vulg. Alc.* In the following centuries various revisions were attempted. In 1590 an authoritative revision was put forth by Sixtus V., but containing so many arbitrary corrections that two years later it was superseded by the modern authorized Vulgate, put forth by Clement VIII., and hence often called the Clementine Vulgate, and sometimes quoted as *Vulg. Cl.* It is substantially Jerome's revision, but with readings gathered from various quarters.

The version next in importance to the Latin is the Syriac. There is evidence of the existence of a Syriac translation of the Gospels at least as early as the middle of the second century (Euseb. Eccl. Hist. iv. 22). The earliest Syriac versions we now have, the Curetonian and the Peshito, are supposed to stand in the same relation to each other as the *Vetus Latina* and the *Vulgate*. The former exists only in a single ms. of the fifth century, brought by Dr. Cureton in 1842 from the Nitrian monasteries. It contains only fragments of the Gospels (Matt. i.—viii. 22; x. 31—xxiii. 25; Mark xvi. 17—20; John i. 1—42; iii. 6—vii. 37; xiv. 11—29; Luke ii. 48—iii. 16; vii. 33—xv. 21; xvii. 24—xxiv. 41.) This codex has many interpolations, sometimes in common with D, sometimes unsupported by any Greek ms.; but it also preserves many characteristic readings of the most ancient type.

The First Gospel is thought by Dr. Cureton and others to have been translated, not from the Greek but, from the *Hebrew* original of Matthew. The Peshito, belonging originally to a very early period, when the canon of the New Testament was not fully settled, does not contain the four Catholic Epistles, 2 Peter, 2 and 3 John, and Jude, nor the Apocalypse; it also wants John vii. 53—viii. 11. It is shown to be earlier than the fourth century by the fact of its use by all the sects into which the Syrian church was then divided. In the process of transmission from age to age, like the Greek MSS. themselves, it has suffered not merely from the errors of the scribes, but also from the effort to correct it by a Greek text as late as the fourth century. The present Peshito is therefore looked upon as a recension of an older text, combining in itself (like the Latin Cod. Brixianus) readings of the highest antiquity with others which had begun to be current at the date of our oldest Greek MSS.

In A.D. 508 a new version from the Greek into the Syriac was undertaken by Polycarp at the instance of Philoxenus, Monophysite bishop of Hierapolis, from whom it is commonly called the Philoxenian version. Of this version, in its original state, all that now remains are some quotations in Syrian writers, and perhaps one MS. of the Gospels at Florence, and one of the Acts and seven Catholic Epistles in the Bodleian library. The Catholic Epistles, wanting in the Peshito, were also published by Pococke in 1630, from a MS. in the Bodleian, which it is thought may have been a part of the original Philoxenian. These are now commonly printed with the Peshito, to which, however, they do not belong.

A century later (A.D. 616) a revision of the Philoxenian was made at Alexandria by Thomas of Harkel, also bishop of Hierapolis. This also is sometimes cited as the Philoxenian, but is more accurately called the Harclean. Of this version there are known several MSS. of the Gospels, but only one (in New College Library, Oxford) of the rest of the New Testament. As it is mutilated at the end, it is not known whether it originally contained the Apocalypse or not. This

version is of especial value because of its slavish adherence to the Greek, word for word and particle for particle, in entire disregard of the Syriac idiom. It is therefore an important witness to the current Greek text of the seventh century. It also contains in the margin various readings from one or two, sometimes from three, Greek MSS. of a much earlier date. In critical editions the Harclean *text* and *margin* are therefore cited separately.

The so-called *Jerusalem-Syriac* is also cited in critical editions of the Greek New Testament. It is a lectionary of uncertain age, and is supposed by Tregelles to be only a translation of a Greek Evangelistarium. Until recently it was known only in a single MS. in the Vatican library, dated Antioch, A.D. 1031; this has never been published, but its readings have been collated. More recently another MS. of this lectionary has been published at Verona (1861-64). This lectionary has much more value for critical than for other purposes. Its dialect is not the common Syriac, its grammar is peculiar, and its forms rather Chaldee than Syriac. Its readings, however, are ancient, and Tischendorf considers that its text bears a closer resemblance to that of the best uncials than the Peshito.

There are three Egyptian versions in as many different dialects: the Sahidic (or Thebaic), the Coptic (or Memphitic), and the Basmuric. Only the first two are possessed of critical value. From the smallness of the number of scholars familiar with the Egyptian dialect, comparatively little critical labor has been bestowed upon these versions. There is some evidence to show that an Egyptian version was in existence in the second century, and this is supposed to be represented by the Sahidic, while the Coptic may constitute a later revision. They are assigned by critics to the latter part of the second and of the third centuries respectively. The Sahidic has been at various times published in fragments, in part from a MS. of the fifth century; but a complete critical edition is still a desideratum. The Coptic has been repeatedly published, and is still read in the churches of the Egyptian Christians, although their vernacular tongue is Arabic.

The Gothic version was made by Ulphilas, Arian bishop of the Goths, A.D. 348–388. It was, therefore, certainly made in the fourth century, and was in use among both the Eastern and Western Goths. Its principal ms. is the Cod. *Argenteus*, written in silver letters on purple vellum, and preserved in the University of Upsal. It is of the sixth century, but unfortunately in so fragmentary a condition as to contain but one hundred and eighty-eight out of its original three hundred and twenty folios. There are, however, six or seven other codices known, containing parts of all the New Testament except the Acts, Hebrews, Catholic Epistles, and Apocalypse. When the readings of this version confirm those of the most ancient authorities the united testimony is considered of especial value.

Christianity was introduced into Ethiopia in the fourth century, and the Ethiopic version was probably made soon after. The Ethiopic New Testament was printed at Rome 1548–49 under the editorship of three Abyssinians, and this text is reprinted in Walton's Polyglot. In 1826–30 a new edition, formed by a collation of mss., was printed by Mr. Platt. These two editions are usually separately cited.

The Armenian version was made from Greek mss. about the middle of the fifth century. It has been repeatedly published in its original language, with which none of the critical editors of the Greek New Testament appear to have been familiar. Various passages have been collated for one and another of these critics by various scholars, until at last a full collation of the text of Zohrab was made for Tregelles by Dr. Rieu of the British Museum. It seems, however, that much critical labor is still required upon the Armenian text itself before it can be appealed to as of much weight, except on certain definite points.

The third source of evidence for the text — Patristic quotations — must be confessed to be in a far less satisfactory condition than the other two. The transcribers of the writings of the Fathers have so frequently *corrected* their scriptural quotations, by altering them to conform to the text current

in their own day, that it is impossible to place much reliance upon simple citations until the writings of the Fathers themselves shall have been carefully and critically edited from the best accessible manuscripts. Often the context itself shows that a different text was followed by the Fathers cited from that which now appears in their printed works. Probably it is from this cause chiefly that different texts are now found in the same citations in different parts of the works of the same Father. This is especially the case with such voluminous writers as Origen and Chrysostom. There are, however, two kinds of citation which are free from this uncertainty, and in which the value of Patristic testimony is very great. It often happens that the Fathers quote the New Testament in a loose way, not *verbatim*, but giving the sense in words interwoven with words of their own. This is characteristic of nearly all quotations in the Apostolic Fathers, and of many of a later date. In such cases the scribe has had no chance for his alterations, and if the disputed reading is of such a nature as to be shown by a citation of this kind, the authority of such passages may be appealed to with confidence, and will sometimes give evidence as to the text earlier than that of any MS., or MS. of a version now extant. Again, we know that variations of reading in the MSS. existed as early as the time of Marcion (settled as an heretical teacher at Rome before A.D. 139). Origen and Eusebius were abundant in critical labors upon the Greek text, and Jerome upon the Latin. Now these, and other Patristic writers, frequently discuss various readings, state the division of the MSS. about them, and pronounce their own opinion, with their reasons. In such cases — and they are many — the evidence afforded is plainly of the utmost value. Sometimes even here the scribe has undertaken to alter the citation itself, but his work is betrayed by the accompanying discussion. In one or two instances he has carried his attempt at alteration to the point of making nonsense of the passage (as in the comment of Eusebius on Matt. i. 24, *δειγματίσαι*, Cramer's Catena, i. p. 12), yet still leaving it possible to see what must have been the

original reading of his author. Such discussions in the Fathers sometimes show the existence of a reading in early and excellent MSS., which no longer exists in any codex which has come down to our time; if such a reading is confirmed by the authority of the most important versions, it may even happen in rare cases that there will be preponderating evidence in its favor, in opposition to every extant Greek MS. The evidence, however, in such a case requires, of course, very searching scrutiny. In regard to the great mass of simple quotations in the Fathers, it is obvious that more reliance can be placed upon those readings which differ from, than upon those which agree with, the text most familiar to their copyists.

Having thus very briefly sketched the three chief sources for the determination of the text, — MSS., versions, and Patristic quotations, — it remains to be noted that the MSS. may be classified by certain general characteristics which aid materially in determining the weight of authority to be attached to any of them. From the time of Bengel down almost or quite to the present, many critics have attempted to carry out this classification sharply and definitely; some of them recognizing two, some three, and some four groups of MSS. After much controversy, upon full examination of the facts, the present conclusion seems to be that no sharp line of demarcation can be drawn; there being many MSS. which will present some characteristics of more than one of any groups which can be formed. Still, there is an almost universal recognition of certain general characteristics which broadly divide the MSS. into at least two classes: the *Alexandrine* or *African* group, and the *Asiatic* or *Byzantine*. Tischendorf, like many others, subdivides each of these groups into two; but it may well be questioned whether such subdivision is sufficiently definite to be of much avail for critical purposes. There is, however, a third group, sufficiently distinct from the Byzantine, which generally presents a text like the Alexandrine, but is marked by numerous interpolations. This includes D and other Graeco-Latin MSS.,

and was called *Western* by Griesbach, *Latin* by Tischendorf; but the fact that to this class unequivocally belongs the Curetonian Syriac interferes with the appropriateness of either of these names.

The following are some of the peculiarities which serve to distinguish one group of the MSS. from another :

Peculiarities of spelling. Besides those already enumerated under supposed errors in the earlier codices corrected by the later scribes, may be mentioned the substitution of the aspirate for the *tenuis* in such words as ἀφελπίζοντες, etc., and such forms as ἐχθές for χθές, etc.

Peculiarities of inflection; most frequently the Gen. Sing. of the first declension after ρ, in -ης instead of -ας, as σπείρης, πρώρης, etc., the Accus. of the third declension and of adjectives ending in ν, the neglect of the augment in some verbs beginning with a diphthong, and some instances of a future conjunctive.

Peculiarities of syntax; very commonly εἰάν for ἄν, the use of ἵνα, εἰάν, and ὅταν with the Indicative.

Peculiarities in the order of words, and omissions of certain words, and other characteristic readings which cannot be thus briefly described.

It is observable that these peculiarities are not all of them found uniformly in any codex, nor, on the other hand, are they exclusively confined to any group of codices; but they are found so often in some MSS., and so comparatively seldom in others, that their presence or absence becomes characteristic.

The groups thus marked are found each to agree within themselves in their testimony as to various readings; that is to say, in a large majority of instances, the smaller group marked by these peculiarities will be found on one side, with a very few others agreeing with them, while the mass of MSS. will be on the other side. If one will turn to the pages of any critical edition of the Greek New Testament, and simply glance over the citation of authorities, he will observe that certain letters are habitually grouped together, so that not

infrequently the citation is simply made of two or three of them, with an "etc." for the long list usually agreeing with these. The variations within each group will be found relatively much greater in the smaller than in the larger group. This foreshadows the fact, which will presently appear, that they constitute the more independent class of witnesses. It becomes, therefore, a question of much importance to ascertain which group represents the older text, that is, the text nearer to the time of the originals.

This question cannot be decided simply by the antiquity of the MSS. themselves; for, as already said, it may, and sometimes does, happen that a late codex exhibits an older text, or, in other words, has been copied from an earlier MS. than one actually written centuries before it. Resort must be had, in the first instance, to unquestionably early authorities, such as express quotations in the early Fathers and versions of known antiquity. By the examination of a large number of instances of this sort, the *character* of a text may be established, and when this has been satisfactorily done that character gives or takes away our confidence generally in the readings of a codex in which it is found. A long list of such crucial passages may be found in Tregelles on the Printed Text of the Greek Testament (pp. 133-147). It is impossible to present the argument at all fairly in a very limited space; but the few following instances may be enough to show its nature. In Matt. xix. 17 the two readings are: (1) *τί με λέγεις ἀγαθόν; οὐδεὶς ἀγαθός, εἰ μὴ εἰς.* (2) *τί με ἐρωτᾷς περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ; εἰς ἐστὶν ὁ ἀγαθός.* Setting aside the MSS. for the moment, the ancient testimonies are as follows:

For (1), of the Latin versions *f* and *g*; the Peshito and Harclean (text) Syriac; the Sahidic; quotations in Hilary, Optatus, Ambrose, Chrysostom, and the later Fathers generally.

For (2), seven codices of *Vetus Latina*, including all the better ones, and the Vulgate; the Curetonian and Jerusalem Syriac; the Coptic and Armenian; Origen and Augustine

expressly quote the first clause, and point out the distinction between the words as here given by Matthew and those recorded by Mark and Luke.

Farther, two MSS. of the *Vetus Latina*, the *margin* of the Harclean Syriac, the Ethiopic, Justin Martyr, Eusebius, and Jerome give one clause in one form and the other in the other.

It is evident that we have a strong preponderance of early testimony in favor of (2); while it is also plain that the variation was introduced at an early date. On general considerations, we can see no reason why (1) should have been altered to (2) in the first Gospel, and left in the others; while the well-known tendency of the scribes to conform parallel passages to one another fully explains the alteration of (2) to (1). Finally, the testimony of Origen and Augustine is explicit and decisive.

Now let us look at the MSS. For the early reading (2) we have $\aleph$, B, D (D omits $\tau\omicron\upsilon$ and δ), L, 1, 22. For the later reading (1) are C, E, F, G, H, K, M, S, U, V, Δ (Γ omits the first clause), and the great mass of the cursives. The other uncials are defective here. It will be seen that the only very ancient codex for (1) is C, while of the later L, 1, 22 agree with the early codices $\aleph$, B, and D.

To cite another instance more briefly: In Matt. xv. 8 is a quotation from Isa. xxix. 13. There are two readings; one giving the quotation in full, the other omitting the words in brackets: $[\epsilon\gamma\gamma\acute{\iota}\zeta\epsilon\iota \mu\omicron\iota] \delta \lambda\alpha\omicron\varsigma \omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma [\tau\hat{\omega} \sigma\tau\omicron\mu\alpha\tau\iota \alpha\upsilon\tau\hat{\omega}\nu \kappa\alpha\iota] \tau\omicron\iota\varsigma \chi\epsilon\iota\lambda\epsilon\sigma\acute{\iota} \mu\epsilon \tau\iota\mu\hat{\alpha}$. The presumption, on general principles, is in favor of the shorter reading; Origen expressly says that Matthew varies from Isaiah; the shorter reading is given by all the Latin versions except f, by the Curetonian and Peshito Syriac, the Coptic, Armenian, and Ethiopic; it is the reading of $\aleph$, B, D, L, 33, 124. On the other hand, the full reading is given by f, by the Harclean Syriac, and among MSS. by C and most of the later uncials and cursives.

The arrangement of the authorities is almost exactly the same in regard to the omission of the words $\kappa\alpha\iota \tau\hat{o} \beta\acute{\alpha}\pi\tau\iota\sigma\mu\alpha$

ὁ ἐγὼ βαπτίζομαι βαπτισθῆναι, in Matt. xx. 22, only that here we have Z, defective in the former passages, concurring with the few early MSS. in the omission.

After the examination of many score of such passages, in which the classification of the authorities and MSS. is substantially the same, the conclusion seems irresistible that the earliest text is generally to be found in the smaller group of MSS., while the later is contained in the larger mass of them.

These so-called "later readings," however, often had their origin long before the date of even our earliest MSS. Hence one and another even of these will be found at times to support a later reading. For example, in the form of the Lord's prayer as given in Luke xi. 2, $\aleph$ inserts the clause *γεννηθήτω τὸ θέλημά σου ὡς ἐν οὐρανῷ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς*, against B, L, 1, and a few other MSS., against the great preponderance of the early versions, and against the express statements of Origen and Augustine, besides the quotations of Tertullian and Jerome. In very rare cases the whole, or nearly the whole, small group of codices generally containing the early text can be shown to be at fault, and by the testimony of versions and of the early Fathers the true text is shown to have been better preserved in what are usually the inferior authorities. A remarkable instance is the reading *ὁ μονογενὴς θεός*, in John i. 18, instead of *ὁ μονογενὴς υἱός*. In favor of the former are $\aleph$, B, C*, L, 33; while A, C³, the rest of the uncials, and all cursives, except 33, have *υἱός*, which is supported by the great preponderance of early versions, by the far greater number of the Greek Fathers, and was the only reading followed by the Latin Fathers. This, however, is a very exceptional case. It is comparatively seldom that the joint authority of $\aleph$ and B can be set aside, very seldom indeed when they are supported also by D, L, Z (in Matt.), and by 1, 22, 33, and 69 among the cursives. If to these be added A and C and a few of the more important fragments, this numerically small array of authorities is of far more value than the fourteen hundred or fifteen hundred MSS. which may be on the other side.

There is not space here to trace out the historical corroboration of the facts observed in the examination of the MSS. themselves; but it may be remarked in passing, that while Alexandria was once the chief centre of Christian learning and critical scholarship, it ceased to be so after the Mohammedan conquest in the seventh century. It was, therefore, to be expected that the remaining codices presenting in the most marked degree the Alexandrine type of text would be few in number and mostly of great antiquity. On the other hand, after the establishment of Christianity as the religion of the Roman empire and the foundation of Constantinople as the Eastern capital, there must have been there a great demand for copies of the scriptures, and these continued to be multiplied until the capture of the city in the middle of the fifteenth century; we should therefore expect, what we actually find, that the great mass of the later MSS. would exhibit the Byzantine type of text.

It remains to present briefly a few simple rules for the determination of the text. These canons of criticism are sufficiently well settled, and commend themselves to everyone's acceptance upon thoughtful consideration. In this, however, as in most arts, simple as the principles are in themselves, it is only by practice that skill can be acquired in their application. None of them admit of being rigidly applied in every case; they are *general* rules, overruled in particular instances by other considerations. Neither does their importance admit of anything like a definite numerical expression, so that each rule and each authority be counted as so many units, and then the sum added up on each side and the balance struck. The errors in MSS. are the very complex result of human action, and can only be rightly estimated by the exercise of skill and sagacity. In all cases every element of the evidence must be allowed its full weight, and if the observance of this fundamental rule sometimes occasions perplexity, it is certain that its neglect will lead into error. For the external evidence the following canons have been generally agreed upon:

1. The combined evidence of the earliest mss., the earliest versions, and undoubted quotations in the earliest Fathers, gives a certain reading. This holds good whether the mass of later mss. agree or disagree.

2. Mere numerical preponderance of witnesses of one kind, without regard to their intrinsic character, is of small value.

3. In case of conflicting evidence, great weight attaches to the combination of witnesses widely separated geographically. This applies to the versions, and to Patristic quotations, and also to the mss. in so far as they can be distinctly classified. Thus the consentient testimony of Irenaeus, of Origen, and of Jerome would be of more value than that of a much larger number of writers from a single locality.

4. The weight of each of the three classes of evidence is obviously different in regard to different kinds of readings. For example, the authority of versions generally is much greater on questions of omission or insertion than on verbal niceties; and so correspondingly of the others. It is therefore impossible to be guided always by any mechanical rule of taking two out of the three classes, or any such short and easy method. Much the same thing may also be said as to deciding what is really the collective testimony of any one of the classes; the character of each subordinate witness in view of the nature of the reading, is to be taken into the account. The testimony sometimes of a Semitic, and sometimes of a Latin version is of the higher value; on questions that have to do with geography, the reading of a Father familiar with the localities is of more importance than that of one who knew nothing of them.

5. Disagreement of the ancient authorities, when not explicable as the mere *lapsus* of the scribe, marks a variation of reading of still earlier date.

6. The more ancient reading is *generally* — not quite always — the reading of the more ancient manuscripts.

In practice there is less uncertainty in the application of the foregoing rules than might appear from the somewhat indefinite form it is necessary to give them in order to make

them general. So far as these canons of external evidence are concerned, there would be very little difference indeed in the text formed upon them by any number of experienced critics. The case, however, is otherwise in regard to the canons of internal evidence. These canons themselves are somewhat differently stated by each of the critical editors, and there is also some variety in the application of those which are generally agreed upon. The following are among those most commonly recognized, but they require to be used with so much of limitation, and have also so much of corollary, that such difference as now exists — which indeed is not very much — between the texts of the best critical editors is due almost exclusively to their varying use of the canons of internal evidence.

1. *Brevior lectio praeferenda verbosiori* (Griesbach's first canon). This "rests on the well-known tendency of transcribers, already before alluded to, to include in the text all marginal notes, glosses, etc. found in their copy; nothing, if possible, being omitted." This is a canon of wide application and of small uncertainty. Its limitations are obvious, as in the case of a *homoioteleuton*.

2. *Proclivi lectioni praestat ardua*, a canon of Bengel's, and also of wide, but of much more uncertain application. Among *lectiones arduae* are included solecisms, such grammatical peculiarities as have been already spoken of, rare or irregular usages of words, cases of apparent want of connection, etc. It was natural for the scribe to seek to correct these, which appeared to him accidental errors. The greatest caution, however, is needed in the use of this canon. It was oftentimes quite possible for an illiterate scribe to introduce solecisms, or for a provincial to introduce provincialisms. A merely mechanical copyist might inadvertently introduce an obscurity, as well as an intelligent one seek to remove one he observed. The best critics will sometimes differ, not so much as to the applicability of this canon, as in regard to the weight to which, in any case, it is entitled.

3. *Praeferatur aliis lectio cui subest sensus apparen-*

falsus, qui vero re penitus examinata verus esse deprehenditur. (Griesbach). This is sometimes considered as included in the last canon, but is of sufficient importance to stand by itself. A good instance, cited by Tregelles (Printed Text, etc., p. 203), is 1 Cor. xi. 29, where under this canon the word *ἀναξίως* must be omitted: *ὁ γὰρ ἐσθίων καὶ πίνων [ἀναξίως] κρίμα ἑαυτῷ ἐσθίει καὶ πίνει, μὴ διακρίνων τὸ σῶμα.* The obscurity arises here from taking *μὴ* as a simple negative in the sense of *οὐ*; translate the *μὴ* if not and the obscurity vanishes. It is doubtless to remove the apparent difficulty that *ἀναξίως* was originally inserted in the margin (referring to vs. 27) as an explanation. In this case the canon of internal evidence is important, for we have in favor of the insertion the great preponderance of the versions, all Patristic quotations (though none of them can be called *express*), and the great mass of MSS. including one or two of importance. For its omission however, we have the almost irresistible authority of *κ**, A, B, C*.

4. That reading is to be preferred which will explain the origin of the variations. That is to say, when there are different readings which have each of them important evidence in its favor, the one from which the others could have been easily derived is more likely to be true than one from which they could not have been. This canon is of quite frequent, and of sufficiently well-defined application.

5. In parallel passages (whether quotations from the Old Testament, parallel passages of the Gospels, or different narratives elsewhere of the same event), other things being equal, that reading is to be preferred which gives a verbally different, rather than a verbally concordant reading. This canon is sufficiently plain, and rests on principles already considered. Its most extensive application is to the parallel passages of the Gospels.

6. Those readings are to be preferred which are characteristic of the Hellenistic idiom, or of the style of the New Testament. This canon is already partly included in 2, and, like that, is to be applied with the greatest caution. In so far

as the following out of its dicta is dependent upon subjective views, its use must vary with the idiosyncrasies of the critic.

7 (as an extension of 6). Those readings are to be preferred in the books of any particular writer which are characteristic of that writer. There is at once obvious force and obvious danger in this canon. On the one hand, the style of a writer will generally be true to itself, and will be characterized by certain idiosyncrasies; on the other hand, it is by no means to be expected of any writer that he will always express himself in precisely similar terms or forms. On the application of no other canon is a difference of opinion more likely to arise between critics. Tischendorf especially has pushed this canon very far in the determination of readings.

On the whole, it will be seen that while the canons of internal evidence are useful and important as *auxiliaries*, they are a dangerous reliance, except in connection with the balancing of divergent external testimony.

The following short collection of all the more important disputed passages shows how far there is a *consensus* of the principal critical editors in regard to them.

Mark xvi. 9-20. Griesbach "probably omit;" Lachmann retains; Tregelles and Alford give as not by St. Mark; Tischendorf omits.

John i. 18. *μονογενὴς θεός* Tregelles, (Alford, margin); *υἱός* Griesbach, Lachmann, Alford, Tischendorf.

John v. 3, 4 (*ἐκδεχόμενων* to *νοσήματι*). Griesbach "probably omit" and bracketed; Lachmann retains; Tregelles, Alford, Tischendorf, omit.

John vii. 53-viii. 1. Griesbach "in all probability omit;" all others omit.

Acts xx. 28. *θεοῦ* Alford, (Tregelles, margin); *κυρίου* Griesbach, Lachmann, Tregelles, (Alford, margin), Tischendorf.

1 Tim. iii. 16. *θεός* none; *ὅς* all.

1 Pet. iii. 15. *κύριον δὲ τὸν θεόν* Griesbach; *τὸν χριστόν* all others.

1 John v. 7. *ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ* to *τῇ γῇ* all omit.

Appended is a List of all the known Greek uncials with a Table representing graphically the parts of the text of the New Testament contained in each.

THE UNCIAL MSS. OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.

It often happens that when several manuscripts are cited as in favor of, or against, a reading of the New Testament text, one is yet in doubt as to the proportion of ms. evidence on either side. Many mss. are not cited at all. Can the weight of their authority be added on either side, or are they silent in regard to the passage in question? When using texts as well arranged as that of Alford, or, still better, of Tregelles, this difficulty is largely removed by the notation in the margin of all the mss. containing any portion of the text upon the page. But even this case does not, as readily as might be desired, put the reader at a glance in possession of the possible manuscript authority. In the following tables an attempt is made so to represent the uncial mss. graphically, that the eye can at once take in the possible authority for or against any reading. By following horizontally across the page in any part of any chapter, it will be seen what mss. do, and what do not, contain the passage under examination. The schedule is made as nearly perfect as the necessities of the scale allow, being worked to the one hundredth of an inch. Some further points of interest in regard to the mss. and some lacunae smaller than can be marked on the schedule are noticed in the margin. Several interesting facts in regard to the New Testament uncials will also be presented to the eye by the schedule.

As there has been some difference of notation in the case of several of the mss. a list is here given with their probable date, and sufficient description for their identification.

Æ. [iv. Cent.]. Codex Sinaiticus. In the Imperial Library at St. Petersburg. It contains the New Testament entire.

A. [v.] Cod. Alexandrinus. Library of the British Museum. Beginning at Matt. xxv. 6, it contains the whole New Testament with only two lacunae.

B. [iv.] Cod. Vaticanus. Vatican Library at Rome. Contains the New Testament as far as Heb. ix. 14, but wants 1 and 2 Timothy, Titus, Philemon, and Revelation. The close of Hebrews is supplied by a later hand.

B₂. [VIII.] Cod. No. 2066 of the Vatican Library. (Formerly Cod. Basilianus No. 105). Revelation.

C. [v.] Cod. rescriptus Ephr. Syri. Imperial Library at Paris. Contains fragments of all the books of the New Testament except 2 Thessalonians and 2 John.

D. [vi.] Codex Bezae. Cambridge University Library. A Graeco-Latin ms. containing, with some lacunae, the four Gospels and the Acts, with 3 John 11-15 (in Latin only) before the Acts.

D₂. [vi.] Codex Claromontanus. Imperial Library at Paris. Also a Graeco-Latin ms. containing the Pauline Epistles, with a single hiatus (Rom. i. 1-7). The Latin is the *Vetus Latina*.

E. [VIII.] Codex Basiliensis. Public Library at Basel. Contains the Gospels entire, except three lacunae in St. Luke.

E₂. [vi.] Codex Laudianus. Bodleian Library at Oxford. Contains Acts, with a single gap.

E₃. [x. ?] Cod. Sangermanensis. Imperial Library at St. Petersburg. A transcript of D₂ of no weight. It is not included in the schedule.

F. [ix.] Cod. Boreeli. Public Library at Utrecht. The four Gospels much mutilated.

F₂. [ix.] Cod. Augiensis. Library of Trinity College, Cambridge. A Graeco-Latin ms. containing the Pauline Epistles with lacunae in the Greek, and wanting the Epistle to the Hebrews. All these are supplied in the Latin, except Rom. i. 1—iii. 19.

F^a. [vii.] Cod. Coislianus 1. Paris. A few fragments of the Gospels, Acts, and Pauline Epistles found in the margin of the Septuagint Octateuch, called Cod. Coisl. 1.

G. [ix. or x. ?] Cod. Harleianus. (Formerly Seidelii I, or Wolfii A). Library of the British Museum. The Gospels much mutilated.

G₂. [vii.] A single leaf brought by Tischendorf in 1859 to St. Petersburg. Acts ii. 45—iii. 8.

G₃. [ix.] Cod. Boernerianus. Royal Library at Dresden. A Graeco-Latin ms. of the Pauline Epistles, somewhat mutilated. The Latin is interlinear and in cursive letters, altered from the *Vetus Latina* to suit the Greek. This codex once formed part of the same volume with Δ of the Gospels, and it is so like F₂ as to show them to have been copied from the same exemplar.

H. [ix. or x.] Cod. Seidelii. (Formerly Seidelii II, or Woolfi B). Public Library at Hamburg. The Gospels considerably mutilated.

H₂. [ix.] Cod. Mutinensis. Grand Ducal Library of Modena. The Acts mutilated.

H₃. [VI.] Cod. Coislianus 202. Twelve leaves in the Imperial Library at Paris, and two in that at St. Petersburg (these two were formerly cited by Tischendorf as N^e, and by others as Frag. Mosq.), with two others at Moscow. Fragments of the Pauline Epistles. Tischendorf has found at Moscow another leaf containing part of Col., iii. and three more leaves whose contents are not described.

I. A series of fragments of the Gospels, Acts, and Pauline Epistles, sometimes called "Fragmenta Palimpsesta Tischendorfiana," or Cod. Tischendorffii II. Imperial Library at St. Petersburg. I^a, I^b (Frag. Nitr.), and I^c are of Cent. v.; I^d and I^e are of Cent. vi.; while I₂ and I₃ are of Cent. vii.

K. [IX.] Cod. Cyprius. Imperial Library at Paris. Gospels complete.

K₂. [IX.] Cod. Mosquensis. Library of the Holy Synod at Moscow. The Catholic Epistles entire (sometimes formerly cited as J), and the Pauline with two lacunae.

L. [VIII.] Cod. Regius Parisiensis. The Gospels with five lacunae. A ms. of peculiar value from the indications of its having been copied from a very ancient ms.

L₂. [IX.] Cod. Angelicus (or Passionei. Formerly cited as G. of the Acts and Cath. Epp., and as J of the Pauline Epp.). The Acts beginning at viii. 10, Catholic Epp., and Pauline to Heb. xiii. 10.

M. [IX.] Cod. Campianus. Imperial Library at Paris. The Gospels entire.

M₂. [IX.] Cod. Ruber. (Cod. Uffenbadianus). Two leaves in the British Museum containing fragments of 1 and 2 Cor., and two in the Johanneum at Hamburg, containing the beginning and the end of the Epistle to the Hebrews.

N. [VI.] Cod. Purpureus. Four leaves in the British Museum (formerly cited as J), six at the Vatican (formerly cited as N), two at Vienna (formerly cited as Γ), thirty-three recently found at Patmos. Fragments of the four Gospels.

N₂. [IX.] Two leaves at St. Petersburg containing a fragment of Gal. and of Heb.

O. [IX.] Cod. Mosquensis. Library of the Holy Synod. Eight leaves brought from Mt. Athos, containing fragments of St. John.

O^{abedef}. [VI.-IX.] Copies of the Hymns in Luke found in various Psalters.

O₂. [VI.] A double leaf at St. Petersburg, containing 2 Cor. i. 20—ii. 12.

O₂^b. [VI.] A single leaf seen by Tischendorf at Moscow, containing Eph. iv. 1–18, with lacunae.

P. [VI.] Cod. Guelpherbytanus. Ducal Library at Wolfenbüttel. A Palimpsest containing fragments of the four Gospels.

P₂. [IX.] Cod. Porphyrianus. Moscow. Contains the Acts, Pauline and Cath. Epp., and Rev. considerably mutilated.

Q. [VI.] Cod. Guelpherbytanus II. Like P, but containing only fragments of Luke and John.

Q₂. [V.] A Papyrus at St. Petersburg, containing fragments of 1 Cor. i. vi. vii.

R. [VI.] Cod. Nitriensis. A Palimpsest in the British Museum, containing fragments of Luke.

S. [A.D. 949]. Cod. Vaticanus 354. The four Gospels entire.

T^a. [V.] Cod. Borgianus I. Library of the Propaganda at Rome. Fragments of Luke and John.

T^b. [VI.] Fragments of St. John at St. Petersburg. Discovered recently by Tischendorf.

T^c. [VI.] Cod. Porphyrius Petropolitanus. A fragment of St. Matthew.

T^d. [VI.] Fragments of Matthew, Mark, and John, discovered by Tischendorf. These four mss. marked T are very much alike.

U. [IX. or X.] Cod. Nanianus. St. Mark's Library, Venice. Four Gospels entire.

V. [IX.] Cod. Mosquensis. Library of the Holy Synod, Moscow. The four Gospels (with two lacunae in Matt.) as far as John vii. 39, whence it is finished in cursive of 13th Century.

W^a. [VIII.] Cod. Imp. Paris. No. 314. Two fragments of Luke.

W^b. [VIII.] Cod. Neapolitanus rescriptus. (Frag. Neap.). Fourteen leaves. Fragments of Matthew, Mark, and Luke.

W^c. [IX.] Cod. Sangallensis rescriptus. Three leaves. Fragments of Mark and Luke.

W^d. [IX.] (Frag. Cant.). Library of Trinity College, Cambridge, Fragments of Mark.

W^e. ("Frag. Ath._a" and "Frag. Ath._b"). Two fragments of St. John. These fragments are much like the Cod. Mosquensis, O, also from Mt. Athos.

X. [IX. or X.] Cod. Monacensis (formerly Ingolstadiensis). University Library, Munich. Fragments of the four Gospels.

Y. [VIII.] Cod. 225 of the Barberini Library at Rome. Contains John xvi. 3—xix. 41.

Z. [VI.] Cod. rescriptus Dublinensis. Trinity College, Dublin. St. Matthew, much mutilated.

Γ. [A.D. 844?]. Cod. Tischendorfianus IV. Bodleian Library, Oxford in part; the rest at St. Petersburg. Fragments of the two first Gospels, with the other two complete.

Δ. [IX.] Cod. Sangallensis. Monastery of St. Gall. A Graeco-Latin ms. of the Gospels, with a single hiatus.

Θ^a. [VII.] Cod. Tischendorfianus I. University of Leipsic. Fragments of Matthew, of which one leaf (xiii. 46–55) is almost illegible.

Θ^{bcd}. are fragments brought by Tischendorf from the East, now in the Imperial Library at St. Petersburg. Θ^b. [VII.] Frag. Matt. and Mark. Θ^c. [VI.] Matt. xxi. 19–24. Also, John xviii. 29–35, found by Porfirii. Θ^d. [VIII.] Luke xi. 37–45. Θ^{efgh} are fragments from the collections of Porfirii. The three first, containing fragments of Matthew, Mark, and John, are of Cent. VI. The last, three leaves of Matthew, is of the IX. or X.

Α. [VIII. or IX.] Cod. Tischendorfianus III. Bodleian Library, Oxford. Luke and John complete.

Ξ. [VIII.] Cod. Zacynthus. Library of Brit. and For. Bible Soc., London. A Palimpsest, containing fragments of Luke.

Π. [IX.] Cod. Petropolitanus. The four Gospels, with four lacunae.

The table following is only of the uncials. It may not be amiss to add that the three most important of the cursives are the following: Codex Basiliensis (Basle K. iii. 3) of the tenth century. Uniformly cited as 1 in the Gospels, Acts, and Pauline Epistles; Codex Colbertinus, of the eleventh century (called by Tregelles the Queen of the cursives) cited in the Gospels as 33, in the Acts as 13, and in the Pauline Epistles as 17; Codex Leicestrensis, of the fourteenth century, cited in the Gospels as 69, in the Acts as 31, in the Pauline Epistles as 37, and in the Apocalypse as 14.

Chap.	α	A	B	C	D	E	F	F*	G	H	I	K	L	M	N	S	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	Γ	Δ	Θ	Π	Chap.
18											^{ed} d ¹¹ 19																18
19					28																						19
20																											20
21																											21
22					20																						22
23																											23
24																											24
25																											25
26																											26
27																											27
28																											28

O, Q, R, Y, Z, and A do not contain any part of this Gospel. There is a fragment containing Matt. xx. 8-15 and Luke i. 14-20 which was formerly marked A, but which has since proved to be an Evangelistary. In D, iii. 7-16 is supplied by a later hand. The var. lect. of F, from vii. 6 onward, are given by Wetstein. G is filled out from xxviii. 18 in cursive of the thirteenth century. In Θ*, xiii. 46-55 is almost illegible.

hps	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I°	K	L	M	N	P	S	U	V	W	X	Y	Δ	Chap.
14							19 25								13 24							14
						54		59 70			3				18 61			67				
15						15					20		23		19							15
						30		44							35							
16	18	8			15			14														16

F^a, O, Q, R, Y, Z, Δ, and Ξ do not contain any part of this Gospel. In G, i. 1-13 is supplied in cursive. In D, xvi. 15 to end is supplied by a later hand (in the Latin xvi. 6 to end). In s and B there is no mutilation, but as the Gospel terminates in them at xvi. 8, it seems necessary so to mark them.

[Besides these uncials, there are a very few cursives which are of value in the determination of the text; indeed, of more value than most of the later uncials. The chief of these are: **1**, a ms. of the tenth century, belonging to Basle, containing the entire New Test., but the text only of importance in the Gospels. **13**, of the twelfth century (Küster's *Par.* 6), contains the Gospels, but defective Matt. i. 1-ii. 21; xxvi. 33-53; xxvii. 26-xxviii. 10; Mark i. 2-45; John xxi. 2 to the end. **33**, the most important of all the cursives; it contains the New Test., except Rev., but is numbered 33 in the Gospels, 13 in Acts and Cath. Ep., 17 in the Pauline Ep.; it is of the twelfth century, and is the *Cod. Colbertinus* 2844 in the Imperial Library at Paris; it is defective Mark ix. 31-xi. 11; xiii. 11-xiv. 60; Luke xxii. 38-xxiii. 16; John vii. 53-viii. 12 (i.e. it does not contain the last passage). **69**, of the fourteenth century, *Cod. Leicestrensis*, belonging to the town council of Leicester; it contains the entire New Test., and is numbered in the Gospels 69, in the Acts and Cath. Ep. 31, in the Pauline Ep. 37, in Rev. 14; it is defective from the beginning to Matt. xviii. 15; Acts x. 45-xiv. 17; Jude 7 to end. **124**, of the twelfth century (Vienna, Theol. 188. N.), contains the Gospels, but, defective Luke xxiii. 31-xxiv. 28. **346**, of the twelfth century (Milan, Ambr.), contains the Gospels, but is defective John iii. 6-viii. 52. Besides these, there is the *Cod. Tisch. Actorum*, now called **61** (the former 61 having proved to be a part of 111). It is 20,003 of the British Museum, and contains the Acts except iv. 8-vii. 17; xvii. 28-xxiii. 9. Tregelles also cites **47**, a ms. of the Bodleian Library, containing the Pauline Ep., as valuable.]

Chap. α A B C D E F F^a G H I^b K L M^{bdef} O P Q R S U V W X^{abc} Y Γ Δ Θ^d Λ Ξ Π Chap.

[illegible]

Y and Z do not contain any part of this Gospel. G is supplied in cursive xii.
27-41. O^a contains only the first two fragments, O^b only the first.

Chap. α A B C D E F F^a G H I^d e K L M N P Q R S T^a U V X Γ Δ Λ Π Chap.

12			^{a3}		⁶ 27									⁶ 34 45	⁴ 15 43 40 52	¹⁵												12
13					¹⁴ 24										²⁶ 1 12	³²												13
14					¹⁸ 28									¹⁴ 25	¹⁴ 31	¹³ 1												14
15					⁴ 14									¹³ 22	¹⁴ 31	¹³ 16												15
16					³ 14																							16
17																²¹ 24												17
18					¹⁴ 28					^d 14 25				¹³ 39	¹⁵ 34 11	¹⁰ 22										⁴³		18
19					⁴¹ 37																							19
20			¹² 27		¹² 21									⁴⁷ 17	²¹ 34 8	²⁰ 34 47										¹⁶		20
21			²¹ 19		²⁷									³ 16	¹² 15	²⁰												21
22					⁴³									²⁷ 46	⁴² 56	⁷¹ 11	²⁰											22
23			²⁵ 17		¹¹ 36	^{e21}								²³ 33	³⁰ 49	³⁸ 61												23
24					⁶¹ 19					^e 10 119				¹⁵ 1	¹⁸ 21 14	²⁷ 49												24

Chap. x	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	K	L	M	N	O	P	S	T	U	X	Y	Γ	Δ	Θ	°	Δ	Π	Chap.
12							3 14		9																		12
13			8				25			13 27											5						13
14			7				34								2 10												14
15									12 2					15 22							25	3					15
16			21						19												23						16
17																											17
18			36				5	3	18 19																29 35		18
19							5		11 24																17		19
20							27		12 e 17 28									23 27			41				35		20
21			26						25									10 13 15 17 20 24									21
												15						1 11									
																		30 31									

Q, R, Z, and Ξ do not contain any part of this Gospel. G has the lacuna xviii. 5-18 filled in cursive. The fragments of P are represented by a series of dots, but are too small to be indicated exactly; they are parts of the following verses: in xiii. 16, 17, 19, 20, 23, 24, 26, 27; in xvi. 7, 8, 12, 13, 15, 16, 18, 19. V is completed in cursive of the thirteenth century. In several of the mss. (x, B, T, X,) there is no break at vii. 53; but as they do not contain the passage vii. 53-viii. 11, it seemed proper to indicate the fact by a gap in the lines representing them. L and Δ leave a space vacant, but not enough to contain the whole passage. A and C are defective; but, from the amount of space on the missing leaves, it is certain that they did not contain the passage. It may be here mentioned also, that it is not contained in the cursive 83.

Chap. 8 A B C D E₂ F^a G₂ H₂ L₂ P₂ Chap. Chap. 8 A B C D E₂ F^a H₂ I₂ L₂ P₂ Chap.

1									1	16									16
2									2	17									17
3									3	18									18
4									4	19									19
5									5	20									20
6									6	21									21
7									7	22									22
8									8	23									23
9									9	24									24
10									10	25									25
11									11	26									26
12									12	27									27
13									13	28									28
14									14										
15									15										

The end of H₂ is not by the original scribe, but is in uncials by an ancient corrector. P₂ contains three and a half words of ii. 9, not indicated on the schedule; it wants a few words in xvii. 20, 21, 25, also in xxviii. 22, 23, and the larger part of vs. 21.

Chap.	Σ	A	B	C	D ₂	F ₂	G ₃	K ₂	L ₂	P ₃	Chap.
1				3	7	9	5				1
2				5			16			16	2
3							25			5	3
4				21		19					4
5											5
6											6
7											7
8											8
9				5						33	9
10										11	10
11				15				18			11
12										23	12
13				31						1	13
14											14
15				10							15
16											16

There is another Uncial, marked E, which contains the Pauline Epistles; but as it is a mere transcript of D with some of its corrections, and is of no authority, it is not given.

Chap. n	A	B	C	D ₂	E ₂	F ^a	G ₃	H ₃	I ₂	K ₂	L ₂	M ₂	P ₂	Q ₂	Chap.
1			3												1
2															2
3					13										3
4					16										4
5															5
6					7					13					6
7			18		14								15 17		7
8						39				7 11					8
9			9												9
10									22 29						10
11									16						11
12													23		12
13			18										5		13
14													23		14
15													39		15
16			40							53 9		59			16

Q₂ is a Papyrus of the fifth century, containing fragments of i., vi., and vii. As no more definite description of it has yet been published, a dotted line is drawn through these chapters.

2 THESSALONIANS.

Chap. & A B D₂ G₃ K₂ L₂ P₂ Chap.

1								1
2								2
3								3

1 TIMOTHY.

Chap. & A C D₂ G₃ H₃ K₂ L₂ P₂ Chap.

1								1
2								2
3			9			13		3
4								4
5								5
6			10				12	6

2 TIMOTHY.

Chap. & A C D₂ G₃ K₂ L₂ P₂ Chap.

1			3				25	1
2								2
3								3
4								4

TITUS.

Chap. & A C D₂ G₃ H₃ I₃ K₂ L₂ P₂ Chap.

1			2			15	13	1
2								2
3						13		2

PHILEMON.

& A C D₂ G₃ K₂ L₂ P₂

			3				
--	--	--	---	--	--	--	--

HEBREWS.

Chap. & A B C D₂ F^a H₃ K₂ L₂ M₂ N₂ P₂ Chap.

1								1
2			4					2
3						11 ^a 14 14 ^a 16		3
4						13 ^a 15 16 ^a 18		4
5						13 ^a 12 15		5
6							8 11 ^a	6
7								7
8								8
9			14		16			9
10							1 ^a 7	10
11						20 ^a 22		11
12								12
13								13

JAMES.

Chap. & A B C K₂ L₂ P₂ Chap.

<u>1</u>						<u>1</u>
2						¹³ 2
<u>3</u>						²¹ 3
4						<u>4</u>
<u>5</u>						5

P₂ lacks only parts of verses 7, 9, 10, 11, 12 in 1 Tim. vi., and parts of 2, 3, 4, 5 in 2 Tim. i. In Jas. ii. 13-21 there is no hiatus in P₂, but it is almost illegible; it is marked by a fine line.

1 PETER.

Chap. &	A	B	C	K ₂	L ₂	P ₂	Chap.
1			²				1
2							2
3			⁵				3
4							4
5							5

2 PETER.

Chap. &	A	B	C	K ₂	L ₂	P ₂	Chap.
1			²				1
2						³ ₅	2
3							3

1 JOHN.

Chap. &	A	B	C	K ₂	L ₂	P ₂	Chap.
1							1
2							2
3						²⁰	3
4			²			¹	4
5							5

2 JOHN.

&	A	B	K ₂	L ₂	P ₂

3 JOHN.

&	A	B	C	K ₂	L ₂	P ₂
			³			

JUDE.

&	A	B	C	K ₂	L ₂	P ₂
			³			⁴ ₁₅

REVELATION.

Chap. &	A	B ₂	C	P ₂	Chap.
1					1
2					2
3					3
4			¹⁹		4
5					5
6			¹⁴	⁶ ₁₀	6
7			¹⁴ ₁₇		7
8			¹ ₅		8
9					9
10			¹⁶ ₁₀		10
11			³		11
12					12
13					13
14					14
15					15
16			¹³	¹²	16
17				¹	17
18			²		18
19			⁵		19
20				¹ ₅	20
21					21
22					22

In 2 Pet. ii. there are only a few words lost in P₂ in each of verses 3, 4, 5; these are marked by a fine line. In Rev. P₂ in vi. 6, 8, 9, 10 has lost a part of each of these verses, which are marked by a fine line. It has also lost part of xi. 3, one word of xxi. 19, and part of xxii. 2.

ARTICLE II.

THE CONSERVATIVE REFORMATION AND ITS
THEOLOGY.¹

BY CASPAR RENÉ GREGORY, LEIPZIG, GERMANY.

THE Lutheran church is to a great extent unknown, ignored, and misunderstood by the numerous Protestant churches of other names in America : its strength is unknown, its influence is ignored, and its doctrines are misunderstood.

When contrasted with all the other Protestant churches of America combined it seems small ; but lay it by the side of the German and Dutch Reformed churches in our land, and it takes a good place, having more than double their united strength ; or compare it with the Episcopal, the Congregational, and the main body of the Presbyterian church, and it proves to be larger than any one of them. In Germany, though the union of the Evangelical churches in Prussia removes the possibility of exact numerical comparison with the Reformed church, no one can doubt its superior strength, and it counts its hosts in Norway and Sweden, in Denmark, in Russia, and in Hungary. An impression rests on many minds that it is an inferior branch of the Protestant church, while the statistics seem to indicate that it is stronger than any other division.

The influence of the Lutheran church is immense. Its mere size and its wide diffusion necessitate this, for it carries everywhere not only the Augsburg Confession, but better yet, the German hymns, the richest in the world, and, best of all,

¹ The Conservative Reformation and its Theology, as represented in the Augsburg Confession, and in the History and Literature of the Evangelical Lutheran Church ? By Charles P. Krauth, D D., Norton Professor of Theology in the Evangelical Lutheran Theological Seminary, and Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy in the University of Pennsylvania. Philadelphia : J. B. Lippincott, and Co. 1871.

an open Bible. In our own land it has, to a large extent, kept in the background. Its foreign origin, its foreign tongue in many places, and its conservative ways have served to keep it from notice, though it is daily becoming more domesticated, using our language more, and entering a more active sphere. But in its own home, and forth from its own home, Germany, it wields a strong arm. In theology, in church history, and in biblical studies there is nothing to compare with it for activity, strength, and success. Few theological students are aware of the debt they owe to Lutheran work; and even of those who have a certain familiarity with the men and their books, few recognize the fact that they are Lutherans. The doctrines which are said to be misunderstood will be referred to later.

It is important that we should know the Lutheran church, because it gives us another side of the Reformation and another type of church life. While we are one with it in essentials, there is still a difference between us and it, a difference of such a nature that we can learn much from the Lutheran church. Its religion and piety are of a different cast from ours. A pious joy and happiness reign in it, to which we are comparative strangers. The Germans have a word which finds no English equivalent; it expresses a combination of kind feeling and warmth with what it is the custom to call personal magnetism. However this quality may be defined, it is characteristic of the Lutheran religion; a fulness of piety, not an ascetic, self-inwrought devotion; but a bright, cheerful, sympathetic spirit, that glows as well as aspires. If this be indeed a national characteristic, inwoven with the church life, which some may think it to be, we shall find it none the less to our advantage to partake in it.

We are always ready to glory in Luther as a reformer. We know his round face and portly form as well as we do the attenuated features of Calvin. We share in the work that Luther did in freeing the gospel. And we may well turn a friendly face towards Luther's church. He did not name it after himself, nor did the church name itself from

him ; the name was cast upon it as a reproach, and it has kept it, as being ashamed neither of the God that Luther served nor of the servant who wrought so stoutly in his cause.

The author of the work in hand comes to teach us about the Lutheran church. The church could wish for no abler setter-forth of herself and her doctrines, and students could find no one more fit to inform their lack of knowledge. By birthright he is a scholar and a clergyman. He is a man of experience in the church, and long served as a pastor. That he is a worthy theologian, his position in the Evangelical Lutheran Seminary at Philadelphia assures us. That he is of philosophical training we learn from his holding the chair of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy in the University of Pennsylvania. He is also accounted one of the first students of the English Bible, and finds a place in the Committee for the Revision thereof. And we may be sure that he will set forth the Lutheran doctrine in all its completeness ; because, as we learn from chance allusions in his book, he is accounted as one of the most uncompromising maintainers of pure Lutheranism, or, in other words, is called a High Lutheran. The work does not disappoint the expectations that its author's known powers excited. While there is a lightness and sprightliness in some parts that does not often find a place in theological writings, there is in other parts quite as tough reading and as close thinking as a student could wish. It is readable, thorough, and complete. It has been well received, and is recognized in America and abroad as a standard work.

The preface presents the claim of the Lutheran church to be that reforming and conserving church which, equally distant from the dead conservatism of Rome and the destructive radicalism of Geneva, shall at last prove the rallying point for uniting Protestantism and uniting Christianity. It likewise contains a remarkable discussion of the church of England whose eclectic character threatens her own destruction.

The object of the book, as we have seen, is the delineation

of the conservative as distinguished from the radical side of the Reformation. To speak more closely, the design appears to be twofold; the author desires to maintain and defend the Lutheran church without and within. On the one hand, he looks towards those outside of the Lutheran church, and in so far as they are unacquainted with her, seeks to present her to them in all her beauty, while in so far as scholars of other churches have misunderstood or misstated her doctrines, he wishes to give her doctrines in their true form. On the other hand, he looks towards those within the Lutheran church, and, in so far as some of these have neglected her history, would recall to them her former glory and power, while in so far as some, even of the leaders, have taught error, he would sustain the old and pure doctrine.

The author's position is that of the strictest adherence to the old doctrine — a position gained only by conscientious inquiry and research, seeing that his first preferences and prejudices lay altogether in another direction.

The arrangement of the material permits of division into three parts — the history, the history of doctrine, and the doctrine of the Conservative Reformation. A table will show the contents best.

The Conservative Reformation.

I. History :

1. Occasion and Cause; 2. The Organ; 3. Instrument;
4. Church.

II. History of Doctrine :

1. Confessional Principle; 2. Primary Confession;
3. Secondary Confessions; 4. Correction of Mistakes.

III. Doctrines :

1. Original Sin; 2. Person of Christ; 3. Baptism;
4. Lord's Supper.
 - A. Thetically stated; B. Antithesis considered;
 - C. Objections answered.

It must not be supposed that all the points under each of the three parts are discussed at length; in that case we

should have had three volumes instead of one. Each subject is treated briefly or more largely according to its relation to the general aims of the book named above. In obedience to this, the last part, doctrine, forms the larger half of the work, the doctrines there discussed being the chief points of attack outside as well as inside of the church, and hence the chief points of defence.

I. HISTORY.

1. *The Occasion and Cause.*

Thus we begin with the historical part, and that with a glance at the occasion and cause of the Conservative Reformation. As far as the occasion is concerned, we might say that it is not of great importance, or at least that little need be said about it, since it is only the focus of the causes. It matters much what causes there are, and in what condition these causes are ; but there is not much more in the occasion, to human eyes. Looking at the Conservative Reformation in this way, we may name as its occasion the nailing of the theses on the door of All Saints' Church, at Wittenberg, on All Saints' day, in 1517. The case were different if the divine spark were regarded as the occasion — the spark which inflamed Luther to this deed ; but we put the divine side of the work under the causes, and turn to them.

At this the author points with glowing warmth to the one primary cause of the Reformation — the word of God. This word acted in two ways. By a general and comparatively unmarked influence, it prepared the nations for the new era, being read here and there, in a monk's cell or in the churches, or preached in some hidden parish. And then with a special influence it prepared Luther for his work. Much might be said about subordinate causes, — active intercourse between different countries, the invention of printing, and the invention of paper made from rags, were causes, to the extent that without them the Reformation might perhaps have been confined to narrow limits, but they only appeared in order that the word might make use of them.

Luther, in the library at Erfurt, read the Bible with holy zeal; the one primary cause worked on him. In the year 1522, the date of the publication of Cardinal Ximenes' Polyglot, Luther's New Testament in German appeared. He thus translated the New Testament, and finally the whole Bible, into the vernacular, so that this primary cause of the Reformation should lead its course farther and make it broader. The position of the Christian, as of the political world, — two domains not easily distinguished then, — secured the use of the new-given Bible, and the light of the word triumphed over the darkness of superstition. The author urges the necessity of maintaining this word uncompromisingly.

2. *The Organ.*

From the occasion and cause, we proceed to consider Luther, the organ of the Conservative Reformation. There are two ways in which one may describe the life of a hero, and that almost without writing, — he can show to us pictures, and he can lay before us the words of others; but only a master of style can display the pictures well, and bring the words of others into a complete whole. Taking up Gustav König's pictorial life of Luther, the skilful words of our author lead us through it page by page. We behold the poor boy, the eager student, the Augustinian monk at Wittenberg and at Rome, the Reformer at Wittenberg, Leipzig, and Worms, the knight at the Wartburg, and the general theological standard-bearer. His home life lends warmth to all this, as we watch his delight with the tree at Christmas eve; and our hearts cannot but be moved when he stands sad and grieving at the death-bed of his child, his darling Madeleine.

We need, however, to discover the character of Luther — to consider the spirit as well as the body of the man. Had the author spoken with his own words, it might have been said that he was prejudiced, or, at any rate, that he gave but his own opinion. Instead of this, we find here a most remarkable collection of the testimonies of others to the power and worth of Luther. Men from different times and countries, and

from different churches and philosophical schools, submit their opinions with regard to him. The most devoted admirer of Luther must, we think, stand amazed at this line of witnesses. He, whom Lessing, Heine, Schlegel, Bayle, Bossuet, Calvin, Carlyle, Coleridge, D'Aubigné, D'Israeli, Bunsen, and Stolberg praise, must be a true hero. There is no room for prejudice here. Romanists as well as Protestants, and infidels as well as Christians, pay their tribute with no sparing hand.

The Instrument.

Mahomet spread his doctrines and multiplied his followers by the power of the sword. Luther used a fountain and its streams. He spread his doctrines by causing the streams from the new-discovered fountain of life, that had refreshed and inspired him, to flow through the whole land. He multiplied his followers by inviting every one to these streams to be renewed and strengthened by their waters.

Our author leads us to the Wartburg, to the writing-table of the singular prisoner, and shows us how Luther had been prepared for his task, by his familiarity with Hebrew and Greek, his warm piety, and his power over the German language. The man is fit and ready for the work.

The German New Testament appeared and swept over the land. Its enemies could make no headway against it, and were actually carried away in the stream. Henry the Eighth of England stirred up Duke George of Saxony against the book, but to no purpose. This opposition affords an amusing passage. Duke George, greatly enraged at Luther's Testament, and especially at the pictures, which he denominated "outrageous," bade his secretary Emser, a Catholic theologian, confute it. This Emser did, first by a book which declared that Luther's translation contained some "fourteen hundred heresies and falsehoods," and secondly by a rival translation. But we must let our author speak: "He had the two qualities in which many translators have found the sole proof of their vocation; he could not write the language into which, and

did not understand the language from which, he was to translate. But his coolness stood him in better stead than all the knowledge he might have had of Greek and German. With little trouble he produced a translation, equal on the whole to Luther's. . . . The way he did the masterly thing we have mentioned was this: he adopted, not stole (he was above stealing),—he adopted Luther's translation bodily, only altering him where he had had the audacity to desert the Vulgate for the original." And to make it popular, Duke George paid for copies of the very pictures he had condemned, and the whole thing was issued by ducal authority.

Some object to Luther's New Testament that it follows the Vulgate instead of the Greek, and, besides, that the translation is not exact. Against this view our author, although admitting in advance that Luther did at times follow the Vulgate, declares that he did not follow it slavishly. He then farther shows that Luther had added from the Greek things not in the Vulgate, that he left out things that the Vulgate had, but the Greek had not, and that in certain various readings he had followed the Greek, and not the Vulgate. We find, also, a careful comparison of the variations between the Complutensian of 1514, the first edition of Erasmus, 1516, Luther's translation, 1522, and the English version, 1611. All inquiries serve only to show the carefulness of Luther's work.

The charge of inaccuracy in the translation is summarily disposed of. The language has changed its meaning somewhat since the time of Luther, many of the objections are mere trifles, and some of the passages cannot be translated with satisfactory and certain exactness by anybody. The work of Luther must ever remain not merely the basis, but the very substance of all German translations of the Bible. Its power, its beauty, and its vivacity can never fail.

4. *The Church.*

Having observed the occasion, cause, organ, and instrument, we now proceed to the result, and turn our eyes to the church

of the Conservative Reformation. The author refers briefly to the process of naming churches, and touches satirically the formation of new churches with pompous names, such as "Disciples of Christ," "Church of God," or "Christians," which denounce all sectarianism, and build up the narrowest of sects. He then relates the origin of the name of the "Evangelical Lutheran church." This church preferred the term "Evangelical" simply, but that applies, at the present day, to many other churches. From the protest against bishops and enforced mass, at the Diet of Spire, 1529, the Lutherans received the title of Protestants, and were known by that diplomatically, till the peace of Westphalia, in 1648. Eck used the term "Lutheran" first, in his bull against Luther, and the church gradually came to adopt this name as indicating the doctrine which they followed. No other name can now distinguish her so well as that of "The Evangelical Lutheran church."

We next follow the author as, with a pardonable pride, he holds up to view this church: her distinctive principle, justification by faith; her claims as the oldest, most legitimate, and most extensive of Protestant churches; her character as Augustinian, but not fatalistic, as ever inclined to unity and adverse to divisions; the acknowledged purity of her faith; her liberality and charity, her worship, her warm, practical life, her descendants in America, and her future.

To those who look back with grief at the divisions of the Protestant church this chapter offers an aggravation of their sorrow. It would seem as if all parties had been so thoroughly agreed that division was unnecessary. At the same time, however, to those who look forward to the reunion of dismembered Protestantism this chapter gives the hope that those once so near each other may again stand side by side, and, seeing the truth with the same eyes, join in one church and worship. God grant that it may not be true of churches that estranged friends be less reconcilable than old enemies. With the later developments of old Catholicism, the time seems at hand when we may with fresh courage aspire to the

union of the whole Western church ; Ultramontaniam dying, or holding an empty name.

The statements of the author which have a unifying tendency are in three groups—the denial of imputed errors, the quotation of Reformed approval of Lutheran doctrine, and the expression of the love of the Lutheran for other churches.

We have been in the habit of disliking the Lutheran church, because we believed that she taught certain errors. Could we be led to suppose that, in the grounds for that belief, we had heard incorrectly or judged falsely, we should be far on the way towards a better opinion of her. Now, whatever may be the decision of a careful weighing of doctrinal words, it is assuredly of some moment to know that the errors in hand are pointedly denied by the Lutheran church. She has been charged with making baptism necessary ; she replies that of course the baptism of the Spirit is absolutely necessary, as all will agree, but that the outward rite has only an ordinary necessity. She has been charged with holding the doctrine of consubstantiation. Indeed, that is almost the only thing that an ordinary Reformed theological student knows about the distinction between the Lutheran and the Reformed church. The standard question with examiners is : “ What is the Lutheran doctrine with regard to the Lord’s supper ? ” and the regular answer is : “ Consubstantiation,” which is almost universally satisfactory ; and the student is thereafter qualified to speak of this Lutheran doctrine with unlimited confidence. The Reformed church has, however, had what she deemed fit grounds for naming the Lutheran doctrine “ consubstantiation ” ; and it is not purposed to concede anything with regard to that without careful consideration. Suffice it here to note that the Lutheran church repels the imputation of this doctrine with all her might. Says our author : “ The charge that the Lutheran church holds this monstrous doctrine has been repeated times without number. In the face of her solemn protestations, the falsehood is still circulated. It would be easy to fill

many pages with the declarations of the confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran church, and of her great theologians, who, without a dissenting voice, repudiate this doctrine — the name and the thing — in whole and in every one of its parts.” It is to be hoped that no one will feel bound to turn out all the stray sentences of old Lutheran theologians in order to convict them of this doctrine. A theologian who expends labor to prove and bind upon others, solely for the sake of historical accuracy, a doctrine which they now reject, in so far appears to neglect his mission of furthering, not hindering, the advance of truth. For the present, it is enough for us that the Lutheran church rejects, and declares that she has ever rejected, consubstantiation. She has been charged with teaching the ubiquity of the human nature in the person of Christ, and that as if Christ’s human body were infinitely locally expanded, and were locally present in the bread at the Lord’s supper. This question, like the preceding, requires for its proper understanding an extended discussion. Here need only be remarked the following denials from the Lutheran Formula of Concord: “Our church rejects and condemns the error that the human nature of Christ is locally expanded in all places of heaven and earth, or has become an infinite essence. When the word ‘corporeal’ is used of the mode of presence, and is equivalent to local, we affirm that the body of Christ is in heaven, and not on earth. Of a local presence of the body of Christ, in, with, or under the bread, there never was any controversy between the Lutherans and Calvinists; that local presence we expressly reject and condemn in all our writings.” She has been charged with erroneous views as to the Lord’s day. It is simply answered that she considers the Lord’s day as still to be observed. With this as to her rejection of imputed errors, let us turn to the testimony of the Reformed concerning her doctrine.

Zwingle, Calvin, Anthony de Bourbon, King of Navarre, Claude, J. A. Turretin (not to be confounded with his father, the celebrated and orthodox Francis Turretin), the church

of Geneva, and Pictetus all speak of the purity of the Lutheran doctrines; but Alting and Spanheim treat of it in detail and closely. Alting wrote a book to show that the Palatinate church in her Heidelberg Catechism, and the other Reformed churches with her, still adhered to the Augsburg Confession. This he attempts to prove by a careful comparison of article with article, and in conclusion writes: "This is a collation of the Augsburg, Palatinate, and Helvetic Confessions, in all the articles, which most clearly exhibits and demonstrates their orthodox agreement in every article except the tenth, and there the disagreement is not entire." And Spanheim, while declaring, in general, that Lutherans and Calvinists have the same rule and principle, the same fundamental doctrine of salvation, and the same worship, hold the same Christian duties, make the same anti-papal protestations, are under the same obligations to forbearance in love, and have the same interests and motives for evangelical peace, proceeds to assert their agreement in the disputed doctrines, to the following extent. In the Lord's supper, both agree that the spiritual eating of Christ's body is necessary to salvation; this eating being the act of true faith, directing itself to the body of Christ delivered to death for us. In predestination, grace, and free-will, both agree that after the fall man had no power for good left, and that the whole salvation of man depends alone on God. In the person of Christ, both agree that the two natures are personally and indivisibly united, without confusion or change; that the names of the natures are reciprocally used, the properties of each nature being affirmed of the whole person, according to the nature to which each property may be peculiar; that the human nature of Christ is not intrinsically omnipotent or omniscient, and that the human nature of Christ was lifted to supreme glory, and sitteth at the right hand of God. In baptism both agree that infants are to be baptized, that the object of baptism is that they may be made members of Christ and spiritually regenerated; that baptism is necessary, but not absolutely, so that infants are capable

of receiving regenerating grace, and that these things pertain to the essentials of this sacrament. We refer thus in detail to Spanheim, because the stating the agreement of Christians with each other is a more necessary and a more grateful task than that of stating their differences. Could we fix our gaze and our hearts on the great truths common to both communions, the points of debate would be lost to sight. We pass without delay to the desire the Lutheran church evinces for unity with other churches.

She presses nothing for true church unity but the "common acceptance of the fundamental doctrine of the gospel in the same sense," and "agreement in the scriptural essentials of the administration of the sacraments." In the latter point she differs only from the Baptists, and from them only in so far as they make the particular form essential. The author displays Luther's great desire for unity. We should, however, remark, as followers of Calvin, that we are satisfied that Calvin made greater concessions with regard to Lutheranism than he received, as even the author would seem to allow, when, in a later chapter, he urges the fact that Calvin accepted the Augsburg Confession, and acted as a Lutheran minister. Luther's trouble about not uniting seems to have rested not exactly upon obstinacy, but upon a pertinacious adherence to the infallibility of his own interpretation of scripture, and an immovable conviction that no church could be one with his unless it accepted his words of interpretation in the sense in which he used them. The author lays great weight on the fact that the Lutheran church is not affected by the high churchism which makes walls of forms and ceremonies; and lastly, he declares that she not only recognizes other churches as churches, but has boldly protested against the persecution of other churches, as, for example, against the Huguenot persecutions in France.

This long array of evidence tends to one point,—to show that the two Confessions should originally have been one, and, having failed of that, should now seek to become one.

The article hereupon recites briefly the controversies within

the German Lutheran church, and gives the names of her most eminent theologians. It is to be regretted that, in referring to the Lutheran church in America, it gives no clue to the controversies therein. An outline of them might have marred the beauty of her apparent unity, but it would have furthered theological knowledge in regard to this church and to her doctrine, had we been permitted to see what difficulties arise in their development in America. Moreover, we should in that case probably have been better able to understand, at least, one of the subsequent articles, which contains frequent references to "The Definite Platform"; this appears to be, or to have been, the manifesto of a party in the American Lutheran church, which our author feels bound to condemn. There is also an allusion to a General Synod of the Lutheran church in America, which appears to differ from the General Council of the Evangelical Lutheran church in America, and to insist upon fewer of the symbolical books. The fact of the matter is, that in reading the book in hand one would not suppose, save from the chance allusions just mentioned, that the Lutheran church in America was anything but the united harmonious church of the author's ideal, whereas statistics, and occasional newspaper references would lead us to consider it as divided into several bodies. We do not even light upon saving clauses which seem to allow that such a state of affairs exists in that church. If the divisions are doctrinal, it is pertinent to ask, what has become of the unity described as embracing the Lutheran church all over the world; and if the divisions be on less important matters than doctrines, what has become of the spirit of concession as to non-fundamentals. These questions are not offered as taunts, but as desiring information. Perhaps at another time we shall receive from the hand of this clear writer a statement of the position of parties and questions in the American Lutheran church.

Thus we have glanced at the topics which fall under the general designation of history. In the last article treated, we have already encroached upon the second general field which calls for our attention, that of the history of doctrine.

II. HISTORY OF DOCTRINE.

1. *The Confessional Principle.*

In considering a church, we ask at once, what she believes — what doctrine she teaches? But before we examine the actual confessions, we must seek the confessional principle of the church; we need to know how she uses her confessions. She may possibly regard them as a mere form, seldom heard of, and according to which very little is determined; or she may hold them as of equal value with scripture, and as the one rule by which everything is determined. This article shows that the Lutheran church grants to the confessions a middle place, subordinating them to scripture, but only in so far as that they are man's shape of the same divine doctrine, and regarding them as more than a mere form, in that they guide the church under the scriptures.

As the book is intended for America, this article begins with the principles of the General Council of the Evangelical Lutheran church in America. These principles maintain the generic unity of the one Christian church in the gospel and sacraments, and the specific unity of a single church in her doctrine and faith in the sacraments, each being manifested in creeds, general or specific, which creeds or confessions must be understood in their own and only sense. In consequence they proceed to declare that the Evangelical Lutheran church finds her unity in the accepting and acknowledging the unaltered Augsburg Confession, in its original sense, while she, at the same time, receives the other Lutheran confessions, the Apology for the Augsburg Confession, the Smalcald Articles, Luther's Catechisms, and the Formula of Concord. Thus must every professor of the theological seminary of the Evangelical Lutheran church at Philadelphia, affirm his faith.

The discussion of the reasons for this confessional basis follows, and offers many points well worthy of notice at a time when so many seek to cast off all creeds. No less important are the inquiries into what are fundamentals, and who are Christians, which close the article.

In contending that fidelity to a confession does not conflict with the right of private judgment, the author says: "A great deal is claimed upon the right of private judgment which is a most impudent infringement of that right. A man is a Socinian, a Pelagian, or a Romanist. Very well. We maintain that no civil penalties should restrain him, and no ecclesiastical inquisition fetter him. Give him, in its fullest swing, the exercise of his right of private judgment. But your Socinian insists on such a recognition by Trinitarians as logically implies that they either agree with him in his error, or that it is of no importance. What is this but to ask thousands or millions to give up or imperil the results of their well-used right of private judgment at the call of one man who abuses his."

We shall not, however, dwell upon this question of a confessional basis. The author in urging the claims of the basis above given for the Lutheran church, declares that this basis is scriptural, has had the approval of three centuries of the said church, has been approved by Reformed theologians, and is essential to union in fundamentals. The last head opens the consideration of what are fundamentals, a point of vital importance in all attempts to keep a church together or to unite parted churches. Though we should turn a deaf ear to all who decry creeds and confessions, we cannot avoid meeting those who differ from us as to what doctrines are fundamental. The word "fundamental" says the author, "has been so bandied about, so miserably perverted, so monopolized for certain ends, so twisted by artifices of interpretation, as if a man could use it to mean anything he pleased, and might fairly insist that its meaning could only be settled by reference to his own mental reservation at the time he used it, that at length men have grown afraid of it, have looked upon its use as a mark of lubricity, and have almost imagined that it conveyed an idea unknown to our church in her purer days." Fundamental doctrine is, after the Apology of the Augsburg Confession, pronounced to be "the true knowledge of Christ and faith"; or, after the Confession

itself, "the doctrine of the gospel and the administration of the sacraments." We reach, unfortunately, no more definite conclusion than that, "What the Evangelical Lutheran church regards as fundamental to gospel doctrine is what her existence, her history, her confessions declare, or justly imply, to be her articles of faith."

We are in doubt as to the meaning of the words here. If the author means simply that the few subjects treated specifically in the doctrinal articles of the Augsburg Confession are fundamental to the unity of the particular church of which he treats, we have nothing to object to; but if we are to understand that precisely everything contained or implied in Lutheran confessions is in that form fundamental for all Christians, we beg leave to differ from the author.

If the latter sense be held, the author should cease quoting Reformed theologians as agreeing with him in fundamentals. They do not agree with him in this manner, and he should recall in such instances, as he has done in one case of criticism, their erroneous idea as to what fundamentals really are. If this sense be held, the Lutheran church is one in fundamentals with no other church that ever did or ever will exist on earth or in heaven. If this sense be held, the "Principal Articles of Faith," the first part of the Augsburg Confession, are misnamed, else were these fundamental, and the others not fundamental. If this sense be held, Luther, who wished a point or two more to be put into the Confession but gave up to opposition, either gave up "fundamentals"—and the Confession does not contain all fundamentals—or he desired to put non-fundamentals into the Confession, and so opposes the definition. As we have said, we are not sure of the intention, but we claim for the word "fundamental" such a sense, that we do not hesitate to say that we believe that the Reformed church is one with the Lutheran in fundamentals, although she does not approve of everything that the existence, history, and confessions of the latter declare or justly imply to be her articles of faith.

The author defends fidelity to confessions from the charge

of depreciating the authority of the rule of faith — the scriptures, and denounces the cries for wide creeds, declaring that they could set no limit to such expansion. At the same time he assures us that the Lutheran church gladly recognizes Christians under whatever name.

The following is presented as the course of rationalism: (1) pseudo-pietism and fanaticism, urging practical and experimental truths, aside from their connection with profounder doctrines; (2) unionistic efforts, ignoring the doctrines dividing Lutherans and Reformed as of lesser value; (3) endeavors of Semler to depreciate the view of the inspiration of the Bible, as the origin of these doctrines which should be laid aside; (4) clear rationalism.

The Evangelical Lutheran church has such a confessional principle. The confessions themselves must next engage our attention, and first of all the Augsburg Confession. In presenting the confessions it is desired simply to give such an outline of the author's careful history of them as shall aid the inquiries of young students and the memory of the old.

2. *Primary Confession.*

We cannot avoid remarking at the outset, that Americans in considering the rise of the Lutheran symbolic books, especially in comparison with that of the Reformed Confessions in England, should remember the widely different political, and consequently politico-ecclesiastical circumstances. The Lutheran church grew in separate states, some larger, some smaller, all acknowledging the emperor, it is true, but under no such union as the English. The governments of these states were all closely united with the religion of their respective states, some acquiescing in it, and some ordering it to their liking, but all giving an active attention to it.

The Reformation, whose spirit we may read in her confessions, was not a destructive, but a constructive movement. All progress in the church must be in the direction given to her by the Reformation. The shallowness of our day seeks to free itself from the theology of the sixteenth century

as from papistical remnants, but, even in America, the Lutheran church shall find her profit in the closest adherence to that theology, and above all to the Augsburg Confession.

There was no general creed after the Athanasian (probably about A.D. 434). "The oldest distinctive creed now in use in any large division of Christendom" is the Augsburg Confession. If we look at the general creeds, the Lutheran church is as closely united with the early church as the Romish church is; if we look at their earliest distinctive creeds, the Lutheran church is thirty years older than the Romish, seeing that the Augsburg Confession was presented in 1530, whereas the decisions of the Council of Trent were not finished and set forth till thirty-three years later.

Between Luther's theses at Wittenberg, on All-Saints' day, in 1517, and the presentation of the Augsburg Confession on the twenty-fifth of June, 1530, occurred four diets that should be remembered. At Worms, 1521, Luther refuses to retract, and the edict is given for his seizure and for the burning of his books; at Nuremberg, 1522, the papal Nuncio demands that the edict of Worms be carried out; at Spire, 1526, the edict of Worms is virtually annulled, and a council is promised; and again at Spire, 1529, the decision favors Rome. The protest of the evangelical princes against this decision gave rise to the name Protestants.

Charles the Fifth could not get the pope to agree to the calling of a general council, which the Protestants had asked for; so he summoned the Diet at Augsburg, told the Protestants to bring a statement of their case, and promised to hear it himself. The statement of the case by the Protestants was the Augsburg Confession. This Confession, however, was really the culminating point of a series, which series may be given in five steps:

a. October 1-3, 1529, Luther and the Saxon divines meeting Zwingle and the Swiss divines at Marburg, framed the fifteen Marburg Articles, which set forth the disputed and undisputed points between the Lutherans and the Zwinglians, and which were signed by both parties.

b. October 16, 1529, Luther, on the basis of the fifteen Marburg Articles, and with the help of other theologians, prepared the seventeen Articles of Schwabach, so called from the place at which they were presented.

c. November 29, 1529, these seventeen Articles were also presented at Smalcald, and are hence sometimes called the Smalcald Articles, though not to be confounded with the Smalcald Articles proper, of 1537.

d. March 20, 1530, these seventeen Articles, which are mainly doctrinal, were revised and sent to Torgau; they were long called the Torgau Articles, but incorrectly.

e. March 20, 1530, the Torgau Articles proper, which are on the abuses, were prepared by Luther, with the aid of Melanchthon, Jonas, and Bugenhagen. The Augsburg Confession rests on these two papers just named; the doctrinal articles, on the revised seventeen Schwabach Articles, and the articles on abuses, on the Torgau Articles proper, both of which sets of articles were chiefly from Luther's hand.

Luther could not go to Augsburg; but remained at Coburg, the nearest safe point. The first form of the Confession was sent to him here; and all subsequent steps in its preparation were, as far as was possible with the then private postal arrangements and at that long distance, laid before him for his consideration. Our author, opposing the rationalistic Rückert, enters at length into the consideration of the position of Luther with regard to the Confession; and, with an apparently invincible argument, displaying the closest research, triumphantly shows that he approved it heartily. The Confession was presented to the Diet on June 25, 1530, in two original texts, Latin and German. These texts, of like authority, guide mutually each to the understanding of the other. On national grounds the German copy was the one chosen to be read aloud. The emperor, who received both copies, kept the Latin, and gave the German one to the elector of Mentz. It is not certainly known that either of the originals still exists.

In 1540, Melanchthon, without the least right to do so, issued

a varied edition of the Latin, altering and enlarging a number of articles. All remarked this at once, foes and friends complaining. Although some of the changes seem to leave the former Confession, we can but believe Melanchthon when he says that to him the new meant the same as the old, for he often thereafter acknowledged the unaltered as the statement of his faith. For the unaltered Confession, the highest authority belongs to Melanchthon's original editions of the Latin and of the German.

The Augsburg Confession consists of two main parts — the twenty-one principal articles of faith, and the seven articles on abuses; the former is preceded by a preface, a transitional piece separates the two sets of articles, and the whole closes with an epilogue and the subscriptions. As the articles follow no regular order, the author classifies them into (1) the Catholic; (2) the Protestant, to which of course the whole of the seven articles of the second part belong; (3) the Evangelical; (4) the Conservative or Lutheran articles. The last class alone calls for mention here; they are the doctrines of the proper inseparability of the two natures in Christ, both as to time and space (article III.), the objective presence of both the heavenly and earthly elements in the Lord's supper (X.), the true value of private, that is, of individual absolution (XI.), the genuine character of sacramental grace (XIII.), the true medium in regard to the rites of the church (XV.), the freedom of the will (XVIII.), and the proper doctrine concerning the cause of sin (XIX.)

The author closes this head with an estimate of the value of the Confession, and of its claims as a creed.

3. *Secondary Confessions.*

Five secondary Confessions, and the three general Creeds, joined with the Augsburg Confession, make up the symbolical books of the Evangelical Lutheran church, and are contained in the Book of Concord; observe the distinction between the Book of Concord, which contains these several parts, and the Form or Formula of Concord, which is the last of the parts.

These five are, the Apology of the Augsburg Confession, the Smalcald Articles, the Smaller and the Larger Catechism of Luther, and the Formula of Concord, in its two divisions of epitome and of ampler declaration.

It having been objected by some, that the Lutheran church has too much confessional matter, that she did not and does not need more than the Augsburg Confession, and that she had no right to add to her doctrine as stated in the said Confession. Our author, while agreeing that a creed, in the sense of "what" is to be believed, cannot be changed, replies, that a creed, as an official "statement" of the faith held, can be, and may be, added to; as, indeed, the Apostles' Creed added to the single creeds of scripture, the Nicene added to the Apostles', the Nicene of the West added to the Nicene of the East, and the Athanasian expanded two main points to about six times the length of the Apostles' Creed. But we must mark well that this addition to the statement is, in each case, no change of, but an amplifying the expression of, the faith. So the Augsburg Confession added only to the statement, and not to the faith, seeing that the points added had been potentially and implicitly in the faith of the pure church, though never formally confessed by her. At the same time the reverse course of subtraction is not compatible with the holding of the same faith. The objections that the Lutheran church did not need more confessions, and that she has too many, are met by the facts, first, that this church always has had more than the Augsburg Confession, and, second, that the Book of Concord really put a bar to the multiplication of confessional books. Five sevenths of it, or all except the Formula of Concord, were accepted in the church before the book was made, and these five sevenths are the first or selected part.

A. *The Collected Confessions.*— We shall ask at each of the books, what right it has to be held as a symbol.

a. *The Apology.* The Apology, which teaches the same as the Confession itself, has been acknowledged by scholars as a symbol, and has only been disparaged by unionists and

rationalists, (unionists, those who press the union of the Reformed and Lutheran churches, as in Prussia). Had permission been granted, it would have been presented at Augsburg to the Diet. In 1532 the Evangelical Lutheran states presented it at the Schweinfurt Convention as their Confession of Faith. In 1533 Luther in a public letter, refers to it as setting forth his and the church's faith. In 1537, at Smalcald, the theologians compared it with the Confession, and formally subscribed it with the Confession. In 1539, in Denmark, it was prescribed as a doctrinal guide to the Lutheran pastors. In 1540 it was delivered to the Conference at Worms as a statement of the Lutheran doctrine. In 1541 it was solemnly confirmed by the Protestant princes and states in addressing the emperor; and it was incorporated in all the "Bodies of Doctrine" proper, without exception. It then was of right that it found a place in the Book of Concord.

b. The Smalcald Articles. When the pope called a council to meet at Mantua, on the twenty-third of May, 1537, the Lutherans rejoiced, thinking that they should now have a hearing. So the elector told Luther to make ready a new series of articles as a basis of conference. These new articles, having been thoroughly examined in the convention at Smalcald in February, 1537, were subscribed by the theologians at that place, and from it named the Smalcald Articles. The church wanted new articles, not because her faith had changed or because the great Confession was not approved, but simply because the Confession and Apology were not suited to the council expected. The council was to deal with the questions at issue between Romanists and Lutherans, and it will at once be perceived that the Augsburg Confession was not adapted to this end. The Confession was too large, it contained many undisputed doctrines, which, if brought into view, would but encumber the discussion. On the other hand, in 1530, the church had not developed minor points of difference, so that the the Confession contained too little for the council, in that it passed over some of the points in question.

Nor was the spirit of the Confession fitted for the new occasion. The Confession sought peace; the new articles were a declaration of war. The Jesuits cried that the Smalcald Articles did not agree with the Confession; but the Lutheran church understood and understands them to be the same and holds them as symbols. They close the Reformation, and pronounce the separation from Rome.

c. Luther's Two Catechisms. While catechizing dates from the earliest periods, the honor of its latest and present form belongs to Luther, whose Shorter Catechism of 1529 is the most ancient now in use. Based on the Decalogue, the Creed, the Lord's Prayer, and the two sacraments, it follows as closely as possible simplicity and warmth, seeking neither to confound the understanding by intricacy, nor to chill the heart by rigidity. The two Catechisms, the Larger being as a commentary upon the Shorter, were everywhere accepted by the church as a comprehensive Bible for the laity, and used publicly and privately with great delight.

B. *The Formula of Concord*.—The part of the book with which we now have to do, is the cardinal of the whole, as it is the new part. No one, so far as recorded, who accepts this, rejects or objects to any other part of the Book of Concord. A slight sketch of its history will best show what need there was of this Formula, and how greatly it subserved the general unity of the church. We take this up the more gladly because it will at the same time carry us through an important and not well understood period of the Lutheran church, and will fix the places of a few of her theologians.

(1) We shall look at some of the causes and preliminaries of its preparation. Melancthon, gentle and philosophical, but weak and inconsistent, was no stay for the church that Luther had cared for. In his variations of the Augsburg Confession and its Apology, and in his kaleidoscopic Loci Communes, he moved this way and that, with hopes now of agreeing with Rome, and now with Switzerland. This occasioned indefinite trouble; Philippists and Reformed using his double-sided phrases in their worst sense, and Lutherans

insisting upon their rejection, or pressing their agreement with Luther's utterances. The Philippists wished to make the Philippic Corpus Doctrinae (1560), of confessional authority — a thing to which consistent Lutherans were loath, seeing that this body of doctrine was large, almost entirely from Melancthon's hand, to a great extent composed of private writings not acted on by the church, of a corrupted text, cumbrous, and ambiguous. These things, and the promotion of a Crypto-Calvinism by the Wittenberg theologians, led, in 1569, to several consultations among the sounder theologians, such as James Andreae of Tübingen, Martin Chemnitz, David Chytraeus, and Nicholas Selnecker. In 1570 a convention was held at Zerbst, representing Saxony, Brandenburg, and Brunswick; but Andreae was the only one satisfied thereby. In 1573 Andreae sent to Lower Saxony, for subscription, two books, one of six sermons on the divisions which had arisen between 1548 and 1573, and the other an exposition of the present controversies. In 1574 the Saxon divines, at the order of the elector Augustus, prepared the Electoral Torgau Articles, which, though at first approved by Selnecker, were afterwards generally suspected of undue leaning towards Calvinism. In 1575 Chemnitz and Chytraeus, who in 1571 had prepared a confession for the churches of Lower Saxony, drew up the Suabian-Saxon Formula of Concord. This was based on the exposition by Andreae, to which we referred a moment ago, and itself became the groundwork of the Formula of Concord.

(2) The next stages of preparation lead us more intimately into the curious intermingling of petty states with church questions, which we have noted, and show how the German Reformation shaped its course through civil, as well as theological hands. Augustus, the elector of Saxony, called twelve theologians to meet at Lichtenberg, February, 1576, and they determined that all unkind thoughts must be dismissed; that the Philippic Corpus Doctrinae, though a good book, was not a symbol; and that Chemnitz, Chytraeus, and Andreae, the three who had already done so much in this

line, should with Marbach prepare a statement of the controverted questions.

During the preceding year, however, the elector had met old Count Ernest of Henneberg at a hunt, and talked over church matters with him; the count promising, as they parted, that he would have a paper drawn up setting forth the errors charged and the truths maintained. The old count attended to this at the wedding of the daughter of Louis the duke of Würtemberg to Charles the margrave of Baden. The three — count, duke, and margrave — committed the preparation of the desired paper to Luke Osiander and Bidembach. These took the Suabian-Saxon Formula above mentioned, compressed it, and added scripture proofs and citations from Luther; finishing, on the fourteenth of November, 1575, a paper which, from its presentation to the theological delegates of the princes at Maulbronn, on the nineteenth of January, 1576, is called the Maulbronn Formula. According to the bargain made at the hunt, the old count Henneberg sent this Maulbronn Formula to the elector Augustus, and he at once handed it and a copy of the Suabian-Saxon Formula to Andreae for his advice. The latter declaring the Suabian-Saxon Formula too diffuse and indefinite, and the Maulbronn too brief, advised that a third be prepared from these two as a basis. The author does not give the day of the month for the beginning or end of the Lichtenberg Convention above noted; but this action of the elector with regard to the two Formulas appears to have occurred just after the convention. The elector approved of Andreae's counsel, and followed it by calling a convention of twenty theologians at Torgau, in May, 1576. Of the eighteen who came, eleven had been members of the Lichtenberg Convention of twelve. Selneccer, Andreae, Chytraeus, Chemnitz, Musculus, and Cörner are the most distinguished of the body thus meeting in Torgau. Agreeing with Andreae's view, they set about making a new book, using the Suabian-Saxon Formula as the basis, and following as nearly as possible the order of the articles in the Augsburg Confession. In ten days, from

the twenty-ninth of May to the seventh of June, 1576, they had the Torgau Formula ready, and handed it to the elector. We may consider Andreae and Chemnitz as its authors.

(3) The elector, having examined the Torgau Formula and sent it to the evangelical states of the empire, conventions were held to consider it, and in all twenty-five responses were received, generally favorable, but with valuable suggestions as to improvements. Then the elector, acting also for Brunswick and Württemberg, told Chemnitz of Brunswick, Andreae of Tübingen, and Selnecker of Leipzig to revise it with this new light. This they did at Bergen, from the first to the fourteenth of March, 1577, making also an epitome of the Solid Declaration. A second revision (from the nineteenth to the twenty-eighth of May, 1577), at Bergen, by the former three, with Cörner and Musculus of Frankfort-on-the-Oder, and Chytraeus of Rostock, gave the last touches, leaving it with the name Bergen Formula, although it is exactly what, on publication in 1580, became known as the Formula of Concord. Having determined the standards, namely, the Confession, Apology, Smalcald Articles, and Catechisms, and having prepared a new confession on the new issues, it was necessary to secure the subscription thereto of the church teachers, and the sanction thereof by the political estates, to shield it from attack. Instead of calling a general convention, they sent it around for signature; and, in spite of a dissenting minority, it received the names of three electors, twenty-one princes, twenty-two counts, twenty-four free cities, and of eight thousand of the teachers of the church. By 1582 eighty-six states had subscribed it.

Our author thereupon describes its still further reception in and out of Germany, as well as the opposition with which it met from Lutherans, Reformed, and Romanists, and enters into an account of the men who prepared the Formula. An analysis of the Formula and a brief reply to the objection that the Formula separated the Lutheran church from the Zwinglian Calvinistic churches close this section.

We call attention to the fact that, under the heads of the

confessions, we have used the author's words, to a large extent, and can only lay claim to any errors which our inaccuracy in condensing them may have caused.

4. *Correction of Mistakes.*

The author now takes up a History of Doctrine by a Reformed scholar, and at once shows and replies to one or two common mistakes in reference to Lutheranism. The nature of some of the faults alluded to will go far to substantiate what we said at first with regard to the common ignorance concerning the Lutheran church. If a theologian, and a writer upon the history of doctrine, and one to whom our author concedes a certain acquaintance with Lutheran theology,—if such a one can make the mistakes pointed out, the position of ordinary theological students, and still more of church members in general, cannot be satisfactory. However, we need not spend much time with this article, as most of the points touched will appear elsewhere. Its polite sarcasm serves as a relief to the severe discussions which follow. Let us look at two passages :

“Dr. — says, the Formula Concordiae was ‘presented to the Imperial Diet.’ We are at a loss to guess out of what misconception this statement could have originated. Not only is there no historical voucher for any such statement; but the thing itself, to any one who will recall the history of the times, will be seen at once to be absolutely impossible. And yet Dr. —, as if to show that there are degrees in the absolute, adds that this Imperial Diet ‘sought to secure its adoption by the Lutheran church.’ All this is purely aerial. There was no such Diet, no such presentation, and no such recommendation. Dr. —’s pen is the magician’s wand which has conjured up the whole. This is a serious charge to bring against so eminent a scholar; but, feeling the full responsibility involved in it, truth compels us to make it. Dr. —, still in his aerial movement, says of this empirical Imperial Diet, ‘In this they were unsuccessful.’ Dropping any consideration of the lack of success of this hypothetical Diet

in its phantasmagorical decrees, we might say that no official effort from any source has ever been made to secure the adoption of the Formula Concordiae by the entire Lutheran church."

And again we read: "Dr. — continues to call the electors (we know not why) 'crown princes,' and in general seems to stumble from the moment he gets on German ground. What will intelligent preachers and laymen in the German Reformed church think, for instance, of this eulogy, with which the notice of the Heidelberg Catechism closes: 'In doctrine, it teaches justification with the Lutheran glow and vitality, predestination and election with Calvinistic firmness and self-consistency, and the Zwinglian theory of the sacraments with decision and is regarded with great favor by the High Lutheran party of the present day.' We will not undertake to speak for our German Reformed friends, except to say, that this is not the sort of thing they talked at their Ter-centenary, and put into their handsome volume. As to 'the High Lutherans of the present day,' if we are of them, as we are sometimes charged with being, Dr. — is right; the Heidelberg Catechism is regarded by them with great favor — all except its doctrines. It is a neat thing, a very neat thing, the mildest, most winning piece of Calvinism of which we know. One-half of it is Lutheran, and this we like very much, and the solitary improvement we would suggest in it would be to make the other half of it Lutheran too. With this slight reservation, on this very delicate point, the High Lutherans are rather fond of it than otherwise, to the best of their knowledge and belief."

III. DOCTRINE.

As we have already said, this book does not contain a complete dogmatic or detailed statement of doctrine. It offers only the principal doctrines in which the Lutheran church differs in her teachings from that of the Reformed church. Hence we find in this division simply four subjects: original sin, the person of Christ, baptism, and the Lord's supper. Original sin is treated in the form of analyzing the

article thereon in the Augsburg Confession, elucidating at each point of the analysis the questions that have arisen concerning it. The article touching the person of Christ stands as a discussion of an article by a Reformed theologian, and presents the Lutheran doctrine chiefly in quotations from Chemnitz, and in comparison with Reformed views. In the article on baptism, the Lutheran doctrine is defended at length from the claim that it is "immersionist," and the inward efficacy, as well as the necessity of baptism, are urged. As the Lord's supper is the great point of discussion between Lutherans and Reformed, it receives special attention, occupying more than a quarter of the whole book. Its discussion is in three articles, — the first presents the doctrine from the scriptures, this being the thesis; the second, presents the errors opposed to this scripture doctrine, this being the antithesis; and the third, answers objections. Under the second article occurs a treatment of the metaphor which is particularly noteworthy. During twenty pages the reader cannot but think that he has a grammar or a rhetoric in hand, instead of a theological work; metaphors are searched through and through from all sides, until no point has been neglected. Few scholars have the facility in grammatical figures and in their presentation, which the author here shows. His keen mind and practised pen fit the subject exactly. The third article also contains a somewhat unusual application of philosophical knowledge to the answering of objections drawn from the later philosophy.

A brief look at the discussion of original sin, and at the discussion of baptism, will be as much as our present bounds allow.

1. *Original Sin.*

After tracing the preparation of the second article of the Augsburg Confession, the fourth article of the Marburg fifteen, and the Schwabach seventeen, and after showing, by a comparison of the readings of this article of the Augsburg Confession in different editions, that Melancthon's *Editio Princeps* is the highest critical authority, the author refers briefly

to the papal confutation of the Augsburg Confession, read at Augsburg on the third of August. At this we have the commission of seven from each side, to which the consideration of the Lutheran and Romish views was intrusted. Each side appointed two princes, two jurists, and three theologians; the Romish theologians were Eck, Wimpina, and Cochlaeus, the Lutherans were Melanchthon, Schnepf, and Brentius. Spalatin was added as notary. As far as the second article is concerned, the Romanists made certain objections, Melanchthon explained them skilfully away, and the two parties considered themselves as agreed on this article.

The treatment of the anthropological question, of the real sinfulness of original sin, and of its cleansing away, will call our attention. The doctrine of the Augsburg Confession as to original sin, claims a sound anthropology as its basis. It presupposes a proper conception of man as capable of and needing regeneration, and at the same time as the highest earthly creature, consisting of body and soul, personal, free, morally accountable, and immortal. It presupposes that the Bible account of the creation of man is literally true, that all men have come from one pair. It presupposes that after the immediate creation of Adam all human beings were, and are, immediately created. It presupposes that man at first was in a state of integrity, and that he fell into sin. It presupposes that sin is caused by the finite will, and attaches to its conditions as well as to its overt acts. The question as to the propagation of the human soul is judiciously handled, and, as might be expected, from a Traducian point of view. The subject is to such an extent a mysterious one, that we could scarcely find fault with any theologian if he should, with Augustine, say that he did not know about it, and could not decide. Not a few points of controversy in the history of the church would have been avoided had theologians been more ready to say, "I do not know." Pre-existence, which, with its Gordian simplicity, is compared to "the hopeless cosmography of the Hindoos, except that it stops at the elephant," is linked to the names of Plato, Philo, Origen, Kant, Schel-

ling, Julius Müller, and Edward Beecher. Creationism, while guarded from abuse by many good men who have held it, still is viewed as leading by necessity to the doctrine that God is the author of sin. Traducianism, the view of many of the Fathers and of most Lutheran theologians, and the only one which the author can accept, is stated by him to be "a creation by God, of which the parents are the divinely ordained organ."

In the showing that original sin is really sin, the words *morbus*, *vitium*, and *peccatum*, with the German words *seuche* and *sünde*, are carefully discussed, and the analogies between *morbus* (disease) and sin, as well as between *vitium* and original sin, are traced. That original sin is truly sin, then, appears from the fact that its names, essence, attributes, acts, penalties, and remedy are those of sin, it being also conformed to a true definition of sin.

The paragraph with reference to the moral mystery of the imposition of the penalty of death for original sin, deserves remark. At the present day, at least in America, there is a tendency to universalism, a tendency, we fear, much more widely spreading or developing among Orthodox clergymen than is commonly supposed. Among other grounds for this now thought, now spoken, universalism, is the difficulty of believing that God, an infinitely loving Father to mankind, can so pursue his justice as to inflict eternal death on mankind for sin. To such a difficulty the following answer may be given for all who admit the existence of original sin,—an answer which bears still more strongly on actual sin than on original sin, to which it is in the first place directed: "Death, even eternal death, as the endurance of suffering, is not essentially so fearful a thing as sin. It would be more in keeping with divine holiness to permit suffering in the highest degree than to permit sin in the least degree. Suffering is the removal of a lesser good than that which sin removes, and the bringing in of a lesser evil than that which sin brings in. . . . If it were a doctrine of the Bible that the race is actually lost forever because of original sin, the

mystery of the loss would be a less mystery than that of the permission of sin. Those who admit the existence and perpetuation of original sin, admit, therefore, a mystery greater than the doctrine of the absolute loss of this sinful race, in consequence of original sin, would be."

Relief from this burden of original sin can be obtained solely through the working of the Holy Ghost, since Christ's work without the applying power of the Spirit does not produce the new birth, and since neither relation to Christian parents, nor birth in the midst of covenant privileges, nor death has regenerating power. A short space is devoted to the consideration of 1 Cor. vii. 14, resulting in the declaration that the holiness referred to is generic, that is to say, that the children where but one parent is Christian belong, equally with children where both parents are Christian, to the genus Christian. The author denies the right of the inference from these words, "that children are members of the visible church by their birth, and much more the inference that they are born again by virtue of their relation to Christian parents."

From this the author proceeds to the points concerning baptism as a means of the new birth; this we shall refer to under the head of baptism. A careful presentation and a condemnation of Pelagianism closes this head.

2. *Baptism.*

The article before us, opening with a summary statement of the Lutheran doctrine, and then proving at length that Luther was not an immersionist in the sense of regarding immersion as the only form of baptism, passes to the question of the internal efficacy of baptism. This is set forth in an explanation of John iii. 5: "Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God." The context, the text, the parallels, and the resorts of interpreters are considered. Under the head of the context the author is led into an interpretation of Matt. iii. 2, in which it seems to us that he is thoroughly wrong, although there are

commentators who agree with him in part. Having shown that the context necessitates the supposition that Christ meant baptism when he spoke of water, the author rejects from the text itself any figurative interpretation, and adduces the parallels to prove that Christ and the apostles elsewhere spoke thus of baptism. Then the resorts of interpreters who have tried, by calling it a hendiadys or an epexegetis, to escape the reference to baptism, are refuted, and are declared, if provable, to be only of value to show that baptism is meant.

The question of the necessity of baptism appears to have been a matter discussed inside of the Lutheran church in America, and if we are not mistaken in supposing that the mythical "Definite Platform," constantly referred to by the author, represents a party in that church; some, at least, have believed that their own standards inculcated the necessity of baptism in an absolute sense. However, the author denies that the Lutheran church holds to the absolute necessity of baptism, and declares that she teaches only its ordinary necessity. In proving that the Lutheran church allows that baptism is not always followed by regeneration, the author brings in a single phrase of Gerhard, and to show that regeneration is not always preceded by baptism, he cites the Confession as to faith and regeneration, without the least reference to baptism, and then concludes with another phrase from Gerhard, who says, that regeneration may precede baptism. We should prefer a clear phrase on each point from the perfect Confession; and the fact that such does not appear goes to show that none exists.

When the question of the state of infants who die unbaptized, comes up, it is treated with especial reference to the Calvinistic doctrine. The method of putting the case is strangely one-sided, if looked at carefully. It should be remarked that the subject is one in which almost all churches have in later times modified their doctrine. Without any desire to charge the author with unfairness, we cannot but remark the singular way in which he has given a bad view of Calvinism, and a favorable view of Lutheranism, seeking to separate them

widely in a matter wherein his efforts make it appear that there was at bottom little difference between the two. That is to say, according to some in each church at one time, many of these unbaptized children were left in a doubtful or a lost condition, and it is now believed that all are, or probably are, in a saved condition. We do not mean to say that the doctrines are the same, but that the result upon which our author lays much stress is essentially the same in each case.

However, look at his method of treating the subject. Let us turn to the reference to this point under the article on original sin, which we promised to speak of. For the Lutheran side of the question, he quotes Luther and Bugenhagen's exposition of the twenty-seventh Psalm, which does not appear in the least to touch the general question mooted, but only to combat those who held that Christian children who could not be baptized were lost. Then he quotes Hoffmann, Feuerlein, and Carpzov, all of whom are commenting on the Confession. Now observe, of these three, who are presumably as good witnesses to his case as the author can find, not one pretends that the Confession does say that unbaptized children are saved. They simply deny that the Confession denies, and explain its assertion away. Thus Carpzov: "The Augsburg Confession does not say that unbaptized children may not be regenerated in an *extraordinary* mode." The italics are not ours. The Confession does not say that these children "may not be safe." That is a trifle unsatisfactory. Moreover not one of these three men, as quoted, does anything more than suspend his judgment or allow of a possibility; none expresses a belief or urges a likelihood.

That is the Lutheran side; an allusion to a subordinate question in Luther and Bugenhagen, and a "does not say" that it "may not be," from three others, which authorize the final statement, that only "the plea of ignorance" can save "from the charge of malicious falsehood" those who affirm that it is a doctrine of the Lutheran church "that baptism is absolutely essential, and that all unbaptized persons are lost." He does not use the severe language which he elsewhere

charges to Calvin, but such an expression as "malicious falsehood" savors strongly of the vigor of ancient discussions.

We must now turn to the Calvinistic side as given here. We find quotations from the Westminster Confession and from Peter Martyr, and, oddly enough, not one of these quotations teaches the doctrine alluded to. In the first place, with the exception of a single one, they are general, referring to the state of men and to the ordinary means of salvation; the author supplying at each a gloss that gives it an ill look, a gloss that the author would probably call an atrocious or malicious misrepresentation, or what not, if it lay on the doctrines of his confessions. To answer these glosses would overrun our limits, and we must content ourselves, as for all but one, with attributing them to what the author at another place thus describes: "Nothing is more difficult than for a thinker or believer of one school fairly to represent the opinions and faith of thinkers and believers of another school." In the second place, the one quotation which alludes to infants reads as follows: "Elect infants, dying in infancy, are regenerated and saved by Christ through the Spirit, who worketh when and where and how he pleaseth." It would be enough to take up the method of Carpzov, whom our author has used above, and say: "The confession does not say that non-elect infants may not be saved." This, however, is not necessary. It is as easy to suppose that all who die in infancy are elect. But the author rejects this as illogical: "To assume that all children dying in infancy, even the children of Christians, are elect, and yet that the prevision of their being so born and so dying has no relation to their election, is illogical." That is where the author is out. He does not need to bring in a bit of prevision, and has no right to do so, seeing that it is expressly excluded by the sentence to which he thus adds a gloss. Prevision has nothing to do with the election; that is a Lutheran, not a Calvinistic view. It is illogical to say that a choice resting upon a subsequent cause is made without reference to that cause; or we might name it absurd and

false ; but Calvinism is not guilty of such a thing here. It is illogical to put a doctrine where it does not belong ; say pre-vision, where there is no call for it. It is more illogical to put a doctrine in the place of an opposite doctrine ; say fore-sight, in the place of election and foreordination. And it is most illogical to put a doctrine unnecessarily in the place of an opposite doctrine, simply to be able to stamp the interpolated doctrinal statement as illogical, and that is what the author appears to have done.

The discussion of this point in the article on baptism is much entangled with that intangible "Definite Platform," and so we may let it alone. At one place, however, the author again compares Lutheran and Calvinistic views, quite as felicitously as before. The statement may be met as the previous one. The argument is against the doctrine of election, and the example offered is one that loses its point if the supposition we have given in the other case be accepted.

Here comes the news across the sea that the author has written and compiled a learned commentary upon a foot-note in Hodge's Systematic Theology, a note that touches this point. Of course, in dealing with even a minor doctrine, one may involve the more important doctrines, as in fact in the pages just discussed, the author brings in, so far as relates to Calvinism, more of everything else than of the doctrine nominally treated. Nevertheless it is to be regretted that he should have expended so much force upon a doctrine which is not a leading one. On the other hand, however, if the reports of the length of the commentary referred to be correct, we can but congratulate the world of journals and reviews that only this much was handled.

The book, which we have thus cursorily glanced at, has no equal in its presentation of the Lutheran church. The ease of its style, the carefulness of its research, and the solidity of its argument commend it to every scholar. We trust that it may go far in bringing the Lutheran and the Reformed churches to a mutual understanding, and thus subserve the furthering of a true union, such as our author and all earnest men desire.

ARTICLE III.

THE FIRST CHAPTER OF GENESIS.

BY REV. THOMAS HILL, D.D., LL.D., FORMERLY PRESIDENT OF HARVARD COLLEGE.

It has been observed by many biblical critics during the last six score years, that the Book of Genesis was not written by the author of the Pentateuch; but rather compiled by him as an introduction to his own writings. Two principal documents, or sources, seem to have been used by Moses in this compilation, embracing accounts of the creation and fall, the deluge, the dispersion of nations, agreeing in a striking manner with the early traditions preserved in sundry profane writers. Those disposed to regard the Book of Genesis with reverence, as the compilation of a divinely illuminated man, look upon these traditions recorded by him as the true versions, giving us the realities; those who wish to disparage the Bible, assume that the first book of Moses is of no more value than any of the traditions of the Etrurians, the Chaldeans, or the earlier Aryans. The latter class seize upon the anthropomorphic character of many passages in Genesis to show, as they think, that the writers had no higher conceptions of the Deity than those held by any of the pagans. To this the defenders of Moses reply, that we must consider the extreme antiquity of these fragments, that they far antedate Moses, and were addressed originally to a people more rude and uncultivated than the earliest Hebrews. Those people must be addressed in their own language and in their own style of speech, else they would not comprehend the lesson. These fragments in Genesis contain, each, a lesson well worth learning, and which can be conveyed to rude, uncultivated people, even at the present day, in no paraphrase so well and so forcibly as in the biblical form.

This general line of defence and of argument will not avail, unless it be directly and distinctly applied to the individual cases. Let us take up, therefore, the first of those two apparently contradictory accounts of the creation with which the book opens, and see if we can discover the divine lesson which it contains. At some future time we may endeavor to show that the second account is equally wonderful, — that it needs only a generous and appreciative interpretation to show that it was, for the age in which it was given, the best possible form in which the great lessons of our moral freedom and our responsibility to God could possibly have been given. But at present we will confine ourselves to the consideration of the first account, which includes the whole of the first chapter, and ends with the word “created” in the fourth verse of the second chapter; and endeavor to show the correctness of Professor Benjamin Peirce’s view, that this chapter contains in itself, just as it stands in our ordinary English translation, demonstrative evidence, first, of its extreme antiquity, secondly, of its absolute perfection of thought and adaptation to man, — thus proving that the original author was divinely illuminated, as well as Moses who made it, in preference to any kindred tradition, the introduction to his books of the law.

The late Professor Agassiz was accustomed to deny that he ever indulged in hypotheses. He thought that he studied the phenomena to be considered until they revealed to him their own meaning, and that, until this revelation was made, he held his mind in entire suspense, without making any tentative hypotheses. Most men will think that Agassiz must have deceived himself in this matter; and that the truth was, that his mind was so clear and so rapid in its action, as to reject the untenable hypotheses as soon as suggested, thus allowing them no time to impress themselves on his memory. To us it seems impossible for a finite mind to proceed in any other way in the interpretation of nature or of literature than by hypotheses and verification, in a manner analogous to that of the good old “rule of false,” so unwisely discarded from modern treatises on arithmetic.

We will, therefore, proceed in this manner in our examination of the first chapter of Genesis. It gives us, in some sense, a cosmogony. Shall we suppose that it was intended to be a literal narrative of events? If so, then the second chapter was probably written with the same view; yet the two chapters, taken as narratives of events, are irreconcilably in contradiction to each other. In a compilation made by the chosen lawgiver it is not probable that this would occur. Moreover, as a literal narrative of events, its pertinence as an introduction to the Mosaic law is not very apparent. Dr. Palfrey's hypothesis that everything in the Book of Genesis is inserted because of some valuable bearing upon the religious doctrines or the moral lessons of the Mosaic law, commends itself to our judgment as having an overwhelming probability in its favor. The first thing, therefore, to be looked for, is a revelation of the unity and omnipotence of God. Now this chapter has, above its narrative of events, a religious sublimity, which has made it revered wherever read. Jews and Christians have alike clung to it, as worthy to have come from inspiration; heathen critics have praised it, and atheists have been reclaimed by it. About forty years ago, a Chinese boy, in one of the suburbs of Canton, threw away the idols of his family, became an atheist, and ran away to America. In the city of New York he supported himself as a porter, and spent his Sundays in the streets, or on the shores of Hoboken. Curiosity led him one day to look into a church, and he was astonished to find no idols there. He asked, the next day, an explanation of his employer, who replied by simply putting a Bible into his hands. The first chapter of Genesis converted him; he became a Christian, studied and was educated, and returned a Christian teacher to China. He was in the same class with us, in 1839, and we bear joyous testimony to his good sense, ability, and character; and to the genuineness, so far as men could judge, of the conversion wrought in him by this first chapter in Genesis.

This account of the creation is very old. The Hebrew
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scholars tell us that the language in it contains marked archaisms, which set its date far antecedent to the age of Solômon, and even to the age of Moses. But without recourse to Hebraists, the English translation testifies emphatically to an extremely early date. For this is an account of the creation—a speculation on the cosmogony; yet it contains no philosophical or technical forms of expression, it betrays nothing of the style of a school; it must have been one of the very first of human speculations on such subjects. The simplest and most sublime message that can be given to man is to announce to us the existence of God. The revelation of his being is a necessary prelude to the promulgation of his law; just as the promulgation of his law necessarily precedes the mission of a Saviour, authorized to announce the terms and arrange the means of forgiveness for sin. Let us, then, make the hypothesis that this is the message of the present chapter; and, in order to put the hypothesis to the severest test, let us make what may be deemed an extreme and extravagant hypothesis,—let us suppose, for a time, that to some very early prophet, like Enoch, the seventh from Adam, the injunction was given to proclaim to mankind the doctrine that God is the absolute Creator of the material universe and all its forces, and that from his will all the tribes of animate beings, including man, sprang to life; let us farther suppose that, in fitting and illuminating the prophet for his task, the whole course of nature from the beginning to the end was unveiled, and all the discoveries and inventions of man, and the speculations of philosophy, down to the present day were shown to him. Now if this hypothesis explains all the facts in the case, and if there is no fact to be found inconsistent with it, then it is fair to infer that so much of the hypothesis as may be found necessary to explain the facts is true; and this inference will be greatly strengthened if the hypothesis extends farther, and explains facts not at first taken into view; also if the imagination in vain seeks any other explanation.

In the first place the prophet would naturally seek to say

that God is the Creator of matter and its forces. But in what terms can he do this? No speculations have as yet discussed the origin of matter; there is no word signifying to create; the arts have not sufficiently advanced to make a distinction between material and product, and there is no word for matter; neither have the sciences reached the state in which the forces of nature were named. Of course, in addressing men the language of men must be used, and the prophet having no words by which to express his ideas, and being forbidden by the necessity of making himself intelligible from coining words, must use periphrases. He endeavors to declare that God was the Creator of matter by saying that God shaped the heavens and the earth, and the earth was waste and empty, and darkness lay over its abysses, and the breath of God brooded over its waters. This representation of the forming of a formless earth is the nearest approach to a declaration of the creation of matter that the language of that early day could make. Then, in order to declare God to be the author of all the forces of nature, and that he holds them under his control, what resource is there but for the prophet to select the most striking of those forces, and to say, God made that, and thus imply that he made all the rest, that would hereafter be discovered. He chooses light, the most striking and wondrous of all to the untutored eye, most wonderful in itself, in its revelations and its suggestions, and declares, God said light be, and light was. The emphasis throughout the whole chapter is upon the divine name; the proposition to be conveyed being not so much that God said, as that it was God who said—a distinction which the rude language could not make. All things sprang from his foreknowledge and his will,—this is the prophet's meaning; it is only the poverty of the uncultivated language of the time which forces him to express himself in this way. God saw that the light was good; that is, he predestined it for its multiform uses in the economy of vegetative and animal life, and in the development of the human intellect. And it was he who separated the light from the darkness; he retained

the control of the force which he had created, and appointed of his foreknowledge the alternations of day and night. In like manner with all the forces of nature afterward to be discovered in scientific research, — heat, electricity, galvanic currents, chemical affinities, actinic rays, whatever they were, — they came at God's command, they were foreseen by him as good, and designed for their uses, and they are retained in his power of guidance. How could the prophet say this to the rude people of his early time better than in those sublime words selected from their unpolished language, to shine, nevertheless, as undimmed brilliants throughout all ages: "God said let there be light, and there was light. And God saw the light that it was good, and God divided the light from the darkness, and God called the light day, and the darkness he called night; and the evening and the morning were the first day."

Every utterance of a mind filled with great thoughts is boldly figurative, and the figures are bold in proportion to the intensity of the speaker's emotion, and to the poverty in words expressive of his thought and feeling of the language which he is using. Thus it appears that our prophet, uttering the grandest truths that can enter a finite mind, and naturally led by his subject, after the delivery of his first proposition, to speak of day and night, is thereby induced to continue in the bold figure of describing the creation as a series of days' works. He does not bring the figure forward offensively, as has been often done by his interpreters, he does not distinctly affirm that the creation was the work of six successive days, but simply divides his description of creation into six periods, by adding at the close of each important division of his subject the poetical refrain, And it was evening and it was morning on that day. These days of creation are not, then, to be considered as periods of time, short or long, any more than if the prophet had said, "In the first place God created matter and its forces, in the second place he made the heavens above," etc., we should consider creation as having been accomplished in six successive portions of

space. The six periods are neither periods of space nor of time, but are logical divisions in the survey of the universe, which the prophet makes in the fulfilment of his mission,—to make a comprehensive and exhaustive statement of the fact that all things, past present and to come, visible and invisible, are the workmanship of God.

Having thus declared, in the first place, God to be the Creator of matter and its forces, the prophet would naturally turn to the heavens, and say that they were the work of the same God. In doing it he must use the Hebrew words: they called it a firmament, which upheld the clouds and stores of rain, and the prophet simply says, God made that firmament; without implying it to be hard and hammered out, any more than we imply that it was heaved up, by calling it heaven. In the third place he would naturally turn again to the earth, and declare its arrangement of seas and continents to be his work, and intelligently designed by him for the use of man; God gathered the seas, and raised the dry land, and saw that it was good. He also gave the earth its fertility, and adapted its grass and herbs and trees to their future uses, and saw that it was good—that the adaptation was perfect. All the work of Ritter and Guyot, all the arguments of the Bridge-water Treatises, and the Graham Lectures, are thus foretold in these brief sentences of the Book of Genesis.

In the fourth place, continues our early prophet, he who made the heavens and the earth adapted their relations to each other—the sun to give light and warmth, and the change of seasons; the moon to light the night; the two to furnish the means of chronology, signs and seasons, days and years. He made, also, the stars, whose uses it will be left for far distant generations to discover; but God saw that it was all good; he foresaw and foreordained the uses that even the stars will have in distant ages. This prophecy has been in our days fulfilled, and the stars have given to man, in the latter half of this nineteenth century after Christ, some of the grandest opportunities for intellectual triumphs that have ever been achieved by human genius.

In the fifth place, he goes on to say, it was God who gave the sea its myriad creatures, that swim in the depths beneath, or on the surface, or fly over its waves ; and he saw from the beginning that it was all good — that all these creatures also were adapted to each other, to their place, and to the future uses, corporal and intellectual, of man.

Then, in the sixth place, it was God also who created the tribes of earth, from the least to the greatest, in all their variety, each with its own nature, and capable of perpetuating its kind ; and it was he, also, who created man in his own image, capable of understanding and using all these works ; it was he who gave us dominion over all things, and pronounced all things very good — perfectly adapted to the future needs of that human race which he had placed on the earth to rule and use it. The long course of history, slowly developing the exceeding richness of man's nature, has, at the same time, developed the divine fulness of this most ancient prophecy, declaring that God in the beginning made a grant of terrestrial sovereignty to man, and pronounced the whole universe adapted to his needs. One knows not which most to admire in our nineteenth century, the mastery which the human intellect is acquiring of the intellectual revelations of nature, or the discovery of new and useful properties in the various forms of matter.

The prophet's task is accomplished ; he has made a complete and exhaustive statement of the great truth entrusted to him ; he has announced God as the Creator and Controller of matter and its forces ; whether in the heavens or on the earth ; whether in the earth and seas, or in the plants and animals ; whether in the lower animals, or in man, who is created in his Maker's image, and set to have dominion over all things below. The prophet's burden is delivered, and he feels the joy of rest. He adds, therefore, one more thought ; God, the Creator of all, has not exhausted his power in his work, he ended voluntarily, — he rested on the seventh day, not because his power was exhausted, but because he chose ; and he blessed the seventh day and hallowed it : he enjoys now the sight of the things which he has made.

Interpreted in this way, there is not a phrase in the whole account which militates against the hypothesis that it was uttered from the highest divine inspiration ; that is, by a man to whom the whole truth in both science and theology had been revealed ; nor is there a phrase which is not explained by the hypothesis that the sole emphasis is to be placed upon the divine name, — that the sole intent of the account is to reveal the one truth that in the beginning God created heaven and earth.

But if the account came thus by a higher inspiration than that of genius, we shall probably find, on examination, that there are other meanings in this passage ; a greater wealth of meaning than the prophet himself was aware of. The doctrine of manifold meanings in the scripture is dangerous ; and we do not propose to advocate it. The word is written to convey one thought and feeling, and is to be quoted as authority for that one end only. Nevertheless, such is the richness of God's wisdom, that if he inspires a man to speak, that speech will partake somewhat of the marvellous character of the works of nature, which always subserve multiform purposes. It is a great triumph of human ingenuity to contrive, occasionally, a tool that shall combine in itself several uses. But the substances of nature are usually applicable to multifarious purposes ; the tools of nature serve many ends ; as the tongue is used in tasting, chewing, swallowing, speaking, as a delicate organ of touch, etc. If, therefore, we find that in this account of the creation there are, besides its main meaning, as expounded above, sundry secondary meanings, each obvious, just, and true, it will confirm our faith in the divine inspiration of this pre-Mosaic speech.

But the history of Jewish and Christian literature is full of attempts to draw from this chapter meanings of various kinds, scientific and religious. It is not necessary, and would not be profitable, for us to refer to them in detail. The Jewish doctors found abstruse philosophical meanings in single words and single letters, nay, even in the parts of letters. John Scotus Erigena, the first great light in advance

of the revival of learning, found in it evidence of his grand theory of the division of nature ; insisting that the chaos was no chaos, but only a potential cosmos, the ideals of creation intrusted by the Father, for execution, to the Son, who is the Beginning, from whom the Book of Genesis is named. In our own day, Arnold Guyot, and others, have sought to find modern geology confirmed here, and Tayler Lewis has given a grand exposition of the Six Days as Time Cycles, arguing chiefly on philological grounds. None of these attempts, to make a secondary meaning become primary, have, in our judgment, succeeded farther than to show the language capable of bearing the secondary meaning, and thus giving an indication of its wonderful richness. The primary meaning attached to it by Peirce, as we have now endeavored to set it forth, being the grandest meaning capable of being put into human speech, and most perfectly according both with the language of the chapter, and with its position as the introduction to the books of the Law, the history of the revelation through Moses, must be accepted as the primary meaning ; and the secondary meanings then become of interest only as revealing the inspired character of the account ; that it is many sided, like a work of nature, and implies a divine fulness of wisdom, consciously or unconsciously held in the writer's mind.

Two of these secondary meanings are especially worthy of notice, since they do not involve subtleties of thought, or minute attention to words and verbal constructions, but are patent on the face of a translation ; the first is the natural suggestion that the six days are not only in the logical order of the prophet's thought, but in the actual chronological order of events ; the second is, that the prophet anticipates, and as it were heads off, all the subterfuges of an atheistic spirit.

First, then, the six days, although primarily but six divisions in the prophet's order of thought, actually represent six periods of time. If the mathematicians finally allow the nebular hypothesis to stand, as they seem of late years inclined to do, then there was chaos antecedent to the cosmos. And modern discoveries rapidly tend toward the conclusion that

all the known properties of matter are but modes of motion, so that the first act of creation must necessarily have been that the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters. Another discovery of our nineteenth century is, that in every form of matter known to us, there is actually light as well as heat — absolute darkness is as unknown as the absolute zero of heat. It has been so from the beginning; and when creation flashed into being, light was the first created beam. In the very language, therefore, in which this earliest prophet announced God to be the Creator of matter, and of all the forces which govern it, there is, we might say, an implied knowledge of the great physical discoveries of the present day.

Moreover, if the nebular hypothesis is finally established, in spite of the difficulties surrounding certain portions of it, then the heavens were made before the earth; the nebulous mass separated into stars before it divided into planets, and it divided into planets before the planets became cool enough to form into continents and seas and became inhabitable. Here, then, the logical order of the second day is the chronological order of the nebular hypothesis; another instance in which this earliest religious teacher anticipates the boasted discoveries of Herschel and La Place.

Then, if the modern physiologists and geologists are right in their interpretation of the facts of nature, the third division of this chapter was actually next in the order of time. The glowing mass of the earth cooled, the steam was condensed into seas, the upheaval of the continents followed, and the protruding rocks were covered, above and below the water line, with vegetation. And now, also, comes, in its proper order of time, according to modern scientific theory, the relation established between the sun and moon and stars, on one side, and the earth upon the other. The atmosphere cleared, by the condensation of the seas, of its former perpetual clouds, allows the rays of these bodies to come in upon the thin crust of the earth; and the sun's heat becomes, according to Peirce's acute observation on the direction of mountain ranges and coast-lines on the globe, the efficient

cause determining the form of the more fully developed continents, and a perpetual witness that the obliquity of the ecliptic, and the main relations of the solar system, have not been changed since the birth of time,—since God established them on the fourth day of creation.

The fifth and sixth day's work prove, also, according to the modern discoveries of geology, to have been not only natural steps in the progress of the seer's thought, but actual steps in the order of terrestrial development. The sea was first filled with living things, swimming in its depths or flying over it, and afterward came the land animals, and as the crown of the series came man. Nay, even the seventh day's rest stands approved by the results of modern investigation, for not a trace of progress or development, or of the appearance of new forms upon the earth, can be found by the most ardent evolutionist in any rock-records since the appearance of man upon the planet,—a fact which a firm believer in development endeavored once to explain to us, by assuming that the development of all the lower orders was arrested by the presence of man as the head of the series. Sweep man from the planet, he said, and the development would again go on till man were reproduced. We may be excused for thinking the first chapter of Genesis more rational than such a speculation.

Again, this chapter may bear, as another secondary meaning, an interpretation which makes it an answer, in advance, to all the subterfuges of an atheistic or an idolatrous heart. In this light it might almost seem that the prophet had foreseen all the various speculations in which men would indulge concerning the origin of the universe, and had said, "I will anticipate them all, and in my declaration of the being of the one Almighty God, I will show to all those who deny him and turn from him, that I foresaw their errors, and lifted up my voice in the beginning to warn them from the paths that lead to destruction." "The fool hath said in his heart," there is no God,—matter is eternal, all things move on by the forces inherent in the original substance of which all is

composed. Against this oldest form of atheistic speculation comes the clear announcement, "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth"—created the very material of which they are made, and it was from his command that the forces of nature sprang. The atoms thereof are in his hand to all generations, and they never disobey his word. And the next utterances are against the oldest forms of idolatry. Jupiter, the æther, the air, have been confounded with each other and regarded as the givers of rain and of fruitful seasons, and worshipped with sacrifices of thanksgiving and supplications for continued prosperity. But, says our prophet in advance, it was God who created the firmament, and when the clouds drop fatness, it is at his command; that is, it is of his foreordaining law. Give your thanks to him who can hear and accept the offering; give them not to the unconscious creatures of his power. The earth, also, has been worshipped as the mother of all things; her divine bounty is manifest in the fruits that she pours forth; and, under various names, Terra and Cybele have received thanks and sacrifices. As if foreseeing this future idolatry, the first chapter of Genesis announces that it was God, the Creator of the earth, who gave her her power of bringing forth grass and herb and tree for the service of man, and that it is to him alone that we should give thanks for all these mercies.

Most plausible among the forms of idolatry is the worship of the heavenly host. Men who beheld the sun shining, and the moon walking in brightness, have been secretly enticed, and they have yielded to the persuasion that these were indeed gods. All literature, all mythology, is full of traces left by this worship of the stars of heaven. But in the earliest age of the world is this clear truth uttered, to forbid every future form of the worship of the sun and stars, that it was God who created them and appointed their revolutions in the sky, to mark our days and months and years, our seasons and our hours, for us; that the grand host of heaven is, after all, only one of God's gifts to man.

Other men have been seduced by the mystery of animal

life into the idolatrous worship of bulls and rams, of crocodiles and cats and ibises; and these, too, among nations of the highest of ancient civilizations. And it might seem that this was one of the reasons why the prophet commissioned so long before Moses to proclaim the unity and omnipotence of God, should, foreseeing this foul apostasy, leave it clearly on record that men had been warned against this criminal folly, and had been distinctly taught that the life in these animals is but the gift of the one God, who made all these creatures, not as objects of human worship, but for human uses; that God has given to man complete dominion over all sublunary things — given him a grant to use for his own purposes all things below, animate and inanimate.

But the human heart is deceitful above all things and desperately wicked, who can know it, who shall anticipate all its errors? The crude atheism of the materialist passes away, the various forms of fetichism and idolatry are outgrown, and a highly cultivated, and speculative nation begins to inquire into the foundations of faith. They behold the science of their times, seeking the causes of outward phenomena, gradually lead to the perception of a unity in the forces of nature — to the perception that there is, indeed, but one Cause of the universe. By what name shall they speak of this one Original Cause of all causes? It is evident that no human intellect can understand this Cause, and by searching find out the Almighty, or tell out his wonders. Some, in their contemplation of this insoluble mystery are moved to declare that the First Cause is wholly unknown and unknowable, and that we can predicate of it no attributes whatever; and here they would have us rest. Others would say that the First Cause builds the universe, as the soul of an animal builds its body — it is a principle or power of growth, evolving itself ever in more and more complex forms, by a necessity of its own nature, and herein lies the insoluble mystery presented to our speculations. Others add that this soul of the universe, struggling out of brute matter into vegetable forms, struggling with more energy into the bodies

of the animal kingdom, working ever upward and climbing for something higher, reaches its fullest development in the human frame, and attains self-consciousness first in man's brain. According to this view an honest man is, not only the noblest work of God, but is himself the highest god that has yet come into being. Such is the extreme into which the conceited human intellect runs, in endeavoring to reason concerning the nature of the Deity. In the full-blown state of this egotheism a man becomes conscious of himself as being identical with the First Cause of all things; and may think of himself as causing plants to grow, and rain to fall, of leading the march of the hosts of heaven, and calling the stars to their posts of duty. Strange as this folly may seem to the ears of common sense, it passes for wisdom and high philosophy among some highly cultivated and very acute metaphysical thinkers.

To us it seems sadder than atheism; it just as effectually takes the sun out of heaven, and puts an immoveable rock over the mouth of the sepulchre; it takes all the light of love and joy out of human life, and substitutes this insane self-conceit for filial and fraternal love. We recoil with horror from these conclusions concerning the nature of the universe and the soul, and say, the First Cause is greater than all which he has made; inscrutable in his attributes though he be, those attributes must include power and wisdom and love, for the universe contains them and their manifestations; the world is the embodiment of wisdom and love through power; and the only power we know is the power of will. The answer to which our reason thus attains is simply the truth which the first chapter of Genesis was written to announce, that there is one God, whose fiat is the cause of all that is. But mark how the eye of the prophet who wrote it seems to have pierced through the long ages of idolatry in every form, and through the misty clouds of speculation which have arisen since the seventeenth century, and detected this pernicious outgrowth of the Hegelian philosophy in our time, and uttered, fifty centuries in advance, his protest

against the blasphemous folly; saying, that creation was a voluntary act of God, and that he, of his own pleasure, created man in his own image. We are not the creators of God, the highest conscious beings, and alone in our knowledge of the laws of the universe; but we are the creatures of God, made in his image, gifted with power of thought to apprehend partially his designs; with affections to feel feebly what his love is; with power that we may, in our works of labor and art, rise into awe at his omnipotence. Our powers are faint images of his, not his the weak dilution of ours.

Finally, the announcement of the seventh day's rest may be considered as a caveat against the atheism referred to in the Epistle of James, and drawn from a consideration of the unvarying constancy of the operations of nature. All things seem capable finally of reduction to constant laws of periodic return to their former condition, giving thus a suggestion that the universe may be eternal, and undergoing an eternal series of evolutions from some necessity inherent in its nature. If, in the olden days God created the things that now appear, why do we not see him now creating, at least occasionally, some things. No act of creation has ever been observed; the law of secondary causation is unbroken; each state of the universe flows directly from a previous state; thus it will be forever; thus it has been from eternity; and "there is no occasion for the hypothesis of a Deity." The prophet, foreseeing, apparently, this form of atheism, meets it in advance, by saying, God rested on the seventh day,—he voluntarily ceased from acts of creation, for reasons of his own, which we may not fathom. Yet, as he pronounced creation very good, that is, useful in the highest degree, it is lawful for us to observe that a creation in which miracles are of rare occurrence, and the usual course of events, flowing from strictly invariable laws, is very seldom broken, is far better adapted as a school in which to develop the mind and the soul of man, than a creation could be in which miracle was too frequent. The sublime lessons given by the laws of the universe have been the means of all the development which

has brought the light of the nineteenth century out of the darkness of preceding ages ; those laws are not yet exhausted ; the progress of discovery is, indeed, more rapid now than ever before ; but all scientific study of the order of the physical universe is necessarily based on faith in the inviolability of physical law. The rest of God's seventh day has thus become the source of all the intellectual and spiritual blessings that exalt man above the beasts ; while the benefits of the first six days' work are shared by us with the mute creatures.

This then, in brief, is the exposition given by Professor Peirce to the first chapter of Genesis. The hypothesis that it is an express revelation from God, the utterance of truth by a prophet who spake with a wisdom above the reach of human endeavor, is absolutely required to explain the combination of so much knowledge of modern discoveries and modern speculations with the self-evident fact of its extreme antiquity. That antiquity is avouched to us by the language, which although treating of the highest possible themes, is neither poetical nor philosophical, but simply descriptive of phenomena, as they appear to the uneducated eye. That knowledge of human science and human philosophy, in their latest development, is shown by the order of time in which the events are arranged — in making motion the beginning of creation, and light the first effect of motion ; in making the earth covered with plants before the sun and planets, of still earlier creation, were visible from its surface ; in making animals subsequent to plants ; in making man the last comer upon the planet ; and in making a distinct denial of every form of pantheistic and of atheistic theory, down to our own day. Its primary object is not to describe the times or places or succession of the acts of creative power, but would simply lead us to bow in grateful adoration before the one God, whose will is the cause of all that is, and whose loving-kindness, looking upon the whole, pronounced it very good — all adapted for beneficent ends to the creatures whom he had made in his own image.

ARTICLE IV.

ASSYRIAN AND BABYLONIAN MONUMENTS IN AMERICA.¹

BY REV. SELAH MERRILL, ANDOVER, MASS.

I SHALL cast reflections upon no one if I speak of the ignorance which prevails in our country in regard to these monuments, even among our learned men, to say nothing of the mass of ordinary intelligent readers. Outside of a very limited number, I may say that the ignorance is total, both in regard to what monuments we have and to what they reveal, and as to their place in history. A writer in one of our prominent Quarterlies no longer ago than April, 1874,² speaking of these slabs, says: "In our country there is a small collection at Amherst and at Williams Colleges, and in the New York Historical Society's Museum, but not one has been edited or translated." And in May, 1874, an able literary critic, in the columns of a leading religious journal, stated, speaking of the cuneiform inscriptions in this country: "The material in the colleges of this country still waits for its interpreter, even among the fellows of the Oriental and Philological Societies." The paper was the *Christian Register*, and the critic "B." who is a member of both the societies he has mentioned. I need not produce further evidence to show the need of such a paper as this which I now present.

In consequence of the ignorance just referred to, there

¹ The author desires to state that two only of the museums mentioned in this Article he was unable to visit, viz. those of the Theological Seminary of Virginia, and the Mercantile Library of St. Louis, Missouri. Competent persons, however, furnished minute details of the relics at these places, so that their peculiarities are incorporated under the proper titles throughout the Article. It may be stated also that this paper was read before the American Oriental Society, at its session in New York, Oct. 28th and 29th, 1874, and is published at the request of several of its members.

² Baptist Quarterly, p. 203.

is a lack of general interest in this subject, and even a disposition on the part of some to slight it; for in pursuing my investigations, I am constantly met with the questions, "Do you find any thing important?" "Do these inscriptions amount to anything?" The persons who ask such questions — and in some cases they have been persons of prominence in the literary world — cannot appreciate the labors of the archaeologist or the antiquarian. That patient, plodding spirit, which is content to glean on the most barren field that has been trod by our fellow-men in the past, which is thankful for even the smallest hints which shed light on some ancient epoch or people, cannot by its labors satisfy the prevailing spirit of our times, which demands something startling — a gigantic scandal, or defalcation perhaps — before it will consent to listen to any speaker. But the antiquarian knows that the slightest hint, the smallest relic, or even a fragment of an inscription, may be of the greatest importance in reconstructing the past.

THE FIELD NOT A BARREN ONE.

In proposing to give an account of the Assyrian and Babylonian monuments in America, it might seem that we were attempting to labor in a barren field; but because the number of these monuments is not large, is no reason why we should neglect to study and appreciate such as we have. But the field is more promising than would appear to one whose attention has not been specially called to it. Poor as we are in treasures of this kind, compared with those which the British Museum possesses, we still have slabs enough, to say nothing of bricks and smaller relics, to panel or wainscot a wall two hundred and seventy feet in continuous length, and the height of this wainscoting would be for almost the entire distance nearly eight feet. This is the result of actual measurements. Then the cost of these relics has been by no means trifling; but amounts, as nearly as I have been able to collect the facts, to between eight thousand and ten thousand dollars, probably nearer the latter than the former. These relics

have been brought to this country at intervals between the years 1850 and 1860 ; Williams College receiving the first in 1851, which were sent in 1850, and the last lot coming in 1860 for Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Maine, and the Theological Seminary of Virginia. The large slab at Andover was received in this year also. Again, the popular impression is, that Dr. Lobdell, missionary of the A. B. C. F. M. at Mosul, obtained and forwarded all, or nearly all, of these relics ; but the fact is, that six other missionaries were nearly or quite as much interested, and as active in this work as Dr. Lobdell.

WHERE THESE MONUMENTS ARE TO BE FOUND.

The following institutions and private cabinets are the places where these Assyrian monuments are now to be found. I hope the list is complete ; but should any person know of such relics in places not mentioned here, I shall consider it a great favor, if he will take pains to communicate the fact to me. The Theological Seminary at Andover, Mass. ; Amherst College at Amherst, Mass. ; Williams College at Williamstown, Mass. ; Union College at Schenectady, N. Y. ; the Theological Seminary at Auburn, N. Y. ; Yale College at New Haven, Ct. ; the Connecticut Historical Society at Hartford, Ct. ; the private cabinet of Rev. Daniel A. Goodsell of Meriden, Ct. ; the New York Historical Society at New York ; the Theological Seminary of Virginia ; Middlebury College at Middlebury, Vt. ; Dartmouth College at Hanover, N. H. ; Bowdoin College at Brunswick, Me. ; and the Mercantile Library Association at St. Louis, Mo.

THE NUMBER AT EACH PLACE, AND BY WHOM OBTAINED.

It may be of interest to notice the number of slabs and bricks at each place in the order of their arrival, and to mention the missionaries who were specially instrumental in sending them. Williams has three slabs and two bricks. These came at two different times. The first, two of them, were shipped in 1850, and were received in 1851. The rest

were shipped in 1855, and reached here in 1856. They were all obtained by Rev. Dwight W. Marsh, missionary of the A. B. C. F. M. at Mosul, and the two first are interesting from the fact that they are the only slabs ever presented to an American by Mr. Layard. This fact is emphasized for the reason that at Amherst there is an impression that their slabs were received the first of any in this country, and it has even been stated by Professor Tyler that they were presented to Mr. Lodbell by Mr. Layard, both of which impressions are wrong. Mr. Marsh was the only American at Mosul from 1850 to 1851. Mr. Lodbell reached Mosul in May 1852. In the winter of 1852-53 Mr. Layard was in England, and Mr. Lodbell did not even visit the mounds till March 1853, when he selected the first instalment for Amherst. All the slabs which Mr. Lodbell sent, and in fact most of those which have been sent to this country, except the two presented by Mr. Layard, as just mentioned, and excepting perhaps those latest received, were presented to the missionaries by Mr. Rawlinson, Consul and English Resident at Bagdad, also spoken of as Major, Colonel, and at last as Sir Henry Rawlinson, as he is at present known. It is pleasant to know that Mr. Marsh speaks in the most cordial manner of the courtesies shown him by both Mr. Layard and Mr. Rawlinson.

The second lot were presented to the missionaries in 1853 by Mr. Rawlinson, and reached this country in 1854. They went to Yale, Union, and Amherst. This was Amherst's first instalment. Rev. W. F. Williams was chiefly instrumental in getting them, originally designing them for Yale and Union alone. In a letter to Dr. Leonard Bacon, dated June 15, 1853, Mr. Williams says: "Dr. Lodbell, on behalf of Amherst, rather insisted upon having an equal chance with Yale and Union. We, of course, could not go to the mounds as rival claimants We brought away six slabs, and divided them into three lots, as equally as we could, and then I chose first for Yale, second for Union, and the third went to Amherst." Yale has two large slabs, two small ones, two bricks, and besides these there are four small,

broken slabs, in boxes, which have never been mounted; these last were the gift of Mrs. Charles N. Allen, of New Haven, Ct. Yale has also a miscellaneous collection of seals and minor relics. Union has two large slabs, one small one, and six bricks.

The third lot reached this country in 1856. They went to Williams, Amherst, St. Louis, Dartmouth, and Hartford. It was in this year that the collection at Williams was completed, as we have already stated, and also that at Amherst. It seems that Dr. Austin H. Wright solicited Mr. Rawlinson for certain slabs for Dartmouth. Under date of Feb. 13, 1854, Rev. W. F. Williams writes: "Colonel Rawlinson has been up, and has given us eighteen slabs, six of them for Dr. Wright [who had previously solicited them] for Dartmouth, if he wants so many." It is this third lot that Mr. Marsh alludes to, when he speaks of certain slabs which "were given to us Americans by Consul Rawlinson, English Resident at Bagdad, who gave equal shares to Dr. Lobdell, Mr. Williams, and myself"; of course, he means those which remained after the six for Dartmouth had been deducted. It is the packing of these slabs which Dr. Lobdell speaks of as superintending, under date of Dec. 29, 1854. In this letter he speaks of six slabs which belonged to Dr. Wright, and which were designed for Dartmouth and the University of Virginia.¹ But we have found, upon inquiry, that the University of Virginia has no slab, and it is probable they were all sent to Dartmouth. In February, 1855, Dr. Lobdell, who was then in failing health, was busy getting the boxes of slabs and bricks ready to be shipped. This was almost the last work which he did; for he died the next month, i.e. in March. Mr. Marsh states that "none of these slabs left Mosul till the summer of 1855." Amherst has, in all, five large slabs and one small one, six bricks, besides a lot of fragments of pottery, broken pieces of stucco cornices, many of which have Babylonian characters upon them, and a variety of minor relics, of which I shall speak hereafter.

¹ See his Memoir, p. 359.

Dartmouth has six large slabs, one small one, two bricks, and one fragment of pottery. Auburn has one large slab, which was sent by Rev. W. F. Williams, and was received in 1857. Middlebury has one large slab, which was obtained and sent by Rev. Wilson A. Farnsworth, a missionary, in 1858. My informant states that it was "sent" then, but does not state when it was received. The Theological Seminary of Virginia has three large slabs. Bowdoin has four large slabs and one small one. These last two lots were obtained and sent by Dr. H. B. Haskell, a missionary physician at Mosul, and reached this country in 1860. The custodian of the New York Historical Society's rooms informed me that their collection "was shipped to Boston, and bought and presented to the society by Mr. James Lenox, in the year 1859 or 1860." Their collection consists of twelve large slabs. Andover Theological Seminary has one large slab and one quite small one. The latter was presented by Rev. Leonard W. Bacon, on his return from his visit to the East, which he made with his father, Dr. Leonard Bacon, in 1851. The large one was obtained and sent by Rev. W. F. Williams, in 185—, and was received at Andover in 1860. Rev. Sylvester D. Storrs, now residing at Quindaro, Kansas, asked Mr. Williams to get it for a college in that state. The slab was shipped by Mr. Williams, accordingly; but on arriving in this country it was transferred by Mr. Storrs to Andover, the seminary at which he graduated. There is, besides those already mentioned, a small slab, in the possession of Rev. Daniel A. Goodsell, of Meriden, Ct., which deserves special notice, from the fact that it belonged to Dr. Lobdell's mother. Dr. Lobdell told his mother that he sawed it with his own hands. After his death, his mother presented the slab to Mr. Goodsell as a special token of friendship, and because Mr. Goodsell, she said, could take better care of it than she could herself.

It will thus be seen that in fourteen (fifteen, if we count that of Mr. Edgel of St. Louis, see farther on) of the museums and private cabinets of our country there are to be

found these Assyrian and Babylonian relics. There are, in all, forty-two large slabs and thirteen small ones, making a total of fifty-five. The slabs all have inscriptions, except in the case of two or three of the smaller ones. There are also in this country twenty-two bricks, distributed as follows: Amherst, six; Williams, two; Union, six; Yale, two; Dartmouth, four; Hartford, two. All these bricks, except three, bear inscriptions. There is but one Babylonian brick in the country, and that is in the possession of Amherst College. Two or three of these bricks came from Koyunjik, while all the rest, except, of course, the Babylonian brick, came from the ruins at Nimrud. From these ruins came also all the slabs which we possess. They all bear the same inscription; but in the case of some of the smaller slabs, only a few fragments of the inscription appear. These slabs all belong to the reign of Assur-nazir-pal, who reigned from B.C. 883 to B.C. 859. The earlier date, formerly assigned as the period of this king's reign, is wrong. Perhaps Dr. Oppert is the only respectable Assyriologist who now holds that view, and a few hours examination of the slabs in the British Museum would no doubt convince him of his error.

HOW THE SLABS WERE BROUGHT TO THIS COUNTRY.

It will serve to give completeness to this paper, if a brief statement is made in regard to the manner of shipping these slabs. As they stood in their original places as panelling to the walls of palaces, they were from twelve to eighteen inches in thickness. Mr. Layard states, that they "rarely exceed twelve feet in height; and in the earliest palace of Nimrud, were generally little more than nine; whilst the human-headed lions and bulls, forming the doorways, vary from ten to sixteen feet."¹ Some of the slabs, Mr. Layard states, were twelve feet high and twelve feet wide, forming a block of stone not easy to handle. But the usual width was from six to eight feet. The missionaries had them cut into sections, and also divided laterally, thus reducing the

¹ Nineveh and its Remains, ii. p. 203 (American edition).

length by one to two feet, and the thickness from twelve or eighteen inches, to four or six. But the slabs, besides being cut into sections, have, nearly all of them, been badly broken in the process of removal to this country, and some of them exist now in ten, fifteen, and even twenty, fragments. In their present state Assur-nazir-pal would, no doubt, have rejected the whole as rubbish; while we consider that, mutilated as they are, they adorn the walls of our museums.

Rev. W. F. Williams, writing to Dr. Bacon under date of June 15, 1853, speaks of packing these slabs in wool which cost three cents a pound, and remarks: "I guess it will sell for that in Connecticut." Most of the earlier shipments were by camels to Aleppo and the Mediterranean, while some of the later, certainly those sent to Bowdoin and the Theological Seminary of Virginia, were sent *via* the Tigris and the Persian Gulf and Bombay.

I ought to state, that although the slabs have been cut and broken into so many pieces, they have been fitted together, and mended tolerably well; and I have observed that not only have the seams been cemented, but in a multitude of cases the letters also have been carefully puttied up. The only exception are the slabs in the New York Historical Society's Rooms. These have been simply set up in position, but the seams and broken places have not been patched or cemented at all.

THE KIND OF STONE USED FOR THESE SCULPTURES.

The kind of stone most in use for these sculptures was gypsum. It is chiefly of a grayish color, shading slightly towards the darker in some cases, and in others towards the lighter colors. Mr. Layard speaks of a coarse kind of alabaster with which the plains of Mesopotamia, as well as the low lands between the Tigris and the hill country, abound.¹ Mr. George Rawlinson speaks of "a soft gray alabaster which abounds on the left bank of the Tigris, and which is easily cut into slabs, and forms an excellent material for the

¹ Nineveh and its Remains, ii. p. 201.

sculptor.”¹ Elsewhere he speaks of “the delicate alabaster used for bas-reliefs.”² Lenormant makes a statement to the same effect.³ Dr. Lobdell, in his *Memoir* (p. 359), states that the material most in use was gypsum, and in this he is doubtless correct. The only point I raise here, is in regard to the material of a few of the slabs, whose prevailing color is a dirty white, which is very much mottled with greenish and yellowish spots; and instead of calling this alabaster I would call it talco-steatite. It is very soft, and evidently did not work well, and comparatively but little of it was used. It has not borne exposure and time at all well, and the sculptures and inscriptions upon stones of this material are the most imperfect of any. It is my impression that alabaster would endure time and exposure, while exactly the results observed would be produced if talco-steatite were used; but upon this point I only make a suggestion, and do not pretend to speak as a scientific man. A few of the smaller slabs are marble, such as the one in the show-case at Andover.

THE LESSONS OF THE MONUMENTS.

I propose to give, with some detail, the lessons which merely the monuments above noticed give us in regard to Assyrian art and life. Let us take a representative slab and see what we find upon it. In the centre is a colossal human figure, with a noble, expressive face, with muscles finely developed, the form quite erect, giving the impression of intelligence combined with great physical strength and powers of endurance. In front of the figure is half a vine on the edge of the slab, and the same is true of the edge behind him. He has a pair of double wings; two hang down the back from the shoulders, but are slightly raised from the body, while the points of the others rise perpendicularly from the shoulders. Then he has a head-dress which has two, and often three, horns in front. Then he has a cord which passes about the forehead and above the ears, which cord is tied behind the

¹ *Ancient Monarchies*, i. p. 219 (edition in 3 vols.).

² *Ibid.* i. p. 337.

³ *Ancient History*, i. p. 457.

head, and the ends of it fall upon the neck; this cord is often adorned with large rosettes; the hair hangs in a massive mat upon the shoulders; the beard is heavy and curled, and the mustache always close-cut, leaving the lips free, unlike the modern French mustache, which is both inconvenient when eating, and prevents distinct articulation in speaking. The fore-arm is always bare. In one hand he holds at his side a basket, and in the other, which is raised to the vine already mentioned, he holds a cone of some sort,—sometimes this hand, which here holds the cone, is merely held up, with the fingers extended. About his waist he has a belt in which are two, but more commonly three, daggers; these are in sheaths, of which both the handles and the points appear; the points of the sheaths are sometimes embroidered; the handles of the daggers are often ornamented in a variety of ways, sometimes chased, and sometimes with heads of horses or other animals. About his arms above the elbows are arm-bands; the ends of these always pass each other, showing that they were of one piece and elastic; the ends are chased and figured in many ways,—sometimes the four ends of the two bands on the same person are all different in their ornamentation. On his wrists are heavy bracelets, which are also of various patterns. Then the figures have invariably ear-rings and necklaces; the ear-rings are of different styles, one or more of which are in use at the present day; the necklaces seem to be heavy and rich; some are single, and some have a double row of what appear to be pearls; on some of the figures the necklace is light, and tied in a delicate bow in front. Then the figure has on a long robe, which reaches to the feet. About the middle is a cord or sash, which is tied, the ends hanging to the feet and terminating in long heavy tassels; these ends, before they reach the feet, are often looped up in a showy way. The edge of the robe is sometimes folded back; on the edge is a heavy fringe, and also all round the bottom of it, above the feet; back of, or above the fringe, is a belt of embroidery, where appear all sorts of devices—trees, shrubs,

fruit, men, animals, battle-scenes, and a great many other things, which represent needlework. On some of the robes, this belt of embroidery has a pattern something like the Greek square; the space is divided into squares, and inside of each of these are smaller ones, in regular gradation, so that the space is filled with squares of different sizes, each separate from every other. The feet are always protected with sandals; they are bound to the feet with cords or straps. On some of the slabs the sandals are painted black, while the soles are red; these colors, although applied more than eight centuries and a half before Christ, are perfectly distinct at the present time. Most of the figures have a heavy curl, ten or twelve inches in length, hanging down the shoulders, and, in one or two cases, there are three of these curls. The variety of styles in the ear-rings is remarkable: on the few slabs we are here noticing, there are five or six different styles, and some of these differ from any that Mr. Layard has given. Then the variety in the needlework, can hardly be exaggerated. This is true especially of some of the rich robes worn by the royal eunuchs.

On some slabs is represented a hunter. His robe is bound more tightly about him. His cap is also different from that already described, being in the shape of a flat-topped Fez cap. He has a bow in one hand, one end of which rests on the ground; the end grasped by the hand is often figured with the head of some bird or beast. In the other hand is frequently a flat bowl, resting on the extended fingers. On one slab, at Bowdoin, is a king in his hunting costume, and behind him are two eunuchs, holding over the king's head a parasol; while in front of the king, and facing him, is a figure with his right hand raised and extended over the king's head, while in his left hand he holds loosely the ends of the sash which is about him. The figures which hold a basket almost always, and perhaps always, hold it with the left hand; the right holds the cone. Sometimes the right hand is raised and extended, as if the person were praying for some blessing; sometimes the left holds a twig with five

or six leaves, and the right is raised and extended, as just described. In one case the right hand holds a six-leaved twig, and the left holds a mace, which is carried horizontally. Two other maces are represented, and each is of a different pattern from the rest.

In regard to the eunuchs, they have always full fleshy faces, but are by no means gross in appearance. Their robes fit closely about the limbs, but are remarkable for the amount of needlework displayed upon them; they appear to be more richly and elaborately wrought even than those worn by the king. This statement should perhaps be limited to their dress when attending the king, where he appears in his hunting costume, as if about to start for the chase. Sometimes they appear as attendants to carry weapons; on the shoulders is a bow, and they also carry, suspended by a strap from the shoulders, a quiver, which is full of arrows. Some of the figures are eagle-headed; and some of these eagle-heads are crested. In the case of these sculptures, the ear-rings of course are omitted; but beginning with the necklace, they have all the variety of personal ornaments which the ordinary figures have. Figures of this kind are commonly thought to represent the deity Nisroch. It is not for me to decide either for or against this theory; but towards elucidating the true theory, I have one or two suggestions to make. In the first place these eagle-headed figures are doing just what those which represent human beings are doing. In the second place their dress is such, it seems to me, as entirely to preclude the idea, of their being made to represent any deity. We can conceive of a deity making use of a bow, but what would a deity belonging to a severe, literal, non-ideal people, like the Assyrians, want of a bracelet and neckties? And such a necktie! dainty and diminutive enough to satisfy the pride and taste of a boarding school miss, or a sophomore, whose dress is faultless in his own eyes. It seems as if the practical Assyrians would not dress a deity in such a way.¹

¹ It is a singular coincidence that Ezekiel (xvii. 3) should represent the King of Babylon under the symbol of "A great eagle with great wings, long-winged,

On some of the slabs the vine which has been mentioned is omitted entirely; on others it appears only in front, and again only behind the figure.

In two or three cases we find on some of the smaller slabs, a figure kneeling. The dress is peculiar; it is a robe which fits tightly, and descends to the feet; it appears to be made of coarsely-ribbed material, and hangs in folds, of which there are five in number. In these figures the right hand is supporting a bunch of the leaves of the vine already mentioned, before which it is kneeling; while the left is resting lightly upon the same cluster of leaves, and above it. In one figure I noticed that the belt above the fringe of the robe was divided into squares, as if the intention was to fill these with smaller squares. Possibly this was not the intention; these squares may have been simply another variety of ornamentation by needle-work.

WHERE THE FINEST SLABS ARE FOUND.

If it is of any importance, I would like to indicate where the finest slabs are to be found. The one marked No. 3 (if my notes are correct), at Amherst, I would notice as remarkably beautiful. Also one of the slabs at Yale, and especially the "eunuch," at Dartmouth, and the slabs at Union, all deserve to be mentioned for their beauty and excellence. At Bowdoin also, there is one slab which exhibits superior workmanship. Some of these slabs are remarkable for the richness of the robes which the figures wear, and especially for the extravagance, both in quantity and variety, of the needlework upon them. Bowdoin has two slabs unlike any others in the country. One consists of a group of four figures; the king in his hunting-dress; behind him two eunuchs, holding over the king's head a parasol; in front of the king, and facing him, a figure with the hand extended over the king, as if pronouncing a blessing upon him. The other is a long, narrow slab, with two figures, one full of feathers, which had divers colors [marg. embroidering]." It seems not improbable that these eagle-headed figures on the slabs suggested the symbol and parable here referred to.

of which is a hunter. The faces of both figures are badly mutilated. Then the inscription begins at the top, and is written in letters of enormous size. The lines are two inches apart, and the letters are as tall as the lines are wide.

The New York Historical Society has one slab which must be specially mentioned. It is a large slab, and nearly or quite eight feet high. Running through the centre is a broad belt of inscription, which belt serves to divide the slab into two sections, an upper and a lower. On the extreme left of the upper section, as one faces the slab, is a complete vine. Near the centre of the remaining portion of this section is another perfect vine. On each side of this last vine, and facing it, are two kneeling figures, such as have been already described (the kneeling figures at Union and Yale must have formed the upper section of such a slab); then in the lower section there is the complete vine to the extreme left. In the centre of the remaining portion is also a perfect vine, and on each side of it, and facing the vine, are two eagle-headed figures, each with the cone in one hand and the basket in the other; these two last figures, supposing, with some, that they represent deities, must be worldly-minded, for they have all the personal ornaments that the most fashionable Assyrian could desire. The small eagle-headed figure at Amherst, with the one at Yale, would form the lower section of a slab of this description. In a glass case at Hartford is a small slab without inscription, but interesting from the sculptures upon it. It has five figures all facing the right; the two foremost appear to be female captives; they have long hair, full and very fair faces, and each has something in the left hand. Behind them are three warriors with bows and quivers. There is no other sculpture like this in the country.

SMALLER OBJECTS.

Among the smaller objects, I would call attention to a human figure at Amherst, about seven inches long, which has no head; his right arm hangs by his side, his left is bent so that the hand is on a level with the chest; in this he holds a

dish full of fruit, very much like the large glass fruit-dishes which stand upon our tables. The figure has the belt and one dagger, and the left wrist has a bracelet; at its left side was originally some object like a human head; but the whole figure or group is much mutilated. Then at Amherst also, there is a great variety of small articles—seals, cylinders, rings, fragments of stucco-work and of marble, fragments of clay tablets, etc. These fragments came, probably, from Babylon, as many of them have Babylonian letters, or fragments of letters, upon them. It is possible from them all to make out twenty or thirty syllables, perhaps; but in no case a connected sentence, so far as I observed.¹ At Hartford there is the bottom of an earthen jar, which Mr. Marsh brought from Koyunjik; the material is burnt earthenware, and the diameter is about three inches and a half. At Yale also, there is a miscellaneous collection of gems, seals, cylinders, part of a bracelet, and other small relics. It is not certain that they are all Assyrian. One of the seals has characters upon it which I am unable to read. Most of them were procured of Rev. J. H. Shedd, in 1871. Allow me to say that when I have made farther progress in Assyrian studies, I propose to re-examine the seals, cylinders, and smaller relics which are found at Yale and Amherst.—After this Article was prepared a note was received from Mr. George S. Edgel of St. Louis, Mo., stating that he has in his cabinet “a piece of a jar” and “a small alabaster slab,” which were presented by Mr. Marsh at the same time that he sent the large slab, namely in 1855, reaching here in 1856.

THE INSCRIPTIONS THEMSELVES.

A word must be said in regard to the inscriptions themselves, and the chisel-work upon the slabs. On a large slab the inscription is usually in nineteen lines. Here the letters are well made, and are not crowded. It is, no doubt, well

¹ Some important corrections could be made in the account of what the “Nineveh Gallery” at Amherst contains, which is found in the Memoir of Dr. Lobdell, pp. 362, 363.

understood that the sculpture was first made, and the inscription cut across the slab like a belt subsequently. On the narrower slabs the number of lines runs up to twenty-six. But we find them of sixteen, seventeen, eighteen, nineteen, twenty, twenty-two, twenty-six, and twenty-seven lines. On the narrower slabs the letters are apt to be crowded. In many cases the fringe on the robe is skipped, which would necessitate the letters being crowded more, and would also increase the number of lines. I have already spoken of the inscription in large letters on one of the slabs at Bowdoin. It is hardly possible to exaggerate the effect upon one, of those wide lines and enormous letters. Two or three lines of this inscription were omitted. The lines were marked; but the inscription was never completed. A similar omission is noticeable on one of the slabs at Dartmouth. And several of the inscriptions, as the slabs now are, are incomplete. On one of the sculptures at Bowdoin the calf of the leg stands out quite prominently, and on this are nicely cut certain cuneiform characters. This may have been done to relieve the eye, or possibly merely as the sport of some workman. On one of the slabs at Williams the inscription began on the edge. We have already stated the thickness of the slabs, which would leave an edge twelve or eighteen inches wide, and in this particular case the inscription began on this edge; the slab having been cut laterally, the inscription as now found does not, of course, begin at the beginning. This slab, doubtless, stood at some doorway, or at the corner of some hall, where the edge would be exposed, and hence it was covered with the inscription.

The talco-steatite (or soft alabaster, if it is such) evidently was not considered good material for sculpture. This stone would not allow needlework, and consequently there is noticeable on the slabs of this material the absence of delicate work of every kind. Besides, this material would not stand time and exposure well. I noticed on one of the slabs at Dartmouth that all of one side was left unfinished. There were marks of the workman's chisels, which appear to have

been both narrow and keen, so that the cuttings were as smooth as the marks of a sharp instrument upon a cheese. In one case, another sort of instrument had been applied, evidently preparatory to the work of polishing. The instrument was a pointed one, which, being driven against the surface repeatedly, left the place to be polished full of little holes resembling the pores of the skin under a strong magnifying-glass.

SUMMARY OF WHAT THE SLABS REPRESENT.

A recapitulation of what is found upon the slabs may not be out of place. We find the ear-rings of several different styles; the necklaces single and double; the neckties, the bracelets, and arm-bands variously ornamented; then several styles of hat or head-dress; the horns and rosettes upon them; the robe, with its fringe and rich embroidery; the sash or cord and tassels; the curl back of the shoulders; the sandals, with their fastenings, and the black and red paint upon them; the belt, with its daggers; the sword, with its sheath; two or three styles of maces; the bow, the quiver, and the arrows; the eagle head, sometimes crested; the manly beard, and the smooth face of the eunuch; the parasol; the baskets of two or three styles; the vine; the manly form of the king; the king prepared for the chase; the attending eunuchs; the priest in the act of blessing; the kneeling figures; the figure with hand raised and extended, as if in prayer; the bowl of wine; the soldiers; and the female captives.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SCULPTURES.

It is noticeable that the prevailing sentiment expressed by these sculptures is that of joy and triumph, mingled with religious devotion. If we had no other means of judging than the few sculptures now brought under review, we should say at once that the Assyrians were a highly religious people. There are the twigs held in one hand, while the other is raised as if in prayer; then the basket in one hand, and the other raised in the same manner. Then we have the kneeling figure, and the hands resting upon the vine, as if

praying or pronouncing a blessing. Then the king as he goes forth to the chase receives the blessing of the priest. Then, again, the king himself appears to offer a libation before he starts out for the chase or battle. The vine, the fruit, the baskets, the wine, the blessing, the praying, all imply devotion, joy, hope, prosperity, and plenty. They were not a gloomy people, either in their religion or their social life. They enjoyed the productions of the earth, and expressed their thankfulness for them in numberless ways.

THE BRICKS IN THIS COUNTRY, AND THEIR INSCRIPTIONS.

We have already said that they were found at Hartford, Yale, Amherst, Williams, Union, and Dartmouth. Amherst has six, five of which are Assyrian, and one is Babylonian. The Babylonian brick is inscribed, and four of the Assyrian bricks have also inscriptions. I have taken pains to measure the bricks, being under the impression that their size is significant. Doubtless they had a reason for making them of a certain size, rather than of a certain other size. Mr. Birch long ago suggested that the size of the bricks may represent multiples of some measure, perhaps the cubit. He was speaking of the Babylonian bricks, of which Mr. Layard says, "The usual dimensions are as nearly as possible one foot square, by three and a half inches thick." Mr. Rich says they are thirteen inches square.¹ The Babylonian brick at Amherst is thirteen inches square by three inches in thickness. The Assyrian bricks, as students are aware, are not of a uniform size. Of those at Amherst, the dimensions are as follows :

No. 1. Length nineteen and a half inches, width nineteen inches, thickness two and a half inches ; No. 2. length fifteen inches, width fifteen inches, thickness five inches ; No. 3. length fifteen inches, width twelve inches at one end, thirteen inches at the other, thickness three and three-fourths inches ; No. 4. length fifteen inches, width seven inches, thickness five inches ; No. 5. is broken at one edge, but the whole width

¹ Nineveh and Babylon, p. 452 note.

was fourteen and a half inches. Its present thickness is about two inches, but it has been sawed apart laterally.

I also took particular pains to ascertain whether they were burnt, or simply sun-dried. I have not found any that appear to be sun-dried. I am not aware that the sun produces all the effects on clay when exposed to its rays that fire produces; and every one of these bricks when probed at all below the surface shows the action of fire. The labels on some of the bricks at Amherst, and, in a few cases, on those in some of the other museums, mark them as "sun-dried," which, upon examination, I think is a mistake.

Then a careful examination of the bricks brings out clearly another fact; namely, in regard to the manner in which the inscriptions were written, and the implements used for that purpose. All students agree, I believe, in the theory that the Babylonian bricks were stamped, so that a single blow with the stamp would make the whole inscription. Mr. Birch thinks that the inscription upon the Assyrian bricks was also made by a stamp, "as the trouble of writing upon each brick would have been endless." But Mr. Layard, whose opportunity for observation was much greater than Mr. Birch's, thinks a triangular style was used. Mr. Layard is, no doubt, correct. The bricks themselves prove as much. The person inscribing the brick could make most of the characters perfectly as he stood before it, without bending his wrist; but in a few cases, in order to make them perfectly, he must have gone around, so as to face the base of the brick. But in every case these characters are not made perfectly. If made with a stamp these would have been as perfect as the rest, but being made with a style their imperfection is easily and naturally accounted for. The person writing, by turning the point of his instrument in towards his body, and then striking, would make an impression exactly like what we find in every case upon these bricks. There are some horizontal strokes made perfectly; but for these the writer may have taken the instrument between his thumb and finger. Nor would the labor be endless as Mr. Birch supposes. Slaves

and boys were numerous ; and a boy, with a little practice, could inscribe one of these bricks with a triangular style, very much quicker than the same number of characters could be made with a pen.

Although the bricks are kiln-burned, yet it is noticeable that they were only slightly burned compared with our own ; and some seem to have been burned less than others. Then, in some cases, I notice that they seem to fall short of the full dimensions ; instead of fifteen inches we have fourteen and a half ; instead of twenty, nineteen and a half ; and it is possible that a mass of clay fifteen or twenty inches square, would shrink in the process of drying and burning so as to account for the discrepancy. I notice that when a brick is made half the size of the large bricks, the width only is altered. A brick fifteen inches square and five inches thick, in the half form would be fifteen inches long, seven and a half inches wide, and five inches thick.

THE INSCRIPTIONS.

They vary in the number of lines. One is of Assur-nazir-pal, and his are invariably of three lines. Three belong to Shalmanzer, Assur-nazir-pal's son, and these invariably cover the entire surface of one side of the brick. The characters are always quite large. Some of Shalmanazer's inscriptions on his bricks consist of seven lines, and others of five, according to the shape of the brick. The inscription of Assur-nazir-pal is generally in the centre ; the lines extending entirely across the brick, with wide margin at the top and bottom. This particular brick of Assur-nazir-pal (at Amherst) has bold lines to guide the writer. The characters are neatly made, as if the brick were to be in an exposed place, where it would meet the eye. This brick was broken into four pieces, and one line was badly defaced. The inscriptions on the other bricks are, for the most part, well preserved. The one which has no inscription is marked on the label as from Koyunjik,—“brick with bituminous cement.” I am in doubt as to the accuracy of this last statement. It is covered with a black

substance which appears to be merely a mixture of ashes and burnt earth, which, being wet, would adhere to the brick. It flakes off, and crumbles to powder in the fingers. Still, it is possible that it may have been bitumen, and been burned.

The seven-line inscriptions read, and are divided into lines as follows :

1. " Shalmanezzer, king great,
2. King mighty, king of nations, king of the country of Assyria,
3. Son of Assur-nazir-pal, king great,
4. King mighty, king of nations, king of the country of Assyria,
5. Son of Tuklat-Adar, king of nations, king of the country of Assyria also,
6. Builder of the ziggurat (i.e. tower)
7. Of the city of Calah."

The inscription in five lines is identical with this ; but is divided as follows :

1. " Shalmanezzer, king great, king mighty,
2. King of nations, king of the country of Assyria, son of Assur-nazir-pal, king great,
3. King mighty, king of nations, king of the country of Assyria, son of Tuklat-Adar,
4. King of nations, king of the country of Assyria also, builder
5. Of the ziggurat (i.e. tower) of the city of Calah."

I have numbered the lines for convenience, though they are not numbered on the bricks. The inscription of Assur-nazir-pal reads and is divided as follows :

1. " Palace of Assur-nazir-pal, king of the country of Assyria,
2. Son of Tuklat-Adar, king of the country of Assyria,
3. Son of Bin-nirari, king of the country of Assyria."

In some cases after the last word in the third line occurs the word "also," or "the same," meaning "the same Assyria."

We have on these slabs four kings of Assyria in the order of their succession ; Bin-nirar, Tuklat-Adar, Assur-nazir-pal, and Shalmanezzer. This was Shalmanezzer II., who reigned B.C. 858 to B.C. 823.¹

Williams has two bricks, both of which bear the seven-line inscription of Shalmanezzer, as given above.

The bricks are fourteen and a half inches square, by four and a half inches in thickness. It is noticeable that one of

¹ See Schrader, *Die Keilinschriften und das Alte Testament*, p. 297.

these bricks — what I have not observed in any other case — has three lines of the inscription on the upper edge of the brick; the inscription then breaks over to the side of the brick, which is covered with the remainder of the inscription.

Union has six bricks; one is not inscribed; one has the three-line inscription of Assur-nazir-pal, and is identical with that at Amherst. Its size is nineteen inches by twenty inches. The uninscribed brick is twenty-three inches square, the largest of all in the country. Of the rest, two of the seven-line bricks are fourteen inches square, by five inches in thickness. One of these has a very old look. Possibly it was in a very exposed place, but the inscription has suffered greatly. The inscription is identical with the seven-line brick at Amherst. One of Shalmanezer's bricks at Union has but six lines (if my notes are correct), but the inscription is the same. The remaining brick here is fourteen and a half inches long, six and a half inches wide, and five and a half inches thick. Here is an instance where the thickness is greater than the usual measure.

Yale has two bricks, both of Shalmanezer. One is fourteen by fifteen inches, and four and a half inches in thickness. The other is fifteen by seven inches, and five inches thick. One is of seven and the other of five lines, and the inscription is the same as that given above.

Dartmouth has three whole bricks and one broken one. Three of the inscriptions are the seven-line inscription of Shalmanezer. One is the three-line inscription of Assur-nazir-pal, but it is remarkable because it is on the edge of the brick, and not on the side. The inscription is identical with that at Amherst. These bricks are all fourteen inches square by four and a half inches in thickness.

Hartford has two bricks; one has no inscription; the other has the seven-line inscription of Shalmanezer as given above. The dimensions are, of the first, ten and a half by fourteen inches, and three inches thick; the second, thirteen and a half by fourteen inches, and four and a half inches in thickness.

Thus there are in all twenty-two bricks ; the inscribed ones (except the Babylonian brick) belonging either to Assurnazir-pal, or to his son Shalmanezer. It will be noticed that the king making the brick inscribes it with his own name, and those of his two immediate predecessors. Thus, as already remarked, we have four kings in the order of their succession.

The one Babylonian brick also bears an inscription, but it is so effaced as to be almost illegible. Indeed it is doubtful if it was ever inscribed at all. The impress of the stamp upon it is so faint, that it leads me to suppose that the workman merely set his stamp down upon the soft clay, and the weight of the stamp made whatever impression there is upon the brick. By the closest inspection, about half the characters can be made out. The brick is thirteen inches square, and three inches thick. It is kiln-burned. The inscription is in the centre, with a margin on its four sides. Mr. Birch says that the inscription on the Babylonian bricks varies from three to seven lines.¹ This brick has seven lines. I think I am able to make out about half the characters upon it. It belongs to Nebuchadnezzar, and, like all the Babylonian bricks, it bears his legend.²

The translation is as follows: "Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylon, restorer of the temple SAG-GA-TU and of the temple ZI-DA, eldest son of Nabopolassar, king of Babylon I am."³ Schrader makes *za-nin*, here rendered *restorer*, imply not only that, but *guardian* also, and gives prominence to the latter signification.

TRANSLATION OF THE INSCRIPTION ON THE SLAB.

There is, as I said, but one inscription. I have made the translation from the slab at Andover. I have compared it with the slab at Amherst, from which Mr. Ward made his translation ; and, unless I overlooked some portion, the two inscriptions do not vary in a single character. This is im-

¹ Ancient Pottery, i. p. 133.

² Rawlinson, Monarchies, iii. p. 56 note.

³ See Ménant, Leçons d'Epigraphie Assyrienne, p. 44.

portant, if one wishes to compare the two translations. The translation of the gentleman referred to, may be found in Manuscript in the Library of Amherst College. Also in a printed form in the History of Amherst College by Professor Tyler, and in the proceedings of the American Oriental Society. This inscription will serve as a fair specimen of Assyrian style. One may learn from it also, what subjects that people considered most important to be introduced into their public records, viz. religion, conquest, transplanting tribes, the building of cities and palaces, and the accumulating of public treasures.

I have aimed to preserve as nearly as possible the Assyrian idiom.

Palace of Assur-nazir-pal, servant of Assur, delight¹ of Bel and Adar, chosen of Anu and Dakan, worshipper of the great gods, king mighty, king of nations, king of Assyria, son of Tuklat-Adar, king great, king mighty, king of nations, king of Assyria, son of Bin-nirari king of nations, king of Assyria also,—a warrior victorious, who in the service of Assur his lord has marched and among the kings of the four regions who his equal had not: a prince wonderful,² not fearing war: a leader mighty, who a rival has not: a king, subduing those not submissive to him: who many bodies of men has ruled: the valiant, the mighty; passing over the heads of his enemies;³ trampling upon all enemies, crushing the assemblages of the wicked: a king who, in the service of the great gods his lords has marched and countries all of them, his hand captured, their territories⁴ possessed, and their tribute received, taking securities, establishing⁵ laws over all those countries. When⁶ Assur, the lord, proclaimer of my name, enlarger of my royalty, his unfailing forces for the hands of my majesty extended;⁷ the armies of the broad lands of Lullume in the midst of battle with weapons I subdued: by the favor of Samas and Vul,⁸ the gods my protectors, the armies of the countries of Nairi, Gilhi, Subarie and the adjacent country, like Vul the inundator, upon them I rushed. The king who from the crossing of the Tigris to Mount Lebanon and the Great Sea, the country Laqe according to its whole extent, the country Suhi unto the city Rapiqi, to his feet subdued: and from the head sources of the river Supnat to Armenia his hand captured; from the country adjoining the country Gilruri to Gilzani, from the crossing of the lower Zab to the city

¹ Schrader, KAT. p. 69.

² Sayce, "a prince of great deeds."

³ Norris, p. 782. ⁴ Norris, p. 704; but *har-sa-ni* is usually rendered "forests."

⁵ Lit., *taker of*, and *establisher of*.

⁶ Sayce, "at that time."

⁷ Perhaps, "wielded his invincible weapons," etc.

⁸ The air-god, called "Rimmon" by Sayce.

Tel-Bari which is beyond the province of Zab, from the city Tel-Sabtani to the city Tel-sa-Zabdani, the city Hirumu, the city Harutu, the country Birate of the province of Babylonia to the borders of my country I restored: from the country adjacent to the country Babite to the country Hazmar to the people of my province I counted. In the countries which I held them, my lieutenants I established. Homage they did. Assur-nazir-pal, prince, glorious, worshipper of the great gods, generous, great, powerful, acquirer [by conquest] of cities and territories,¹ the whole of them, king of lords, devouring the wicked, strengthening the peaceful, not fearing war, a chief unyielding, divider of spoils,² king of gifts, a ruler strong over men, who the command of his mouth he has established, shaking³ mountains and seas, who in the union⁴ of his dominion kings powerful, fearless, from the rising of the sun to the setting of the sun under one [ruler] has brought. The former city Calah which Shalmanezzer, king of Assyria, a prince, going before me, built, that city had decayed and fallen into ruins. That city anew I built. People, captured by my hand, from the countries which I ruled them, from Suhi, Laqe, according to its whole extent, the city Sirqu, which is across the Euphrates, the country Zamua according to the whole of it, Bit-Adini, Hatti, and that of [king] Lubarna [i.e.] the country of the Patenai, I collected, within I made occupy. The old mound I threw down: over to the water I brought [it]: one hundred and twenty courses on the bottom I made good. A palace of cedar, a palace of box, a palace of cypress, a palace of *ku-i*,⁵ a palace of *mis-kan-ni*, a palace of *bu-ud-ni* and of *tarpik*-wood for the seat of my royalty, for the glory of my dominion forever, in the midst I placed. [Images of] creatures of the mountains and the seas of fine white stone, and ornamented stones I made, in its gates I erected, I placed, I consecrated.⁶ Coverings of copper I added. Doors of cedar, box, cypress, *mis-kan-ni*, in its gates I hung up.⁷ Silver, gold, lead, copper, iron, acquisitions of my hands from the countries which I ruled them, abundantly I collected, in the midst I placed.

PROGRESS MADE IN ASSYRIOLOGY.

It will serve to show the wonderful progress of Assyriology from the region of guess-work towards the condition of scientific accuracy, if we give the fullest information which the best Assyrian scholars were able to give twenty years ago in regard to the Standard Inscription of Assur-nazir-pal. This king was called "Assur-adan-pal, or Sardanapalus." We

¹ See p. 343, note 4.

² *A-nun-te*, a difficult word, but must mean *spoils*.

³ Root מוט.

⁴ See Norris, p. 541.

⁵ Four kinds of wood not certainly identified.

⁶ Norris, p. 608.

⁷ Or *fixed*; cf. Heb. רתם.

shall reproduce the account given by Mr. Vaux, in his *Nineveh and Persepolis*.¹ He alludes to the fact that the inscription is repeated more than a hundred times on the slabs in the Northwest Palace of Nimrud, and then gives the commencement, as follows: "This is the palace of Sardanapalus, the humble worshipper of Assarac and Beltis, of the shining Bar, of Ani, and of Dagon, who are the principal of the gods: the powerful and supreme ruler, the king of Assyria: *son of the servant of Bar*, the great king, the powerful and supreme ruler, king of Assyria; who was the son of Hevenk, the great king, the powerful and supreme ruler, king of Assyria." The translation Mr. Vaux takes from "Major" Rawlinson. Mr. Vaux continues: "After this introduction, the inscription goes on, apparently, to notice the efforts made by the king to establish the Assyrian worship; and then occurs, incidentally, perhaps, a long list of the geographical names of the nations at that time tributary to Nineveh.

"Major Rawlinson states that he can neither follow the sense throughout, nor read with certainty some of the names; yet, nevertheless, that it is possible to gain some general insight into the geographical distribution of the places mentioned. First of all are noticed the people of Nahiri (or Northern Mesopotamia), most likely the land about the heads of the Euphrates and Tigris; Aram Naharaim of the Bible, and Naharaina of the Egyptians; of Lek (perhaps the Lycians before they moved westward); of Sabiri (perhaps the Sapires); and of the plains sacred to the god Hem. Then there is an allusion to the countries beyond the Tigris as far as Syria; and, after the enumeration of several names not otherwise known, there is a notice of the city of Rabek, which, from many points of evidence in the later inscriptions, appears to represent Heliopolis, the capital of Lower Egypt. The inscription continues thus: 'I received homage (?) from the plains of Larri to Ladsan, from the people beyond the river Zab, as far as the city of Til Biari, from the city of Tel Abtan to the city of Tel Zabtán; from the cities of Akrima and

¹ *Nineveh and Persepolis*, pp. 457, 458.

Kharta, and the sea-coast dependent on Taha-Tanis to the frontiers of my country I brought abundance; from the plains of Bibad, as far as Tarmar, I bestowed (all) upon the people of my own kingdom.' ”

The foregoing is a good illustration of Assyriology twenty years ago. It is like a man groping in the dark. Yet it is interesting in a historical point of view. This same inscription, which is not by any means easy reading, we are able to render now with nearly the same accuracy that we can a page of Greek or German.

In the two passages which purport to be translations from the inscription, the names are so changed, and the meaning is so far from what the inscription really states in these paragraphs, that we constantly feel as if we were dealing with an entirely different inscription, which, of course, is not the case.

Also in regard to the inscription upon the bricks, which we have given, it is curious to see how it was rendered in the early days of Assyriology. I quote from Dr. Birch's *Ancient Pottery*.¹ He copies three different bricks, making in all thirteen lines. In these thirteen lines, there are seven mistakes. I mean in the cuneiform characters. I will give the translation which is found there only of the seven-line inscription of Shalmanezzer :

1. “ Temenbar the great king,
2. The supreme and powerful king, king of Assyria,
3. Son of Asar-aden-pal, the great king,
4. Supreme and powerful king, king of Assyria,
5. Son of Abedbar, powerful king, king of the land of Assyria,
6. Of the city of Halah.”

The sixth line of the inscription is omitted altogether in the translation. There is no word corresponding to “supreme.” The word *also* is omitted. In regard to this sixth line, Mr. Layard has not copied it correctly. It reads as he copied it *ri-h-sa ziggurat*. It should read *ri-zip-tu sa ziggurat*. The root is 𐎶𐎵𐎶.

¹ London, 1858, i. pp. 110-112.

NINEVEH GALLERY AT AMHERST.

I proposed also to give a brief notice of the Nineveh Gallery at Amherst, which is arranged and adorned with excellent taste. This notice, however, must be omitted. There is upon one of its walls a fresco painting of Sennacherib, seated on his throne, and beneath it an inscription in colossal letters, which we give, with the translation: Sin-ahi-irib sar Kissati sar mat Assur ina Kussu ni-mi-di u-sib-va sal-la-at ir La-ki-su ma-ha-ar-su i-ti-ik. "Sennacherib, king of nations, king of the country of Assyria, sits upon a lofty throne, and receives before him the spoil of the city of Lachish." The translation given in Smith's Dictionary of the Bible, under the title "Lachish" is quite incorrect; it is the same, however, as that given by Layard in his Nineveh and Babylon. Only no longer ago than 1869 Dr. Oppert rendered *Kussu ni-mi-di* by "throne of justice." But the word is an adjective from the passive of the root "*ma-ad*" to be much, and signifies *made great or lofty*. It may also signify *splendid or gorgeous*.¹

ASSYRIAN LITERATURE AND SCHOLARS IN AMERICA.

I proposed to prepare a list of Articles that have appeared

¹ As to the translation here given, which is also that of Schrader, see Die Keilinschriften und das Alte Testament, p. 170, there can be no reasonable doubt. Yet the anonymous critic of my Article in The Nation for Nov. 5, 1874, disputes the rendering here given of *ni-mi-di* and *i-ti-ik*. *Ni-mi-di*, he thinks, may be from מוט, to shake, hence a movable throne. But מוט is, perhaps, never used in a sense equivalent to our word *movable*, when we speak of an object that can be moved from one place to another; but commonly in a bad sense of tottering or shaking. How undignified to say: "Sennacherib sits on a shaky throne." The word belongs, properly, under the root *ma-ad*; see Fürst's Lex. under מחד and מאה. There are several examples of its use easily accessible in Schrader's work just referred to, namely, pp. 111, 113, 171, 176, 183; and see p. 88. The root appears in *ni-mi-it-Bil*, *Bel is exalted*. How could this word be referred to מוט?

The root עתק to which Schrader refers *i-ti-ik*, means to remove from one place to another; and the Hif. means besides this, to bring together; see Prov. xxv. 1. Hence the rendering "receives before him," in the sense of *collects*, is preferable to "passes before him," which the anonymous critic just referred to adopts. Besides the conjunction "va" which follows *u-sib* as an enclitic usually connects verbs that are co-ordinate, so that the natural construction would be, Sennacherib does this, and he does that. See Norris, pp. 710, 711.

from time to time in our reviews and other journals which treat of Assyrian matters, and also a list of those persons who have devoted any considerable time to the study of this subject. But, at present, other duties make it impossible for me to complete this part of my paper. My object was by showing what had been done, and by whom, to stimulate others to undertake this interesting and important study. I may say, however, that while there is a considerable number in our country who have kept pace with the literature of this subject, the number of those that are able to read the Assyrian text is very limited.¹

MISSIONARIES AND ORIENTALISTS.

I hoped also to notice as they deserve, the faithful missionaries who have promoted Assyrian and other Oriental studies. The eminent service which they have rendered to such studies is appreciated by none more heartily than by Orientalists themselves. On this point the following remarks of Professor Max Müller, in his Address before the late Oriental Congress in London, are of unusual interest. He says: "I have lately incurred very severe obloquy for my supposed hostility to missionary enterprise. All I can say is, I wish there were ten missionaries for every one we have now. I have always counted missionaries among my best friends; I have again and again acknowledged how much Oriental studies, and linguistic studies in general, owe to them; and I am

¹ The new edition of Appleton's American Cyclopaedia, vol. v. p. 576, speaks of Mr. Ward's translation as the "first ever made of an Assyrian inscription by an American scholar." If I have been correctly informed, this is a mistake. Mr. Ward's was made in 1871; while as long before as 1863, Mr. Edward C. Taintor, who graduated at Union College in that year made a translation of this Standard Inscription by the help of Layard, Rawlinson, and others, which I am told was considered quite satisfactory. There is no doubt that the person who has the most thorough and practical knowledge of Assyrian in America at the present time is Prof. G. A. F. Van Rhyn of New York. Among the more noticeable Articles that have been written by American scholars may be mentioned those by Prof. W. H. Green, D.D., in the Presbyterian Quarterly and Princeton Review for July, 1872, and April, 1873, and July, 1874; by Prof. Otis T. Mason, in the Baptist Quarterly for April, 1874; and by Rev. W. H. Ward, a few pages of notes in the Bibliotheca Sacra for Jan. 1870.

proud to say that, even now, while missionaries at home have abused me in unmeasured language, missionaries abroad — devoted, hard-working missionaries — have thanked me for what I said of them and their work in my lay-sermon in Westminster Abbey.” He goes on to show how much more the English Universities might do for missions than they do at present by a sufficient staff of Professors for Eastern languages, who might prepare young men for their special fields of work; “and in these missionaries we might have not only apostles of religion and civilization, but, at the same time, the most valuable pioneers of scientific research.”

CONCLUSION.

Assyriologists have steady and important work before them. They need patience and application. They should avoid what is sensational, as was appropriately suggested by Mr. Rawlinson at the last Oriental Congress in London. If the world asks them for startling news, they should reply: “We have the language and life of an ancient people to explore, which we propose to do in a slow, painstaking, and scientific way.”¹

¹ Yet this must not be understood as meaning that these records are destitute of interest. The Assyrian literature reveals a multitude of new and important facts which illustrate in a remarkable manner the life and thought of the Semitic races, and which constitute a mass of evidence corroborative of the Hebrew history.

ARTICLE V.

PROFESSOR ALBERT HOPKINS.

BY REV. JOHN BASCOM, LL.D., PRESIDENT OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
WISCONSIN.

Professor Albert Hopkins, for forty years and more, was, in a very unusual way, the centre of the religious life of Williams College. Many in that period received from him the most efficient and controlling spiritual impulses of their lives; and many are ready to testify that when in search of a perfect and upright man their thoughts most immediately revert to him. This real excellence of character, this glory of a Christian manhood, this extended and benign influence, exerted with no peculiar vantage-ground of position, entitle him to our remembrance, and make every tribute a blessing to him whose soul prompts him to render it. I am confident that the graduates of Williams College for these many years gladly unite in every word of honest recognition, and find them all too few to express their obligations or measure their esteem. It was on a throne of goodness that he sat, and ruled by a sense of righteousness those who came near him.

Albert Hopkins was born in Stockbridge, Mass., July 14, 1807. He was graduated at Williams College in 1826; became a tutor in the college in 1827; and a professor, in 1829, of mathematics and natural philosophy. This position he held till his death, May 24, 1872. In 1838, his professorship was changed to that of natural philosophy and astronomy. The events of his life were of a wholly ordinary grade, and leave no record behind them. His character only was extraordinary. This made his years excellent, as the perfume of flowers the days of spring.

If we understand by faith the mind's hold of invisible things, the vigor with which it realizes them, the constancy

with which it spreads them before its inner vision, the steadiness and clearness with which it shapes daily action under them and for them, then faith was the pre-eminent characteristic of Professor Hopkins. His changes of religious life seemed to be but the modified expression of one absorbing conviction—expression suited to the changing sympathies and external conditions which he found about him. When the revival came, it did not appear to be to him so much a revival, as the breathing in of fresh hopes to an anxious and waiting spirit—the giving air to fires that had been suppressed, but not smothered, by the heavy, sluggish atmosphere about them. In 1832, he established in college a noon prayer-meeting, of a half hour, held on four days of the week. This was maintained by him for about forty years. It was the most firm, persistent, and steadily influential means of religious life that I have ever had occasion to observe. Its conception and execution were possible only to a spiritual temper and light that never burned dim. Upheld by sheer strength of will, such meetings would become wearisome, painful, and utterly unfruitful; as the offspring of life, they gave life. Any new accession of religious feeling was always heralded by an increase in numbers in the noon meeting, by clearer and more flashing light in the deep-set eye of the professor, and more trumpet tones in his commanding voice. We felt at once that an earnest soul, the soul of a watchman, was being awakened and emboldened by the promise of a coming good. This steadfastness of faith, this belief of the soul in its own, this holding on to the invisible ways of holiness,—travelling them in solitude, or with a joyful multitude, as he was able,—this was the first and great fact in the religious life and character of Professor Hopkins.

The doctrines held by Professor Hopkins were those of the Congregational church; with no peculiar emphasis, so far as we are aware, laid upon any of them. He was liberal in spirit, not disposed to insist upon dogma, and, with quiet appreciation, termed the flock which he himself had gathered,

"The Church of Christ in the White Oaks."¹ There came, however, from his unusually vivid realization of spiritual facts, an appreciable character, a distinct and peculiar glow, to his words, which separated him from other men. He was a revivalist, not of the demonstrative, but of the earnest and direct kind. The supernatural — meaning thereby the immediate, manifest, and sudden intervention of the Spirit — had large possession of his thoughts and language. A tinge of belief — which hardly took the form of explicit statement, and was none the less effective for that reason — pertaining to the early second coming of Christ would flash over his speech, and light it up with a sudden intensity, as if a little rent in the future had disclosed itself to him, and he felt at liberty to announce that great things were at hand. He had the power, in a very unusual degree, of imparting a tendency and temper to what he said quite beyond the statement contained in the words themselves. Thus attention was never

¹ Notice the preliminary statements to the creed and covenant of this church which were prepared by him during his last sickness: "The following statements are believed to be both scriptural, and of vital interest. As such, they are commended to the prayerful consideration of Christians of whatever name. 1. A church is a body of believers, voluntarily associated in the name of Christ, to show forth his praise, and to increase their own power both of receiving and doing good. 2. Love to Christ is the only essential prerequisite to an acceptable public profession of faith in him. 'If thou believest with all thine heart, thou mayest.' 3. Baptism in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost admits the believer to the Christian church, and entitles him to all its privileges and blessings. 'He that believeth and is baptized, shall be saved.' 4. Church-fellowship may not be abridged by local churches within limits narrower than those sanctioned by Christ and the example of the apostles. 'Who art thou that judgest another man's servant?' 5. A regard to the above precepts would recommend great simplicity in our forms of admission to the church, and caution in the multiplication of technical and doctrinal tests. 'Destroy not him with thy meat, for whom Christ died.' Under the impression of the above truths, the church in the White Oaks was formed, and its covenant adopted. The church was organized December 20, 1868, and is now enjoying special tokens of the divine presence and favor. Should the form of the subjoined Covenant be generally adopted, or some equivalent form, not much more or less inclusive, it is believed that sectarianism and denominational differences would gradually subside, and, in the end, quite disappear. 'One Lord, one faith, one baptism,' would not be an unmeaning ideal, but would express, as it did for a time, the happy experience of a church, one in name, one in aim, one in the experience of its inward life, and substantially one in its outward form."

turned to this dogma, as a probable or improbable belief; yet, by language which hardly amounted to an affirmation, an intense, vivid, portentous coloring was given to the relations we hold with the spiritual world about us and before us. A sudden and great work ceased to be strange and unexpected under his clear anticipation; and the mind fell easily under the influence and guidance of one who seemed to have such a spiritual affinity with invisible and forthcoming events.

It was this pre-occupation of the imagination, even more than the thoughts, with the things of the kingdom, which made him a revivalist, and capable of creating impressions which it was difficult to translate into words, and not always easy to turn into rational, well-advised action. Indeed, the word rational bore no very frequent or very large burden in the religious experience or instruction of Professor Hopkins. While utterly free from all superficial and fictitious practice, while thoroughly and forever permeated with one living impulse, he took but a secondary hold on natural law, and went straight and constantly to divine grace for his motives, means, and supplies.

There is here room for diversity of experience and diversity of belief. Some may be profoundly impressed only as Sinai is ablaze; others, bearing this divine power and being deeply in their hearts, may stand at the foot of the mount with equal comfort and faith when it is bathed in serene sunshine and outlined in the blue sky. We confess to a heart that turns yearningly and hopefully to the natural, to the enduring laws of mind and society, to the framework alike of order and growth which God has established in and about us. We expect him, for the most part, to work in and under these methods of his ordination; and we find our own work in a steady development of the natural forces just at hand. The sanctified heart is not one denuded of nature, but restored to nature; and we wait patiently and hopefully on a long work of restoration — more properly of spiritual development — in man and society. The word “development” has no alarms

for us, if it be the creative grace of Christ that is at work in and through it. The supernatural is ever lapsing into the natural; it awakens us to the natural,—God's constant, habitual work,—and then makes way for it. The soul, stirred by a new sense or a new outburst of spiritual powers, needs to be turned at once in the expenditure of its strength to the natural, to the low grade of duties that gather just about it. Israel marches from Sinai into the desert, and there in daily camp-life shows the temper which the divine presence has begotten. The overflowing impression of the supernatural which belongs to the revivalist may be initiatory of the truest life, but hardly by abiding in its first character. It must calm itself down into distinct, common-place duties; it must take up the burdens of nature; it must find life and salvation everywhere, till here as there, and now as then, it shall live and move and have its being—its daily being—in God. I can distinctly recall whirlwinds of impression, in my early religious life, which were not in this way husbanded, which did little more than fill the air with dust. Forty days of delay and wonder were too much for the Israelites; they made a golden calf to consume time and feeling. Professor Hopkins's supernaturalism was wholesome to his own mind, for he abounded in plain daily work; it was healthy to many other minds, for a like patient, fruitful spirit has been again and again called out by it; still, it gave little place to a type of Christian character which will increase as the glory of God shines forth more and more through his creation. The kingdom is not to come so much by rejection as by incorporation, not so much by creation as redemption.

Professor Hopkins was always liberal, more than usually so, in the support of stated benevolences. Foreign missions were much to him, directly and indirectly. The student contemplating this labor found peculiarly warm sympathy and counsel in him; the missionary returning from it, tarried with him, and was by him introduced to the college. But, like all positive Christians, he sought opportunities for more

personal and direct effort — for the best expenditure of his own power in its living, lively form. This led him early in life to a wide range of missionary labor in neighboring districts, and later to the establishment and maintenance of a chapel in White Oaks. The success of this project affords an excellent illustration of the power stored up in one life, which a system of general benevolence often overlooks. The nearer one's work is to him, the more efficient and blessed is it; and if remote, organized, missionary labors are to be to the church a substitute for private, direct effort, they will be an injury. Yet this is a mere form of admonition. There is no such tendency in missionary labor. He who is earnest in giving will be earnest in doing; and the doing is his most direct stewardship. For a like reason Professor Hopkins was greatly interested in efforts to be made for the establishment of a direct mission in South America. This form of private effort has especially prospered in Germany, and acquires an apostolic character which is too liable to be lost in a great organization. Frederick Hicks, under the encouragement and aid of Professor Hopkins, spent some years in Panama and the neighboring region in an effort to plant such a mission; but his health early failed him, and the results were not permanent.

Professor Hopkins, by his acknowledged zeal and power, became the centre of revival influence in the town as well as in the college. He came to the front as a matter of course, whenever there was an earnest, working mood. Yet this leadership was tacit, quiet, without friction or observation. It fell to him because it was in and of him; and no one felt in a religious meeting that they knew the finality — what was to be hoped — till he had spoken.

In exhortation and preaching, his chief characteristic was positiveness of feeling, sustained by clear realization and vivid imagination. This produced sudden outbursts of assertion that at once swept away all indifference and opposition. For spasmodic power, that shot out instantly from the depths of conviction, he was unsurpassed by any whom I have ever

met. It was not sustained argument, it was not proportionate, prepared eloquence; it was a sudden leap of the soul toward truth, startling and awakening all who beheld it, that made him a prophet from another world. He was at one time in the habit of holding a Thursday evening lecture, or exposition, in his study. His choice of books often disclosed his predominant tendencies. Among these was the Revelation. Its bold imagery, its indefinite suggestiveness, the free range it offers to the purely religious and supernatural impulse, seem all to have drawn him toward it. It is full of that secure prophetic element he delighted in, that strong, undefined influence with which the spiritual world in its disclosure overshadows the mind. He came, in his exposition, to the fourteenth chapter, in which a new song is spoken of, belonging to the redeemed of the earth, and which cannot be sung by another. This fact laid instant hold of his heart. He raised his voice, lifted his hand, and put the inquiry, in the most startling way: "And why couldn't they sing that song?" Waiting for a moment, for the difficulties of the question to get possession of our minds, he dropped his hand, and lowered his voice in solemn, final affirmation, making answer: "Because they couldn't." By the mere force of his own feeling he carried over an answer bordering on the ridiculous into the sublime. No reason could have so convinced us of the folly of any unredeemed spirits meddling with that song. We felt at once, as the speaker felt, that it was and could be only the outgush of a purified, regenerated soul. Professor Hopkins did not argue much with men; but swept them on by the visions of his spirit and his tide of conviction.

The Old Testament, and Old Testament characters, had strong possession of his mind. He loved the concrete more than the abstract; and these early events and persons — the scripture narrative turning so exclusively on the religious impulse — gave free play to his sentiment and imagination. Shortly before his death he gave a protracted series of evening discourses on the history of David, wonderful for

their life-like effects. He seemed to move in those remote, dark regions, in reference to which our impressions are often made only the more vague and unreal by early and constant familiarity, as one who held a powerful light, casting its pure beam before him. He had only to direct it to this and that person, and instantly they rose out of the shadow, the lineaments and passions of life full upon them. Doeg, Joab, Asahel, Abner, David himself, took new possession of the mind, calling forth fresh feelings of like or dislike. There were no scholarly deductions, no learned exegesis, but a quick seeing and lively sympathy, by which we felt and saw as for the first time. The personifying power, by which the shadowy becomes real and substantial, — a new adjustment of lenses, casting a bold, clear image on the canvas, — belonged in a high degree to Professor Hopkins. David was an intimate friend of his — one with whom he had gone through many a hard struggle, — and so he became to us, as long as he spoke of him.

There was something in the personal appearance of Professor Hopkins, especially later in life, which served to heighten this impression. He had a prophet's face and bearing, with a sharp, overshadowed eye, bold features, inclined in expression to strength and serenity, and a flowing white beard; tall, erect, and firmly knit, — in my college days there were fabulous stories in circulation among us of his physical strength, — he seemed no inferior image of Elijah, able, like him, to rebuke kings, or gird himself, and run before their swiftest chariots.

The imaginative element in Professor Hopkins was of a dramatic cast, it took hold on action and terse speech. It was never effeminate or merely pictorial. His characters were in earnest, and came before us in their striking attitudes. Connected with this, there was a peculiar relish for proper names. The hard words of the Old Testament seemed to have a certain flavor in his mouth, and he delighted to give them an emphatic utterance, as if he marshalled thereby so many men and places before us. This seems due to an easy

power of personification, by which a name, partly through direct association, still more by an acquired representative power, comes to stand for a person, and readily restores the familiar image. Thus Dickens is ever playing in fancy with his proper names, and they had for him, and come to have for the reader, a symbolic force. The richness of a proper name to us, at least of one on which either the historic or creative imagination has had any opportunity to work, is often a test of our powers of realization.

Professor Hopkins's force sprang so purely from within, that his delivery was often sluggish when the inner vision was not before him. His composition was always concise, and his words chosen with unusual skill, but he proceeded in speaking very slowly, till the prophetic gift came upon him. His discourses, therefore, though well composed, were very unequal in their practical effects. He did not seem to address himself to audiences and external circumstances; but as he was musing the fire burned. He was not the orator of occasions and large assemblies, unless the topic was surcharged with spiritual power.

In his department of instruction, and in natural history generally, he was warmly interested, though his endowments as a teacher and a scholar fall into the shadow of his personal religious influence. Though he possessed thoroughly good intellectual powers, he owed more to his spiritual endowments than to these. We should hardly have dwelt long on the form of the cloud, had it not been suffused with so heavenly a light.

Perfect as he was in Christian character, he was not less complete; or, rather, he was therefore complete, in manly qualities. Few men ever command the same universal respect and regard. His integrity was affirmed with an oath in the lowest circles. Nobody was willing to acknowledge that he had dropped so far as to distrust Professor Hopkins. It became a passion to praise him. He owed this regard of the poor to his constant regard for them. He was Christian and democratic—and the two things are inseparable—by

his settled instincts and cherished purposes. There was neither cold seclusion nor diffidence in his intercourse with any. He passed from one grade of society to another with the utmost freedom. With quiet composure, as a matter of course, he conversed with the most intelligent, or led the least intelligent. He was not embarrassed by any, neither did he embarrass any. His dignity was always present, and never disclosed itself. He thought not of himself, but only, in the simplest, most direct way, of the work before him. Of a truly democratic, yet always elevating influence, no better example has ever been presented to me. He owed this quiet, constant, and universal control to several causes.

In the first place his influence and labor were primarily and consistently Christian. Whatever may be thought of the human heart, it soon gives way to pure Christian love, more quickly than to any other aggressive agent. Such love provokes less passion, and calls forth more affection, than any other thoroughly militant sentiment. With Professor Hopkins this leading purpose enclosed all others; and those who warred with him must war with the tenderness and constancy of a Christian's life. No man did it long. He was also liberal. The poor received much sympathy and aid from him. He gave without instituting a too close inquiry into the past history which made giving necessary. He was thus able to do more for the redemption of a life to whose immediate demands he had not lent a deaf ear. Plain in dress, simple in his manner of living, and with active, outdoor habits, there was very little, either in his appearance or action, to estrange him from any class of citizens.

He sympathized with the social reformatory spirit, in many of its bearings, warmly so; yet he did not give special effort to any of these secondary agencies. He seemed rather to feel that he had found his labor elsewhere, and must cling closely to the chief interests of the kingdom. This one line of action, assumed under his own conviction, diminished opposition; the asperity begotten of new views and special reforms did not attach to him. His efforts, in kind, com-

manded general approval, and, in degree, general admiration. In manners he held an even and nice balance. He was hardly reserved; yet there was never in word or action any abandon — he did not commit himself to men. However gay and pleasant the society in which he was moving, his spirits were only enlivened, and not made giddy. Few, indeed, have had so little occasion to regret words, that, evading the oversight of reason, had escaped them unawares. He always preserved the same earnest, quiet, appreciative temper, that without checking hilarity was not itself hilarious.

He would at this point have fallen off a little from lovability and good fellowship, had it not been for some compensating and exceedingly graceful endowments. There was frequently a sly humor in his words, which at once assured you of his thorough relish of innocent mirth, and set you at rest on that point. His nature was also enriched by a decided poetic vein, and aesthetic culture. The college grounds owed most of their adornments to him, and his own home became a nook of secluded beauty. He instituted an Alpine club, more especially for young women, and delighted to traverse with it the mountains, seek out their picturesque points, and give their leading summits names of historic or poetic interest. It was a pleasure to him to own some of the rough soil of White Oaks, amuse his thoughts with its possible development, and give the salient features designations quite in anticipation of results. His poetic fancies and dreams brought but little embarrassment to his common-place labors, and only flashed out of him now and then in a few suggestive words, for the delight of those to whom he entrusted these visions. So we gather violets in the nooks of a field just broken for grain. An imaginative sentiment danced gayly in and out among his sober thoughts, as a sombre day is cheered and lightened by streaks of sunshine. This was in some respects one of the best victories of his faith; that religion, though it might become terribly earnest with him, united itself always to a cheerful, enjoyable life. His Steep Acres — the charity of a name hiding those flinty, precipitous flanks — were made

merry from time to time by a band at work in his missionary potato field ; or lathing a new tenement ; or by his Sabbath-school teachers gathered for a " sugar-off."

Rarely has Christian character been so purely, harmoniously, and beautifully knit together ; rarely has it been able so directly and persuasively and convincingly to commend itself to every beholder. The problem of Christian life found in Professor Hopkins a full and happy solution. He was more remarkable for what he was, than for anything which he said or did. He was very little indebted to external circumstances for his influence. A thousand lives of equal opportunity and exterior interest are lapsing, almost fruitless, about us. One controlling Christian impulse pushed forward, and held in check, all his powers ; and the symmetry and beauty and strength of character became, obviously to all, the fruit of this interior spiritual life. He thus was one through whom Christ brings life and immortality to light ; one through whom he speaks to the world, and offers it the most immediate guidance, the brightest, most consolatory hopes. It is in looking with clear vision on such a character that we are able to see redemption possible, — redemption from the perplexities, futilities, wretched failures, wretched successes, of ordinary living. Annoyed by no petty ambitions, distressed by no transient discouragements, he enclosed his own life in the spiritual life of the world, and waited in quiet hopefulness in the kingdom of his Heavenly Father. Men, some brilliant in action, some daring in thought, but with blood full of the fretful fever of the world, may well seek correction, repose, encouragement under the shadow of this calm, serene spirit. The flow of his daily action, like quiet, clear waters, was good, and carried good wherever it went ; beauty was in it, and it ministered to the beauty and life of the world. The peace of his spirit was not apathy ; it was victory. Strong passions nestled in him, and great trials overtook him, — as the early loss of his only child, Lieutenant Hopkins, in the war of the rebellion, — but the even tenor of his action was never disturbed by them. In an intimacy of many years, I recall but

one instance in which I thought an unjust sentiment found expression in him, and, as my own feelings were then decidedly adverse to the conclusion reached, I may have partially misjudged him.

There is nothing in human history more profoundly interesting than these victories of love, this rendering into life of the precepts of life. When God sends an apostle, we crave the wisdom to see him, the power to be inspired by him. How large a chapter in Grecian history is illumed by Socrates; in Roman history, by Marcus Aurelius. Though Christianity has made the philosophy of living far more familiar to us, no place or time can well spare one of its clear lights. Such a light to many college generations was Professor Albert Hopkins. Wherever else the alumni of Williams College may wander for great men, their eyes will turn lovingly to him as their type of Christian manhood.

ARTICLE VI.

THE POWER OF ISLAM.

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It has often been asserted that the religion of Mohammed is losing power over its votaries; that, before the civilization and religion or infidelity of Western nations, Mohammedan power, both civil and religious, is giving way; and that the downfall of the whole system, especially in Turkey and in India, cannot be distant. The crescent is thought to be no longer a fit symbol for a waning faith; and there is the expectation, how general the writer does not presume to say, of the end of Islam, both as a temporal and a spiritual power, by some sudden movement near at hand, like the putting out of a candle or the crash of a falling wall.

Doubtless, the recent progress of the religion of the Arabian prophet among certain African tribes is a disturbing

and contradictory fact; and the tenacity with which everywhere, and especially among Arabic-speaking Moslems, those who have professed the faith of Islam hold, at least formally and outwardly, to their ancient religion, is somewhat baffling to our enthusiastic hopes. So that, while we believe the decay of the system as a faith is a fact, and expect that the men of the next generation will see the end of all Mohammedan civil power, yet it is evident that elements of power still exist in Islam, which, without a miracle in the conduct of his providence, God cannot eliminate and suppress, except by the working of gradual forces and influences. And, while experience has shown us the very great difficulty of properly estimating those forces and influences, of truly and clearly conceiving and representing just what Islam is, and of rightly showing what are the elements of its power, we shall attempt to point out some of the pillars of its strength, which will at the same time make evident the hold it still has upon the Mohammedan mind.

I. ONE ELEMENT OF THE POWER OF ISLAM IS THE ONE GREAT TRUTH ON WHICH IT IS BASED.

No great system of pure error has ever existed in the world. No such system could possibly exist. The revulsion of men from bald and unmixed falsehood is a fact of human consciousness and human history. Men have great mental capacity for receiving lies in the place of the truth, folly instead of wisdom; but they will neither be deceived nor humbugged, unless at least some grains of sense and truth are skilfully mingled with the potion they are invited to swallow. Confucius taught a high morality. Buddhism answers, in a way, the aspirations of men towards the supernatural. The system of the better Greek philosophers contained more of truth than of error. And Islam draws the very breath of its life — has ever nourished the sinews of its power — from a clear, stern, and polemic utterance of the primal truth of the existence of one supreme, personal God. This was boldly uttered against the old heathenism of Arabia. It thundered against a

corrupt and weakened Christianity in Palestine, Egypt, and North Syria, before the faith it had begun to publish with the sword, as its one flaming and conclusive argument, was half a century old. It flashed from Turkish scimitars four centuries later when Togrul was founding the empire which, later, took the name of Ottoman. Everywhere, from the first till now, "There is no God but God," has been the one all-powerful watchword which the tens of millions who own the name of Mohammed hear uttered, and themselves utter, at least five times each day. What power this truth had in the ancient Jewish theocracy! And Mohammedanism is built on Judaism so far, that we find this great truth braced up in the Koran by many a narrative of Old Testament history.

It must not, however, be supposed that the doctrine of God means, in its practical bearing, the same to the Moslem that it does to the Christian. How, and with what, does he hold his fundamental doctrine? If he "hold the truth in unrighteousness," of course its practical influence will be either nullified or transformed. Mohammedan history shows how skilfully pleasing error has been grafted upon fundamental truth in that system. When we inquire into the value and influence of what the Moslem holds in reference to the divine character — the attributes of God — upon his practical belief and conduct, we find that the expressions, "God is great" and "God the most merciful," are oftenest used, and more than all others, influence the life; as it is these which chiefly mould the Moslem's idea of God. The distinct divine attributes enumerated in Islam are very many; but of the hundred names, or attributes, many are, in effect, repetitions of others; and while the attributes, e.g. of justice and holiness, those fundamental moral attributes of God, are distinctly stated and theoretically received; yet these attributes have little real influence in the creed of the Moslem, and still less on his life. The Moslem not only professedly, but actually and firmly, believes in a personal God; in the absolute and unconditional unity of God; in God as an absolute and glorious Sovereign; as eternal and unchangeable, and as a

God of mercy ; and to this God of power and mercy he commits himself, resigns himself ; and this “ resignation ” (Islam) is his religion and the essence of his faith. However profane or sensual he may be, however grossly he may habitually violate all the laws of truth and justice, he throws himself, with an assured confidence, and in the punctilious discharge of the prescribed formal duties of his religion, on the divine mercy. Theoretically and practically, he recognizes no need of any atonement for sin ; and of that holiness and moral purity which reaches the heart, and is shown in a renewed and internally upright and pure soul,—of that, namely, which is the fundamental condition of discipleship to Christ,—the Moslem knows nothing. Of sin in the heart as guilt, and punishable without reference to anything external, he knows nothing.

So far is the attribute of holiness in the divine character ignored in the practical belief of the Moslem, that his highest ideal of heaven is of a sensual—a refined, but still a sensual—paradise. According to his expectation, as the highest gift God has to bestow upon his servants, in his own highest heaven, there is to be the fullest gratification of all his sensual appetites. When we consider the character of Mohammed himself, especially his unblushing sensuality in his later years, it is not strange that the worst examples of beastly sensuality, even of “ doggishness,” to be found anywhere are found among the Moslems, and that too, oftentimes, when the days of youth have long since passed away. It is natural, therefore, that to the Moslem the idea of God as one who cannot look upon any, even the most secret sin, without loathing and hatred, is one removed at least from all practical influence upon his life. This point needs to be carefully observed in order that the extent and meaning of the doctrine of God in the Mohammedan system may be justly weighed. But it still holds true that the great fundamental truth of all religion, although it is held by the Moslem in connection with a practical ignoring of some of the most essential of the divine attributes, is still the one corner-stone of his system,

and of its success in the world. And although it is not necessary for our purpose here to state the several doctrines of Islam in detail, it may be well to add that its doctrine of decrees is a doctrine of fate; the doctrine concerning the human will is of a "partial will"; i.e. will in man is distinguished, on the one hand from the instinct of mere animals, and on the other hand is distinguished, in a marked manner and in well known terms, from "the absolute will" of God. So that, literally, in this system, "sin is no more sin, and grace is no more grace," and, as has been before observed, no atonement is regarded as necessary, and none is taught. The necessity of regeneration is not recognized. *In* man no radical change is regarded as needful. *For* him no objective atonement is provided. There is a formal righteousness here, and a sensual heaven hereafter. In the life, there is an absence of all rectitude of soul and real pacification of the human conscience. In the conception of God, there is the absence of all just estimate of his most distinguishing moral attributes.

II. THE PRESTIGE OF ISLAM IS DOUBTLESS TO-DAY ONE MAIN ELEMENT OF ITS POWER OVER THE PEOPLE.

From the middle of the seventh century till past the middle of the sixteenth, the successive great Moslem empires were, beyond all question, if we except the great empires founded by the barbarous and terrible Mongul conquerors, the leading powers on the earth (and this exception is, perhaps, unnecessary, for those gigantic empires, though founded by merciless conquerors who swept the whole of Asia almost with irresistible fury, hardly outlived their founders. Humanity itself, the very earth, hastened to obliterate the memory and the works of such a blood-thirsty fiend as Timour the Lame). Not alone to Mohammedans themselves, but to the Christian nations as well, the worldly power of Islam appeared, through all those centuries, invincible. Mohammed had not been in his grave twenty years, when, in Egypt and Syria, some of the fairest possessions of the Christian church were subjected to the rule of the successors.

of the Arabian prophet. Before Mohammedanism was one century old the Moslem rulers had subjected all Africa, and had founded a powerful empire, long famous for its military and literary glory, in Spain. And although, after their defeat by Charles Martel in the battle of Tours in 732, their farther conquests in Europe were stayed for more than six centuries, still their prestige suffered nothing, either among Mohammedans or Christians. The Crusades, while they naturally embittered Moslems against Christians, and furnished a good pretence, if not a justification, for the invasion of Europe by Moslem conquerors in subsequent years, certainly added to the glory of the Moslem arms. Think of the millions of European soldiers who followed, as their leaders, knights, dukes, princes, kings, and emperors to Palestine and to Egypt, and melted like snow on the battle-plains of Moslem countries, and some conception of the rapid growth of Moslem power and glory and prestige can thus, perhaps, be gained. But one of the most signal successes of Islam was its conquest, as a religion, of its own conquerors, the Seljuk Turks, who, besides possessing the existing Arabic kingdom and caliphate in Asia, founded Mohammedan empires in Syria, Persia, and Asia Minor, in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, which have held a most prominent place in the world's history; not even receiving serious permanent harm from those terrible Mongul conquerors, Zengis Khan, at the end of the twelfth century, and his descendant, Timour the lame, at the end of the fourteenth. After the newly founded Ottoman empire, which from that time to this has been the chief bulwark of Mohammedanism, had recovered somewhat from the wounds it suffered at the hands of the bloody Timour, the Turkish sultans began their victorious march westward. Orkhan, the second Ottoman ruler, made Brusa his capital; and, later, in the fourteenth century, his son, the first Murad, established his capital at Adrianople, in Europe itself. His son, the fiery Bayazid, is one of the boasted names of Turkish history. The second Mohammed took Constantinople in 1453; and till the end of the reign of Soleyman, the mag-

nificent, in 1566 (whose whole reign of forty-six years was one blaze of glory to the empire), the prestige of Islam, and of its defenders the sultans, had not at all been dimmed. The Moslems had not, till that time, taken one step backward in the path of glory. Their power in arms and conquest was at its zenith, and had no worthy rival. The dread crescent appeared a crescent still ; well might " the faithful " believe, as some do to this day, that all the rulers of the world wear their crowns at the permission and bestowment of " his august and imperial majesty the ruler of the two seas and the two lands." It is not in human nature that a political and military history so glorious as Mohammedanism had put upon record at the date above mentioned, should not have a very great influence on the devotees of that faith to this day. And it must not be forgotten that this glory and prestige are perpetuated, as has been done among all other civilized nations. Tradition perpetuates them ; anecdote, proverbs, narratives from the lives and acts and words of such Sultans as Soleyman, Murad, Bayazid, Mohammed, Ahmed, Mahmoud and Selim are preserved, and told still in cafés and by firesides all over Turkey. Minute and careful histories of all the great facts of the past have been written, and constitute what is valuable in Turkish literature. And poetry also has not failed to sing such deeds of daring and heroism and success as delight the minds of the present generation, and awaken, at least, some aspirations to emulate those great acts of the caliphs and their armies when Islam was in its glory.

But beyond the influence of tradition, history, or poetry, or all these put together, is the influence of the great mosques. The greatest names in Turkish history, and thus the great acts, and the glory of those acts, are perpetuated in solid and imposing buildings, not given to state uses, not devoted as mere monuments of great deeds, but consecrated to the worship of God. First at Brusa, then at Adrianople, then, and more numerous, at Constantinople, these buildings—surpassing, beyond all comparison in cost, in solidity, in impres-

siveness, not only private dwellings but all public edifices,— have been in turn erected by Orkhan, Murad, Bayazid, Selim, Soleyman, Ahmed, Mohammed the conqueror of Constantinople, and Mahmoud ; and any one knows, who has visited Constantinople, how these mosques (with that one wrested from its original design and use as a Christian cathedral, St. Sophia, and which now forms the brightest gem of all in the crown of the Moslem's boasting) constitute, aside from the natural grandeur of its site, the glory of the city. The writer has lived for years in Constantinople, and repeatedly gazed at the whole city from every possible point of view ; and the image of the city now in my mind is chiefly that of these great historic monuments, at once of Islam conquest and the Islam faith. They overshadow everything. Their minarets, their domes, are seen from sea and gulf, and from the land on every side. They are preaching to the people in the morning, at noon, at evening, by sunlight and by moonlight, of the glory and power of Islam. No change comes over them. They, with the splendid tombs of their illustrious dead, seem above all possibility of decay. Europe may talk of the weakness of Turkey ; we may assert that Islam has had its day ; but the mosques of St. Sophia, of Ahmed, near it, of Soleyman (more grandly beautiful than either), and others only just inferior to these peerless temples, are standing in unchanged majesty, proclaiming loudly five times each day from their minarets, and silently all the day and all the night, from year to year, from age to age, from century to century,—who can tell with what all-controlling power to the masses of the adherents of Islam,—the glory, the abiding glory, of their faith, their history, their worship.

III. THE POWER OF ISLAM CONSISTS LARGELY IN ITS PECULIAR POLITY AND DISCIPLINE.

The use, in an ecclesiastical sense, of the words “polity” or “discipline” in reference to the Mohammedan religion is, of course, a use by accommodation ; for “ecclesiastical,” as distinguished and separate from “civil,” does not exist among

the devotees of that faith. The Roman Catholic church has furnished to the Christian world an impressive and striking example of the power of ecclesiastical dogmas, commands, and interdicts, when supported and made effective for the enslaving of men by a supreme and irresistible civil power. But the religion of the Moslems is indissolubly connected, rather it is fused and made indistinguishably one, with their duties to the state.

a. Islam has no strictly and distinctively religious officers.

This will appear, probably, a startling statement, and it is one I would not have ventured to make some years ago; but from what follows its truth will appear evident. There is, however, one singular exception; viz. the muezzin, that is, the man who calls the hours of prayer from the minaret. He is scarcely an officer at all, and frequently mere boys, with sonorous and clear voices, are appointed for this service. But the office or duty, such as it is, is strictly religious. There is another seeming exception, which is not a real one; and that is found in the large and numerous sects of Dervishes scattered all through Mohammedan countries. These sects present the singular spectacle of really religious, as distinguished from secular bodies, professedly Mohammedan, and, therefore, directly protected by Mohammedan governments, while really caring nothing either for Mohammed or his religion. These bodies fully recognize, and make much of, the ancient and Oriental distinction between the esoteric and exoteric, the initiated and the uninitiated; and asceticism, superstition, hypocrisy, religious pride, and the other abnormal phenomena of man's religious nature, find among them abundant and striking illustration. But they are only parasites on Mohammedanism, and do not at all show what that religion itself is, either in its doctrines, its worship, or its relations to man's social or civil life.

It will, of course, be expected, in a system where Islam is a state religion, that the king, the sultan, should have prerogatives of a religious as well as civil nature. It is well known that the sultan is the successor of the prophet. But

this idea is familiar to us even though in our own country no such relation exists. Everywhere else, in Christian countries, this idea would not be found foreign to the conceptions of the people.

We will now examine certain terms, and certain titles of office that are generally supposed, among us, to be appropriated to strictly religious duties :

(1) The term *Oolema* has been used as corresponding to "clergy" with us. In justification of this use, it is granted that the Turkish *Oolema*, as a body, are the intelligent, influential, and zealous supporters of the Mohammedan faith ; and that, educated as they are in Mohammedan learning, — the Koran, traditions, the Arabic language, etc., — they are the instructors of the masses of the people in the elements of the same learning. But the term in question means simply "the learned," and has no properly religious sense or application. Civil officers, equally with the so-called religious officers, come from the *Oolema*, and in the apprehension of Mohammedans themselves there is no religious sense to the term.

(2) The term *Mulla*. — This is a literary term, meaning "master," and is given to those pupils of the higher schools who have distinguished themselves in their studies, and is retained afterwards, as a title of distinction, when they become judges or teachers.

(3) *Sheikh ul Islam* and *Mufti*. — These terms, among us, are often supposed to be nearly correspondent to archbishop or primate, and bishop, respectively. It is supposed that the mufti, for example, hears and decides religious questions or causes on, and according to, the Koranic or religious law, while civil causes belong to the hakim or *cadi* (judge) ; but this is not the distinction. The difference is in the method of the inquiry and the grounds of the opinion given. The mufti hears any cause presented to him, and gives his opinion, somewhat as our grand jury does ; while it remains for the judge, as to our petit jury, to call witnesses, *pro* and *con*, and decide on the evidence. The opinion of the mufti is,

however, as a matter of fact, usually final in the great majority of cases presented to him. The cases, too, in which his opinion is sought, it should be observed, are often questions of casuistry, or of the interpretation of law; and the sheikh ul Islam is simply the first mufti of the empire, a very high officer of the government. His office is nearer that of our attorney-general than to any other known among us.

(4) The *Imam* or *priest*. — This is, perhaps, the most universal officer in Mohammedan countries. Every mosque, every quarter of every city, has an imam; and the officer is, partly, at least, a religious one. The care of the mosque, the leading of the devotions of the people in the mosque at the stated seasons, are among his duties. But he is also clerk or registrar of his quarter, attends funerals, both as priest and undertaker, performs marriages (marriage is not, with Moslems, a sacrament — not religious, but civil), etc.; and he has properly no concern with the strictly spiritual instruction of the people. There are, connected with the principal mosques, or itinerating from one to another, *preachers*; but they do not form a distinct office, and are not an essential to the Mohammedan system; they are from the number of the *Oolema*.

While, therefore, it appears that Islam has no strictly and exclusively religious officers, it is a fact, —

b. That all the officers of the Mohammedan state are officers of its faith, and every man, official or unofficial, is engaged for the establishment and preservation of “ecclesiastical” discipline.

The schools teach Arabic, the sacred language, and the tenets and customs of “the faith,” and, except the general schools lately established, they teach little else. There has grown up among the people, in the course of ages, such a “public sentiment” against defection from the national faith, that only the strongest motives which influence human action can avail to make a man break away from his religion. Moreover, to leave the national faith is to deny all one’s rights and duties as a citizen. The Osmanly is the ruling race. Its

religion is Islam. A man cannot drop his faith and keep his citizenship, any more than he could cut out his lungs and still breathe. And while the death-penalty for defection from Islam is formally abolished, and there live certain Christian Turks in the capital, yet they are considered as expatriated ; while every expedient, of persuasion, of intimidation, of interest, is used openly and secretly, officially and by friends and neighbors, to keep the ranks of the Moslems unbroken. Every man is, as regards his profession, and the public discharge of the prescribed duties of Islam, under the surveillance of all his neighbors ; and any dereliction is not a religious offence merely, but an offence against the state, a failure to meet one's duties as an Osmanly citizen.

Defection from Islam into infidelity, however, provided there remains the shell even of a profession of the national faith, is tolerated ; and instances of this are numerous and well known. This fact is another evidence that the Moslem cares little for his faith considered as a religion, while it makes it the more evident that he holds to it with the utmost tenacity considered as a symbol of that national glory and glory of conquest which is the proudest boast of his citizenship.

c. Islam makes no attempt to retain the heart-service of its devotees. Witness the numerous tribes of Kuzelbash Koords, who often curse Mohammed in secret, and to whom the Koran is no more than the Vedas. Witness the crowds of dervish sects. Witness the infidels of the present day, on the model of French infidelity. The same is true also in reference to those who have become convinced of the truth of evangelical Christianity. There are such men, some scores at least, known to us. But those who, in the face of all the opposition, have had the boldness to declare themselves Christians, and then live as Christians, are very few. Said a general in the army to a captain who had acknowledged himself a Christian : “ Be a Christian if you want to ; it is nobody's business what you are at heart, what you believe, but keep it to yourself. Be outwardly a Moslem, and you may be as devout

a Christian as you please at heart, and keep your place. I don't care for my religion any more than you do ; but if you declare yourself a Christian, I'll disgrace you." This fairly represents the sentiments of the great body. Said a gentleman, high in office in the government, to me : " With us, a man's religion, strictly speaking, is entirely a thing between himself and God ; no man and no power on earth has the right to interfere with it. It is only when what a man says or does publicly implicates him in some offence as a citizen that any authority can take hold of him." Very many would not accept language so strong as this, but doubtless it is not very far from correct as expressing the fact that the discipline of Islam concerns only the outward, and makes no claim to control the inner belief. At the same time it is manifest that the natural tendency of all this is, in the highest degree, demoralizing. It directly encourages, in fact it gives a premium to, hypocrisy, and makes its premium greatest when duplicity and hypocrisy are most artful and complete.

In conclusion, it is obvious to remark, although it is common to forget, that Islam is not heathenism. It differs most materially in its fundamental doctrines and in its entire cultus from heathenism. And Moslems themselves recoil with the greatest aversion from heathenism in every form. Again, while we must not suppose, because the Moslem is ready to receive from the Christian the superior benefits of his material civilization, that he is, therefore, ready to receive the Christian's faith ; and while, as yet, efforts for the conversion of Mohammedans have met with little encouraging and enduring result, still it must not be supposed that effort for the enlightenment of Moslems in reference to the saving truths of Christianity is vain ; unless, at the same time, we are prepared to limit the power of divine truth to races of men. Because Mohammedans have preferred their own faith to the corrupt Christianity which it superseded, is no reason why they will persist in preferring their own faith, when it has grown effete, to a Christianity truthfully taught and illustrated worthily by living examples.

Finally, it is fitting to observe that Christian faith, instructed by history, may fairly expect that when God has used the religion of the Arabian prophet, as he has long done, to shame and rebuke the unworthy and false representatives of Christianity who have lived side by side with Mohammedans, for as long a time as shall subserve his wise purposes of discipline or of punishment, he will make effective, by his providence and by his Spirit, the means used for the enlightenment and Christianization of the Moslem races, and greatly increase those means in volume and in spiritual power.

The power of Islam is yet to wane and fail before the power of Jesus and his gospel. The gospel is adapted to accomplish the destruction of that which opposes it. It waits the worthy exercise of faith on the part of the Christian church, and when that faith is so exhibited we may then be ready to see and acknowledge that the waiting on the part of God's providence was but apparent.

ARTICLE VII.

EDITORIAL CORRESPONDENCE.

THE RAWLINSON THEORY RESPECTING THE SITE OF UR OF THE CHALDEES.

We have received, and here insert extracts from, a letter of Rev. Lucien H. Adams, an excellent missionary of the A. B. C. F. M., who describes his recent tour in Mesopotamia, and his detention at the modern Oorfa. He believes that the ancient "Ur of the Chaldees" was *at or near* the present Oorfa. A theory, however, which about twenty years since was advocated by Sir Henry Rawlinson, and has been restated in Smith's Bible Dictionary by Rev. George Rawlinson, D.D., is that Abraham's birth-place was at least four hundred miles from Oorfa; that the patriarch was born in Mugheir, originally a seaport upon the Persian Gulf, but moved one hundred and twenty-five miles inland in consequence of alluvial deposits, and six miles from the Euphrates, upon its western bank, and that a tribe, including Abraham's family, migrated to Haran upon its way to Palestine. Mr. Adams objects to what he terms the Rawlinson theory, because it opposes a tradition of twenty centuries, opposes the opinions of many emi-

ment scholars, and renders it necessary to believe in an alluvial deposit extending a hundred and twenty miles, and not proved to be such by sufficient evidence. He says :

" Now we object to this location of Ur, because reason refuses to stride so far from premises to conclusion. Sir Henry Rawlinson claims that he found *Hur* written upon a cylinder in the mud of Mugheir, and claims that this was the same as *Ur*, and that it was the name of that locality, and being in Chaldea, ergo, it was Ur of the Chaldees. Now, notwithstanding all the manipulations of Hebrew and Arabic, we may reasonably question the avowal that *Hur* does mean *Ur*; or, if it does, it may have been the name of a king, of a festival, of a god, or anything but that of Ur of the Chaldees; indeed, what is more, not a few acute minds flatly reject all readings of Chaldean hieroglyphics, for reasons well stated a few years since in the *Edinburgh Review*.

" We object to this theory, because it requires us to believe that a tribe, including Abraham's family, crossing the Euphrates, travelled four hundred miles, mostly away from Palestine to Haran, to find pasturage. This theory of a 'tribe,' enables its advocates to account for Terah's wandering to so remote a locality as Haran. They say, 'robbers may have blocked up the road to the north-east,' for we read of such Chaldean gangs in Job i. 17. The only difficulty with this is, that Gen. xi. 31 tells us that precisely four persons migrated to Haran. Does this make a tribe? But if a tribe emigrated, would they not have been able to clear out the north-west road? Why, moreover, should not this tribe have kept along the east bank of the Euphrates, instead of making such a detour to Haran, when pasturage is so abundant near the Great River?

" We object to this theory, because it assumes that Chaldea never extended its authority over Mesopotamia. Its advocates say, in substance, that if Ur was in Mesopotamia, it could not be properly known as Ur of the Chaldees, 'for there is no evidence that Chaldea ever extended its authority over Mesopotamia,' and, therefore, the inference is, it never did." — But "the sway of Chaldea over Mesopotamia is a matter of which most scholars have no doubt. The Chaldeans were originally a race of shepherds in the mountains of Armenia, though others suppose they were the Carduchi of Xenophon, inhabiting the same regions. They descended into the plains of Mesopotamia, attracted by the superior grazing grounds, overpowering all opposition, and established one of the most warlike empires of antiquity.

"Whether they were the Carduchi or not, we care not to discuss; but Xenophon's formidable enemies might well sit for the picture Habakkuk (i. 6-10) draws of their mighty descendants or neighbors, the Chaldeans. 'Lo,' says God, 'I raise up the Chaldeans, that bitter and hasty nation, which shall march through the breadth of the land, to possess the dwelling-places that are not theirs,' etc. etc. Let the reader peruse the remainder

of the prophet's masterly delineation of Chaldean character, and remember that there are no natural boundaries, save the few Sanjar hills, between Mesopotamia and Chaldea, but all is a boundless plain from the country north of Mesopotamia to the Persian Gulf. Let him further consider that if, as Dr. Rawlinson admits, the Chaldeans, in all their invasions of the west, were obliged to cross the Euphrates as high up as Birdjik, then, if Mesopotamia was an independent power, the Chaldeans were obliged to draw all their re-enforcements, and often their supplies, through a country that might at any time turn to be their enemy, and cut off their communications, and then let the reader inquire if it is reasonable to suppose that Chaldea did not extend its sway over the little province of Mesopotamia. The kings of Chaldea were not endowed with such a fine moral sense as would induce them to respect an invisible line drawn through a limitless plain any longer than convenience would require.

"Nor is it any more credible to suppose that when the fierce warriors of Upper Armenia descended into the fertile plains of the Euphrates, and founded the Chaldean empire, they left Mesopotamia as an independent power in their rear, separating their newly established kingdom from their native hills.

"The reader will be slow to allow that Chaldean temper tolerated any such arrangement. If, then, Chaldea did extend its sway over Mesopotamia, there is not the least incongruity in calling Abraham's birth-place Ur of the Chaldees, because it was situated in a province inseparable from those contiguous to the capital of their empire.

"Finally, we object to the Rawlinson theory, because it stands opposed to scripture. — Dr. Rawlinson expressly says, 'Mesopotamia of the Jews included only the northern half of what is known by that name in modern times.' Now Joshua (xxiv. 3), and Stephen (Acts vii. 3), explicitly declare that Abraham dwelt 'beyond the flood,' and 'in Mesopotamia,' whereas, the above theory, according to Loftus's map, locates Ur of the Chaldees on the hither side of the Euphrates some six miles, and far down towards the Persian Gulf. Worse than this, most scholars suppose the Great River anciently joined the Tigris at Ku't el-Ameirâ, which would place their Ur of the Chaldees seventy-five miles west of the Euphrates.

"But Joshua lived within three hundred years of Abraham, and it follows that Joshua and Stephen did not know where Ur of the Chaldees was, and that the Rawlinson school do, or that the latter are mistaken, and the former are correct."

REMARKS ON THE PRECEDING LETTER, BY REV. SELAH MERRILL,
OF ANDOVER.

I. With regard to the name "Ur," the writer says: "If Hur does mean Ur it may have been the name of a king, of a festival, of a god, or anything but that of Ur of the Chaldees." In Assyrian, it is a well known fact

that when the name of a city is written ideographically it is followed by the syllable *ki*. By this we know that we are dealing with the name of a city, although we may not know how to pronounce it. But in this case the pronunciation is given. Let us suppose the ideograph to be represented by X followed by *ki*. These appear in one column. In the opposite column we find the phonetic value of the ideograph as follows :

X. *ki* I u-ru-u.

We are not saying now that "U-ru-u" had any connection with Chaldea, but simply that it is the name of a city, and only that, and cannot be "the name of a king, of a festival," or "of a god." Again, the writer, in the statement, "Sir Henry Rawlinson claims that he found Hur written upon a cylinder in the mud of Mugheir," is liable to be misunderstood. The reader would infer either that the name occurred but once, or that it was of rare occurrence, whereas it occurs numberless times on the bricks in the ruins of Mugheir. There can be no doubt that the ancient name of this city was "Ur" or "U-ru." But farther, we know certainly that this city was in Chaldea, and a good many facts are also known about it. For some centuries it was the capital of Babylonia, until Hammurabi moved the seat of government to Babylon. This king reigned not later than the sixteenth century, B.C., and probably somewhat earlier than that. His inscriptions show that the Babylonian language, with the exception of a few trifling archaisms, was the same then as it was a thousand or more years later, in the days of Nebuchadnezzar. In addition to its being the seat of government, it was the centre of learning. It had a famous library, where were stored up the treasures of science and religion, which the Assyrians afterwards borrowed and made their own. We even know the name of one of the librarians, or "men of the written tablets," as they were called, of this early period. The names of quite a number of its early kings have been preserved. Some of these are Turanian, others Elamite, and others still are Semitic. The earliest that has left any written monuments was Uruk. In his recent expedition Mr. George Smith found inscriptions belonging to another early king, named Dungi, who is placed at about 2000 B.C. (*Assyrian Discoveries*, p. 232). This early Babylonian or Chaldean monarchy lasted from B.C. 2500 to 1500. We have a definite date, namely, B.C. 2280, when the Chaldean kingdom was invaded by an Elamite army, and an image of the goddess Nana was carried off, which was restored by Assur-bani-pal, when he took Shushan, the Elamite capital, one thousand six hundred and thirty-five years afterwards. To recapitulate: 1. We have a city named "Ur." 2. It was the capital of the Chaldean empire for some centuries previous to the sixteenth century B.C. 3. It was a seat of learning, which would give it all the more importance in the history of the world at that time. Now if any city could lay claim to the title, "Ur of the Chaldees," the one we have been describing certainly had such a right. As the writer of the letter is combating

what he calls the "Rawlinson theory," we wish to add that we have written this note without any reference to the writings of either of the Rawlinsons, basing our remarks upon the later investigations and conclusions of three of the leading Assyriologists now living, namely, Smith, Sayce, and Schrader. It is significant that the independent investigations of these men should confirm the so-called "Rawlinson theory."

II. With regard to Chaldea, the writer of this letter confuses facts, because he fails to distinguish between the early and the late Chaldean empires. The Chaldean or Babylonian empire as known in the time of Abraham was an entirely different one from that known to Habakkuk. The two were separated by seven or eight centuries. Habakkuk had in mind only the late empire; hence what the writer of this letter says in connection with Habakkuk's words, can have no connection whatever with the early empire with which alone Abraham is concerned. About the origin of the Chaldeans too little is known to speak with definiteness. We know, however, that twenty-three centuries B.C. they were established in Chaldea (or Babylonia), with cities, a government, written laws, and a literature.

III. We think this "theory," so far from opposing scripture, decidedly illustrates and confirms both scripture and history. In very early times Semitic people are found living with the inhabitants of the old Chaldean empire. For some cause or other the Semitic people emigrated to the north and west. The Phoenicians, or *commercial* Semites, occupying the head of the Persian Gulf, migrated, and found their natural home on what was known subsequently as the Phoenician coast. The *building* Semites migrated and founded the cities which grew at last into the Assyrian empire (Gen. x. 11, 12). We learn from the tablets that the cities just referred to bore the relation of colonies to Babylonia in the nineteenth century B.C., and were governed by Babylonian officials, who bore the name of "patesi." Also in this century a temple was built at Nineveh in honor of a goddess who was worshipped in Babylonia. It was not till some centuries later that Assyria became independent of Babylonia. In addition to the waves of Semitic migration just mentioned, it is generally supposed that there was a third, namely, that of the *pastoral* Semites, represented by Abraham's family. But about the numbers we need not dispute, so long as we have the definite statement of scripture that Abraham's family came from "Ur of the Chaldees" to Haran, where they dwelt some time. Subsequently, when they "had gathered substance" and "gotten souls," they went "out of Haran" and came into the land of Canaan (Gen. xi. 31; xii. 5). Abraham's migration must have been previous to the colonizing of Assyria (Gen. x. 11, 12), and subsequent to the Phoenician migration. Not only are scripture and history illustrated by these facts, but certain problems connected with the languages of these nations are explained. 1. The almost perfect identity of the old Canaanite and Hebrew

languages (Abraham needed no interpreter in Canaan). 2. The very close relationship between the Hebrew-Canaanite language on the one hand, and the Assyrian-Babylonian on the other. Even the very name Abraham appears (Abu-ra-mu) in the latter as well as in the former.

IV. There is a serious philological objection to the theory that Abraham originated in Haran, or anywhere in Mesopotamia Proper. In one of the earliest notices of Haran in the inscriptions, Tiglath-Pilezer I. B.C. 1120-1100, it is called an Aramaic city (Aramaic = Syrian). Laban, we know, from Gen. xxvii. 5, was a Syrian. All the early notices we have of the tribes in the region which embraced Haran show them to have been Syrians whose language was Aramaic. But the Semitic dialects to which the Assyrian shows most affinity are the Hebrew and Phoenician; while the Aramaic is, of all the branches of the Semitic family, farthest removed from the Assyrian. Had Abraham originated in the upper Mesopotamia region his language would have been Aramaic; whereas, on the contrary, his language was Hebrew, closely related, as we have seen, to the Assyrian-Babylonian. It was not until after the overthrow of the late Babylonian empire, that Aramaic began to encroach upon Palestine and Chaldea; and then at first only as the language of commerce and diplomacy. It was not until quite late that it began to be the language of the common people.

V. The writer speaks of "twenty centuries of tradition" as if there were but one traditional site of Ur, and that this tradition had been universally held. But there are really four different traditions connected with Ur. One of these, however, is a mere opinion, and hardly deserves to be mentioned. But this opinion, together with one of the traditions, places Ur in the north. It is significant that both the traditions current among the Jews place Ur in the lower Euphrates region. One which appears in the Talmud places Ur at *Warka*. The other, dating from B.C. 150, places it at Ur, the present Mugheir. Doubtless the reader is aware that the two places just mentioned are less than fifty miles apart. The writer is hardly just to history in calling this theory "the Rawlinson theory." It should be said, also, that the so-called "Rawlinson theory" has received the endorsement of by far the majority of living Oriental scholars who have given the subject any attention.

In conclusion, it may be added that Mr. Adams deserves the gratitude of scholars for his literary enterprise in writing the preceding letter. He has invited attention to a subject of importance to geographers, and has given his own impressions while standing on the disputed ground. If men do not agree with him, they must respect him as an inquisitive and intelligent observer.

ARTICLE VIII.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

THE MINOR PROPHETS. Exegetically, Theologically, and Homiletically Expounded by Paul Bleinert, Otto Schmoller, George R. Bliss, Talbot W. Chambers, Charles Elliott, John Forsyth, J. Frederick McCurdy, and Joseph Packard. Edited by Philip Schaff, D.D. Royal 8vo. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Co. 1874.

THE BOOK OF JOB. A Rhythmical Version with Introduction and Annotations, by Prof. Tayler Lewis, LL.D., Union College, Schenectady. A Commentary by Otto Zöckler, D.D., Professor of Theology at Greifswald. Translated from the German, with Additions, by Prof. L. J. Evans, D.D., Lane Theological Seminary, Cincinnati, Ohio. Together with a General Introduction to the Poetical Books by Philip Schaff. Royal 8vo. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Co.

The first of these volumes forms the sixteenth, the second of them forms the seventh volume of Lange's series on the Old Testament. Like the preceding volumes they display a vast range of criticism. The learned theologian, the well-read pastor, the intelligent Sabbath-school teacher, may derive profit from these, as from the other parts of the series. The reader must discriminate, however, between that which is really sound and that which is fanciful in these Commentaries. They form in themselves a valuable library for the biblical student; but there is no library which is in all its parts exactly what we would have it. The difference between these Commentaries and that of Meyer is very great, and yet both the works will contribute much to our knowledge of the Bible.

NOTES, CRITICAL AND EXPLANATORY, ON THE BOOK OF EXODUS.

From Egypt to Sinai. By Melancthon W. Jacobus, Professor of Biblical Literature and Exegesis in the Theological Seminary at Alleghany, Pa. 18mo. pp. 186. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers. 1874.

This is a Commentary on the first eighteen chapters of Exodus. We have had occasion before to speak of Dr. Jacobus's labors as a commentator, and have felt justified in using language of high commendation. The Notes on Exodus deserve to be spoken of in similar terms. The work, as might be expected, takes high evangelical ground, and meets manfully the objections which infidels are wont to urge against the book of Exodus. It

must, we think, always hold a high place in that most useful class of works to which it belongs.

BIBLICAL COMMENTARY ON THE PROVERBS OF SOLOMON. By Franz Delitzsch, D.D., Professor of Theology. Translated from the German by M. G. Easton, D.D. Vol. I. 8vo. pp. 372. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark; New York: Scribner, Welford, and Armstrong.

In his preface to this work Dr. Delitzsch confesses his obligations to Prof. Fleischer, whose manuscript lectures are in the hands of Delitzsch; and also to a generally unknown work of Prof. Wetzstein; "to the Commentary of the Caraites Ahron b. Joseph (1294) which was printed at Koslow (Eupatoria) 1835"; "to the Commentary by the Roman poet Immanuel (born at Rome about 1265), who was intimately associated with Dante, printed at Naples in 1487, and equal in value to a ms."; "to the Commentary of the Spanish Menachem b. Salomo Meiri (1447)"; to Villoison's edition of the Graecus Venetus (1784), and especially to the only existing ms. of this translation found in Venice, which discloses many false readings and many omissions in Villoison's printed edition. We make this statement merely for the purpose of indicating the singular extent of Dr. Delitzsch's erudition. On pp. 50 and 51 he names or alludes to the books which are more generally cited in Commentaries on the Proverbs, and throughout the volume he displays his great knowledge of the Rabbinical literature. The church is under great obligation to him for his comprehensive learning, and the zeal and industry with which he publishes the results of it. He is admirably fitted for writing a Commentary on the Proverbs of Solomon.

THEOLOGY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. By Dr. Gust. Fr. Oehler, late Professor Ordinarius of Theology in Tübingen. Vol. I. Translated by Ellen D. Smith. 8vo. pp. 428. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark; New York: Scribner, Welford, and Armstrong.

From the Editor's preface it appears that twenty-eight years ago Dr. Oehler expressed his intention to publish a Hand-book of Old Testament Theology; that he published considerable portions of his intended work in Herzog's Realencyclopädie and in other publications, but that the present work as a whole must be regarded as posthumous. It is prepared from the manuscript lectures of Dr. Oehler, from the fragments which he published during his life, and from various note-books of his pupils. Still the present volume has a very commendable degree of unity.

The author gives the following definition of biblical theology: he says it "is distinguished from the systematic statements of biblical doctrine by this: that while the latter seeks out the unity of divine saving truth which flows from the whole course of revelation, and the sum of its manifestation, the former, on the other hand, has the task of delineating the biblical

religion according to its progressive development, and the multiplicity of the forms in which it appears. The theology of the Old Testament has therefore to follow the gradual progress by which Old Testament revelation advances to the completion of salvation in Christ; and it has to bring into view from all sides the forms in which, under the old covenant, the communion between God and man found its expression" (pp. 7, 8).

German writers in treating of the special theologies, as, for example, the theology of the Old Testament, of the New Testament, or of Paul or John or James, are tempted to make many distinctions where there are no differences, and sacrifice facts to theories. We cannot say that Dr. Oehler is free from this fault, but he is more free from it than are many of his co-laborers in this department of study. Only the first volume of his work is published; the second will appear ere long. Both of them will doubtless form a treatise of rare worth. In the present volume there are many profound thoughts finely expressed.

AN EXAMINATION OF THE ALLEGED DISCREPANCIES OF THE BIBLE.

By John W. Haley, M.A. With an Introduction by Alvah Hovey, D.D., Professor in the Newton Theological Institution. 12mo. pp. 436. Andover: Warren F. Draper; Boston: Estes and Lauriat. 1874.

Having spent many hours on this work, we feel prepared to commend it highly. It is obviously the result of severe and conscientious study. To a literary man it is interesting as illustrating the different modes in which the same thought may be expressed. To a theologian it is useful as developing the harmony of passages which seem to contradict each other. To a preacher it is eminently suggestive, as it presents vivid contrasts in the one scheme of Biblical truth. These contrasts when exhibited in a sermon have often a magnetic influence. They are like the positive and negative poles of an electrical battery, which need both to be present, and to work even against each other seemingly, in order to the production of the most complete effects. Mr. Haley we hope will be rewarded for his assiduous toil in preparing this book. It is the fruit of extensive reading as well as careful thought.

THE RELATIONS OF THE KINGDOM TO THE WORLD. By J. Oswald Dykes, D.D. 18mo. pp. 210. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers. 1874.

This is the third and concluding portion of Dr. Dykes' work on the Sermon on the Mount; the two former parts bearing respectively the titles of the Beatitudes and the Laws of the Kingdom. It treats, in the first place, of the relations of the kingdom to the world as a possession, and in a very vigorous manner sets forth the duty of abstinence from a covetous spirit. In the second part it discourses on the relation of the kingdom to evil. It dwells on a variety of topics connected with this general subject;

such, for instance, as the best method of correcting and escaping the evils of the world. It will be at once apparent that if these topics are discussed in a way correspondent to their great moment, the scope of the book is a very important one.

ISRAEL IN EGYPT. Egypt's Place among the Ancient Monarchies. With more than two hundred Illustrations. By Edward L. Clark. 8vo. pp. 352. New York: Nelson and Phillips; Cincinnati: Hitchcock and Walden. 1874.

This book will be likely to attract readers by the elegance of its typography and its beautiful pictorial illustrations, if for no other reason. It has, however, in our judgment, stronger claims than these on the reader's attention. Its aim is to give an idea of the social, the political, and the religious state of Egypt during the interval between the Exodus and the time of Christ. Its materials are derived mainly from the study of the architectural and monumental remains of ancient Egypt and the hieroglyphical inscriptions with which these are covered. The work is entertaining and contains much valuable information. There is, now and then, an appearance of extreme elaborateness, and even affectation, in its style, such as we are sorry to see. It has other blemishes also.

TELEGRAPH AND TRAVEL. A Narrative of the Formation and Development of Telegraphic Communication between England and India, under the Orders of Her Majesty's Government; with Incidental Notices of the Countries traversed by the Lines. By Colonel Sir Frederic John Goldsmid, C.B., K.C.S.I. With Maps and Numerous Illustrations. 8vo. pp. xiv., 673. London: Macmillan and Co. 1874.

This volume contains really three separate works, each of which is of great value and interest: (1) A Memoir of Colonel Patrick Stewart, who was identified with the early history and success of the overland telegraph; (2) Ten Years of Telegraphic History, in connection with the lines between England and India; (3) An interesting book of travels in but little known countries, made for the purpose of surveying the routes for the telegraph. A copious index, together with valuable maps, and nearly fifty drawings and illustrations from photographs, add to the value of the work.

In the Appendix to the volume (p. 629) is a beautiful letter from the late Dr. Livingstone to Colonel Stewart's brother, written at the time of Colonel Stewart's death. A few words from the letter, which is dated Feb. 11, 1865, will introduce this noble young man far better than any words of our own. He says: "I was deeply moved when I read the sad news of your dear brother's death. I noticed the tear in his brotherly eye when he parted with you on the ship's deck at Bombay, and liked

him for it; and I liked him still more when, in the voyage, I came to know him better. . . . I never liked one more in so short a time. He was exceedingly lovable, and, I feel sure, has gone to the regions of love, where his qualities of mind and heart will have full development in a higher and nobler sphere. You must excuse my writing thus. It is out of the fulness of my heart." Scarcely thirty-three when he died, his life may be said to have been long, laborious, and useful. He occupies a prominent place in that company of heroic men who — whether in religion, science, commerce, or war — by their Christian character, as well as achievements, have both honored their mother country and shed lustre upon their kind. He was brave, sometimes reckless, enterprising, persevering, indifferent to hardship and exposure, and thoroughly cultivated, genial, and Christian in his character. His labors in connection with the overland telegraph were sufficient to place him among the worthiest of England's sons. Lord Canning said of him: "There is no one with such pleasant good manners, or more agreeable society, or more unspoiled." The Governor-General of India and Sir Colin Campbell recognized the superior merits of the young officer, and were constantly warning him, during the Sepoy rebellion, *not to get shot if he could help it*. His overtaxed system yielded to disease at last; and he died at Constantinople, in January, 1865, just as the telegraph for which he had labored with such zeal was completed.

The services of young Stewart were invaluable in the mutiny, in connection with the telegraph as related to the movements of the army. The difficulties his force labored under were immense. The correspondent of the London Times of those days said: "At one time they are chased by the enemy's cavalry; at another time they are attacked and nearly cut to pieces; or, again, their electric batteries are smashed by the fire of a gun, or their cart knocked to pieces by a round shot; but still they work on, creep over arid plains, across watercourses, span rivers, and pierce jungles, till one after another the rude poles raise aloft their slender burden, and the quick needle vibrates, with its silent tongue, amid the thunder of the artillery" (p. 45). The mutiny taught England that she needed direct telegraphic communication with India. The government decided that this national want ought to be supplied at any cost, and with the least possible delay. Consequently efforts were set on foot; careful surveys were made of the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and throughout Beloochistan, Persia, and Asiatic Turkey; and, after repeated attempts and some partial failures, and many almost insurmountable obstacles had been overcome, the work was accomplished, so that in 1870 there were three lines between the two countries — one by the Atlantic, Mediterranean, Red Sea, and Arabian Gulf; another by way of Constantinople, Asiatic Turkey, and the Persian Gulf; and another through Russia and Persia. Now what occurs in Bombay or Calcutta in the

evening is sent to London, and appears in the papers the next morning. Since 1870, lines have been extended beyond India to China, Japan, and Australia. The line through Russia and Persia, being the most eastern, and being connected with the lines to the far East, receives the bulk of the traffic which goes by the overland lines. It should be said, however, that the all-marine line does more business than the two overland lines combined.

The time for the transit of a message between India and England was from six to seventeen days during the first years of the existence of the line, owing to provoking delays in Turkey and Persia ; but the time is now reduced to an average of three hours and nine minutes, which is good for average time, considering the countries and seas that the lines traverse ; while many messages pass from end to end of the line in a few minutes. A few facts as to the receipts and expenditures of these various lines may be of interest. The line *via* Turkey averaged, in round numbers, from 1865 to 1870, £92,000 per annum for earnings, against £87,000 per annum for expenditure. Since 1870, powerful rival companies have been established, which take the bulk of the traffic. But the earnings of the oldest and least patronized line, to which we have just referred, were about £65,000 for 1873-74, with an expenditure of about the same amount ; so that this line paid expenses. The tariff on a through message of twenty words has varied at different times. From 1865 to 1868 it was £5. On the first of January, 1869, it was reduced to £2 17s. This being then the only line, with a good business, the company could afford to lower the rates. In 1871, owing to the fact that rival lines were established, the tariff was raised to £4 10s. By an agreement effected at an international conference held at Berne, the price which has prevailed since July, 1872, is £3 15s. *via* Turkey, and £4 either *via* Teheran or *via* the Red Sea. But the patrons of the lines, by using certain signs, one of which often represents a whole sentence, have reduced their messages to five or six words ; and a system of what is called " packing " has sprung up, by which the high tariff is avoided, much to the injury of the companies, who are making arrangements to break it up. For instance, a packer collects four messages, of five words each, at, say 5s. per word, puts them into one message of twenty words, and sends the latter to his agent for £4, thus clearing by the transaction £1, less his working expenses ; and each of the senders saving £2 15s.

Telegraphic lines between England and India are now an established fact. They are recognized as a blessing in which the whole world shares. But, in face of this fact, it is curious to recall the opposition which the project met with at first. The natural obstacles to be overcome were great. Unknown rivers, seas, and lands had to be explored ; wild tribes had to be encountered, who frequently destroyed the posts and wires ; and weak, corrupt, and jealous governments, which often

broke their pledges and failed to fulfil their contracts, had to be persuaded and conciliated. Then there were unavoidable mishaps and partial failures, arising from inexperience in the art of constructing cables. These obstacles alone were sufficient to tax the skill and energy of the ablest men. Yet, in addition to all this, those on whom the success of the work depended had to face the jealousies of individuals, and the charges of the public press that the money of the government was being squandered, and the doubts which the newspapers had awakened in the popular mind as to the final success of the scheme.

Sir Frederic Goldsmid, Major Champain, the Messrs. Siemens, — not less, perhaps, than Colonel Stewart, — are to be regarded as the world's benefactors, in establishing by their persevering and often hazardous efforts these telegraphic lines between two of the most important portions of the globe.

But perhaps the most interesting part of the volume is the portion devoted to travel. Sir Frederic Goldsmid is an agreeable guide, whether through lands that are well or but little known. He never dwells on places and scenes and routes that have been described by others, but only on those that are unfamiliar. Besides, he has the rare gift of saying just the right words, and stopping at the moment when the description has become a perfect picture. One never tires of his account of places and scenes. While being constantly entertained, we are also instructed, whether we are in Beloochistan, the desolate portions of Persia, or amid its gardens and orange groves, in Russia or Asia Minor, on the Persian Gulf, the Tigris, the Caspian Sea, or the Volga. It is gratifying, further, to know that he is a devout man — one who respects the Sabbath, and who has a sympathetic appreciation of the labors of the American missionaries whom he met at the different mission stations on his various routes. We would like to cull out the kind things he has said of them, and have them published and circulated among the missionaries as cheering words. We can do little more than follow him, in imagination, from one interesting point or scene to another. For instance, we learn about the commerce of the Volga, on which float four hundred steamers; also about the shipping on the Caspian, the roads between the Caspian and the Black Seas, and the proposed railroads into Central Asia (506, 520); we spend a delightful Sunday with him in connection with the American missionaries at Yazgut (462); enjoy the discomforts of Asiatic hotels at Astrakhan (518); drink with him the clear, cold water of the river Zab (famous in the Assyrian inscriptions), when the thermometer is 96° in the shade (420); are astonished at the large blocks of ice for sale for a mere trifle in Diarbekir, in the latter part of June (436); watch with interest the natives of Beloochistan in their hunting of locusts, which they boil and salt for eating (609); hunt wild boars on the banks of the Tigris (396); take a look at the tomb of Ezra, and at "the alleged site of the Garden of Eden" (395, 396);

search for antiquarian relics with the Jews in Bagdad (410); and notice that many of the *tumuli* of the Tigris — ruins of once splendid Assyrian cities and temples — are covered with rich wheat to the very top (421). We read with him Afghanistan news, and discussions of Central Asian politics in the native newspaper published in Kurachee (589); learn that *Vanity Fair* and *Pickwick*, which are said to be excellent in Russian, are enjoyed by the literati of Astrakhan (516); and listen attentively when he tells us that “the Persian language should have a charm for all students, its grammar is so plain and so intelligible and its words are so musical; but its authors are untranslatable” (546). We visit the marvellous naphtha wells and fires at Baku, on the Caspian (524–529), and learn that it is abundant below Shiraz also, and could be made very profitable (184); we learn, further, that copper and coal are found near Kerman (591), and lead and copper at Tokat (441); we visit, also, the Russian cotton-mills at a certain town between Moscow and Vladimir (489), and the cotton-fields not only in Asia Minor (465, 471), but in various parts of Persia (569, 579); we observe the exquisite shawls and carpets of Kerman (583), and learn the details of their manufacture (586); we notice “the graceful silk-tree,” and the manufactures from the silk (534, 571); then we are told that to understand Persian paintings it is essential to have seen Persian scenery and gardens and vegetation (534), are shown how many portions of Persia might become wealthy and flourishing, if the government would encourage agriculture and reward honest labor with land-grants (598), and learn many interesting details with regard to the famous goats and wool of Angora (468); we are made aware, in numberless ways, of the weakness and corruption of the Persian government, and get some insight into the strength and weaknesses of the Turkish army (429); we are introduced to the simplicity and comparative happiness of certain Kurdish families, and enjoy some sunrise scenes of surpassing splendor among the Kurdish mountains (445). Indeed, turn where we will, we cannot but be interested in this strange world, with its strange scenes, its gardens, plantations, orange-groves, its wealth of flowers, its scenery of every climate and description, its snowy mountains and plains of salt and sand, its Persia, once to English poets a fairy-land, and, not least, its landscapes that unfold their beauties to the eye from its hundred hill-tops.

S. M.

THE WORKS OF AURELIUS AUGUSTINE, BISHOP OF HIPPO. A new translation. Edited by the Rev. Marcus Dods, D.D. Vol. XI. Lectures or Tractates on the Gospel according to St. John, Vol. II. 8vo. pp. 558. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 1874.

In reading this Commentary we are reminded of the frequency with which the sayings of Augustine have been repeated by modern interpreters of the Bible. Many of his thoughts are bright and deep, although intermingled with some which posterity would willingly let die.

THE WORKS OF AURELIUS AUGUSTINE, BISHOP OF HIPPO. A new translation. Edited by the Rev. Marcus Dods, D.D. Vol. XII. The Anti-Pelagian Works of St. Augustine, Vol. II. 8vo. pp. 339. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 1874.

No man ever understood the history of doctrine without understanding the works of Augustine, and especially his writings against Pelagianism. We are, therefore, happy to see that so large a portion of his works is to be published in our own language.

A special edition of these works of Augustine has been imported by Scribner, Welford, and Armstrong for use in this country; the price of which is \$3.00.

DICTIONARY OF SECTS, HERESIES, ECCLESIASTICAL PARTIES, AND SCHOOLS OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT. Edited by the Rev. John Henry Blunt, M.A., F.S.A., Editor of the "Dictionary of Doctrinal and Historical Theology" and the "Annotated Book of Common Prayer," etc., 8vo. pp. 648. London, Oxford, and Cambridge: Rivingtons. 1874.

This new work of a well-known author is one of great value. It is especially convenient for the study table of a theologian. The Index is quite imperfect. The notices of American authors are defective and meagre, some of them also are inaccurate. Under the head of "Necessitarians" our author notices Hobbes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Anthony Collins, and Dr. Priestley. After the mention of Priestley he says, "About the same time the writings of an American divine, which were of a more popular character than those of Priestley, began to be known in England, and helped to spread the doctrine of Necessity among Socinians without and within the Church. This writer was Jonathan Edwards, President of Princeton College [A.D. 1703-1758], who, towards the close of his life, had printed two works, entitled, *An Enquiry into the Freedom of the Will*, and *on the Doctrine of Original Sin*. Since Priestley there has been no writer of distinction among those who have maintained the doctrine of Necessity; but it has been extensively held by the Unitarians and the Rationalists. [Copleton's *Inquiry into Necessity*, etc.]" The inaccuracies of this notice are obvious at a glance.

THE BIBLE REGAINED, AND THE GOD OF THE BIBLE OURS; or, the System of Religious Truth in Outline. By Samuel Lee. Boston: Lee and Shepard. 1874.

This duodecimo of two hundred and eighty-five pages is from the pen of an author already known by a work upon Eschatology, in which the following views were maintained: that the "coming of the Son of Man" refers to the coming of the promised Messiah "to establish the kingdom of heaven"; that the "coming and appearing of the Lord," refers to the manifestation of Christ to his disciples after his inauguration in the

spiritual world as Lord and Head over all things to the church"; a manifestation made to believers at their death. The resurrection is the "future life."

The present work is designed to present the whole "system of religious truth in outline." The reader is desired to take the word "system" here as emphatic. "The doctrines of this volume are those essentially of our venerable fathers," save that the author holds that "all the conditions for the development of moral character are to be found in that other world as in this." He again describes it as his aim "to furnish a consistent substitute" for "the old Calvinism, and a more satisfactory statement" of the "truths included in Christianity." The reader, if looking through the book with care, would soon begin to find his attention caught by statements like these: "Penalty is [not] an element in moral government"—the moral government of God (p. 18). "The doctrine of three persons in one God" is "supremely absurd" (p. 18). "The future world" is "the great theatre on which the Saviour is to employ his grace for the redemption of our race" (p. 19). "By the fall" "the Sabbath," "like marriage, was lost, till restored ages afterwards" (p. 33). "The 'Ten Commandments,' as such, are abolished" (p. 35).

Turning to the chapter on "The Messiah," we read, "At the burning bush and at Sinai there was an exhibition of physical omnipotence. The great manifestation through Jesus was of the moral in God, with its moral power upon man. First, the power was exerted upon Jesus himself. God did not use the man Jesus as a *thing*; he won his heart by a *moral power*, and he then became a co-worker with God" (p. 113). This theory of the person of Christ is argued at some length.

We think that we have gone far enough to indicate the independence of our author, and to furnish a hint as to how far he is successful in presenting, "essentially," "the doctrines of our venerable fathers," and "a more satisfactory statement" of Christian truth. We should be glad to add that the book interests us; but it does not.

D. P. N.

DELIVERY AND DEVELOPMENT OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE. The Fifth Series of the Cunningham Lectures. By Robert Rainy, D.D., Professor of Divinity and Church History, New College, Edinburgh. 8vo. pp. 406. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 1874.

There are men now, just as there always have been, who on different grounds doubt the possibility of doctrine; who question the right either of an individual or a church to reduce the contents of revelation to certain definite forms, and to insist on the acceptance of these as embodying the teachings of inspiration. The object of Professor Rainy in these Lectures is to unfold the manner in which doctrine is developed in the Old and New Testaments, and to lay down certain principles by which one who

attempts to deduce doctrinal statements from the scriptures should be governed, and also the limits within which all such attempts should be confined. Occasion is necessarily found to discuss the very important question of the possibility of doctrine, and the expediency and usefulness of creeds. The scope of these Lectures will be admitted by every one to be important in the extreme. We cannot affirm that the expectations with which we began the perusal of them have been fully met. They are, however deserving of study, both for what they actually contain, and for what they suggest. There is a certain degree of haziness about the style of the book, by which we are afraid its usefulness will be a good deal abridged.

CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY FOR THE PEOPLE. By Willis Lord, D.D., LL.D., late President of the University of Wooster. 8vo. pp. 623. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers. 1875.

We are glad to see a new treatise on theology. A great demand of the present day is for more systematic, doctrinal instruction. The people need this instruction; hence the felicity of Dr. Lord's title, "Christian Theology for the People." The author hopes that the volume "may be of service to students in theology, and to some of his brethren in the ministry." In many respects the treatise is well adapted to the wants of the people. It fails in logical arrangement, definiteness of language, and precise accuracy of statement. It has the characteristics of a compilation rather than of an original treatise. It would be far more luminous if, instead of multiplying proofs and illustrations, it had developed the *nature* of its arguments and shown the *point* of its illustrations. A few sentences, taken almost at random, will indicate the meaning of the preceding criticisms. "A miracle is a work or an effect wrought by the power of God supernaturally exerted" (p. 83). According to this definition regeneration is a miracle.

Among the miracles proving the divine origin of the Bible, Dr. Lord notices the fact that "at the word of Joshua the sun stood still upon Gibeon. "All the laws and forces of nature were operating to press the sun on its way" (p. 83). The nature of this miracle ought to have been explained. Dr. Lord seems to consider it an actual suspension of the law of gravitation.

Our author defines revelation to be "that body of communications from God to men supernaturally given and contained in the Bible" (p. 73.) He afterwards defines inspiration "conceived of as distinct from revelation," to be "that specific action or influence of God on the minds of his servants, which enabled them infallibly to transfer to others, in spoken or written words, the revelation they had received" (pp. 96, 97). But in treating of revelation he makes various remarks which are pertinent to merely what he calls inspiration, and in treating of inspiration he

makes various remarks which are pertinent to merely what he calls revelation. He does not observe his own distinction, and the distinction itself, as he gives it, is unwarranted. Dr. Lord says that the governmental view of the atonement "gives up the infinite righteousness of God as an essential and immutable perfection of his nature"; that according to the governmental view, "sin is punished, not for its demerit, or because it deserves to be; it is punished to benefit the universe. The sinner becomes thus, instead of a sinner, a martyr or a hero" (pp. 366, 367). Similar misapprehensions of important theories characterize several parts of Dr. Lord's volume.

THE HEALING WATERS OF ISRAEL; or The Story of Naaman the Syrian. An Old Testament Chapter in Providence and Grace. By J. R. Macduff, D.D., author of "Morning and Night Watches," "Memories of Bethany," "The Shepherd and His Flock," etc., etc. 12mo. pp. 300. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers. 1874.

We very much value those books in which the divine origin of all parts of the Bible being assumed, an attempt is made to draw out the rich fund of moral and religious truth with which such portions of the Bible as are comparatively unimportant, are yet full. Not unaware of certain hazards to which those who would write such books are exposed, we still esteem them highly. This book belongs to this class, and it has all the merit belonging to its class. It may be earnestly commended to all serious-minded readers.

MEMORIAL VOLUME. — SERMONS BY THE LATE ROBERT S. CANDLISH, D.D., Minister of Free St. George's, and Principal of the New College, Edinburgh. With a Biographical Preface. 12mo. pp. 315. New York: R. Carter and Brothers. 1874.

The recent death of Dr. Candlish awakens the most interesting associations. At once it calls up the names of Robert Burns, Edward Irving, Thomas Chalmers, Andrew Thompson, and a host of younger men; such as Cunningham, Hamilton, Guthrie, and many others. The peculiar power of Dr. Candlish it will be difficult for posterity to estimate. He excelled as a debater in the church courts. The matter, the phraseology, the delivery, of his speeches, all combined to produce a great effect upon his hearers. His published volumes fail to give a full idea of his eminent power. These volumes are entitled: Discourses on the Sonship and Brotherhood of Believers, and other kindred subjects; the First Epistle of John, 2 vols.; the Fatherhood of God, 2 vols.; the Book of Genesis, a Series of Discourses, 2 vols.; Life in a Risen Saviour; Scripture Characters; The Christian's Sacrifice and Service of Praise, or, the Two Great Commandments; the Atonement, its Efficacy and Extent; Reason and Revelation; the Relative Duties of Home Life; Bethany, or, Comfort in Sorrow

and Hope in Death. The Present is entitled Memorial Volume, and contains eighteen discourses. They are written in his usual style, adapted to be spoken rather than read. They abound with rich truths, expressed felicitously as well as forcibly. The declamatory style of the sermons would have been diminished by omitting many needless repetitions of the same phrase. Thus the text of his second sermon, "the Man Christ Jesus," is repeated nearly seventy times, and partially repeated, so as to be plainly referred to, much more frequently. With Dr. Candlish's peculiar elocution this frequent reference to his text was impressive; on the printed page it becomes monotonous.

STRENGTH AND BEAUTY. Discussions for Young Men. By Mark Hopkins, D.D. 8vo. pp. 361. New York: Dodd and Mead.

The numerous admirers of President Hopkins will welcome this volume. The eminent author gives us no preface to his work. The Essays contained in the book were evidently delivered to his college classes; whether they were originally given in the form of Essays or Sermons we cannot always tell. In either case they show to the full extent the merits of Dr. Hopkins, both as a thinker and writer. They are condensed, pointed, and interesting, characterized by the profundity of thought and brilliancy of imagination peculiar to the author. The Essays are remarkable in their suggestiveness, and no intelligent man, we are confident, could read them without, in his own mind, developing original thoughts. A spirit of love breathes through them, and in every sentence we see not only the intellectual greatness, but the ripe Christian character, of the Essayist. Seldom have we seen a work better adapted to influence young men; and we no longer wonder at the love and reverence with which Dr. Hopkins is regarded by his pupils. The book is not designed merely for the educated, and we wish that all intelligent young persons in the country might get the benefit of it. Among these Essays, so nearly equal in interest and presenting so wide a variety of topics, it is difficult to make comparisons. We will say, however, that the opening discussion upon "Strength and Beauty," and the concluding one entitled "The One Exception," possess peculiar interest. The Essay upon "The Manifoldness of Man," and upon "Perfect Love" are worthy of special note. We are glad to say also that the publishers have performed their part in a creditable manner, and presented in an attractive form so excellent a book.

HISTORY OF THE MISSIONS OF THE AMERICAN BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR FOREIGN MISSIONS IN INDIA. By Rufus Anderson, D.D., LL.D., lately Foreign Secretary of the Board. 12mo. pp. 443. Boston: Congregational Publishing Society. 1874.

The American churches have certainly much occasion for gratitude in view of the fact that Dr. Anderson has been able to prepare the very

valuable series of histories, of which the one now before us, we are sorry to have to say, must be considered as the last. These histories could have been written by no one in a manner so entirely satisfactory as they have been by him. We have read this book with an interest peculiarly strong, because it gives us a view of the missionary enterprise in its incipient stage, when it had to contend against obstacles which now, happily, no longer exist. Upon the worth of this book we certainly need not enlarge. No assertions of ours could deepen the impressions of this worth in any reader's mind. It, and the series of which it forms a part, should be read by every one who is capable of finding pleasure in the works of the Lord.

THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER OF THE REFORMED EPISCOPAL CHURCH; adopted, and set forth for use, by the Second General Council of the said Church, held in the City of New York in the Month of May, 1874. 16mo. pp. 588. Philadelphia: James A. Moore. 1874.

This book of Common Prayer differs, in various particulars, from that used by the Episcopal churches in Great Britain and the United States. It is founded, mainly, upon the "Prayer Book of 1785," and omits many phrases which are retained in the Prayer Book of 1789, the book now used in the Episcopal church of this country. It omits the phrases to which the Episcopalians of the Low church have often made objection. Some of the alterations made in this book may be noticed hereafter. The principles on which the book is prepared are stated at length in a pamphlet entitled *Declaration of Principles of the Reformed Episcopal Church*, adopted December 2d, 1873. The pamphlet is an interesting one.

THE ANCIENT CITY: A Study of the Religion, Laws, and Institutions of Greece and Rome. By Fustel De Coulanges. Translated from the latest French edition by Willard Small. 12mo. pp. 529. Boston: Lee and Shepard; New York: Lee, Shepard, and Dillingham. 1874.

An attempt is made in this book to develop the principles and rules in accordance with which society among the Greeks and Romans was governed. There was a radical difference, it is maintained, between the structure of society among the Greeks and Romans and the structure of modern society; a difference so thorough and radical as to render perfectly futile all attempts to shape modern society into a likeness with that of the Greeks and Romans. The peculiarities of Greek and Roman society are to be traced to the peculiar religious ideas of these nations; and it is impossible to understand the former if one is ignorant of the latter. The object of the book is to develop these peculiar religious notions, and to show how they operated in shaping the domestic and political institutions of the nations among whom they prevailed. This object is worked out in an interesting manner, whatever may be thought of the value of the conclusions to which it aims to conduct the reader.

GREAT CHRISTIANS OF FRANCE.—SAINT LOUIS AND CALVIN. By M. Guizot, Member of the Institute of France. 12mo. pp. 362. Macmillan and Co.

"The thirteenth and the seventeenth centuries are the two noblest and fairest epochs of French Catholicism. The sixteenth, and the beginning of the seventeenth, are the two noblest and fairest periods of French Protestantism." Guizot has selected Saint Louis, or Louis IX., and John Calvin as the two best representatives respectively of Catholicism and Protestantism during these periods. The sketches which he gives are lively and interesting. An intelligent reader might, perhaps, have some doubt whether Guizot would present a complete and altogether faithful picture of John Calvin's life and labors, whatever the case might be as to Louis IX. Nevertheless, the book is well worth reading in order to see how differently a Frenchman and an Anglo-American would represent the same character.

THE CATACOMBS OF ROME, AND THEIR TESTIMONY RELATIVE TO PRIMITIVE CHRISTIANITY. By the Rev. W. H. Withrow, M.A. 12mo. pp. 560. New York: Nelson and Phillips; Cincinnati: Hitchcock and Walden. 1874.

To those who are not familiar with the history and present state of the Roman Catacombs, this volume will be interesting as well as instructive. It contains the results of personal examination, and is written with care. It abounds with graphic pictorial illustrations. The author acknowledges his special obligations to Rev. Dr. McCaul of Toronto, Canada, and also to the Cavaliere De Rossi's *Roma Sotterranea* and *Inscriptiones Christianae*. The work is divided into three books: I. On the Structure and History of the Catacombs; II. The Art and Symbolism of the Catacombs; III. The Inscriptions of the Catacombs. The second section of the third book is on the Doctrinal Teachings of the Inscriptions. This chapter will be regarded by many as the most important in the volume.

The inscriptions on the gravestones found in the Catacombs are generally supposed to be of a religious character. The following extract from this volume shows that there were many exceptions to this rule: "During the latter part of the fourth and the beginning of the fifth century, the management of the Catacombs seems to have been no longer in the hands of the ecclesiastical authorities, but under the control of the fossors, with whom the bargain for interment was made by the friends of the deceased. Numerous inscriptions occur in which this bargain is recorded, together with the names of the buyers and sellers, and sometimes those of the witnesses to the contract, and even the price that was paid, as in the following examples: 'It is unquestionable that we, Jan-narius and Britia, bought a place in front of [the tomb of] Lady Emerita

from the fossors Burdo, Micinus, and Muscus for the consideration of one solidus and a half of gold' (about \$7.00). 'The place bought by Bartimistus, that is, a bisomus; and the price paid to the fessor Hilarus, 1400 folles (about \$5.65), in the presence of the fossors, Severus and Laurence.' The fossors also probably prepared and engraved the funeral slabs, as seems to be implied in the following: 'A quadruple tomb (bought) of the stone-cutter.' " In a rude sketch found in the "Catacomb of Callixtus the fessor is seen standing in a *cubiculum* lined with graves, and surrounded by the implements of his labor. On his shoulder is the mattock with which he dug the friable tufa, and in his hand the lamp with the spike by which it was fastened to the rock while he worked. At his feet lie the compasses for marking out the *loculi*, and over his head we read the simple epitaph, 'Diogenes the fessor, buried in peace on the eighth before the calends of October.' "

MANUAL OF MYTHOLOGY: Greek and Roman, Norse and Old German, Hindoo, and Egyptian Mythology. By Alexander S. Murray, Department of Greek and Roman Antiquities, British Museum. Second edition, rewritten and considerably enlarged, with forty-five plates. 12mo. pp. 368. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Co. 1874.

The title-page of this volume sufficiently indicates its design. A minister of the gospel may derive important aid from this and other Manuals of Mythology. He is often told that, with the exception of the doctrines relating to Christ, the pagan writers have taught all the theological truth which is contained in the Bible; but such a volume as this suggests to him, that although pagan writers here and there have taught the doctrines of natural theology, yet no one author has brought together these doctrines in a system, or taught any one of the doctrines consistently with all the others. It is the same in regard to the duties of life. With the exception of the duties pertaining to Jesus Christ, all the rules of conduct which are found in the Bible may be also found scattered up and down among the volumes of heathenism; but no one heathen author has brought all these duties into one system, or explained a single duty in its harmony with every other. The grand peculiarity of the Bible is that it gives us a consistent and comprehensive scheme of morals, omits nothing which is true, and teaches nothing which is false. One is surprised when one reads a volume like this of Mr. Murray, at the suggestions which it contains of profound theological and ethical truth. One is equally surprised at the fact that these hints of truth are associated with such flagrant error. Mythology suggests an argument for the Bible, as the Apocrypha of the Old and New Testament suggests an argument for the accepted canon.

It is often said that what man has done without the Bible is the measure of what man can do; that as man has not, when left to himself,

discovered the complete system of theological and ethical truth, so man cannot do it. It might as well have been affirmed fifty years ago that the facilities which man then enjoyed for the transmission of intelligence were the measure of what he could attain; that as he never did communicate his thoughts in a few seconds to his trans-Atlantic brethren, so he never could communicate with them in so short a time. The fact is that man's ignorance of moral truth is derived from his perverse will—he could have learned more than he ever would. Mr. Murray's Manual, and other similar works, illustrate the power of man's intellect and the depravity of his heart. When pagan nations have learned a pure truth they have associated it with corrupt ideas. They have buried the truth under its corruptions. They have not *liked* to retain God in their knowledge.

We are compelled to omit any farther notice of the volume, and simply express our gratitude to Mr. Murray for his faithful labors, for his precise and accurate statements, for his rich moral suggestions. The plates in the volume are beautiful and impressive. The typography is also excellent.

HELPS TO A LIFE OF PRAYER. By Rev. J. M. Manning, D.D., Pastor of the Old South Church, Boston. 16mo. pp. 159. Boston: Lee and Shepard; New York: Lee, Shepard, and Dillingham. 1875.

This volume contains many profound and, we may add, many original thoughts. It is well fitted to encourage the Christian in his life of prayer. There are some very important suggestions in the volume, as for example, on pp. 50, 54, 55, 111, 112, etc. Dr. Manning furnishes a good example to his ministerial brethren in giving to the world the ripe fruits of his study and Christian experience. His style is perspicuous and often beautiful.

THE YEAR OF SALVATION. Words of Life for every Day; a Book of Household Devotion. By J. J. Oosterzee, D.D., Professor at Utrecht. The Festival Portion of the Year. Translated by C. Spence. 12mo. pp. 499. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark; New York: Scribner, Welford, and Armstrong.

It is an admirable plan of the Messrs. Clark to publish a series of devotional works written by the European, especially the German and Dutch, theologians. The present volume of Dr. Oosterzee is the first of this series; and it forms an auspicious beginning of what we regard a rich collection of devotional treatises. The meditations in the volume are original, suggestive, and deeply spiritual. The translation is faulty in various respects.

CORRESPONDENCE OF WILLIAM ELLERY CHANNING, D.D., AND LUCY AIKIN. From 1826 to 1842. Edited by Anna Letitia Le Breton. 12mo. pp. 426. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1874.

This collection of letters is little more than a collection of elegantly-

written essays, on a variety of important subjects, such as the condition of the poor in England, the Reform Bill, the perils threatening the Anglican church, and the like. Essays on such themes, by two writers of such well-earned celebrity as Dr. Channing and Miss Aikin, would, as a matter of course, contain little, if anything, that was not well worth reading; but that indefinable charm we expect to find in a genuine epistolary correspondence — that charm which we find in the letters of Cowper — nowhere meets us in these. The reader does not feel that he knows either of the writers better than he did before these letters were perused. We get scarcely a glimpse of the personal history or the inner life of the writers. We are brought into contact with their intellects, but not with their hearts. Shall we be pardoned, also, if we add that the collection seems to us to be deformed by one positive blemish? Each writer lavishes flattery on the other altogether too profusely. It is Southey, we think, who once said that we can judge better of the character of a man by the letters which are written to him, than by those which are written by him. Regarding this as a good rule of judgment, one can hardly avoid thinking that Dr. Channing and Miss Aikin had less true value for each other than they express, or else they would have dealt less freely in adulation. After all that we have said, we are sure that every one who reads these letters will find a great deal which he will be grateful for the opportunity of reading.

THE OLD REGIME IN CANADA. By Francis Parkman, Author of "Pioneers of France in the New World," "The Jesuits in North America," and "The Discovery of the Great West." 8vo. pp. 448. Boston: Little, Brown, and Co. 1874.

Mr. Parkman has given us another of his valuable works. The present volume forms a most interesting sequel to *The Jesuits in North America*. The latter book treated of the heroic effort and total failure of the French Jesuits to convert the Huron Indians. The present work introduces us to a new stage of Canadian history. The period of romantic missions has passed away, and the practical formation of the French colony begins. The work opens with a long account of the disputes between the Bishop Laval and the French governors. In these disputes Laval prevailed, and modelled the Canadian church in its present form. The Canadian commonwealth was established on entirely different principles from those of New England. Everything was done on the most generous scale for the Canadian colony by Louis XIV., who gave the inhabitants large grants of land and money, patronized local industries, and erred chiefly in doing for the emigrants what they should have done for themselves. An amusing instance of royal bounty is found in the fact that every settler, being compelled to be married, received a wife from the hand of the king, when he could not find one for himself. The Canadians thus

depending on the king rather than on themselves, did not acquire the self-reliant habits of our fathers; the former were weakened by indulgence, the latter strengthened by neglect.

An interesting account is given of the origin and early mismanagement of the fur trade. Although, from the nature of the subject, the work is less exciting than some of Mr. Parkman's earlier volumes, it contains many passages worthy of so powerful and brilliant a writer. His descriptions of natural scenery, of forest life, and of the struggle of the early settler with his savage foe, are unsurpassed. Mr. Parkman has developed for us a new department of history; we trust that more works may issue from the same pen. The book is clearly printed on good paper; the publishers have performed their part in a creditable manner.

HISTORY OF THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SLAVE POWER IN AMERICA. By Henry Wilson. Vol. II. 8vo. pp. 720. Boston. 1874.

This second volume of Mr. Wilson's History begins with the circumstances attending the admission of Florida, as a State, in March, 1845, and ends with the famous canvas which resulted in the election of Abraham Lincoln to the presidency, in November, 1860. It covers the period of the Mexican war, the struggles over the admission of Oregon, California, and Kansas, and the "Wilmot Proviso" and "Compromise Measures" of 1850. In short, it takes the slave power when, flushed with its triumph over the admission of Texas, it was dreaming of larger victories, and daring to hope for a permanent supremacy; and follows it through all the series of its shameful successes, until it became maddened with over-confidence, and rushed into a defeat more complete than its worst hater had ever dared to pray for. For this work we conceive Mr. Wilson to be singularly fitted, both by his mental constitution, the simplicity and completeness of the peculiar education which circumstances have given him, and by the opportunities of his position. He is a fair-minded man, of kind heart, and superior abilities, especially for the memory and for the marshalling of facts. His sympathies are those of an American freeman, generous and sweet. He has been trained in the school of politics, so as to have a living sense of what he writes about, with a personal knowledge of many of the characters and events of this remarkable history; his manly qualities and high station bringing him into close contact with all parties.

The period of which he writes is one of the most humiliating, as well as one of the most important, in our annals. And yet, to a heart that welcomes a sense of oneness with all of human kind, there may be a certain mournful satisfaction, when recalling the depravities of heathendom, the unscrupulosities and cruelties of the Roman church, the corruptions of the Bourbons, the horrors of the French Revolution, and the inexpressible baseness of England's opium war against China, to be able

to point to our American slavery throughout its last wicked struggle, and say, we are brothers, after all, to the worst of you! Our own history renders the saddest history credible.

This work of Mr. Wilson's will be of great value to young men just beginning to be interested in our politics. They will here find, within limits not too much extended, a substantially correct picture of the war of slavery against freedom, given with enough of detail to enable them to make it real in their apprehension. And the book is of value, also, to the moralist and the student of human nature; for no biography of an individual exhibits the strength, the weakness, and the depravity of this nature, as does this photograph of a great moral war.

We have no complaint to make of the author's treatment of individuals. We do not see that Calhoun, Toombs, or Brooks can accuse him of harshness. Towards Webster, in his course on the "Compromise Measures," the tone is more of sorrow than of denunciation. And this, we think, will be the tone of the final historic judgment on this great man. Undoubtedly he missed a precious opportunity; he was blind to duty. And yet when we remember his age at the time when this trial came, his lifelong devotion to the union of the States, the clearness with which he had always perceived the terrible consequences of disunion, and his thorough persuasion that Southern leaders were in deadly earnest, we can pity him that his fidelity to his conscience had not been stanch enough throughout all his life, to enable him, even then, in his old age, to break away from hopes and friends and ambitions, and to rise above the dreadful dust of that conflict, so as to see the expediency of the right, or, at the very least, to believe in it. Mr. Webster was too old a man, at that time, to change very easily any rooted habit of mind, or any long-established lines of conduct. And, alas, he had not in all things been true to his own soul. We must allow him the credit, moreover, of seeing more clearly than some others, the imminence of a struggle for disunion. Mr. Webster never said, with Wendell Phillips, that the South "could not be kicked" out of the union. Could he have lived, and retained his powers till the trial of blows actually occurred, there is not the slightest reason to doubt that he would have flamed like a star in front of the hosts that marshalled for "liberty and union, now and forever, one and inseparable." It is the old tragedy of a lost opportunity; a fall, partly due to a conjunction of circumstances, which was his misfortune, but partly also to an old weakness, that was not a mere weakness, but also a sin. After the bitterness of that conflict has wholly passed away, generous hearts will find in these particulars an appeal to their sympathies. Mr. Webster's fame will recover from this eclipse; and the majestic proportions of his public character and services will be universally recognized.

D. P. N.

THE

BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

CHRIST PREACHING TO THE SPIRITS IN PRISON.
1 PET. III. 18-20.

BY REV. HENRY COWLES, D.D., OBERLIN, OHIO.

IN the English version of this passage we read: "For Christ also hath once suffered for sins, the just for the unjust, that he might bring us to God, being put to death in the flesh, but quickened by the Spirit: by which also he went and preached unto the spirits in prison; which sometime were disobedient, when once the long suffering of God waited in the days of Noah, while the ark was a preparing, wherein few, that is, eight souls, were saved by water. The like figure whereunto even baptism doth also now save us (not the putting away of the filth of the flesh, but the answer of a good conscience toward God), by the resurrection of Jesus Christ; who is gone into heaven, and is on the right hand of God; angels and authorities and powers being made subject unto him" (1 Pet. iii. 18-22). In the original the essential words are: "θανατωθεῖς μὲν σαρκί, ζωοποιηθεὶς δὲ πνεύματι, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τοῖς ἐν φυλακῇ πνεύμασι πορευθεὶς ἐκήρυξεν, ἀπειθήσασί ποτε, ὅτε ἀπεξεδέχετο ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ μακροθυμία ἐν ἡμέραις Νῶε, κατασκευαζομένης κιβωτοῦ."

The object of this Article is to ascertain *when, where, by whom* (instrumentally or otherwise), and *to whom*, this preaching was done.

The issue lies between two widely diverse constructions of the passage: first, that which assumes that this preaching was done — as to *time when* — in the interval between Christ's death and resurrection; as to *place where* — in Hades — the realm of the dead; on the point *by whom* — by Christ himself in his disembodied state; on the point *to whom* — to the lost spirits who while living on earth were of Noah's generation, the very men who were persistently unbelieving during the period while the ark was in preparation. Second, that which assumes that this preaching was done — as to *time when* — while the ark was in preparation; as to *place where* — on this earth, and not in Hades; on the point *by whom* — by Christ really, but through Noah instrumentally, whom Peter himself speaks of elsewhere as “a preacher of righteousness” (2 Pet. ii. 5); on the point, *to whom* specifically — to those hardened, defiant sinners, with whom God in long-suffering waited so long, and of whom he at length said, “My Spirit shall not always strive” [with these men]. The main issue lies between these two constructions; all minor issues over this passage are of comparatively trivial importance.

I maintain that the latter construction (not the former) is the true one. My argument will be more readily apprehended if I first suggest what I take to be the course of the writer's thought in this passage and its context.

The Christians to whom Peter is writing were obviously exposed to contumely, and perhaps to violent persecution. Peter tells them it is better to suffer (if they must) for doing well than for doing ill, and would enforce this by the example of Christ. He suffered for us even unto death, but rose therefrom to a more glorious life — suffered beyond most of his people under the extremest frailties of flesh, but by the Spirit of God was exalted in his resurrection to a deathless, omnipotent power. Expanding and illustrating the latter point, he thinks of the Divine Spirit as the embodiment of divine power, and as having been manifested first (in the order of the inspired record) in his striving with the resisting, impersuasive generation of Noah's time, but as

reaching its climax of augmented force at and after his resurrection, when Jesus through the mission of the Holy Ghost entered upon a dispensation of efficiency never known before. The going (*πορευθεῖς*) to preach to the wicked men of Noah's time (vs. 19) is set over against the going (*πορευθεῖς*) into heaven (vs. 22), which shortly followed his resurrection, when he took his seat at "the right hand of God; angels, authorities, and powers being made subject unto him." The former going and preaching proved unavailing; but the latter going, following close upon his death of agony, opened a new era of unsurpassed power and majesty. Therefore, with such a case before them let his saints have no fear of suffering, be it only for righteousness' sake; there is unspeakable glory to follow.

This antithesis between the first going (*πορευθεῖς*), translated "went" (vs. 19), and the second (*πορευθεῖς*), translated "is gone" (vs. 22), but better, having gone (the precise usage of the aorist participle without the article), — that is, between the less successful, not to say unsuccessful, work of the Spirit at the first stage of his manifestations, and his gloriously successful work in his last stage, — should not be overlooked. That this antithesis, amounting almost to contrast, was in Peter's thought cannot well be doubted. At the beginning point, where the Spirit's moral agency appears first on the scripture record, almost the whole living world resisted the Spirit, and were consequently lost under the flood. You might even *count* the saved, only eight, all told, from that whole generation; but at the closing point — which Peter so well remembers — one day brought in three thousand, all baptized; for baptism is suggested to Peter here by the waters of the flood from which Noah was saved. Such I take to be the scope of thought throughout this passage and its context.

Of the two rival constructions above put, I reject the former and justify the latter by the three considerations following:

I. The grammatical usage of the Greek language admits the second construction, and favors it rather than the first.

II. The points assumed in the second construction (as above put), and underlying it, are fully in harmony with the scriptures, and especially with the known views of Peter, with his habits of thought, and with the scope of the context.

III. The points assumed under the first construction and the results involved in it are in harmony neither with Peter nor with any other inspired writer, and are in the highest degree improbable, not to say morally impossible.

I. The grammatical usages or laws of the Greek language admit and favor the second construction rather than the first.

The main point to be ascertained is the *time when* this preaching was done, and, especially, the time as related to the disobedient state referred to in the aorist participle (*ἀπειθήσασι*). There can be no doubt that the "spirits" preached to were the men of Noah's generation; nor is there any doubt that they are spoken of as "disobedient" (i.e. unbelieving, impersuadable) *then*, i.e. while living on the earth before the flood. The real point to be settled, therefore, is this, — the time-relation of the preaching to the disobedient state; was it substantially simultaneous, i.e. only shortly preceding — preceding, perhaps, in the order of nature, they being preached to because they were in an unbelieving state, and needed the most solemn admonition to save them from their impending doom; or may the disobedient state have been two or three thousand years before the preaching, having, therefore, no special time-relation to it whatever?

This nice point is determined in the Greek participle by the omission or insertion of the article. The article being omitted (as here), the participle becomes, in its sense, an adjective, and as to its time-relations, implies that the disobedient state was co-existent with the preaching, or preceded it by only the briefest time-period. The preaching was done to spirits *then disobedient*.

On the other hand, the participle with the article inserted before it (the noun which it qualifies being made definite, as here, by the article) becomes essentially equivalent to the finite verb with its relative pronoun, and would merely

identify these spirits as the same who were disobedient in the time of Noah. This, it will be seen, would admit and sustain the theory that the preaching was done long after the disobedient state referred to. It would really make no account of the time when the disobedience existed.

Our authorized version translates by using the finite verb and relative pronoun: "Who sometime were disobedient." This would require in the Greek, either the finite verb with the relative (a literal translation), or the participle with the article repeated before it (*τοῖς ἀπειθήσασι*). But the present Greek text requires the translation, "Preached to the spirits, they being disobedient," or "Preached to those disobedient spirits."

This point of distinction, viz. between the participle with the article preceding and the participle without it, being thoroughly fundamental in our present discussion, should be made as clear as possible. Grammarians have not been uniform in their use of terms for defining this distinction, yet the distinction itself they have universally recognized.¹ It being supposed always that the noun which the participle qualifies has the article, and that a pronoun, expressed or implied, is equivalent to a noun made definite by the article, then the participle with the article repeated before it serves to identify, and answers the question *Who?* Without the article it expresses some circumstance or quality. If the verb be intransitive, its participle approximates closely to an adjective; and it answers the question *What?* This distinction will become more apparent by reference to actual usage. Examples from Peter are specially in order. We have one in 1 Pet. v. 10: *ὁ δὲ θεὸς πάσης χάριτος, ὁ καλέσας ἡμᾶς*, (the same who hath called us; but not, having called us, nor, when he hath called us); *εἰς τὴν αἰώνιον αὐτοῦ δόξαν ἐν Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ, ὀλίγον παθόντας*—us, having suffered

¹ When without the article as in our passage it is called "circumstantial" appositive; also by some a 'predicate, or a predicative participle; while *with* the article it is called an "attributive," or an "epithet" describing and defining.

a little while, or *after* we have suffered ; but not, us who have suffered a little while, for this would simply identify the parties, and would require either the article before the participle or the finite verb. The reader will notice that here we have both cases illustrated, that of the aorist participle *with* the article, (*ὁ καλέσας*), and that of the same participle *without* it, (*παθόντας*). In the latter case, the participle is brought into the closest time-relations with the word it qualifies, "hath called us, having suffered awhile ; us, transient sufferers." The implication here is, calls us into his eternal glory immediately after this transient suffering ; or in other words, the aorist participle gives antecedent (past) time, yet not indefinitely long past, but the shortest time — immediately preceding. See another example : *Καὶ ταύτην τὴν φωνὴν ἡμεῖς ἠκούσαμεν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ ἐνεχθείσαν* (2 Pet. i. 18) ; ungrammatically translated in the English version : "This voice which came from heaven we heard ;" but correctly translated thus : "This voice we heard *as it was borne down* from heaven ;" or more closely, "We heard it *coming* down." The English version would require in Greek either the article before the participle, or, as the English translators put it, the finite verb. The true construction here suggested gives the sense of the participle without the article. The reader will notice that the article preceding this participle would give the sense, This voice — the same which came down from heaven — we heard, etc., and would lay stress upon its identification ; but would leave the time-relations altogether loose, for the voice might have come down indefinitely long before it was heard. On the other hand, the participle without the article makes the time-relation very close : This voice we heard coming down, or as it came down. Of course the time of the aorist participle is past, but in usage, naturally, as here, only by the shortest time-period : we heard it on its way down. Yet again, see the participle with the article repeated before it in Acts xvii. 24 : *ὁ θεός ὁ ποιήσας τὸν κόσμον*, God, he who made, or the same who made, the world ; the participle with the article identifying God as the Creator, yet indicating

no special time-relation. But without the article, this would be good Greek: God having made (*ποιήσας*) the world in six days, rested on the seventh; the time-relation in this case being close and definite.

That the participle with the article is substantially equivalent in identifying force to the finite verb with its relative, may be seen in Rev. vii. 14. To the question, "Who are these, — the ones arrayed in white robes — and whence came they?" The answer describes and identifies them thus: The comers forth from great tribulation (*οἱ ἐρχόμενοι*) — the *same* who came out of, etc., and who have washed [finite verb], and have made them white [finite verb] also. The defining answer begins with the participle [article prefixed], but continues with two finite verbs in the same line of thought. Correspondingly in our passage, with the article prefixed, this participle (*τοῖς ἀπειθήσασιν*) would have defined these spirits as the *same* who were some time or other disobedient, but without giving any special light as to the time when. The finite verb and its relative pronoun (as in the authorized version) would mean the *same* — both answering the question *Who?* But without the article, the participle answers the question *What?* What about them? — by saying "disobedient," impersuasive; and as to time when, assumes it to be coëtaneous, or at farthest, shortly preceding. Cases illustrating and proving this close time-relation, are in place here, and may be found in profusion; e.g. Peter's own words (Acts v. 30, essentially repeated Acts x. 39); not quite accurately put in the authorized version: "Whom ye slew and hanged [Aor. Part.] on a tree;" the sense of the Greek being, not that they first slew him, and then hung his dead body on a tree; but this: Whom, having hung him upon the wood [of the cross], ye slew; i.e. slew by hanging — by crucifixion. The hanging preceded the taking of life, yet only by a very short interval. Paul might furnish cases, e.g. Acts xvii. 32: "Hearing of the resurrection from the dead [Aor. Part.], "some mocked," — i.e. upon hearing; as soon as they heard. "Howbeit certain men, attaching themselves unto him

[Aor. Part.], believed." The attaching themselves and the believing were closely related in time.

Cases in which the aorist participle qualifies the subject [nominative] of a finite verb, and exemplifies this close relation of time, are most abundant. Running the eye over a single chapter (Acts vii.), we may note: "Then, *having gone forth* (ἐξελθὼν) from the land of the Chaldeans, he dwelt in Charran" (vs. 4), with no long interval of time between; "The patriarchs, *moved* with envy [Aor. Part.], sold Joseph into Egypt" (vs. 9) — as closely related in time as cause and effect; "Jacob, *hearing* of corn in Egypt [Aor. Part.] sent out our fathers" (vs. 12), i.e. as soon as he heard, by reason of his having heard; "Joseph *having sent*, [Aor. Part.], called to him his father Jacob" (vs. 14), i.e. he invited him by means of a special embassy with wagons; the time-relation being as close as the agency employed is to the thing done; "He brought them forth, *having shown* [Aor. Part.] wonders and signs" (vs. 36), i.e. by means of miracles he effected their exodus — the time-relation of the two acts being that of the means used to the end accomplished.

I close the list with two other examples, from Peter, viz. "For not by *following* [Aor. Part.] cunningly devised fables have we made known unto you," etc. (2 Pet. i. 16) — the time-relation being most intimate; "But saved Noah, *bringing in* [Aor. Part.] the flood upon the world of the ungodly" (2 Pet. ii. 5), i.e. he put Noah in a place of safety, *what time* he was bringing that flood upon the wicked.¹

My argument, therefore, holds that the Greek text of our passage — the participle ἀπειθήσασι qualifying τοῖς πνεύμασι, but without repeating the article — cannot be used to identify the spirits preached to as the same who lived in the age of the flood, since this would require the article before the participle. Being without the article, it must describe a fact of their state *at the time* of the preaching, or immediately

¹ A very elaborate and able discussion of our passage in its grammatical relations appeared in the New Englander for October, 1872, p. 601, from Prof. S. C. Bartlett.

preceding it, as a reason why the preaching was vital to their salvation. This close relation of time between the preaching and the disobedient state is, therefore, one point of my argument. The other is that broad distinction between the participle with the article before it, *identifying*, answering the question, *Who?* and the participle without the article, answering the question *What?* by giving some fact or circumstance or quality, in the nature of an adjective.

By virtue of these points of Greek usage, I feel justified in the position that this Greek text admits and favors the second of the constructions put above, rather than the first. I purposely make this statement moderate, impressed that I might make it stronger, even to the extent of saying that Greek usage *demand*s the construction I give the participle. But my argument requires not this added strength; if the Greek *admits* my construction, the points that follow will supply the necessary force of argument.

The use of the Greek particle *πότε*, following *ἀπειθήσασι*, comes into this discussion, inasmuch as it is supposed by some to favor the English version. The rendering "some time" is not specially felicitous; its sense being rather, *in ancient time*, long ago. Cases of its use appear in our author, rendered "in the old time" (1 Pet. iii. 5), and said specially of Sarah, the wife of Abraham; also, "Prophecy came not *in old time* by the will of man" (2 Pet. i. 21); and "in time past" (1 Pet. ii. 10), said originally of the Gentiles, through long ages alien from God.¹ As used in our passage, we might translate: They being persistently unbelieving in that ancient time when the long-suffering of God waited in the days of Noah through the entire period while the ark was in preparation.

II. My second argument is, that the points assumed and made to underlie the construction I adopt are fully in harmony with the scriptures, and particularly with the known views of Peter, with his habits of thought, and with the scope

¹ Other cases of its usage occur in Rom. vii. 9; xi. 30; Gal. i. 13, 23; Eph. ii. 2, 3, 11, 13, etc.

of the context. These points assumed and underlying may be put in the order which the course of thought in our passage suggests.

1. That "being quickened" (*ζωοποιηθείς*), being in antithesis with "being put to death," must refer to Christ's resurrection. This seems too obvious to require argument.

2. "Quickened," i.e. raised from the dead, "*by the Spirit*" (*πνεύματι*), cannot mean in his spiritual nature, as distinct from his physical; for this, as applied to his resurrection, gives no pertinent sense. I must therefore take this word to denote the power by which he was raised from the dead, viz. the *Spirit of God*. Peter is accustomed to ascribe Christ's resurrection to the power of God (See Acts ii. 24, 32, 33; iii. 15; iv. 10; x. 40). That he should put it here in this form (*πνεύματι* — the Spirit), may be due to one or more of the following considerations:

(a) The influence of antithesis with the "flesh" just preceding. Flesh is weakness; spirit is power. Peter's mind runs to antitheses.

(b) In apostolic thought especially, and in general throughout the scriptures, the Spirit of God is almost synonymous with *divine power*. The conception of the Spirit seems to be, God in the manifestation of his power; God in act; God putting forth energy. Thus, throughout the Old Testament the Spirit of God came upon men, and made them heroes of faith and valor; e.g. Othniel (Judg. iii. 10); Gideon (vi. 34); Jephthah (xi. 29); Samson (xiv. 6, 19). In the same sense the Spirit was in Joshua, as also in Moses (Num. xxvii. 18); was upon Elijah conspicuously (Luke i. 17); and in double portion upon Elisha (2 Kings ii. 9, 15, 16). God's creative energy is said to be in and by his Spirit (Gen. i. 2; Ps. xxxiii. 6; civ. 30). The usage of Luke, or rather of Jesus himself, as given by Luke, is strongly in point: "Tarry ye in Jerusalem, until ye be endued with power from on high" (Luke xxiv. 49); "Ye shall receive power, the Holy Spirit coming upon you" (Acts i. 8); "God anointed Jesus of Nazareth with the Holy Ghost and with power" (Acts x. 38).

(c) The case of Jesus, first suffering even to death, then raised to highest glory *by the Holy Ghost*, becomes by analogy more directly practical to the point of Peter's exhortation in this context; for Christians get their blessings from suffering, by means of the Spirit of God coming more abundantly upon them. We see, a little onward, that this is in Peter's thought: "If ye be reproached for the name of Christ, happy are ye; for *the Spirit of glory and of God* [as here upon Christ] *resteth* upon you" (1 Pet. iv. 14).

3. Jesus raised from the dead by the Spirit of God suggests the glorious effusions of the Spirit which immediately followed and signalized that event, and also the exaltation of Jesus to the right hand of the Father in unutterable majesty, as we see at the close of this chapter. But these glories will be seen more impressively in the light of contrast. Go back, therefore, to the first example recorded in scripture of the moral working of the Spirit of God (viz. in Gen. vi. 3) upon Noah's generation, in connection with his preaching of righteousness — when Christ went down and began his ministrations of preaching through human lips, and the Holy Ghost accompanying. Note how persistently impersuasible that whole generation were, and how Christ was morally compelled to desist from this endeavor, and say: My Spirit shall strive with these scoffing unbelievers no longer.

Do these assumed facts need special proof? What Peter thinks of Noah as "a preacher of righteousness," he has himself made entirely certain by a second reference to him in a similar connection, (2 Pet. ii. 5), where he uses the same word as here, calling him a *χῆρυξ* — a herald, one who proclaims as with loud voice to a people reckless, morally deaf, all absorbed in their worldly engrossments. Such is the character everywhere ascribed to the sinners of that generation. Recall the tone of the narrative in Gen. vi.; consider the allusions in Job xxii. 15–18; and close with the testimony of Jesus, Luke xvii. 26, 27. Surely no generation of sinners in our race has a reputation more pronounced than they for bold, blasphemous, persistent unbelief and sin.

Can it be necessary to prove that in Peter's theological system, Christ was in and with the Old Testament saints and prophets, preaching through their lips, with the Holy Ghost attending, even as under the gospel dispensation? These Epistles testify that in his view "holy men of God spake in old times as they were moved by the Holy Ghost" (2 Pet. i. 21), and that "the prophets searched diligently what time the *Spirit of Christ which was in them* did signify" (1 Pet. i. 11.). If still it should seem to some reader that this construction puts a New Testament sense upon Old Testament historic facts, I only answer, even so; and so it should be; for is not the author a New Testament man, looking back upon Old Testament facts with New Testament eyes, from the stand-point of the gospel age? Can we forget that Peter has been through the scenes of the great Pentecost, and is blessedly familiar with this glorious doctrine of the gospel age — that Jesus preaches through the lips of men, by and with the Holy Ghost?

4. But these "spirits" are thought of as "in prison," and obviously, either when Christ was preaching to them, or when Peter was writing about them. I freely admit that the former would be the more natural construction if there were no objections to it; but, such objections existing, the latter construction seems admissible. It is plain enough in these Epistles that Peter continually thinks of the wicked dead as "reserved unto the day of judgment to be punished" (2 Pet. ii. 9); "to whom the mist of darkness is reserved forever" (vs. 17); and of "the angels that sinned as cast down to hell, and delivered into chains of darkness, to be reserved unto judgment" (vs. 4). Indeed, this view of their state was entirely familiar to his mind; so familiar, that it is by no means strange that when those sinners of Noah's time came up to his thought, he should describe them as "in prison." Why he called them "spirits" it may be difficult to decide absolutely; whether because they were, in fact, only "spirits" at the time of his writing, — their bodies having long before perished in the flood, — or through some word-attraction with

the term "spirit," just before used, and so present to his mind.

5. It remains to say that these allusions to Old Testament history are thoroughly in harmony with Peter's habits of thought and of writing. Peter, himself a Jew, and writing to Jews; himself familiar with the Jewish scriptures, and writing to men likewise familiar with them, was in the habit of referring to those scriptures, and especially to historic cases on record there, to illustrate or to confirm his positions. See instances in 1 Pet. iii. 5, 6; and 2 Pet. ii. 5-8, 15, 16; and iii. 5, 6; where we have allusions to Sarah and to the holy women of olden time; to Noah a second time, as here; to Sodom and Gomorrha, and to Lot; to Balaam and to his history; to the deluge a third time. It should not surprise us, therefore, to find in our passage a reference to Noah, as acting for Christ, preaching righteousness to the persistent scoffers of his age during the many years while the ark was in preparation. Such reference is altogether in harmony with the habit of this apostle's thought and writing.

This remark may be extended to all the points above made, as assumed and underlying the construction which I present as the true one; viz. that "quickened" should refer to Christ's resurrection; that this resurrection was by divine power, of which the Holy Spirit is the recognized embodiment and manifestation; that thus the whole circuit of Christ's relations to the Holy Spirit comes up to the writer's mind; that the preaching of Noah to the men of his generation was with the Holy Spirit, and, therefore, was referred to and involved in the words: "My Spirit shall not always strive with man" (Gen. vi. 3); that this preaching may be said to have been done by Christ ("he went and preached") — the Spirit always representing Christ, witnessing both with and for him ("he shall receive of mine and shall show unto you," John xvi. 14). Moreover, it is thoroughly in harmony with Peter's thought to speak of those lost souls as being "in prison;" and finally that it was but natural for the mind of Peter to grasp the entire sweep and range of Christ's spiritual

work on the hearts of men as associated with his resurrection ; yet as beginning, where it first appears in the scripture record, in the age of Noah, in its comparative weakness ; but as reaching the acme of its power in his own age, and subsequent to the scenes of the great Pentecost. His words in this passage show that his mind spanned the whole space between the point where Christ went and preached to the spirits, then (in Noah's time) persistently impersuasible ; and the point where he went into heaven to be enthroned high "above all principalities and powers." This construction is therefore in harmony with the current doctrines of the scriptures, with the well known views of this writer, and with the course of thought in this entire passage ; and therefore, for all these reasons, commends itself to us as the true one. If the question be asked, why did Peter in this passage single out those sinners in particular, and that special case of Christ's preaching, the answer is abundantly obvious.

III. It remains to substantiate our third position ; viz. that the points assumed and underlying the first above-named construction are neither in harmony with Peter nor with any other sacred writer ; and are in the highest degree improbable, not to say morally impossible.

1. This construction has no support from other passages of scripture. On this point the sole reliance has been upon Ps. xvi. 10, quoted by Peter in Acts ii. 27. The English version of the passage in Ps. xvi., with its context is : "I have set the Lord always before me ; because he is at my right hand I shall not be moved. Therefore, my heart is glad and my glory rejoiceth ; my flesh also shall rest in hope ; *for thou wilt not leave my soul in hell*, neither wilt thou suffer thine Holy One to see corruption." In Acts ii. 25-27 Peter quotes these words from the Septuagint with no essential variation, inferring from them that this passage relates to Jesus, and not to David, and proves that the resurrection of his body before corruption in the grave was definitely predicted by the prophet David.

The great question here is, Does this passage whether in

David or in Peter, teach that Christ's soul went down to hell, taking this word in the sense of the *abode of imprisoned souls*. I answer, Not at all; for "soul" is not to be taken here in distinction from body, but rather in the sense of me, myself — a position sustained by frequent Hebrew usage, and by the parallelism of the verse "thy Holy One." The verse should be construed to affirm not two facts, but one only; not the destiny, first of the soul, and, secondly, of the body; but one fact only, of Jesus, with no special distinction as to body and soul — that he should not be given up to death (personified) so as to experience corruption in the grave. For, let it be carefully noted, this is the only point that comes into Peter's argument, and, remarkably, is the only point which Paul (Acts xiii. 35), quoting this very passage from David, even names at all. He manifestly assumes that he has the whole thought of the verse in this second clause. Farther, both Sheol in Hebrew, and Hades in Greek, are used by poetic license to personify the power of death, especially to corrupt and destroy the body. Such personification appears in Paul (1 Cor. xv. 55), according to the current text, and in Hos. xiii. 14. The sense then would be, thou wilt not surrender me to this decomposing power. The tyrant grave shall not be suffered to turn my body back to dust. With this corresponds the usage of the Hebrew verb [פָּקַד] to which Gesenius, in this passage, gives the sense, "to leave at one's disposal," "to give up to his pleasure"; and Fuerst, "to surrender to one's disposal."

Under the head of our exegetical argument it remains to say that the prepositions — both that before Sheol [לְ] and that before Hades [εἰς] — go strongly against the sense of *leaving in* a place, and in favor of the sense, *surrendering to*, into the power of. Legitimately, normally, they both mean *to or into*, not *in*. Thus far our exegetical argument, which I present in the briefest manner, because the current of modern exegetical opinion is so decidedly strong in support of the construction here given.

There is another kind of argument appropriate to the point

in hand—that of logic or common sense. Thus, it is claimed that Christ went down to hell to preach to lost spirits there—to preach a second probation and a new era of mercy. This, it is claimed, the words of Peter, now under discussion, signify, and therefore, affirm. In farther support of this theory appeal is made to David (Ps. xvi. 10), and to Peter (Acts ii. 27). But, unfortunately, these passages, even conceding the construction which the parties referred to give them, say nothing about the missionary enterprise; nothing about gospel preaching, nor, indeed, about any sort of preaching; but simply teach us that *God would not let him stay there!* Indeed! the compassionate Jesus zealously pushing a missionary enterprise into the very prison of the lost; but the Lord his God interposing to remand him back, even before his body in the grave could see corruption! What can this mean? Who planned this missionary enterprise? Was God's blessed will in it, and was Jesus in full sympathy with his Father's will? If so, how happens it that the only allusion to this mission, outside of our passage in Peter, is this in which the spirit of prophecy through David expresses the exultant hope that God would not let Jesus remain there! To complicate the case still more, the passage (Ps. xvi.) speaks in the person of Jesus himself, and expresses, therefore, not merely the purpose of God that he should not stay there, but the exulting hope and confidence of Jesus that his Father would not let him stay! What kind of missionary spirit, then, is this? Again, the reference to the Divine Spirit as co-working with Christ in this preaching would seem to imply that he was, at least, in sympathy with this preaching—a circumstance which renders it yet more inexplicable that the Father should be only solicitous to get him away. Is it not more than probable that this whole theory of a missionary enterprise to the abode of lost souls is a mere fancy, utterly foreign from fact?

2. That it is a mere fancy and no fact would seem to be sufficiently proved by Christ's words to the penitent thief: "This day shalt thou be with me" (Luke xxiii. 43). Where?

Not in that Hades where spirits are "in prison," but "in Paradise." Thus Christ's own testimony on the point of his locality immediately after death, brought into court upon the question of his going down to the prison of the lost, *proves an "alibi."* He did not go down to that hades, because by his own showing, he did go up to heaven. Will it be maintained that hell and heaven are precisely the same place, and that Jesus comforted the penitent thief with the promise of being that day with him among lost spirits "in prison," "reserved in chains under darkness"?

3. There is still another grave objection to the theory that Christ went to hell with the attendant agency of the Holy Ghost to preach to those lost souls "who sometime were disobedient," that is, in the age of Noah.

The hypothesis of another probation for sinners after death attracts some truly benevolent minds, and they look favorably, may we not even say hopefully, wistfully, toward it, as affording a possible relief from the thought of a ruin absolutely hopeless and remediless. Consulting human reason, it seems to them almost or quite demanded that those who die in very early life, also those who have never heard of Jesus and have had no light from a written revelation, should have a new probation under more auspicious circumstances. This is not the place to discuss these fairest aspects of this great question extensively. I allude to them rather for the purpose of saying that if this supposed allusion in scripture to a future probation obviously *contemplated these classes of our world's population*, the argument would have much greater plausibility, not to say force. But note how far otherwise are the facts of the case, even on the construction of our passage now under discussion. The class of sinners thought of here as being visited and preached to (according to the construction now in question) are precisely those who appear on the scripture record, not as never faithfully warned; not as having never enjoyed the preaching of God's faithful servants; not as having never had the light and the strivings of the Spirit; but as having had both the preaching of righteousness

and the striving of the Spirit to such a degree that their case stands out in this respect very prominently on the sacred record; and, moreover, as having repelled every merciful endeavor to bring them to repentance with most persistent infatuation and insolent scorn. Eliphaz (in Job xxii. 15-18) puts their spirit before us by means of a few graphic strokes: "Hast thou marked the old way which wicked men have trodden, who were cut down out of time, whose foundation was overflowed with a flood; who said unto God, depart from us; and what can the Almighty do for them," i.e. for his own people? Our Lord (Luke xvii. 26, 27) represents them as utterly unmoved by the solemn announcement of God's displeasure and of the impending flood, up to the very hour when Noah entered into the ark. On the sacred record throughout they stand as special and prominent examples of sinners *resisting the Holy Ghost*, until Infinite Mercy, to shield the Spirit's person and work from dishonor, and to show a scoffing world that neither his person nor his mission can be persistently scorned with impunity, proclaimed before heaven and earth, "My Spirit shall not always strive" with these men: let the flood come! Now, on the theory under discussion, these identical sinners are selected from among all the indefinite varieties and classes of the whole world's population as those to whom Jesus hastened as soon as his soul left his body, *to preach to them new hope and mercy!* Note also, in order to see the case in its full and true light, he went *by and with the Spirit*—the same Holy Ghost whom they had insulted, grieved, resisted, until God declared in awful earnestness before heaven and earth, "My Spirit shall strive [with such sinners] no longer."

What shall we say of this? Is the policy of God's counsels reversed? Has the unchangeable God revoked the earlier policy and adopted a new one? Or is the God of the Old Testament one being and the God of the New another? Or is the policy of God the Father one, and the policy of Christ and of the Holy Ghost another? Or, again, do the words, "shall not strive with men forever," mean that the Spirit

takes up the work after death, and then and thenceforward prosecutes it forever? And is the sin of blaspheming the Holy Ghost to have forgiveness "in the world to come"? Has the Lord repented of his early policy as being too rigorous and not sufficiently lenient and compassionate, that Jesus should hasten to testify to a change of administration by singling out those very men whose doom as incorrigible and hopeless stands out so prominently under the old economy, and by making this special mission to them as soon as death released soul from body?

If it be, indeed, true that God has reversed his policy in regard to those sinners whose contemptuous scorn of the Holy Ghost made their case utterly hopeless for this world, then unquestionably this supposed mission of Christ, with the Spirit's presence attending, to this very class of sinners, is of all supposable methods the most decisive to prove it. I do not see how any less or other significance can be found in it. There could not be the least danger of mistaking its meaning. For aught I can see the whole question might fitly be made to turn on this single point: Can it be safely assumed that God has abandoned the policy so clearly declared over the case of those hardened men of Noah's age; so distinctly and solemnly reiterated in the subsequent records of his written word; and so terribly foreshadowed, not to say fulfilled, in his retributions on sinners throughout all the ages of human history? Is this change of policy destined to open a new field for the preaching of Christ and for the agency of the Holy Ghost, beginning, for the sake of a more brilliant example, with those sinners whose doom as they went down under the flood *seemed* to show, according to our author, that "the Lord knoweth how to deliver the godly out of temptation, and to reserve the unjust unto the day of judgment to be punished" (2 Pet. ii. 3-9)? And is this total change of policy destined to work to the utter reversal of those declarations which have certainly seemed to be as clear and emphatic and solemn as human language ever bore: "He that believeth not the Son *shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth*

on him" (John iii. 36)? "These shall go away into everlasting punishment" (Matt. xxv. 46)?

Or, the point of my present argument may be put in few words, thus: Let it be assumed that Christ descended into hell to preach to the spirits of the dead men of Noah's time; and then let the question be put, Why did he select those sinners to preach to in hell above any and every other class? Why preach to them, and to them only, unless (as said above) that he might the more decisively reverse the divine policy manifested in withdrawing his Spirit from them, and in hurling upon them, instead, that awful flood?

It cannot be necessary to expand and press this argument farther. The construction named first above must be set aside as not only lacking all support from the Bible but as in palpable antagonism against it. It is utterly reckless of the scope of this context. It leaves neither dignity nor self-consistency to the character of God. It is, therefore, not only more than improbable, it is morally impossible.

I close with but a single remark, bearing on the subject of a future probation.

The doctrine of a future probation for those who have had a probation in this world is not only without scripture authority, but squarely, utterly, and irreconcilably, against it. As to a future probation for those who have had no probation in this world, all we need say here is, that it lacks definite scripture authority. The Bible does not teach it, we might say does not *touch* it. The assumption that the passage herein discussed favors it is simply baseless, for these two reasons: (a) *It has no reference to that class of moral agents*, but does refer to another and totally different class. (b) That construction of this passage by which some have sought to make it a foundation for this theory, or even this hope, lacks support grammatically, while logically and scripturally it cannot possibly be true. So far forth, therefore, as any support from revelation is concerned, the theory of a future probation (analogous to the moral probation given to our race in the present life) is a theory with no bottom underneath.

ARTICLE II.

DR. WATTS'S THEORY OF CHRIST'S PRE-EXISTENT
HUMAN NATURE.

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To the student of New England theology it will ever be an interesting work to seek some acquaintance with those men whose writings contributed either to the matter or the form of the literature of that theology. It is often easy to trace among certain of the old English divines, a similarity to the thought, and modes of thought, and that same kind of logical suggestiveness which characterizes the New England writers. Among the very foremost of these men, who may thus be called the English fathers of American Christian thought, stands Dr. Watts. His prose works formed a large part of the thorough and critical studies of President Edwards. Indeed, one cannot read a chapter of these writings without perceiving at once that here was one of the great sources of that vigor of style, closeness of reasoning, and that glowing eloquence of reasoning, that "logic on fire," which so distinguishes the great theologian.

Comparatively few are aware of the high place which these writings once held, and the immense influence they exerted ; and we must still accord to their author the title of "great," for the decline of this influence is not because of any modern discovery of subtle sophistry in thought, or of unsubstantiality in the bases of thought, but it is due to certain other causes, which, in their inevitable workings, have dug the grave of the offsprings of many a great man's thoughts. We may hint a few of them.

Some of the truths contained in these works were those important ones that are needed everywhere and at all times, and thus the law of universal use has caused them to be

reproduced in later writings, and thus, in America especially, in the abundance of the new, the old has passed away. Especially does this law obtain in respect to the controversial portions of his works. The fate of these has been like that of all controversial writings, which, when the interest of debate which gave birth to and sustained them has passed away, have always given place to the same truth in new relations, and in forms more attractive, because more in accord with the advances of philosophy, and better adapted to modern discussion.

Again, with Watts the reputation of the poet has obscured that of the theologian. It is a curious law of the human mind which exalts a man in its opinion to a degree measured by that one of his excellences of which it has the most vivid idea, and then lets every other quality, however good it be, go for naught. From the day that Milton's *Paradise Lost* became known to the world, his prose works became forever a dead thing in literature. So it has been that, since there is scarce a pulpit in English-speaking lands from which Watts's hymns have not been read many times, men have been content that, full honor being paid him here, the rest should pass unnoticed. Thus the prose works of Dr. Watts have long since ceased to be read. One may search through scores and scores of ministers' libraries and not find a single copy, and few men realize the large excellence of that wonderful man, who, while he was the great fountain-head of emotional truth to the masses, was at the same time a fountain-head of religious thought to the greatest minds of a later age.

Another reason for the decline, is this: One detects in the theological writings of Dr. Watts a mingling of the poetical with the logical element. Not only does it add a glow to the style and language, but it also sometimes performs functions of an originaive faculty. There are some peculiar theories pertaining to the mysteries of Christianity, the first suggestions of which one could easily fancy had their birth in this part of the author's nature. Perhaps this, also, may serve to explain why some parts of these works were disparaged in the

eyes of the early American divines, and why they failed to receive a more hearty acceptance from them. The sinewy New England theology would have for the foundation stone of its new structure, nothing but the solid granite of reason. It looked askance at any idea which had its origin from that other quarter, and asked, "Can any good thing come out of Nazareth?" But whatever may be said of the poetic origin of these theories, there certainly is no lack in the keenness and purity of the logic by which they are developed and maintained.

Among the more important of these theories may be classed the subject of the present Article, which is not intended to be a discussion of its merits, but to be a statement, so far as its limits will allow, of Dr. Watts's own view of the nature of this theory, and of the reasons which he presents in its behalf, as these appear in two of his treatises on the subject, the principal one of which is entitled, *The Glory of the God-Man Revealed*. It is, therefore, to be distinctly understood that the writer is not putting forth his own views at all. He is for the time putting himself in the place of Dr. Watts, and, though not in the language of that author, thinking his thoughts, and presenting them in the order and style which he would have employed had he written on this subject in modern times.

The theory is this, that the human nature of Christ was not coëval with his entrance into this world, but was pre-existent, having been created by God at some indefinitely remote period in the ages before the world began. Therefore the incarnation, in its literal sense alone, expresses all the change that took place at Christ's birth from the Virgin Mary. At that time the soul of Christ, already existent, and already united with the Deity, took on itself a real and proper body.

Thus the theory leaves untouched the question as to the actual time when Christ, as a man, began to exist. It may have been at, or just before, the creation of the world, or before the creation of the angels, so that he might be literally

“the first born of every creature;” or, Christ may have been eternally existent, created, like the decrees of God, from the eternal will of the Father. Nor does the theory presume to relate in any manner to those metaphysical questions as to the mode of the connection of this human soul with the Divine nature; but whatever the nature of this connection was, whether a concentricity of spiritual essence, or simply some mysterious union, it took place not at the incarnation, but at the moment of the creation of Christ’s human soul, and it continued thus; and at the incarnation the united God and man’s soul clothed itself in a fleshly body. Therefore, whatever was true of Christ’s relations to God while on earth was true before in heaven.

To the theory, as thus limited, there can be no possible objection on the ground of its contrariety to orthodoxy. It does not stand in the way of any of the received doctrines of the church. The doctrine of the Trinity is in no way modified by it. Nothing which any of the different theories of the atonement demands as essential to it, and nothing which is even conjectured to be essential, is done away with by this theory. Moreover, there is nothing in this theory which requires any change in the feelings of the humblest Christian towards Christ. In no way does it make Christ a less sympathizing friend; in no way does it lessen the depth of his love for him, or prevent the closeness of union between Christ and himself. Christ is just as truly a human being; he may be conceived of as clearly as before, and the realization of the personal actuality is no less distinct than before.

Dr. Watts is by no means the only one who has held this theory. There are many celebrated English divines who, before the time of our author, both held, and vigorously maintained, these views. Among these we may notice the following: Dr. Henry More, in *The Mystery of Godliness*; Dr. Edward Fowler, Bishop of Gloucester; Robert Fleming, in his *Christology*; Joseph Hussey, in his *Glory-man*; Francis Gastrell, D.D., Bishop of Chester; Dr. Knight, in his controversy with Dr. Clark; Dr. Thomas Bennet, in his *Trinity in*

Unity ; Dr. Thomas Burnet, of the Charter House ; also Dr. Burnet, Rector of Westkington ; and Dr. Knight, in his *Primitive Christianity Vindicated*. These are all names celebrated in the records of Christian theology, and they serve to show that this doctrine of the pre-existence of Christ is by no means the mere outgrowth of the fancy and speculations of a single man.

The theory presents itself in its best light when viewed as a hypothesis ; not, therefore, so much demanding belief as being proved, but rather recommending itself on the grounds of the good it will accomplish if it be received, and its validity acknowledged. It does not, however, on this account, play a less important part in systematic theology, especially in the refutation of error ; for it may do the work of hypotheses in general, which, though they accomplish nothing by positive creation of thought, yet they go pioneering through the matter, removing obstacles and difficulties which may be in the way of positive advances. While resting upon foundations apparently as light and unstable as the air, they have the mysterious power of resisting and nullifying the force of the most fatal objections that can be brought against the truth. They absorb objections, they disintegrate them, they annihilate them. Their mode of warfare may be compared to that of a certain island people who, to resist the attack of ships of war upon their town, made barricades by hanging up before it, on square frames, detached layers of silk cloth, so that the enemy's balls striking them were spent and made harmless by the sheer force of the yielding of these slight things. So a hypothesis can bring the strongest objection to a nonentity, and make it accomplish nothing by giving it nothing to do.

As a hypothesis then, this theory recommends itself on the ground of certain numerous and important advantages. When applied to scripture representations of Christ and his mission on earth, it removes a large class of difficulties encountered in the language and style of the Bible.

First may be noticed some logical incongruities in certain passages relating to the intercourse between Christ and the

Father. Such, for instance, are these : " God so loved the world that he *gave* his only-begotten Son," etc. ; " Christ glorified not himself, but he that said unto him, thou art my Son," etc. ; " I will give thee for a light to the Gentiles, to open blind eyes " ; " I will hold thy hand " ; " Then said I, Lo I come, I delight to do thy will, O God." In short, these passages, taken with others, suggest a scene in heaven wherein the great plan of redemption is laid ; a *contract* in which there is a promise on the Father's part to support and uphold the Son in his hard task, and a promise on the Son's part to enter upon the work and perform it faithfully in accordance with the Father's will.

These passages suggest a classification, viz. of those relating to the *distinction* between Father and Son. According to all the theories of orthodox divines this distinction is not such a one as can ever assume a definite form to finite minds ; it is wholly unreducible to any analogy in finite things. Least of all, then, is it a distinction of personalities. To say that the Father is one intellect and one will, and that the Son is another entirely distinct and complete intellect and will, would be to open the way for a never-ending train of errors in the human conceptions of Divinity. Yet in these passages, and in all others of the class which these represent, there is a clear implication of two distinct persons, in the strict and proper sense of the term.¹ What shall we do then ? Here God is represented as actually holding conversation with some being. Now who is this being ? It cannot be the Divine Son, for it is impossible to conceive the Divine and Infinite Father holding converse with or expressing ideas to the Divine and Infinite Son, who is himself, in all the essentials of his nature. In what manner is the difficulty settled by the orthodox divines ? Of course all literalness must be at once rejected. *Figure* of style is the ground of explanations.

¹ " He [Dr. Bennet] takes it for a certain truth that our Lord Jesus had two intelligent natures in him united to his body ; otherwise, if there be but one, he has proved that that cannot be the self-existent God, but pre-existent soul."—Review of Dr. Bennet's *Trinity in Unity*.

Some say this is a vivid portrayal of the action going on in the mind of God, of that which we might call the consideration of God; thus it is God holding converse with himself. But this is a very vague and unsatisfactory explanation and robs the passages of the value which their place and prominence seem to indicate as belonging to them. Intimating as these passages do that they involve an important element in the plan of redemption, they are yet devoid of sturdy significance if this interpretation be true. And if it were true, the idea thus obtained would be in marked contrast to the clearness and vividness of the language.¹

But others say God is speaking *anticipatorily*—speaking to the Christ who is to be, and making present the things of the future. “To an infinite mind,” say they, “whose laws of thought are unconditioned by time, this is an appropriate operation. It is the same to God to speak to and listen to a Christ in his decrees and ever before his eyes, as to the Christ of the future, who to God would be none the more real and none the more actually existent.” But if this were true, it would appear, when we consider the strength of the first impressions of their literalness derived from the vividness of style, and especially when we consider their logical relations, and the interdependence of these and other parts of the re-

¹ “That the soul of the Messiah was in being before he took upon him our flesh, the most easy and natural translation of 1 John iv. 2, etc. (properly translated, this passage would be), ‘He that confesses that Jesus is the Messiah *come into the flesh*, or into a terrestrial body, is of God,’ which implies that he was before he came into it, which is the doctrine of the Jews, and expressed so exactly according to their sense that themselves could not have uttered it more naturally and significantly, and therefore might they say it is unnatural and violent to put any other meaning upon it. . . . When speaking of his ascension, which was local, he (Christ) mentions also his descension, which it is most natural to understand in the same sense: ‘No man hath ascended up into heaven but he that came down from heaven, even the Son of man, which is in heaven,’ i.e. whose mind and conversation is there, though his personal and visible presence be here on earth. To all which you may add, ‘What if you shall see the Son of Man ascend up where he was before?’” After quoting many passages like this, he says, “It had been very easy for the Fathers to have pleaded for the pre-existence and descent of the soul of the Messiah from heaven into an earthly body, from those passages of scripture which we have quoted.” — Dr. More’s *Mystery of Godliness*, p. 23.

demptive plan, it would appear to be the stretching of a trope which would be little short of a catachresis.

If, now, we return to the question, we ask, who is this second person — this other and distinct being to whom God speaks, and from whom he receives an answer? That it cannot be the Son in his divine nature alone is clearly evident, for that, as we have already seen, would contradict the essential ideas of all those opinions which are held as orthodox. Nor, on the commonly received theory of the birth of Christ, can it be the Son in his human nature, for no such human nature was then existent. Therefore no plain and clear ideas can be presented in accordance with the common scheme of doctrine. "I grant," says Watts, "that, by the figure of communication of properties, what is true of one nature may be attributed to the whole person, or sometimes to the other nature, yet that which is not true concerning either nature of Christ separated, nor concerning the two natures united, cannot be attributed to him at all."¹

If, now, at this juncture, we find a theory which, uncontaminated by any taint of heresy, — nowhere crossing either the teachings or intimations of scripture, but rather supported by certain suggestions of the same, — at the same time answers the question simply, directly, and satisfactorily, is it not philosophical to accept it? The theory of the pre-existing human soul of Christ does this. We have a being not himself infinite, yet so united to an infinite being as to be capable of receiving the high honors and of maintaining the great dignity of his exalted position as a party to this glorious conference with the Deity, and yet a different person, having a different intellect and will, which intellect could be enlightened, and which will could be persuaded, by the ideas put forth in this lofty converse. Historically considered, the other explanations have been such as to invite this to their stead. They have ever been unsatisfactory, because but half apprehended by the mind. They have been too metaphysical, and, though logically possible, yet their rhetorical unaptness

¹ Questions concerning the Son of God.—Question 3d, p. 449.

has been felt from time to time, and thus the question has been kept an open one. Therefore, though silencing, and perhaps convincing, they have carried with them no weight of conviction.

But if some think that they can hold the common theory of the Trinity, and yet conceive such a nature in the divine distinctions as will admit of a kind of intercourse which might be figured by a conversation, there is another difficulty appearing in these passages, which will still cling to any form in which this principle of interpretation may be applied.

In many of these passages there is implied in this second person *inferiority*. He is represented as obeying the will of the Father, as making his plans subordinate to those of the Father, and thus, in doing what he does, he is not actuated by motives proceeding forth from out his own independent nature, but from the will of another. Thus there is inferiority and insufficiency in himself, and a contingency of action, all of which cannot be reconciled with the conception of the Infinite, Self-existent, and Self-sufficient Divinity. If this being, then, was not the second person of the Trinity, in his divine nature, who was he? We can resort again to figure, and say it was the second person, and the inferiority was in his office, and not in his nature; or else it was God anticipating the human Christ yet to be created. But how simple and easy the explanation, if we suppose that the human Christ was there, and, united to the divine second person, was receiving these commands, was yielding his will to the Father's, and was promising that when the time should come he would set forth to fulfil the divine commission, and devote himself to the saving of a lost and ruined world.

But again, these passages imply in this second person *mutability*. He is represented as changing his place of abode. He is now with the Father; but he is soon going to separate himself from him. He is now in heaven, but he is shortly to leave heaven, and come down to earth and dwell there. This difficulty is even less easy to remove than the other, by means of the various afore-mentioned hypotheses. In what

sense can the Divine Son be said to be with the Father at one time, and not with him at another? How can he who is all in all, and who filleth all things, be said to be on earth at one time more than another, and how can it be possible that the Infinite God should at any time be out of heaven? But he is represented as *losing* something by thus changing his place of existence. He loses the pleasures of heaven, and the glories which in heaven were given him. But how can an infinite, unchangeable being suffer loss? What is there which he could not always know, and thus from this knowledge receive always the same blissful emotions? When could the angels of heaven, and for what reason could they, see any less in the unchanging God to praise and glorify? But if we believe that Christ was there, and his human soul was separated from the Father, that he came down from out of heaven to earth, and thus, for the time, held a lower place, then the language is clear, the ideas are simple, and the passages become again a part of the teachings of scripture.¹

As has been said before, this, like the others, may be explained by certain ingenuities of interpretation, which modify themselves according to the needs of each particular, but taken all together, with their numerous phases of difficulty and shades of incongruity, that theory which in a word explains them all must certainly be sufficient to satisfy a mind which, laying aside the prejudices arising from the fact of its novelty, is willing to discern its simplicity, its harmlessness, and its fitness of application. Indeed, it is easy to apprehend that it is its novelty which would be the latent cause of the greatest objections to it in the minds of men; for it is no new mystery of Biblical fact; the essential idea contained in it is

1 "Does he [Dr. Bennet] not tell us that the *Man* Christ Jesus was the first-born of all the creation, (1) because his soul was created before all other creatures; (2) because he is now in possession of the *jus primogeniti* which the divine nature is incapable of receiving, being the governor of all created beings, and God's vicegerent, and that the whole creation is at his command? These things, he says, 'must, or fairly may, be understood of his human nature only,' with many more such high characters of the man or human soul of Christ."—Review of Dr. Bennet's *Trinity in Unity*.

not an addition to the Biblical statement; it requires no greater degree of faith to believe it; it is not outside of the commonly received views of the Christian church. All hold that Christ was born, that the scripture says that his soul was created, but the common belief that he was created at the birth of his body, is not founded on anything in scripture. It is only the *time when* this event took place that is in question, and this, on either side, can be but the result of conjecture.

This objection, then, is one of prejudice only, and one which calm reason should lay aside when it sees anything of merit in the theory itself. But men will be tempted to say of it what the steerer on a canal-boat said when he was asked why they did not put the helm in the bow of the boat, so that it would be easier to see the course. "If that plan had been good for anything," replied he, "somebody would have thought of it before;" a plausible answer it is true, but one which applied as a principle in scientific research would have made sad work with the world's progress.

The arguments contained in the preceding may be thus briefly summed up. The scriptures tell us that that soul was created. The scriptures speak of Christ as existing in heaven before his incarnation, and before the creation of the world; but they speak of him as an inferior being, and so possessed of finite attributes as to lead us to reject the idea that the Deity alone is referred to; therefore the most natural thing for the mind to do is to believe that Christ, in his human nature, is here spoken of, which is a theory so clearly within the bounds of probability, that no one can object to it, and so natural that, had it been held by the early church, no one would ever have thought of questioning it. Indeed, so clear are the biblical representations on this point, that in early times Arianism was resorted to in order to get rid of the plain consequences of these teachings. It founded itself upon these passages; and said that Christ was in heaven a superior being, super-angelic in his nature, and at the incarnation this being became the historical Christ, or was in some

way united to the human being who was known by that name. Now all in Arianism that is philosophical, as being the logical outgrowth of biblical thought, is a proof of the theory of the pre-existent human soul of Christ; for certainly it is far from philosophical to suppose and needlessly multiply strange and sporadic existences, and unique and unheard of forms of being. Therefore the other alternative remains, viz. to suppose the real human nature of our Christ to be the one referred to in all these passages.

Indeed, by holding this theory, great advantage is gained in controversy over the Arians and Socinians; for we thereby disarm them of all that class of objections to the Divinity of Christ which are founded on those passages that seem to be unworthy and debasing representations of the Deity; for we thus suppose a union of being who in himself answers to all the ascriptions both of the infinite and finite attributes.¹

Another advantage of this theory, and another way in which it recommends itself to acceptance, is that, when applied to scripture, it adds a depth and fulness of meaning, or rather allows to remain that depth and fulness of meaning which the simple language seems to possess, but of which any other interpretation than this entirely robs it. The application of this theory elevates biblical language, and makes many passages which are otherwise, some contradictory, some obscure, some tame, gifted with a pregnancy of suggestive ideas, and teeming with rich thought. This it does in several ways.

¹ It is to be regretted that here the author did not take up and answer an objection which might easily be urged against this last argument, viz. that in admitting the theory that the human nature of Christ was something more than an earth-born man, we are forced to relinquish several of the proofs of his Divinity; for many of those attributes and actions recorded of Christ in the Bible, which were too lofty to be referred to a mere man, and were therefore proofs of the Divinity, can, according to this theory, without difficulty be referred to this super-angelic being, the pre-existent Christ. Dr. Watts would probably have been forced to admit this objection, in part; and he might have answered it, in part, by showing that the advantages in the Arian controversy, which have been already mentioned, were more than these disadvantages — which he could easily have done.

1. It adds *beauty* to these passages.

There are many portions of scripture which, interpreted by this principle, not only reveal an attractive symmetry, but clothe themselves in a new and rich lustre, which transforms them from the dead letter of mysteries to beautiful and glowing realities. Such passages are these: In Gen. i. 27 we are told that humanity was created in the image of God: "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness." It has always been a question as to how much this passage really contains. Of what kind, and to what extent, was the likeness of Divinity in man? And so difficult of comprehension was the idea, and so objectionable did every definite and detailed form of comparison appear to many, that they have denied that the passage had any meaning which could be grasped by finite minds. At best, this passage and all those which quote it or refer to it throughout the whole Bible are darkly indefinite; they are abstruse, and can claim a place only in the metaphysics of scripture. But, if we believe that the human being Christ was there and then existent, and that it was he, in his union with the Godhead, that spoke those remarkable words, how beautifully suggestive is the thought! How appropriate that this wonderful being, created according to the divine, and therefore perfect plan,—that this wonderful being, created away back in the ante-mundane ages, literally the "first born of every creature," through all these ages contemplated by the Divinity with approval, the perfect, living, continuous expression and manifestation of God's ideal and of his creative skill,—how appropriate that, when a race of beings was to be formed, this wondrous being should be the chosen model; that in all respects they should be like him; his immortality their immortality, his intellect their intellect; that that marvellous complex of powers, of reasoning, of sensibilities, of emotions and feelings, and all those things which made him what he was, should be reproduced, all in all in man; and thus, stamped with this type of known and tried perfection, man should be that wonderful being, a soul.

How beautifully does this thought suggest why Christ was the one chosen to be the guide and ruler of this race! How plainly do we see why Christ was the one to come down to earth to bear the sins of the race, and in himself to be the substitute of those whose primal glory of being had been lost. Viewed in this light, how beautifully appropriate is his title "the Second Adam." Is not a simple supposition which thus clothes the skeleton of an attenuated metaphysical conjecture with the flesh and blood of a reality worthy of the acceptance which it claims?

Again, those passages which represent God as evincing the feelings of men,—as when he is said to grieve, repent, and be angry, to come from heaven to earth, to walk among men, to talk to them,—we call all these figures of speech, and confess a letting down of language and thought in order to accommodate to the weaknesses and deficiencies of finite comprehension. But we give beauty to this language, if we suppose it was indeed a man who did all this, that we are thus able to trace our Christ through all these ages back of his earthly history, and see the same actions, thoughts, and feelings which he displayed to the later Jews even then characterizing him, and themselves recognizable to the human consciousness as the characteristics of a human nature. What a plain instance of association would it be to recognize through this similarity of principle that wonderful character of Old Testament mystery in him who said, "Woe unto you, scribes and pharisees, hypocrites." Dr. Owen, in his *Meditation on the Glory of Christ*, says: "It had been absurd to bring in God under perpetual anthropopathies, as grieving, repenting, being angry, well-pleased, and the like, were it not but that the Divine Person intended was to take on him a nature wherein such affections do dwell."¹

There is one more class of passages which it will be well to mention, as displaying remarkable beauty when interpreted according to this. They are those wherein Jehovah is called the King of Israel. He is there represented as taking

¹ Quoted by Watts in *Glory of God-man Revealed*, p. 616.

upon himself the political government of this peculiar people ; and we learn why the Messiah had also that title given him, "the King of the Jews," when we consider the pre-existent soul of the Messiah personally united to the Divine nature. It is clearly evident that Jehovah was King of the Jews in their peculiarly narrow and local limitation, for the Jews are reproved by Samuel for desiring another king besides God. He is often called, in the Psalms and the prophets, the Redeemer of Jacob and their King, the Holy One of Israel and his King ;¹ and, what seems still stronger, several of the Old Testament passages referring to the kingship of Jehovah are quoted by the writers of the New Testament as if they had referred specifically to Christ. Now, what a grandly beautiful thought, if we can believe that this pre-existent human being was delegated by God to take upon himself the rule and guidance of his chosen people ; that his special work through the ages should be to care for and protect and guide and safely lead that particular nation of which he himself was by-and-by to be one, and by his special influence and by his frequent personal presence to prepare them for his own advent among them whom he was coming to redeem. If, as every one believes, Christ was created for the special purpose of the atonement, and the Jewish nation was chosen and fitted for the first and direct reception and carrying out of this great plan, what a charm of appropriateness that his existence previous to this event should still be with them and for them, thus fitting each to each in anticipation of the future. In this we find a "just and meritorious foundation laid for his exaltation to a greater and more extensive kingdom, even to be raised to the government of all churches and all nations. He was King of the Jews for many ages before he came in the flesh, and when he rose from the dead he became 'King of the Gentiles and Lord of all things in heaven and earth,' as a reward for his sufferings."

The probability of this idea is farther suggested by those mysterious passages in the Bible, which seem to intimate that

¹ *Glory of God-man Displayed*, p. 619.

the different nations were under the direct control of individual inferior beings—the intervening agency of good and evil angels. Indeed, many commentators hold that the Bible teaches that the heathen nations were judicially abandoned of God to the bondage and slavery of infernal jurisdiction. The heathen nations are said to sacrifice to devils, and to choose devils for their gods; Beelzebub is known as the god of Ekron, and he is called the “prince of the devils.” Those princes of the power of the air, to whom Paul says the heathen nations were in bondage, are the ones known by the different names given by the heathen to their idol-gods. Satan is called the god of this world, and the prince of this world. What, otherwise, can be the meaning of the passage in Daniel, where the princes of Persia and Greece are evil angels opposed to the good angels who spoke to Daniel? And when we see that the good angel Michael helped Gabriel who was fighting with those evil princes who would prevent his coming to aid the Jews in captivity, may we not suppose that this was even he, the Christ of God, the King of his own chosen people, doing battle with the prince of darkness in behalf of the nation whom he lived for and whom he loved? All this is but a suggested thought, it cannot found itself upon incontrovertible proof; but this much is true that could we believe that Christ thus did live, and that he thus did guard and guide his people, then those mysterious passages would, like the many others, be full of beauty.

2. It adds *dignity* to these passages.

Especially is this true in reference to the Old Testament theophanies. One reading these descriptions of the appearances of Jehovah to the patriarchs and prophets, is always hampered in his understanding of them, by the incongruities of the events in the narrative as connected with the acts of the Deity. The insignificance of the occasions on which he appeared to men, his familiarity with men and their familiarity with him, the appropriations of finite conditions and contingencies, all seem to be inconsistent with the conception of those things that are worthy of Divinity; they appear to

be undignified, and they shock the taste when thought of as taken part in by the Infinite, Unchangeable God. In the description of the young men thrown into the flames, does there not seem a lack of fitness that the Great, Eternal Divinity himself should come down and walk back and forth with them in the fiery furnace? In the description of the angel which God was to send before the Israelites in the wilderness, how strangely inappropriate is the language, if we apply it to God, "Behold I send my messenger before thee to keep thee in the way, etc., Obey his voice, provoke him not, for he will not pardon your transgressions, for my name is in him." Here is a messenger, one holding an inferior office and doing a subordinate work, and yet that it is God there can be no doubt, for he can pardon sins, — which God alone can do. How much better to refer that to the human soul of Christ, united with God, and doing the work of God's messenger to his people.

In other passages this inconsistency with dignity is even more apparent. Does it not seem more congruous that a human soul should actuate that human body which ate and drank with Abraham under a tree, and should actuate those human limbs when a man wrestled with Jacob? Is it not beneath the grandeur, decency, and dignity of the Supreme Majesty of heaven to supply the place of such a human soul for the purposes or actions of animal nature; and that the great and Eternal God himself, in an immediate manner, should converse in so human and familiar a way as this angel did with several of the patriarchs? That the glorious and Almighty Godhead should itself animate a visible body to visit Abraham, and tarry with him some hours under a tree, while his wife made cakes and dressed the flesh of a calf for God to eat? That the Eternal God animating a body should eat of the calf, which was dressed with milk and butter? Doth this suit with the supreme glory and dignity of Eternal Godhead and pure Divinity? Doth it not seem more agreeable that God should do all this through the intervention of a human soul, appearing in a visible shape,

than that the infinite majesty of God should immediately abase itself in such a manner? ¹

3. It adds *intensity*.

By this theory the meaning of many passages which refer to Christ and his relations to God is greatly intensified. It is an old principle which holds in the interpretation of scripture, that that sense of it which puts the most into a passage, which makes the passage strongest and most weighty, has, in so far as it does this, an evidence of its truth. In all those places of scripture where the self-denial and humiliation of Christ are spoken of we find this to be true. All these passages have a meaning, it is true, if applied to our Saviour when on earth. It is true that during this life on earth he did suffer much; he did forego many of the pleasures and all the luxuries of life; he did suffer many things that were shameful when done even to a common man; he did endure very many things which were hard to endure, and the language of the Bible on this subject is not too strong to express those sufferings and deprivations which were so great even when compared with the lot of ordinary men; but oh, how manifold greater is the depth of meaning in every single word of scripture, if it be true that Christ was suffering all these after having come down from his home in heaven! To realize the degree of this humiliation, contrast the two beings and their two conditions — Christ in heaven and Christ on earth. See him in heaven, his dwelling place, in the bosom of the Father: there he was sheltered from all that could do him harm; there he was far beyond the reach of all that was rude and distasteful to his refined sensibilities; nothing could come then to mar the harmony of the parts of his perfected being, or disturb the serenity of his blissful existence. There he had legions of angels to serve him at his beckoning; there he had the great armies of heaven to do his bidding; there the glorious hosts of heaven sang his praises; there he was united to God, sharing his glory and honor and majesty. Look at him now on earth: he walks among men; he is not

¹ Glory of God-man Displayed, p. 586.

distinguished from them ; he is as a worm of the dust ; he is despised by his fellows ; he is forsaken by them ; he is left alone to bear the poverty and weariness of an outcast from mankind ; to bear the jeers and the scornings of the proud and the selfish and the sinful. Loaded down with sorrows ; overborne with anguish ; forsaken of men and abandoned of God, he dies on the scaffold, a sacrifice to public justice and a name of contempt to the people. Think of that mighty intellect, trained and enlightened by ages upon ages of experience and knowledge ; a life which was lived in the continuous brightness and effulgence of the Father's presence ; think of that glorious intellect, itself one with God, thrilled by the consciousness of the divinity in it ; think of it leaving heaven, submitting to be dwarfed into the mind of an infant, its sight darkened, its mighty powers dwindled to that ; think of it taking to itself the weak brain of an infant, clothing itself in its puny limbs, and uttering its wants in a feeble cry. Truly this was humiliation indeed. And yet, is not this scene of his birth the key-note of the whole life of the man who began it in the manger of a stable and ended it in the sepulchre of a stranger ? See this glorious King of the nations laying aside his crown, and, ignored by his own subjects, living among the poorest of them, undergoing hardships, hunger, thirst, weariness, and want. See that being to whom those wonderful words were spoken, that to him was given to have life in himself, even as the Father hath life in himself, who was, therefore, subject to no law but the law of his own glorious nature ; see him not only put under the law of God, but under that law as made for sinners, with penalties and hard threatenings, and brought under the very curse of that law. Mark him as he pursues his course through life, walking through the path laid out for him, that path ever thickening with trouble and danger as he proceeds along it, foes gathering nearer and nearer on the borders of that path, and that path leading straight to the cross. Mark him as he suffers in his afflicted soul the great horror while he views the approach of those final agonies, till the sweat drops

from off him to the ground, as it were great drops of blood. See him, to whom untold myriads of angels were wont to bow down, stripped of his garments, arrayed in the mocking purple, blindfolded, buffeted, spit upon, then bending under the load of the ponderous cross, then nailed upon it, hanging there in agony, his ear assailed by the derisive shouts of the rabble, and the curses flung in his teeth by the tortured thieves hanging by his side, till with that dreadful cry, "My God, my God why hast thou forsaken me," he dies; and the dead body is pierced by the spear of the Roman soldiery, and stark and cold it is given away to its burial. Truly this was humiliation, this was self-sacrifice. But when we contemplate him in heaven, foreknowing all the sorrows and all the woes of this life, that he should still choose it, and willingly decide to enter upon it, then we realize for the first time the extent and fulness of meaning in the Bible language which tells us of it.

But there is a certain class of passages which seem from their style and diction to be intense expressions of thought, yet unless interpreted by this theory, are, when closely studied, not only seen to be without depth of meaning, but even appear objectionable in some of their aspects. It is of those which refer to the plan of redemption as laid in heaven before the creation of the world. They speak of the request on the part of the Father, and the promise to fulfill that request on the part of the Son. They speak also of the exceeding great love of the Father to the Son, and that of the Son to the Father. But how hard it is to conceive of a love to a being who was divine only, and thus was the same consciousness and will as the Father. What kind of love, therefore, was that which grieved at the parting from him of one who, by his very nature, could not in any true sense part from him? How vague and indefinite, and hence how practically useless to us, are all such ideas of love. The same is true of the love of the Son to the Father. But when we come to consider the love of the Son to the world, as displayed in his yielding his consent to suffer, we come to much greater difficulties; for, in

the first place, how was any such display possible? Who was it that gave his consent in this great contract in heaven? Was it the Divine Son? But the Divine part of the God-man was not the part that suffered, for it is impossible that Divinity should suffer, or in any way or by any means depart from its perfect and infinite bliss. Was it then the human part of Christ? But there was at that time no human part, and it could only promise in a figurative way — by prolepsis; and what an evil it is here to be obliged to contemplate this in so uncertain a way, and, worse than all, how unfortunate to be obliged to feel that all this vivid and glowing description of the appeal and the response, was but the decree of God, that the man whom he should by-and-by create, was destined to suffer these things. For, after all, the being who really did suffer, and on whom alone the great weight of woe did fall, was not there to give his consent to it. Where, then, was room for the manifestation of great and condescending love, in doing that which he never consented to do, but only entered into a kind of passive obedience when he at last discovered what his destiny was? Indeed, these objections are so manifest and so unconsciously influential upon the minds of men, that it is a noteworthy fact that almost all the eminent preachers, yielding to these inevitable impressions which the scripture language has made upon them, have, in their descriptions of Christ, employed the very language which they would have employed had they believed that Christ, in his human nature, had lived in heaven before his incarnation. There are innumerable instances of this in published sermons, where Christ is spoken of as talking with the Father, arranging plans according to his future purposes, described as a human being, with the thoughts and feelings and longing desires of a human being, with a love of happiness and a dread of impending misery, of leaving the protection of God, and going alone and unprotected to the work before him. In representing all this, these writers usually describe it in such language as can never agree to his divine nature in any propriety of speech, but only to the pre-existent soul of Christ?

and it is evident that the scripture itself leads them plainly into such a representation of things, as that, while they are explaining the transcendent degree of the love of God and Christ to sinners, according to scripture, they are led by the force of the truth into such expressions as are indeed hardly consistent with their own pronounced opinions.¹

Indeed, the scripture language seems to have originated among the Jews the idea that the Messiah was a human soul living in heaven. The Targums allude to it, and in several of the other old books of the Jews are the records of tra-

¹ This fact in the writings of these divines our author regards a very important proof of the doctrine. He has quoted the following from the sermons of John Flavel, as showing how plainly they teach what the natural biblical impressions are. In describing the glorious condition of the non-incarnate Son he says: "He was never pinched with poverty and wants while he continued in the bosom of that Father, as he was afterwards. Ah, blessed Jesus! thou needest not to have wanted a place for thy head, hadst thou not left that bosom for my sake." "He was in the bosom of the Father, and had the most intimate, close, and sweet delight and love from the Father. How unspeakable is it that he should deprive himself of it, to put himself, as it were, out of heaven into hell."

He then draws these inferences: "I. What an astonishing act of love for the Father to give the delight, the darling of his soul, for poor sinners. Never did any child lie so close to a parent's heart as Christ did to his Father's, and yet he willingly parts with him to death, a cursed death, for the worst of sinners. II. Adore, and be forever astonished at the love of Jesus Christ to poor sinners that ever he should consent to leave such a bosom, and the ineffable delights that are there, for such poor worms as we."

Again, in speaking of the covenant of redemption: "Consider the persons transacting and dealing with each other in this covenant. They are God the Father and God the Son; the former as creditor, the latter as surety. The Father stands upon satisfaction; the Son engages to give it. Consider the quality of this transaction. It was federal, or in the nature of a covenant. It was by mutual engagements and stipulations; each person undertaking to perform his part to our recovery. Consider the articles to which they both agree. God the Father promises to invest him with a threefold office, viz. Prophet, Priest, and King. In like manner, Christ restipulates, and gives his engagement to the Father that he will be content to be made flesh, to divest himself of his glory, and to come under the obedience and the maledictions of the law, and not to refuse any, not even the hardest, sufferings it should please the Father to inflict on him. These articles were by both parties performed punctually and precisely. This compact between the Father and the Son bears date from eternity, before the world was made, while as yet we had no existence. God the Father and God the Son do mutually rely and trust to one another in the business of our redemption."

ditions relating to this idea. True it is that these books show by their contents that the ancient Jews were possessed of all sorts of vague and fanciful ideas and of absurd and visionary beliefs, so that their opinions on questions of this kind are of little weight. Still, the fact is a valuable one, as showing what view the unconscious influence of biblical language gave rise to in their minds.¹

There is evidence, also, that among the early church Fathers the same tendency wrought effect in some of their minds, and that they held an idea similar to this. Origen seems to imply this belief, when he says: "Perhaps the soul of the Son in its perfection was in God and his fulness, and, coming out thence when he was sent by the Father, took a body of man." And again, remarking upon the words of John the Baptist, "After me cometh a man which is preferred before me, for he was before me," he says this was spoken of Christ "that we may learn that the man (or manhood) also of the Son of God, mixed with his divinity, had a prior subsistence to his birth of the Virgin."²

Further, the degree of acceptance which this theory has obtained in modern times is thus spoken of by Bishop Fowler, in his "Mystery of Godliness:" "It has been embraced by many of our greatest divines, as valuable men as our church

¹ Here is a passage from "Pesquite," an eminent book of the Jews: "After God had created the world, he put his hand upon the throne of his glory, and brought out the soul of the Messiah, with all his attendants, and said unto him: 'Wilt thou heal and redeem my sons, after six thousand years?' He answered: 'I am willing so to do.' Again, therefore, God said unto him: 'And art thou willing to suffer chastisements for the purging away their iniquities?' and the soul of the Messiah answered: 'I will suffer them, and that with all my heart.'" Dr. Burnet says: "The Jews, and some among the Christian Fathers, have determined that the soul of the Messiah had an existence before the incarnation, and before the very origin of the Jewish nation; before the law and through the whole economy of the law and the prophets." In another old book, held in much esteem by the ancient Jews, called the "Midrash Conen," it is written: "In the fifth house sits the Messiah, Son of David; and Elias, of blessed memory, said to this Messiah: 'Bear the stroke and judgment of the Lord, which he inflicts on thee for the sin of Israel, as it is written by Isaiah, "He was wounded for our transgressions, etc."'"

² Quoted by Watts, in "Glory of God-man Revealed," p. 646.

can boast of, though most of them have been too sparing in owning it, for fear, I suppose, of having their orthodoxy questioned.”¹

But this theory does more than elevate scripture language; it adds *grandeur* to the character of Christ. It is another well-known principle of biblical interpretation, that we ought to choose those meanings which will in a rational way “aggrandize the glory and dignity of our Lord Jesus Christ, of whom we can never have too high an esteem, so long as we keep within the bounds of scripture.” What new ideas are given us of the glory of the character of the incarnate Christ, if we conceive him to be the cultured and experienced intellect of a dweller in heaven, dwarfed, it is true, for a little in the mind and body of an infant, yet soon developing itself, and struggling forth from its narrow bounds into the full grandeur of its pristine strength, full rounded and enlarged as it had been by its ages upon ages of a life in heaven, in the presence of Divinity and in inseparable union with him; at twelve years of age arguing with the learned doctors and scribes; later in life astonishing the lawyers and scholars, who said: Whence hath this man these things, having never learned his letters? No wonder that this heaven-born soul should awe men in his presence, and cause them to cry out, “Never man spake like this man.” Think of this glorious being, taught of God, the angels for his companions, who was present at the creation of the world, who was familiar with the handiwork of God! How appropriate that

¹ Dr. Fowler further says: “There is no Christian doctrine more clearly delivered than this, and even immediately by our Saviour himself, and often repeated by him; and there is not more plain and undeniable evidence for any one article of faith than there is for this doctrine. And this is the sense in which the disciples of our Lord most certainly understood his declaration.” Our author hesitates to be so bold as this; but declares himself as heartily endorsing the following: “Our Saviour never said a syllable which so much as seems to contradict the plain, natural, literal sense of the words by which he chose to express this doctrine; and it is worthy of our observation, that there is no one text in the Bible, that I know of, whose plain and natural sense so much as seems to thwart the plain sense of those scriptures which I have adduced to support it; and what controverted point is there in religion of which we can say the like?” — Quoted by Watts in *Glory of God-man Revealed*, p. 647.

he whose mind surpassed the united wisdom of the whole world should take upon him the task of atoning for the sins of the whole world ! He was able to do it ; he had the worth of being necessary to do it, for he was “ worth ten thousand of us,” as the people said to David. And, humble Christian, do not dread this exaltation of your Saviour, nor fear that he will be any less dear, or dwell any less near to you ; for, although he is this wonderful being, he is still a human being. What if his heart is so large ? It can love you with a larger love. What though his powers are so mighty, and his wisdom so far-reaching ? He is your kingly friend, but he is none the less your friend. He did come down from heaven, but now on earth he draws none the less nearer to you. He knows your heart ; he who was present when the skilful workmanship fashioned its delicate parts, shall not he know when those parts are broken ? Shall not his quickened ear all the sooner hear the discord — the harsh jarring of its broken strings ? All the majesty and power and greatness of your friend does but increase the worth of his friendship. And what if he did live in heaven thousands of years before he came to earth to be your friend, was he not even then your friend, and was he not even then preparing for you those blessed mansions in the heavens ? Truly, he is worthy of the best gifts of your love, and of your life-long devotion to his service.

Lastly, this theory gives *perspicuity* to the scriptures. It does for them what Julius Müller claims for the theory contained in his Christian Doctrine of Sin — it makes them *anschaulich*. The words of scripture have a meaning, and this meaning is discovered at the first approach.¹ Plain, simple, and clear are the qualities of the language ; and is not this in accordance with our *a priori* conception of what

¹ “ He [Christ] being, happily, before the generation of men and the peopling of the earth, the Messiah elect, as I may so speak. United also with the Logos, and resplendent with celestial glory and beauty amongst the angels of heaven, this hypothesis will give a very easy and natural sense to sundry places of the New Testament that otherwise seem very obscure.” — Dr. More's *Mystery of Godliness*.

the Bible should be? Should we not expect that a revelation from God to his people would be such as to be intelligible to his people—that the term “love” in the Bible should mean just what it means when men use it—that when promises are made in scripture, they should be such in their nature and relations as when one man makes a promise to another? This unforced, straightforward significance of language is in happy contrast with the strained meaning of words and phrases, the figures of prolepsis, and the uncertain strength of terms which have not only always mystified the comprehension, and baffled all attempts of the mind to grasp them, but have given grounds for unceasing controversies and for innumerable objections from the Arians and Socinians. These could find throughout the Bible contradictory ideas, impossible combinations, and difficulties of many kinds, to which it was impossible to give any satisfactory answer. But this one simple supposition (which is not opposed, but rather suggested, by scripture) does away with all this; it unravels every tangle of incongruities, by making a being glorious enough through its union with God to answer to the highest description of greatness and excellence, yet so far inferior to the Deity as to avoid any inference which would follow as inconsistent with a proper conception of Deity and degrading to it.

Does not this clearness of scripture language, and this ready entrance of it into the understanding, tend to strengthen the belief of the Christian in the Bible? For when a thought sits in a clear light in the mind, the belief of it is far easier than when it is only half seen and half realized. Faith is always stronger in proportion as it has a hold upon the reason. We cannot believe what we do not know; no more can we believe, with our whole heart, what we only half understand. Indeed, viewed in this relation, this theory, as a hypothesis, has a value wholly independent of any positive evidence, whether that evidence amounts to a proof, or only brings the idea into the realm of probability. Touching the matter of the Trinity, we may say that its philosophy has

ever been open to the attacks of many and serious objections from the Arians and Socinians. It says that there is but one God, and yet that there are distinctions in the Godhead. But the objector to the Trinity demands: "Tell us what kind of distinctions those are which admit of conversation between them, of separating the one from the other, of inferiority, and yet are numerically and identically the same consciousness and will." If orthodoxy declines to answer this, and is content to acknowledge it a mystery, the Socinian will not leave it thus, but says: "Tell me, then, how it is possible, in the nature of the case, that there should be such distinctions having these contrary qualities." He claims, therefore, that it is more than a mystery, it is a contradiction. If to meet this difficulty we make the first attempt at an explanation, by defining these distinctions, we fall into greater trouble, for every term we use has its figure misinterpreted, and false ideas and narrow conceptions are the consequence, and the final result is inevitably one of two things: either the denial of any distinctions, whatever, or else strict, philosophical dualism. But when we say that *perhaps* the soul of Christ was in heaven, then, immediately we have that necessary second being, with whom is the conversation, from whom is the separation, and in whom resides the inferiority. Thus the explanation of the Trinity may remain wholly untouched. The distinctions or moments of the Godhead we may affirm, and refer to scripture authority. We may admit frankly that it is a mystery, an unfathomable mystery, and there the matter may rest; for by introducing this as a hypothesis we have done that which has placed the doctrine of the Trinity beyond the reach of all attacks on the ground of self contradiction or any other objection. In this case we need not attempt to support the hypothesis by argument, we need not say, even, that it has a great degree of probability. When met by the objector there is one answer which is sufficient for all his objections, viz. "You do not know but that Christ in his humanity was there."¹

¹ It will be very natural here to ask whether the Bible language concerning

Such, then, are some of the advantages of this theory, on the ground of which it presents its claims to acceptance. There are, however, some considerations which, at a casual view, seem to render the theory objectionable, but they are none of them weighty and are easily removed. The following are some of them :

“ Christ is spoken of in the Bible as a man ; but this glorious being with such extensive powers is something above a human soul — it is far above angels ; therefore, even if it be united to a human body, it will not be a man.” To this it may be replied that a man is a finite being, possessing the qualities of a person, i.e. intellect, sensibilities, and will, and which is so constituted as to be able to perform its normal functions through the agency of a human body. With such a definition in view, it is not a difference in degree, but only one in kind that can make him other than a man. The power of the human soul of Christ may be exalted above that of any man on earth, but this in no sense destroys his humanity, for the greatest intellect on earth is no more truly a man than is an idiot. So Christ may still be a human soul, though his excellence far transcend that of the souls of all other men.

It may be answered, again, that the Bible represents the present powers of Christ's human nature to be far above that of men and angels, so that were there any real difficulties in the former case, these difficulties would remain in this. Furthermore we believe that the souls of all Christians will

the Holy Spirit, his office, and his acts, is not open to the same objections which our author claims as existing in these passages when interpreted according to the common theories of Christology. There can be no doubt that this difficulty really exists, and it is to be wondered at that it did not occur to the writers who hold this theory. Indeed, it is more than probable that it did present itself to some of them ; in which case they would have seen no objection to supposing that the Third Person of the Trinity united himself to some inferior being, — some angel or archangel, — and through his agency performed the works recorded of him in scripture. Such a supposition is not unphilosophical, and it would have for its support the same arguments as our author's theory of Christ. At least, it is logically possible, and thus far has all that is needful to make it serve, in the capacity of a hypothesis, for the defence of the doctrine of the Trinity by removing the various objections.

go on through eternity, increasing in power, and attaining to degrees of excellence much beyond our present power of conception. We must remember, also, that Christ, when on earth, manifested powers as great as those which this theory claims for him ; we, therefore, do not know how or when to limit the capacities of human nature, when that nature is freed from its earthly body.

Again, it may be said, "It is difficult to see how this glorious being could lose all his powers of mind, its vast treasury of ideas, and extensive thought, and become only the minute intellect of an infant." This difficulty is solved by a reference to that acknowledged mystery of the connection between mind and body, by which the mind is limited in the manifestation of its powers according to the kind of body, or the condition of the body, in which it dwells. It is a well-known fact, that though the mind be never so rich in the possession of great and varied excellences, yet they may entirely fail to appear when the organs of the body are not in their normal condition. The greatest scholars have been known to lose through disease the use of their minds, and apparently become idiots ; and yet when they recovered from this disease, the mind again put forth its powers in all their former splendor. Therefore, it is easily conceivable how the glorious soul of Christ could become dormant, and lose itself and forget its former powers, and when it did begin to assert itself, how it would be constantly baffled by the confusion of the inevitable commingling of its own ideas with the crude and imperfect emanations of an infant's brain. This explanation seems to be suggested by the scripture accounts of his childhood and youth, which show that he attained the power of his mind much more rapidly than ordinary children do.¹

¹ Our author illustrates this in the following beautiful simile: "Suppose an organist of exquisite skill in music should have all the pipes of his instrument filled with mud ; he could neither excite with his hand nor receive with his ear any of those rich varieties of sound which belong to the organ, until, by degrees, the bellows and organ were cleansed ; and thus, by degrees, he would form and hear broken pieces of tunes, until, the muddy obstacle being quite removed, the grateful harmony will be recovered, and the former skill of the organist appear."

Again, it is objected that the Bible teaches that Christ was exalted to heaven and to heavenly powers, after his resurrection, as a reward for his obedience and suffering; but if this was only a restoration of his former powers, it was no true and proper reward. To this it may be replied, that Christ's condition in heaven after his resurrection differed from that before his incarnation, inasmuch as that now he has a human body, and his soul, dwelling in that body, has all the additional sources of happiness and enjoyment which come through the bodily senses. This addition may be much greater than we suspect, for we are not able to estimate the sources of happiness which a glorified body may contain. The joy of the saints in heaven is not to be perfected till they receive their resurrection bodies, and so, in a larger sense, was this probably true of Christ.

Lastly, it may be urged, "Could this doctrine be true, and yet the disciples know nothing of it during his lifetime on earth?"

The answer to this is, that being Jews they may have held the ancient Jewish idea already alluded to, viz. that the soul of the Messiah was created at the beginning of the world. Or, as many suppose, they held the view that all human souls were pre-existent, then in either case we should not have expected them to give prominence to this fact concerning Christ.

But again, during the lifetime of Christ, the disciples were ignorant of many other important facts concerning their Lord. Some have attempted to show, and that too with a great deal of plausibility, that during the lifetime of Christ the disciples were not even aware of his Divinity. But, as has been already intimated, some of the later and more thoughtful writers, like Paul and John, seem to express a belief in his pre-existence.¹

¹ It may be urged, again, that the Bible makes the impression that Christ at the incarnation *became a man*. Our author could easily reply to this, by saying that (1) he did become a man by entering into the *condition* of all other men. This soul was in heaven before; now it became a man, by living where men live, suffering what men suffer, being subject to the circumstances which con-

This, then, is the theory, and these are the excellences by virtue of which it claims acceptance. The whole may be briefly summed up thus. The supposition that Christ, as a human soul, lived in heaven previous to his incarnation, is one which is perfectly harmless in its nature, is nowhere contradicted in the scriptures, and one against which no valid objection can be brought. While on the one hand it is thus free from objections, it on the other hand rids many passages in the word of God from important logical difficulties. But besides removing from them that which rendered them prejudicial to the reason, it adds dignity to them, and thus makes their representations consistent with proper ideas and conceptions of the Deity. Moreover it gives new beauty to these passages, thus rendering the word of God attractive to the human mind. It also greatly intensifies their meaning, thus making more impressive the message from God to men, and causing it to take greater effect upon their hearts and lives. It not only does not militate against a single doctrine of Christianity, but it helps to defend them and set them in a better light, by removing many of the objections brought against them. Besides this, it makes the Bible clear and perspicuous to all classes of its readers. By it the language is made plain, simple, and straightforward, so that the words which God speaks to men are the language of humanity. And lastly, it adds grandeur to the character of Christ, and thus magnifies the atonement, that greatest of motive-powers to holiness and happiness in men.

A theory, therefore, which combines all these great excellences, fortifying Christianity, giving to us new conceptions of the glory of God ; a theory which enhances in our eyes the value of salvation, by ennobling the worth of that life which purchased it ; a theory which dignifies the whole history of mankind, by making God in man an actual actor in its transactions ; a theory which opens anew the word of

trolled all other men, etc. (2) He became a man, in that he took upon him *flesh*. He was the soul of man before ; but now he became a man in a more tangible sense ; he became both body and soul a man.

God, running like a thread of golden light through its dark passages, illuminating their dim proportions, revealing their beauty, and causing them to stand out in clear and well-defined outlines ; if a theory, such as this, can be found, surely it deserves not to be rejected simply because it was not hitherto a tenet of orthodoxy.

ARTICLE III.

MISQUOTATION OF SCRIPTURE.

BY REV. A. C. THOMPSON, D.D., BOSTON, MASS.

WHEN Martin Luther had finished his translation of the Bible, he begged, in his preface, that all people would let it remain as it was. They might set about making another as soon as they pleased ; but he protested against alterations of his. "Let this continue mine," says the Reformer, "for now-a-days there is no end of mending and bettering." He had the same literary right in that labor which he had in his other translated productions and in his original writings. Whatever the merits of the translation, he was entitled to have its integrity maintained against careless, as well as intentional, modifications. The same is true, of course, in regard to all similar products of the pen. Expurgated editions of the classics, and translations with offensive passages omitted may be expedient—the fact being avowed ; but when professed citations are made from any book, sacred or secular, there is a moral obligation that they should be given with exactness. If reasonable pains are not taken to verify the language, a dereliction of duty is justly chargeable. No other volume in Protestant lands is so widely diffused, so easy of access, so much read, and so often quoted as the Bible. In regard to no other, then, is inaccuracy of quotation less excusable, while no other is more generally abused.

The inaccuracies now to be considered are, for the most

part, such as result from carelessness or ignorance, not such as are due to variations between different editions of our Bible, nor yet such as are designed. The latter may be largely allowable, and, when made for a specific and obvious purpose, are not likely to mislead those who are tolerably familiar with scripture. The same holds in secular literature. It was, for instance, a happy adaptation of the old painter's maxim, "Nulla dies sine linea," when Luther, explaining the secret of his effecting so arduous a work as the translation of the Bible amidst manifold other labors, said, "Nulla dies sine versu." Nor have we in hand at present mere individual instances of blundering. The late Governor Wise, of Virginia, in a letter to Hon. David Hubbard, said: "The Reubens have tried to sell me into Egypt for my dreaming." Unfortunately for the governor, Reuben was the only one in the company of treacherous brethren who did not wish to sell Joseph into Egypt. An eminent lawyer of Maine, in an argument at a session of the Supreme Court in Saco, wishing to emphasize the fact that deeds, not words, show a person's *animus* in any given transaction, cited to the jury the case of the prodigal, whose father divided his property between his two sons, and said: "'Go, work to-day in my vineyard.' One of them said, 'I go,' but didn't; the other refused, and afterward repented and went!" In Genesis xlvii. 9, we read: "And Jacob said unto Pharaoh, The days of the years of my pilgrimage are an hundred and thirty years: few and evil have the days of the years of my life been, and have not attained unto the days of the years of the life of my fathers in the days of their pilgrimage." Referring to this, Voltaire shows his want of honesty or accuracy thus: "That which the good man Jacob, father of Joseph, replied to Pharaoh, must impress those who can read: 'What is your age?' said the king to him. 'I am an hundred and thirty years old,' said the old man, 'and I have not as yet had one happy day in the short pilgrimage.'" "A specimen," says Niemeyer, in his *Karakteristik*, "of how faithfully Voltaire, who is always complaining

of the incorrect citations of others, quotes passages of scripture."¹ Similar instances of loose and erroneous reference, of confused and ludicrous citation, might be given to any amount. Isolated cases, however, do not come particularly within the scope of this Article. Attention is called, rather, to such garbling of scripture as is more or less current among those accustomed to use it, and of whom greater accuracy may reasonably be expected.

One source of popular miscitation is the various collections of classified texts, whether in separate volumes or specific treatises. These not unfrequently are inaccurate; and being consulted, they supply not only convenient references, but inconvenient defects. Matthew Henry's Method of Prayer is one of many specimens. Unless the reader verifies such citations, the probability is he will be treated to sundry blemishes, and will, in turn, unwittingly repeat them. The same liability holds true in relation to other works as well, and, indeed, to the whole range of religious literature.

Another source is the influence of oral habit. Social prayer and familiar religious exhortation, having once started an inaccuracy of this kind, are quite likely to perpetuate the same. Not a little supposititious scripture has thus been put into circulation. It is caught by the ear, and under circumstances favorable for giving it lodgment. Subsequent reading of the sacred page is not sufficiently careful and earnest to correct verbal errors. And so, the eye failing to be an adequate check upon the ear, a mistake becomes domesticated, and will go down from generation to generation. Errors of this sort have a strange vitality, a perverse pertinacity in self-propagation. The only sure safeguard is an habitual reference to the authorized version. No one's memory is infallible. Even so accurate an author as Olshausen is liable to a glaring inaccuracy. On Matt. v. 22, "But whosoever shall say, Thou

¹ It is a little singular that Dr. J. R. Beard, Member of the Historico-Theological Society of Leipsic, author of the Article on Jacob in Kitto's Cyclopædia of Biblical Literature (Vol. ii. p. 64), when he adduces this unpardonable travesty of Voltaire, should be guilty of such a lapsus as to translate *Répondit à Pharaon*, "Replied to Joseph."

fool," he remarks, in a foot-note, thus: "That this precept of our Lord, as well as those which follow, must not be taken in a literal sense, may be seen from the passages of Matt. xxiii. 17, 19, Luke xxiv. 25, wherein Jesus calls men *μωροί*, 'fools,' a term which he applies, in the latter passage, even to his disciples." Now, in the latter of these passages (Luke xxiv. 25) our Lord does not employ the term *μωροί*, but *ἀνόητοι*, "stupid," "inconsiderate," — "O stupid and slow of heart to believe," etc. Olshausen, in all likelihood, quoted from memory, and he was, no doubt, misled in his recollection by familiarity with Luther's German version, where *Thoren*, "fools," occurs; while Luther and our English translators, too, appear to have been a little careless in following the Vulgate, which reads *stulti*. Neither the Greek text in this place, nor the circumstances of the case, will admit of so harsh a word as "fools."

Some of the following specimens are met with more frequently than others; a part of them are sectional in their sphere; while a part are quite widely diffused. The first class range themselves under the head of

I. MODIFICATION OF WORDS.

1. *Number altered.*

(a) *From Singular to Plural.*

Ps. xix. 14. "Let the words of my mouth and the meditation, *meditations*, of my heart."

Ps. xlv. 5. "Thine arrows are sharp in the heart, *hearts*, of the king's enemies."

Ps. cxxxix. 2. "Thou understandest my thought, *thoughts*, afar off."

Daniel iv. 35. "And he doeth according to his will in the army, *armies*, of heaven."

Luke xxiv. 32. "Did not our heart, *hearts*, burn within us?"

Gal. v. 22. "But the fruit, *fruits*, of the Spirit is, *are*, love, joy," etc.

(See also Eph. v. 9). The phrase "fruits of the Spirit" is not found in the Bible. "First-fruits of the Spirit" occurs in Rom. viii. 23.

Col. iii. 2. "Set your affection, *affections*, on things above."

The Revelation of St. John, or simply The Revelation, *Revelations*.

Similar modifications occur in popular literature. Shakspeare says:

"The time is out of joint";

but customary quotation says : "The times are out of joint."

(b) *From Plural to Singular*

Deut. xxxiii. 25. "As thy days, *day is*, so shall thy strength be."

The concurrence of sibilants here renders the mistake quite natural, indeed almost unavoidable, unless particular pains be taken.

Prov. xvi. 1. "The preparations, *preparation*, of the heart in man."

Isa. xxxv. 8. "The wayfaring men, though fools," *the wayfaring man*, *though a fool*.

1 Tim. ii. 5. "For there is one God and one mediator between God and men, *man*, the man Christ Jesus."

1 John ii. 16. "The lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, *eye*, and the pride of life."

Rev. xi. 15. "The kingdoms of this world are become the kingdoms, *kingdom*, of our Lord, and of his Christ."

Cowper, in his Winter Evening, wrote :

"The cups
That cheer, but not inebriate";

while we usually meet with a reference to the beverage or the cup "That cheers, but not inebriates."

2. *Other Modifications.*

Prov. xiii. 12. "Hope deferred maketh, *makes*, the heart sick."

Solomon's Song v. 10. "The chiefest, *chief*, among ten thousand."

Shakspeare makes Marc Antony say :

"This was the most unkindest cut of all";

yet a mistaken regard to Shakspeare's English often modifies the line in this way : "The most unkind cut of all."

Heb. iv. 13. "But all things are naked and opened, *open*, unto the eyes of him with whom we have to do."

Not dissimilar is the citation of the proverb, "Redolet lucernam," which we see quite as often in the form "Olet lucernam." So, too, Franklin's adage, in Poor Richard : "Three removes, *moves*, are as bad as a fire."

II. TRANSPOSITION OF WORDS.

Job xiii. 11. "Shall not his excellency make you afraid? and his dread fall upon you?" the two members of the sentence being sometimes inverted.

Ecl. xi. 1. "Cast thy bread upon the waters; for thou shalt find it after many days"; *And after many days thou shalt find it again.*

Hab. ii. 2. "Write the vision, and make it plain upon tables, that he may run that readeth it."

This is almost universally turned about thus: *So plain that he that runneth may read.* Even Cowper, in his *Tirocinium*, writes:

"Shine by the side of every path we tread
With such a lustre, he that runs may read."

Whereas the prophet is not enjoined to write the vision in characters so large as to be legible to one going at full speed, but to write out the vision plainly, in order that any one having duly examined the same may move on rapidly in his course.

John viii. 7. "He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone, *cast the first stone, at her.*"

John xii. 8. "For the poor always ye have with you," *ye have the poor always with you.*

Col. ii. 21. "Touch not, taste not, handle not"; occasionally, at least, quoted thus: "*Taste not, touch not,*" etc.

Heb. xii. 14. "Follow peace with all men, and holiness, without which no man shall see the Lord," *without holiness no man shall see the Lord.*

James iii. 5. "Behold how great a matter a little fire kindleth," *how great a fire a little matter kindleth.*

James v. 16. "The effectual, fervent, *fervent, effectual,* prayer of a righteous man."

Rev. iii. 11. "Hold that fast which thou hast," *Hold fast that which,* etc.

Thus, too, for Horace's "*Limae labor,*" we generally find, "*Labor limae*"; Cicero's "*Silent leges inter arma*" (*Pro Milone*, iv.) becomes "*Inter arma silent leges*"; and for

"The wheels of weary life at last stood still." — *Dryden.*

"The weary wheels of life," etc.

III. OMISSION OF WORDS.

What classical scholar is not offended by the absence of a preposition from Ovid's line, "*In medio tutissimus ibis*"? and of a monosyllable from another line of the same poet, "*Fas est et ab hoste doceri*"? Accuracy demands that the following familiar adage read, "*De gustibus non est dispu-*

tandum." Virgil's "Labor omnia vicit" sounds a little tame without the *improbis* which should follow.

Is the meaning of "Vox populi, vox Dei," even hinted, when — no unusual thing — the second member is omitted? Was not the enthusiastic shout of the Crusaders "Deus id vult," and not simply "Deus vult"?

Referring to the titles won by Pompey in his palmy days, Lucan says, "Stat magni nominis umbra"; but the unknown author of Junius's Letters, dropping out *magni*, either misconceiving or perverting the signification, adopted the mutilation as a motto, while his misuse appears to have given currency to subsequent and prevailing misuse.

Though few writers have a complete set of the classics on their shelves, every clergyman is the owner of a concordance, and should avoid errors such as here follow; viz. the dropping of

1. *Single Words*

2 Sam. x. 12. "And the Lord do that which seemeth *him* good." (See 2 Sam. xv. 26.)

2 Sam. xiv. 14. "And are as water spilt on the ground, which cannot be gathered up *again*."

Matt. x. 30. "But the *very* hairs of your head are all numbered."

Luke x. 37. "Go and do *thou* likewise."

John i. 46. "Can *there* any good thing come out of Nazareth?"

Acts ix. 6. "Lord, what wilt thou have me *to* do?"

Rom. iii. 20. "Therefore by deeds of the law *there* shall no flesh," etc.

Heb. xiii. 8. "Jesus Christ the same yesterday *and* to-day and forever."

The omission of *and* by Bickersteth in the title of his poem, is pardonable for brevity's sake; yet in most cases such omissions are careless, and detract from the impressiveness of the passage.

2. *Clauses.*

Gen. xxviii. 17. "This is none other but the house of God, and *this is* the gate of heaven."

2 Sam. i. 23. "Saul and Jonathan were lovely and pleasant in their lives, and in their death *they were* not divided."

1 Kings iv. 25; Micah iv. 4. "Every man under his vine and *under his* fig-tree."

Ps. cxix. 71. "It is good for me that I have been afflicted, *that I might learn thy statutes.*"

Matt. xiii. 57. "A prophet is not without honor save in his own country, *and in his own house.*"

Luke xviii. 13. "And the publican standing afar off, would not lift up *so much as his eyes unto heaven.*"

John vii. 17. "If any man will do his will he shall know of the doctrine, *whether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself.*"

Rom. vii. 12. "Wherefore the law is holy, *and the commandment holy, and just, and good.*"

2 Cor. iii. 5. "Not that we are sufficient *of ourselves* to think anything as of ourselves."

1 Tim. vi. 10. "For *the love of money* is the root of all evil."

Christina of Sweden pared down two fine paintings of Titian in order to fit them to the panels of her gallery. The way that sermonizers sometimes treat passages of scripture reminds us of that vandalism, and strikes us as violating a higher law than that of aesthetics. Dr. Ebenezer Porter, in his Homiletics, gives an illustration of this, under the canon "A text should contain a complete sense in itself." "When this principle is violated it is commonly from a desire of brevity. Almost innumerable examples of this sort might be mentioned, and many from preachers of respectable rank. In some cases a mere member of a sentence, amounting to no affirmation, and expressing no complete thought whatever, is violently disjoined from its grammatical connection, to stand for a text. Bishop Horne's sermon entitled, *The Beloved Disciple*, has this text: 'That disciple whom Jesus loved.' The whole sentence is, 'Therefore that disciple whom Jesus loved, said unto Peter, It is the Lord.' His sermon entitled, *The Tree of Life*, has this text: 'The tree of life also in the midst of the garden.' Each of these clauses is only a nominative case with an adjunct. In other instances, a few words are so selected as to express a complete sense; but the brevity at which the preacher so fondly aims, is attained by the omission of intervening words or phrases. The prelate just mentioned, in his sermon on *Patience*, has this text: Follow after patience; which is a mutilation of Paul's injunction to Timothy, 'Follow after righteousness, godliness, faith, love, patience, meekness.'

Dr. Blair, in his sermon, *On the Importance of Order in Conduct*, thought proper to make his text exactly pertinent to his subject, by omitting an adverb and a conjunction in the middle, thus: 'Let all things be done in order.' In his sermon on *Gentleness*, his text, by a similar modification, reads thus: 'The wisdom that is from above is gentle.' In his sermon on *Candor*, the text is 'Charity thinketh no evil'; four members being omitted between the two parts of this clause. But the most singular example of this sort in Blair, is the choice of the words, 'Cornelius, a devout man,' as a text to his sermon on *Devotion*. The passage is given as in Acts x. 2, where, indeed, three of its four words are found, while the other word occupies a remote place in the preceding verse. The entire passage is this: 'There was a certain man in Cesarea, called Cornelius, a centurion of the band called the Italian band, a devout man, and one that feared God with all his house, which gave much alms to the people, and prayed to God always.' This is a sketch of a devout man in one sentence. Why should four words be culled out of this sentence, and put together, containing a nominative case, without any grammatical correlates, or any distinct sentiment?"

Of late years a practice has sprung up in connection with funeral services, which, to say the least, is of questionable expediency, the practice of making the selection of scripture a mere miscellany. The example was set, and a tempting convenience supplied by *Pastor's Hand-Books*, *Pocket-Rituals*, and other time-saving manuals, which have now become rather numerous. In case of a public funeral, or of a private funeral under peculiar circumstances, the officiating minister sometimes writes out a special collection for the occasion. This furnishes a more natural opportunity for taking single clauses or verses, or at most, very short paragraphs from all parts of the Bible. These are often run together with little regard to the precise meaning which they have in their proper connection. The result is a medley; an unhallowed hash of holy sayings. And one familiar with

the Bible finds his mind distracted and wearied by the rapid transit to and fro from the Old Testament to the New, from Isaiah to the Psalms, from the Pentateuch to the Apocalypse, from an evangelist to a prophet. The reading of almost any verse suggests at once its context; and it is doing violence to sacred associations to be hurried thus from chapter to chapter, and from book to book. What would be thought of anything so bizarre manufactured in a similar way out of excerpts from uninspired writers? It is refreshing now and then to hear an entire chapter, like the ninetieth Psalm, or First Corinthians fifteenth, read, and nothing else. No one can, perhaps, reasonably object to three or four extended paragraphs, with two or three specially pertinent single texts thrown in; but a protest is entered against mosaics made up of minute and curiously set fragments of sacred scripture.

IV. INTERPOLATION OF WORDS.

1. *Single Words.*

2 Sam. xviii. 33. "O my son Absalom, my son, my son Absalom! would to God I had died for thee!"

1 Kings iv. 25; Micah iv. 4. "Every man under his *own* vine," etc.

Job xiii. 11. "Shall not his excellency make you *suitably* afraid?" an unpoetical platitude.

Ps. xxiii. 4. "Yea though I walk through the *dark* valley of the shadow of death."

Ps. xlv. 1. "My tongue is *as* the pen of a ready writer."

Ps. xc. 12. "So teach us to number our days that we may apply our hearts unto *true* wisdom."

Prov. xxvii. 17. "*As* Iron sharpeneth iron: so a man sharpeneth the countenance of his friend."

Eccl. ix. 10. "Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with *all* thy might."

Ezek. xxxiii. 11. "I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked; but *rather* that the wicked turn," etc.

Hosea iv. 17. "Ephraim is joined to *his* idols; let him alone." It is printed thus as a text to one of the sermons in the British Pulpit.

Matt. xiii. 42. "*Weeping*, wailing, and gnashing of teeth" (see Matt. viii. 12; xxii. 13; xxiv. 51; xxv. 30; Luke xiii. 28).

Matt. xv. 26. "It is not meet to take the children's bread and to cast it to *the* dogs."

Luke xi. 13. "If ye then being evil know how to give good gifts unto your *own* children."

Luke xvii. 10. "We are unprofitable servants; we have done that which *it* was our duty to do."

John xvi. 8. "He will reprove the world of sin, and of righteousness, and of judgment *to come*."

Acts xxiv. 25. "Go thy way for this time; when I have a *more* convenient season I will call for thee."

Rom. vii. 24. "Oh wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death? *this body of sin and death*."

Rom. xii. 1. "A living sacrifice, holy *and* acceptable unto God."

1 Cor. xi. 26. "Ye do show *forth* the Lord's death till he come."

2 Cor. iv. 17. "For our light affliction, which is but for a moment, worketh *out* for us," etc.

2 Cor. xiii. 14. "The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the communion *and fellowship* of the Holy Ghost be with you all."

Eph. i. 10. "That in the dispensation of the fulness of *the* times."

2 Thess. iii. 1. "That the word of the Lord may have free course, *run*, and be glorified."

1 Tim. iv. 2. "Having their conscience seared *as* with a hot iron."

2 Tim. i. 12. "For I know *in* whom I have believed."

It was quite in keeping with the proprieties of his death-bed that Dr. J. W. Alexander should correct this very common mistake of quotation.

Heb. ix. 27. "And as it is appointed unto *all* men once to die."

A similar insertion is often made in Shakspeare's line :

"But for my part it was *all* Greek to me."

2. *Clauses.*

An unfounded notion has been wide spread that the forbidden fruit in paradise was the apple (Gen. ii. 16, 17; iii. 1, 6). Hence we have *Adam's Apple*, a designation, both popular and scientific, of a projecting cartilage in the human neck, and especially the male neck, as if the prohibited morsel stuck there in the throat of our first parents. In anatomy this protuberance is known as *Pomum Adami*, "so called," says Cooper's Medical Dictionary, "in consequence of a whimsical supposition that part of the forbidden *apple* which Adam eat stuck in the throat, and thus became the cause." So, too, in the line, "*Mala mali malo mala contulit*

omnia mundo," exhibiting a play on the words *mala*, "a jaw-bone," *malus*, "bad," *malum*, "evil," and *malum*, "apple." "The jaw-bone of a bad man by an *apple* brought all ills into the world."

2 Sam. xviii. 9. "And Absalom rode upon a mule, and the mule went under the thick boughs of a great oak, and his head caught hold of the oak, and he was taken up between the heaven and the earth."

There is no mention here of Absalom's long hair, of which he was so vain; nor is there any evidence that it was the occasion or the means of his being caught and suspended by the oak; though that idea — and not unnaturally — is almost universal. Even the Right Rev. George Edward Lynch Cotton, D.D., late Bishop of Calcutta, informs us in Smith's Dictionary of the Bible (see Article *Absalom*), "As he himself was escaping his long hair was entangled in the branches of a terebinth, where he was left hanging, while the mule on which he was riding ran away from under him." Dr. Kitto also affirms that, "the boughs of a terebinth tree caught the long hair in which he gloried."

In his juvenile days the writer knew a man, whose recollections, especially after a public dinner, were apt to be somewhat confused, who, on being asked for a toast at a political gathering, gave the following: "Members of the Hartford Convention: May they all hang by the hair of the head, as did Saul of Tarsus."

Ps. lxxv. 6. "For promotion cometh neither from the east nor from the west, nor from the north, nor from the south."

Isa. i. 6. "From the sole of the foot even unto the crown of the head, there is no soundness in it."

Isa. lviii. 13. "Not doing thine own ways, nor thinking thine own thoughts, nor finding thine own pleasure."

Lam. iii. 23. "They are new every morning, fresh every evening; great is thy faithfulness."

In the letter on Morning of Daniel Webster to Mrs. Page, dated "Richmond, April 29th, 1841, 5 o'clock, A.M.," occurs this sentence: "The manifestations of the power of God, like his mercies, are 'new every morning,' and 'fresh every evening.'" Not unfrequently one may hear the farther supplement, "And repeated every moment."

Hab. i. 13. "Thou art of purer eyes than to behold evil, and canst not look on iniquity *but with abhorrence, or with the least degree of allowance.*"

Matt. xviii. 20. "For where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them, *and that to bless them.*"

Luke vii. 48. "Thy sins, *which are many,* are forgiven."

Not in speaking directly to the woman "which was a sinner," does our Saviour introduce this clause; but in speaking of her to Simon, he said: "Her sins, which are many, are forgiven."

Luke xxiii. 33. "And when they were come to the place which is called Calvary, there they crucified him."

There is neither here, nor elsewhere in the New Testament, anything to authorize the affirmation that the place of crucifixion was an elevated one. The popular phrase "Mount Calvary," is probably due to monkish tradition; but has found its way so widely into the associations, the art, and the literature of Christendom, that probably it will never be displaced. No well-informed, conscientious scholar will, however, be likely to do anything to extend and perpetuate a notion which certainly is without any adequate basis.

Rom. viii. 30. "And whom he called, them he also justified: and whom he justified, *them he also sanctified, them he also glorified.*"

1 Cor. ii. 9. "Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, *to conceive the things,*" etc.

2 Cor. xiii. 14. "The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Ghost, be *and abide* with you all, *henceforth and forever.*"

Various other liberties are taken with the apostolic benediction; and in listening to the jumble sometimes made in that closing act of worship, one is tempted to suspect the minister of being influenced unconsciously by a desire to exhibit a little originality in amplifying and enlivening scripture formularies.

Eph. iii. 20. "Able to do exceeding abundantly above all that we ask or think, *or are worthy to receive.*"

Eph. iii. 21. "Unto him be glory in the church by Christ Jesus throughout all ages, *in a world without end, Amen.*"

Rev. xxii. 17. "And the Spirit and the bride say, Come. And let him that heareth say, Come. And let him that is athirst come. And whosoever will, let him *come and* take the water of life freely."

Can it be that those who are addicted to such interpolations have ever read Proverbs xxx. 6, "Add thou not unto his word, lest he reprove thee, and thou be found a liar"; or one of the last verses in the holy volume—the very next following the one just quoted—"For I testify unto every man that heareth the words of the prophecy of this book, If any man shall add unto these things, God shall add unto him the plagues that are written in this book"?

V. SUBSTITUTION OF WORDS.

Dr. Olinthus Gregory, in editing Robert Hall's celebrated sermon on Modern Infidelity, gives the following prefatory note. It should be stated that Dr. Gregory acted as Mr. Hall's amanuensis in writing out the discourse, which had not been committed to paper before delivery. "After the apostrophe, 'Eternal God! on what are thine enemies intent! what are those enterprises of guilt and horror, that, for the safety of their performers, require to be enveloped in a darkness which the eye of Heaven must not *penetrate!*' he asked, 'Did I say *penetrate*, sir, when I preached it?' 'Yes.' 'Do you think, sir, I may venture to alter it? For no man who considered the force of the English language would use a word of three syllables there, but from absolute necessity.' 'You are doubtless at liberty to alter it if you think well.' 'Then be so good, sir, to take your pencil, and for *penetrate* put *pierce*; pierce is the word, sir, and the only word to be used there.' " Of course, an author has the right to modify his own writings—a right which no editor may exercise except by express permission, and which belongs as little to the one who quotes. Tacitus might reasonably protest against the substitution, sometimes met with, of *mirifico* in his remark "Omne ignotum pro magnifico," and Borbonius against the substitution of *tempora* in his sentiment "Omnia mutantur, nos et mutamur in illis." Nor is there any sufficient excuse for the customary alterations made in such lines as follow:

"A beggarly account, *amount*, of empty boxes." — *Romeo and Juliet*.

"To the manner, *manor*, born." — *Hamlet*.

"Small, *little*, Latin and less Greek." — *Ben Jonson*.

"Men are but, *only*, children of a larger growth." — *Dryden*.

"Fine, *small*, by degrees and beautifully less." — *Prior*.

"When unadorned, *least adorned*, adorned the most." — *Thomson*.

Speaking of Edmund Burke, Thomas Paine said (Letter to the Addressers) "He rose like a rocket, he fell like the stick"; but it is not usually given in the same words. To be sure, we cannot expect that pithy sayings, when they have passed into popular use, will always retain their exact original form; though it may be reasonably claimed of scholarly writers and conversationists that they set an example of scrupulous regard to authentic forms. But where an authority is in the hands of every one, it is right to expect general correctness in citing the same. Yet in this particular — the substitution of words — our sacred writings suffer no less than others. Here are specimen substitutions.

1. *Single Words.*

Gen. iii. 19. "In the sweat of thy face, *brow*, shalt thou eat bread."

Ex. xx. 10. "Nor thy, *the*, stranger that is within thy gates."

1 Kings xix. 12. "A, *the* still small voice."

Job. iii. 17. "There the wicked cease from troubling, and there the weary be, *are*, at rest."

Job ix. 2. "How should, *shall*, man be just with God?"

Job xxxviii. 11. "Hitherto shalt thou come, but, *and*, no further."

Ps. lxxiv. 20. "For the dark places of the earth are full of, *filled with*, the habitations of cruelty."

Ps. xcv. 5. "The sea is his and, *for*, he made it."

Ps. cxxxix. 4. "For there is not a word in, *on*, my tongue."

Prov. iii. 6. "In all thy ways acknowledge him, and he shall direct thy paths, *ways, steps*." Sometimes the first clause of Ps. xxxvii. 5 is coupled with the last clause of this verse: "Commit thy way unto the Lord," and "he shall direct thy paths."

Prov. iv. 18. "But the path of the just is as the shining light, that shineth more and more, *brighter and brighter*, unto the perfect day."

Prov. xi. 14. "In the multitude of counsellors there is safety, *wisdom*."

Prov. xiv. 10. "The heart knoweth his, *its*, own bitterness."

Prov. xxx. 4. "Who hath gathered, *holdeth*, the wind in his fists?"

Ecc. i. 9. "There is no new thing, *nothing new*, under the sun."

Ecc. xii. 7. "Then shall the dust return to the earth, *dust*, as it was."

Isa. xi. 9 (*See* Hab. ii. 14). "For the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord, as the waters cover, *fill*, the sea."

Eccl. iii. 11. "He hath made every thing beautiful in his, *its*, time."

Isa. xxxv. 8. "The wayfaring men, though fools shall, *need*, not err therein."

Isa. xl. 15. "Behold the nations are as a drop of, *in*, a bucket."

Isa. li. 1. "Look unto the rock whence ye are, *were*, hewn, and to the hole of the pit whence ye are, *were*, digged."

Isa. liii. 7 (*last clause*). "So he openeth, *opened*, not his mouth."

Isa. lix. 1. "Behold, the Lord's hand is not shortened that it cannot save; neither, *nor*, his ear heavy that it cannot hear."

Mal. iv. 2. "Shall the Sun of righteousness arise with healing in his wings, *beams*."

Matt. ii. 18. "Rachel weeping for her children, and would not be comforted, because they are, *were*, not."

Matt. vi. 9. "Our Father which, *who*, art in heaven."

Matt. vi. 10. "Thy will be done in, *on*, earth as it is in heaven."

Matt. x. 10; Luke x. 7; 1 Tim. v. 18. "For the workman is worthy of his meat, *hire*." "For the laborer, *workman*, is worthy of his hire."

Matt. xi. 28. "Come unto me all ye that labor, *are weary*, and are heavy laden."

Mark. x. 9. "What, *whom*, therefore God hath joined together, let not man, *let no man*, put asunder."

In the Episcopal form of Solemnization of Matrimony, we find, "Those whom God hath joined together let no man put asunder." And in the Presbyterian Directory for Worship, etc., Chapter XI., Of the Solemnization of Marriage, occurs this: "Then the minister is to say, 'I pronounce you husband and wife, according to the ordinance of God; whom, therefore, God hath joined together let no man put asunder.'"

John ix. 4. "I must work the works of him that sent me while it is day, *work while the day lasts*."

A candidate for licensure once read a sermon before an association of ministers from these words misquoted; whereupon an aged divine suggested that the candidate ought to write a companion sermon from the parallel passage, "Make hay while the sun shines."

John xvi. 8. "He will reprove, *convince*, the world of sin."

Rom. xii. 11. "Not slothful, *diligent*, in business."

1 Cor. ii. 2. "For I determined not to know anything, *to know nothing* among you save Jesus Christ and him crucified."

- 1 Cor. iv. 6. "Not to think of men above that which is written"; often quoted, "*to be wise* above that which is written."
- 2 Cor. iii. 3. "But in fleshy, *fleshly*, tables of the heart."
- 2 Cor. xii. 2. "I knew a man in Christ above, *about*, fourteen years ago."
- 2 Cor. xiii. 14. "The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Ghost, *Spirit*, be with you all."
- Eph. iii. 20. "Now unto him that is able to do, *will do*, exceeding abundantly."
- Phil. i. 6. "Being confident of this very thing, that he which hath begun a good work in you will perform it, *carry it on*, until the day of Jesus Christ."
- 1 Tim. iii. 1. "If a man desire the office of a bishop, he desireth a good work, *thing*."

According to the Church and State Gazette, this verse was thus quoted by a former Bishop of London, at an ordination, some years ago. One can hardly refrain from noticing a certain naturalness in such a variation by the man whose official income was fifty thousand dollars per annum. Such a bishop must make a good *thing* of it.

- Heb. ix. 27. "And as it is appointed unto men once to die, but, *and*, after this the judgment."
- Heb. xi. 6. "For he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a, *the*, rewarder of them that diligently seek him."
- 1 Pet. iv. 8. "Charity shall cover, *will cover*, or *covers*, the multitude of sins."
- 1 Pet. v. 8. "Be sober, be vigilant, because your adversary, the devil, as a roaring lion, walketh, *goeth*, about."
- Rev. ii. 5. "Remember, therefore, from whence thou art fallen, and repent, and do the, *thy*, first works."
- Rev. iii. 1. "I know thy works, that thou hast a name that thou livest, *to live*, and art dead."
- Rev. iii. 17. "Because thou sayest, I am rich, and increased with, *in*, goods."

2. Clauses and Sentences.

- Gen. iii. 15. "And I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed, it shall bruise thy head and thou shalt bruise his heel." *The seed of the woman shall bruise the serpent's head.*
- Job v. 7. "Yet man is born unto trouble, *Man is prone*, or *we are prone unto sin*, as the sparks fly upward."
- Job vii. 10. "He shall return no more to his house, neither shall his place know him any more." *And the place that has known him shall know him no more* (cf. Ps. ciii. 16).

- Job xx. 12. "Though wickedness be sweet in his mouth, though he hide it under his tongue." *We roll sin as a sweet morsel under our tongue. Sweet morsels are not rolled under the tongue.*
- Prov. xii. 10. "A righteous man regardeth the life of his beast." *A merciful man is merciful to his beast.*
- Prov. xxi. 1. "The king's heart is in the hand of the Lord, as the rivers of water; he turneth it whithersoever he will." *Man's heart is in the hand of the Lord; he turneth it as the rivers of water.*
- Prov. xxiii. 5. For riches certainly make themselves wings; they fly away as an eagle toward heaven." *Riches make or take to themselves wings, and fly away as an eagle to heaven.*
- Ecc. xi. 3. "And if the tree fall toward the south, or toward the north, in the place where the tree falleth, there it shall be." *Where the tree falleth, there it shall lie.*
- Isa. lxiii. 5. And I looked, and there was none to help; and I wondered that there was none to uphold; therefore mine own arm brought salvation unto me." (See also lix. 16; Ezek. xvi. 5.) *When there was no eye to pity, and no arm to save, then thine eye pitied and thine arm brought salvation.*
- Isa. lxvi. 8. "Shall the earth be made to bring forth in one day? or shall a nation be born at once?" *A nation shall be born in a day.*
- Zech. iv. 10. "For who hath despised the day of small things?" *Despise not the day of small things.*
- Matt. vi. 12. "And forgive us our debts as we forgive our debtors." Luke xi. 4. "And forgive us our sins; for we also forgive every one that is indebted to us."

The misleading influence of the Prayer Book is specially apparent in regard to our Lord's Prayer. Many besides Episcopalians are accustomed to say, and perhaps usually unconscious of their mistake: "Forgive us our trespasses as we forgive those who trespass against us."

It should be added, however, that citations are made from the Psalter (or Psalms for the Day), which is an older translation (1535) than our Authorized Version, and was made by Coverdale. Thus the Hon. Robert C. Winthrop, on taking the speaker's chair, in the House of Representatives at Washington, invoked the blessing of God, "whose recorded attribute it is *that he maketh men to be of one mind in a house.*" Newspaper correspondents and others at the time were puzzled to know where the quotation came from. It is from Coverdale, Ps. lxvii., which reads: "He is the God that maketh

men to be of one mind in an house"; and which corresponds to Ps. lxxviii. 6, of King James's translation: "God setteth the solitary in families."

VI. PUTATIVE SCRIPTURE.

"Know thyself," is one of the most valuable utterances of the old gnostic philosophy, and it was worthy to be written in letters of gold over the temple door at Delphi; but does not happen to be found, as some have supposed, in either the Old or New Testament. Something more than a dozen years ago Mr. Lamar, member of Congress from Mississippi, replying to Mr. Clark of New York, said, in the House of Representatives: "I would commend to my friend from New York, that passage of the Bible, 'Know thyself.'"

"Spare the rod and spoil the child," belongs to the same category. Solomon does, to be sure, say: "He that spareth his rod hateth his son" (Prov. xiii. 24); but it was the author of Hudibras who wrote:

"Love is a boy by poets styled;
Then spare the rod, and spoil the child."

Alexander Pope penned this line:

"An honest man 's the noblest work of God."

Yet it has been supposed to be a citation from holy writ, and that, too, by others besides the newspaper editor who remarked, in an obituary notice of a worthy person: "We may say of him, as the holy scriptures have so beautifully expressed it, 'An honest man is the noblest work of God.'"

There are some to whom it would be a surprise, if told that the Bible nowhere contains their favorite expression: "We are exalted to heaven in point of privilege." So, too, this: "seals of his ministry," "souls for his hire." And yet again: "A word to the wise is sufficient" — "Verbum sat sapienti." William Shakspeare's

"Undiscovered country, from whose bourn
No traveller returns"

has, in the associations of some, put him among the prophets. "God tempers the wind to the shorn lamb." So wrote Lau-

rence Sterne, in his *Sentimental Journey*. Even he took it from a French writer, Henry Estienne: "Dieu mesure le froid à la brebis tondue." Probably neither of these authors had in mind Isa. xxvii. 8: "He stayeth his rough wind in the day of his east wind."

Quite noteworthy is this: "In the midst of life we are in death." Not a few would look confidently for it in the word of God. Robert Hall once planned a sermon on it. When that shocking accident, the bursting of a gun on board a steam-frigate at Washington, occurred some years since, the government organ quoted the above as an inspired saying. So did Captain Richardson, in his account of the burning of the *Ocean Monarch*. It is the burial service of the Episcopal church which has given it currency. It comes from an old funeral hymn in Latin, by Notker the Elder, a monk of St. Gall, in the tenth century:

"Media vita in morte sumus.

And yet this line is usually misquoted, by inserting the preposition *in* before *vita*.

VII. SCRIPTURE IGNORED.

The treatment of our topic would hardly be complete without some reference to another species of blundering, which proceeds from similar ignorance of the holy volume. It is no unusual thing to hear surprise or doubt expressed, when some unfamiliar phrase or passage is quoted, in regard to its being found in the Bible. The phrase *sursum corda*, used in early Christian times as a summons to prayer, is doubtless generally quoted without any thought of its being found in Latin versions of Lam. iii. 41: "Let us lift up our hearts," etc. Occasionally a signal instance of want of acquaintance with the New, as well as the Old, Testament presents itself. Thus the *Glasgow Reformer's Gazette* is found complimenting Lord Chesterfield for his sensible remark: "Evil communications corrupt good manners."

The Hon. Nathan Clifford was engaged, some years since, as counsel on a murder trial at Lewiston, Maine. In the

course of an argument which he offered, Mr. Clifford, in order to clench an improbable hypothesis of his invention, remarked, with great solemnity and great emphasis: "Secret things belong to God." "At this point," says the Biddeford Journal, "the learned counsel laid down his brief, took off his spectacles, and, thrusting his hands into his pockets, observed to the court that he was indebted to Judge Rice for this thought, who, at the trial, reminded him that it was the language of Hon. Peleg Sprague in concluding his argument for Sager. Deeply impressed with its forcible language, as well as with the originality of the idea, he suspected it must have been borrowed by Mr. Sprague; and now, having devoted some time to the investigation, he was happy to state to the honorable court that he had traced the quotation to its source. By diligently searching the authorities, he had ascertained that the language was first used by 'My Lord Hale, in his Pleas of the Crown,' — referring to the volume and page. This was too much for the County Attorney, Mr. Goddard, one of the opposing counsel, who interposed: "O Mr. Clifford, that is in the Bible; you will find it in Deuteronomy, chapter xxix. verse 29.'"

To revert to the general subject, in every community and congregation there are, at least, a few careful readers of the sacred volume who cannot well avoid noticing such departures from their revered and familiar version, and to whom these blemishes are a grief. A mistake of the kind shocks their sensibilities, as a false note does the delicate musical ear.

In mediaeval and earlier times, authors would affix an adjuration to copyists enjoining correctness in their work. Here is one by Irenaeus: "I adjure thee who shall transcribe this book, by our Lord Jesus Christ, and by his glorious coming to judge the quick and the dead, that thou compare what thou transcribest, and correct it carefully according to the copy from which thou transcribest; and that thou also annex a copy of this adjuration to what thou hast written." Such solicitude was not uncalled for. But how much more appropriate is similar sensitiveness now on the part of

all who consult, and profess to repeat the lively oracles! What punishment would be due for vitiating orders on shipboard or on the field, and shall this be deemed a venial offence? We do not readily forgive the compositor for his blunders. The last edition of Ariosto's Orlando which appeared in his life-time (1532) had so many typographical errors that he was accustomed to say he had been assassinated by the printer. Such derelictions might well be made penal. In 1632 Barker and Lucas, the king's printers, issued an edition of the Bible, in which the mistake occurred of leaving out "not" in the seventh commandment. His majesty, Charles I., gave orders for calling the printers into the high court of Commission, where — the fact being proved — the whole impression was called in, and the printers fined three hundred pounds. One can hardly help wishing that the lapses of the pen and tongue in this line of things might be followed by a judicious mulct. If there is any question in regard to the desirableness of a corrected version of our English Bible, there certainly can be none in regard to correct citations from the same.

It is not to be expected that those whose habits in this regard are formed, and who are advanced in years, will correct themselves fully. Yet no one should deem the matter unworthy of an effort. A thorough reform may be effected by suitable painstaking in the family, the Sabbath-school, and the theological seminary. Every parent and teacher should insist upon verbal accuracy in the committing of scripture to memory, and also in quoting it. *Totidem verbis* should be an inflexible law at the professor's desk. The reacting influence of a painstaking habit in regard to any one thing will prove an element of education worth more than it can possibly cost. Accuracy here will extend its influence more or less to other practices. "He that is faithful in that which is least, is faithful also in much; and he that is unjust in the least is unjust also in much." It should be remembered that in some sort a question of veracity is involved; and no departure from the precise truth is of small consequence.

Of all classes clergymen are those from whom there is justly claimed comparative blamelessness in the point now considered. They are supposed to be, and ought to be, careful students of the *Liber Sacerdotalis*. They are supposed to be educated men, and to have an appreciation of literary fitness, as well as of the reverential exactness due in all treatment of the holy volume. Their habits in this respect go largely to form the habits of hearers: "For the priest's lips should keep knowledge, and they should seek the law at his mouth." The pulpit is in a great measure responsible for the loose, and sometimes slovenly, treatment of sacred language. No people are, as a whole, more familiar with the Bible, or more careful in repeating its language than the Scotch, and this is due somewhat to the practice in the pulpit of giving chapter and verse when quotations are made, while the congregation, book in hand, turn to the places cited. The Jews demand that copyists of the Hebrew scriptures shall write no word by heart merely; that a book of the Law with even one letter too few or too many shall be treated as corrupt; and the world owes not a little to their punctiliousness. The Mohammedan doctor would be discarded who should habitually misquote any one of the six thousand verses of the Koran. Out of the thirty thousand (31,173) verses of the Bible there are not more than one in five that a sermonizer will be likely ever to have occasion to use. Is it too much to require of him that in citing these he should uniformly turn to the sacred page and verify the passage? "Lord, I discover," says Thomas Fuller, "an arrant laziness in my soul." The quaint divine comes nearer standing alone in his candor than in the result of his internal exploration.

ARTICLE IV.

THE NEW TESTAMENT VIEW OF CHRIST AS BEARING SIN.

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THE present Article, though a separate investigation, may be regarded as a sequel to the author's "Meaning of נָשָׂא" in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* for July, 1873. In that discussion, we were concerned with the various ideas expressed by a single word; in this, with a single idea, by whatever words expressed. In our own language, perhaps in most languages, sin is conceived of as a burden, somehow rolled upon us, and pressing us down till it is somehow lifted off. We have found the metaphor a frequent one in Hebrew literature; we have seen that one may thus bear his own sin, or that of another; we have learned that irrational animals, human beings, God himself, and the Servant of Jehovah foretold in Isaiah liii., all bear the sins of men.

Turning to the New Testament, let us inquire whether Christ, according to these records, had such a burden upon him, and if so, how he bore it.

At the outset we cannot but be surprised that the conception of sin alluded to above is so seldom met with in the writings of the New Testament. We found in the Hebrew more than sixty clear instances in which this figure is made prominent with the single word נָשָׂא; but I am able to discover only one case in the Greek scriptures, aside from the two of which Christ is the subject. That one is 2 Tim. iii. 6, silly women *laden* with sins (σωρεύω). This infrequency is in spite of the fact that sin and its treatment form the entire subject of the divine revelation, and in spite of the further fact that Christ is constantly presented in various relations to sin.

The following is a catalogue of these relations: [1] Christ forgives sin (*passim*); [2] saves from it (Matt. i. 21); [3]

takes it away (John i. 29 ; 1 John iii. 5) ; [4] turns men away from it (Acts iii. 26) ; [5] makes a purification of it (Heb. i. 3) ; [6] purifies from it (1 John i. 9) ; [7] namely, by his blood (1 John i. 7) ; [8] washes from it by his blood (Rev. i. 5) ; [9] sheds his blood for its remission (Matt. xxvi. 28) ; [10] gives himself that he may redeem from it (Tit. ii. 14) ; [11] dies unto it (Rom. vi. 10) ; [12] dies for redemption from it (Heb. ix. 15) ; [13] is delivered on account of it (Rom. iv. 25) ; [14] suffers on account of it (1 Pet. iii. 18) ; [15] gives himself on account of it (Gal. i. 4) ; [16] offers up himself a sacrifice for it (Heb. vii. 27) ; [17] puts it away by the sacrifice of himself (Heb. ix. 26) ; [18] bears it (Heb. ix. 28 ; 1 Pet. ii. 24) ; [19] expiates it (Heb. ii. 17) ; [20] is the propitiation for it (1 John ii. 2 ; iv. 10) ; [21] is made sin for us (2 Cor. v. 21).

It will be seen that there is here not only a variety of relations, but a variety of metaphors to express them. Sin is presented as an enemy [2] ; as an evil path [4] ; as a stain [5 to 8] ; as a debt [9] ; as a bandit [10, 12] ; as a load [18], etc. Again, Christ is revealed in these texts not only in his connection with sin, but even more prominently in his relation to the Father, as High Priest, Surety, Victim, etc. ; and in his relation to us as Deliverer, Friend, Purifier, Ransom, etc. May it not be that some of these expressions rest originally on the image of bearing a burden, besides the two translated "bear?" This point we must examine.

The only numbers in the catalogue which might seem to admit of this explanation are [1, 3, 13, 14, 15, 19, 21].

As to forgiveness [1], that is expressed in Hebrew, it is true, by the figure of sustaining the burden of wrong. But in Biblical Greek it is otherwise. The only three words for forgive are ἀπολύω, ἀφίημι, and χαρίζομαι ; the two first implying, negatively, the discharge of a debt, the last implying, positively, the granting of a favor. The image in [13] is of one treated as a criminal, and given over to death for the sins of others. Though Christ *might* be said to bear our sins in this view, that is not distinctly said of him here.

[14] and [15] are connected with the two following numbers, as teaching the great sacrifice of Christ. The intimate relation between sacrifice and the bearing of sin will be presently considered ; but the two pictures of burning and bearing are in themselves quite separate. To expiate [19] is not to bear, but to cover (כִּפֶּר) a hateful object ; see *ιλάσκομαι* in the Septuagint. Whatever may be our theological explanation of [21], whether we regard our Lord as merely the representative of sinners, or as literally taking their place, at least there is no direct allusion, in this strong expression, to the bearing of burdens. There remain before us only numbers [3] and [18] ; and to these four texts let us now address ourselves.

John i. 29. "Behold the Lamb of God who taketh away the sin of the world." The verb is *αἵρω*, which is extensively used in the Old Testament as the equivalent of כָּנָה. We must not allow ourselves on this account, however, to be prejudiced either for or against a particular rendering in this case. It is a great mistake, committed even by those who study the Bible without theological bias, to allow a semi-infallibility to the version of the LXX, when it is well known that in many instances their translation is erroneous, and in many others simply ridiculous. Happily the meaning of a word so frequently used as *αἵρω* can be determined by a careful comparison of all the passages in which it occurs in the New Testament, without resorting to its uninspired use. The reader will find a table of these passages at the close of this Article.

It will be seen that *αἵρω* answers better than any other single word to the Hebrew כָּנָה. It has passed through the same development, *take, take up, lift up, carry, take away*. *Αἵρω*, however, is not used, like כָּנָה, for the idea of *bearing* when no motion is involved (*holding up* as distinct from carrying).

On the other hand, *take away*, which very seldom occurs as the proper translation of כָּנָה, is frequently that of *αἵρω*, and in the writings of John this meaning is the prevailing one. We must not go so far as Huther on 1 John iii. 5,

who calls it the "constant" signification in John; see on the contrary, John viii. 59; v. 8-12; x. 24; xi. 41; Rev. x. 5; xviii. 21. But with these exceptions, the idea of taking away is always present, though not always to be expressed. Now as the word occurs twenty-seven times in John, besides the two cases in dispute, we have raised a presumption in favor of the rendering "take away" in these passages. Moreover, as the only dispute with reference to these is between "carry" and "take away," and as "carry" occurs only in John v. 10 (not the *necessary* rendering even there), this presumption is strengthened. Still further, 1 John iii. 5 seems exactly parallel to the passage before us. There the apostle states the great object of Christ's appearing; it is *αἶρεν τὰς ἁμαρτίας*. Here he records the testimony of the Baptist to the same thing; for it is evident that John means to point the multitude to the cardinal characteristic of Jesus as the Messiah. He is *ὁ αἶρων τὴν ἁμαρτίαν*. Now although the context of this latter verse throws no decisive light upon its meaning, it is otherwise with the passage in the Epistle. The time has gone by when that Epistle was regarded as a string of aphoristic ideas; all the best modern commentators maintain the strict connection of the thought. But that connection is entirely broken if *ἄρῃ* is rendered *carry*, and entirely-harmonious if it is rendered *take away*. Space forbids a detailed support of this statement; the reader is referred to Huther's excellent remarks in his continuation of Meyer's Commentary (excellent, aside from the philological mistakes noticed and to be noticed), also to Alford, *in loco*. We conclude that the English version of both these texts is correct, "to take away sin." But what is the figure lying at the bottom of this phrase? How does Christ take away sin? Not, as we are often told, by simply removing it from the offender, and putting it out of sight. The tempting parallel to 1 John iii. 5, namely, Heb. ix. 26; (*εἰς ἀθέτησιν ἁμαρτίας πεφανέρωται*) must not blind us to the formal difference between *τίθῃμι* and *αἶρω*, words which suggest exactly opposite images. A careful examination of *αἶρω* in the Table

will show that it, no less than $\sigma\psi$, permits one to take an object away, only by taking it upon himself. In the two apparent exceptions (Luke xxiii. 18 [= John xix. 15 = Acts xxi. 36 ; xxii. 22] and Eph. iv. 31) the figure can still be traced. Christ took away our sins, therefore, by taking them upon himself. We go one step further back and ask, How did John get the idea of the Lamb of God who should take away sin ? Again referring for the sake of brevity to the able discussions of this question by recent commentators, I simply record my conviction that this idea could only have come from Isa. liii., where Christ is a lamb, and bears sin as a sacrifice, thus taking it away. So Lücke, Tholuck, De Wette, Meyer, Lange, Alford, and many others. We may say then, that while we are to translate by "take away," and while the idea of deportation is in the foreground of the picture, there is in the background the idea of taking up sin as a load, and bearing it to sacrifice.

Before we pass to the two remaining texts, it may be desirable to examine the usage of two words often associated with the bearing of sin ; $\phi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\omega$ and $\lambda\alpha\mu\beta\acute{\alpha}\nu\omega$. The latter occurs Matt. viii. 17 ; $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\varsigma\ \tau\acute{\alpha}\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\sigma\theta\epsilon\nu\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma\ \eta\mu\acute{\omega}\nu\ \epsilon\lambda\alpha\beta\epsilon$. By a circular process of reasoning it has been held that this points to Christ's bearing our sins ; because (1) it represents Isa. liii. 4, where the Sept. is $\tau\acute{\alpha}\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\mu\alpha\rho\tau\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma\ \eta\mu\acute{\omega}\nu\ \phi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\epsilon\iota$, and (2) $\lambda\alpha\mu\beta\acute{\alpha}\nu\omega$ stands most frequently in the Greek Bible for $\sigma\psi$ with the words for sin. But both these arguments rest only on the authority of the Sept., which in this passage has certainly mistaken the translation.¹ $\lambda\alpha\mu\beta\acute{\alpha}\nu\omega$ only means *take*, *get*, and *receive*, and the LXX have erred again in using this as their favorite word to translate $\sigma\psi$ with the Acc. of the words for sin.

As to $\phi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\omega$, the misconceptions of our standard authorities are lamentable. Something was said, in the writer's previous Article, of the danger of trusting the exegesis of theologians ; a caution must now be given against the exegetes also. We confess to being surprised when Huther on 1 John iii. 5 tells

¹ See Bibliotheca Sacra, Meaning of $\sigma\psi$, Vol. xxx. pp. 442-444.

us that while $\text{נָשָׂא אֶת־חַטְּאֵת}$ means both to bear sin and to take it away, the LXX translate it by $\alpha\lambda\epsilon\iota\nu$ in the latter case and $\phi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\epsilon\iota\nu$ in the former; the facts being that the Hebrew means "to bear sin" even when rendered by $\alpha\lambda\epsilon\iota\nu$, and that it is *never rendered by $\phi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\epsilon\iota\nu$ at all*. As the principle is of some consequence, let us follow Huther to the authority he quotes, viz. Meyer on John i. 29. The latter, referring to Isa. liii., interjects a parenthesis which has been the means of misleading many commentators (נָשָׂא , LXX $\phi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\epsilon\iota$, $\alpha\nu\eta\nu\epsilon\gamma\kappa\epsilon$, $\alpha\nu\omicron\lambda\omicron\sigma\epsilon\iota$). Just below he says that the LXX express the bearing of sin by " $\phi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\epsilon\iota\nu$, etc." But the *only passage in the Greek Bible* in which $\phi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\epsilon\iota\nu$ $\alpha\mu\alpha\rho\tau\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma$ occurs is this same blundering version of Isa. liii. 4, where all the sin is inserted (and committed) by the LXX. The only other place in which $\phi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\epsilon\iota\nu$ occurs in any connection with "sin" is Jer. xlv. 22: "Jehovah could no longer *hold out* before the *evil* of your works." Now as נָשָׂא occurs with the words for sin sixty-five times, and is there translated by seventeen different expressions in the Sept., the assertions of Meyer and Huther become astounding. (I have seen the above parenthesis quoted in a prominent commentary, with the printer's error, $\alpha\nu\epsilon\nu\epsilon\gamma\kappa\epsilon$, faithfully copied.)

Returning to the New Testament we find (see Table) that $\phi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\omega$ means *to bring*, almost never *to bear*, and nowhere occurs with the words for sin.

To speak more definitely, *bear* in the sense of sustain appears Heb. i. 3; in the sense of endure Rom. ix. 22; Heb. xii. 20; xiii. 13. A tree bears fruit not by holding it up, but by *bringing* it forth from its substance (John xv. 2, etc.) "To carry" differs from "to bring" only by reason of the speaker's point of view; bring, is to take and come; carry, to take and go. We render "carry" only in Luke xxiii. 26; John ii. 8. The passive "borne along" we use in Acts ii. 2; xxvii. 15, 17; 2 Pet. i. 21. "Bring" is retained in fifty-five out of the sixty-six passages.¹

¹ It may be asked why the meanings of $\lambda\alpha\mu\beta\acute{\alpha}\nu\omega$ and $\phi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\omega$ are given at length, if they have so little to do with the subject. There is a negative and a positive

We come now to ἀναφέρω ἁμαρτίας, Heb. ix. 28 ; 1 Pet. ii. 24. To deduce the meaning of this verb we must proceed with all caution, as it occurs only nine times in the whole New Testament. Since the simple verb means *bring*, we should expect the compound to mean *bring up*. This, and no other meaning, fits its first occurrence, Matt. xvii. 1 ; καὶ ἀναφέρει αὐτοὺς εἰς ὄρος ὑψηλόν. The same act is described in the same words, Mark ix. 2. Leaving out these, and the two passages in question, there remain five other occurrences of ἀναφέρω, in each of which it is employed in connection with the idea of sacrifice. The context shows the meaning to be “to offer sacrifices.” Literally we should render “to bring sacrifices up,” sc., upon the altar ; and this is exactly the way in which the Jews often expressed “to offer sacrifice” in their own language, using the Hiphil of בָּרַח, בָּרַח, and עָלָה, to cause to go up, i.e. to bring or carry up. Ἀναφέρω, though so seldom used in the New Testament, is found more than a hundred and twenty times in the Sept. (I do not state an exact number, as Conrad Kircher is unreliable.) After examining all these passages, I am prepared to affirm that in nearly every case the radical conception is *to bring* or *bring up*. In the great majority of cases the meaning is “to offer,” and that this is simply “to cause to go up,” appears from the frequent addition ἐπὶ τὸ θυσιαστήριον or τὸν βῶμον,¹ Ps. li. 21 [19] ; Lev. xiv. 20 ; Num. xxiii. 2, etc. ; and especially from the interchange of ἀναβιβάζω and ἀναφέρω, as in Num. xxiii. (I have dwelt upon this point, not because any one doubts it, but to establish a firm basis upon which to proceed). When, therefore, we read in Jas. ii. 21, ἀνεέγκας Ἰσαὰκ ἐπὶ τὸ θυσιαστήριον, the exact translation is, “When he brought up Isaac upon the altar.” “Offer” is retained in the able² reason. It would not be easy in any other way to destroy the current belief as to the use of these words. The chief reason, however, is, that the writer has carefully examined these passages in their connections, and (as in his previous Article) wishes to contribute thus much towards the better understanding of the Bible. To himself, the process of these Articles has been worth more than the result. It may be so to others also.

¹ Acc. not Dat.

² Subsequently changed.

as "bring up" would be ambiguous here; but it is evident that thus far ἀναφέρω is simply ἀνά and φέρω. A glance at Heb. xiii. 15 and 1 Pet. ii. 5, shows that these texts come into the same category. We find our verb twice in Heb. vii. 27. The high priests had daily necessity to offer sacrifices for sin; Christ did that once, by offering himself. Here, then, our Lord is pictured as carrying himself up upon the altar; being both offerer and victim, and that on account of sins. We are now prepared to examine

1 Pet. ii. 24. "Ὁς τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν αὐτὸς ἀνήνεγκεν ἐν τῷ σώματι αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τὸ ξύλον. The English version translates ἀνήνεγκεν by a verb of rest. He "bore our sins on the tree," i.e. as he hung on the tree. But this would require ἐπὶ τῷ ξύλῳ, and as there is no authority for this reading, our version must be wrong. By reason of this accusative, if for no other reason, ἀναφέρω must here be kept to the one meaning thus far developed, and ἀνήνεγκεν ἐπὶ τὸ ξύλον must equal ἀνενέγκας ἐπὶ τὸ θυσιαστήριον above. Nor is the sense impaired, but enriched. Who himself carried up our sins in his own body upon the tree, *cons. praeg.*, carried the sins up, and sacrificed them there. How exactly this conforms to the context. Christ suffered for us, that we might follow in his steps (vs. 21); but he did no sin (vs. 22), and we are burdened with sin; how can we follow him? Why, he took our sins off (vs. 24), and carrying them up the dolorous way, immolated them upon the cross, so that now we may become dead to sin, and live to righteousness (vs. 24). This is the ἀθέτησις of Heb. ix. 26. Nor is it a contradiction that there and elsewhere Christ is said to sacrifice himself, while here he sacrifices our sins; for our sins are slain in and with him; nailed to his cross, like the ceremonial law. Christ is at once the offerer who brings our sins to sacrifice, and who brings himself to sacrifice. Nowhere is this whole truth better stated than by Calovius: "The cross of Christ was the lofty altar to which, when he was about to offer himself, he ascended, laden with our sins."

How exactly this conforms to the Jewish typical sacrifices!

Christ is the antitype of the high priest, and both the goats of the day of atonement. He loads our sins upon himself, and carries them off by giving his life a sacrifice.

But it is objected that since Peter is quoting Isa. liii. 12, as is manifest both from the Sept. and from the context in the Epistle, and since that passage cannot mean "Christ carried up the sins of many," but "Christ bore them as a burden resting on him," the latter must be the meaning here. We reply that it is grammatically impossible for the latter to be the meaning here. We must understand the apostle by taking what he says, and not what we suppose he ought to have said. It is easy to save his quotation without sacrificing his grammar. The reference is, we grant, a plain allusion, an interpretation if you will, but yet not an exact quotation. Isaiah says that Christ bore the sins of many. Peter says that he carried our sins to sacrifice. So far he has not said that Christ bore them at all, for Abraham did not bear Isaac when he brought him to the altar. The point of the apostle's argument is made if Christ has taken away our sin. But Peter does not forget that the language he quotes has a farther import, so in order that his ἀνήνεγκεν may denote the same thing as Isaiah's, he inserts ἐν τῷ σώματι αὐτοῦ. If Christ brought our sins to the cross *in his own body*, he must have been laden with them. Here, therefore, as in John i. 29, we find the great fact that Christ bore our sins, not stated in direct terms, but necessarily involved in the language used, and more distinctly involved than in the former passage. I will add that the translation of ἀναφέρω above given, agrees, so far as I know, with the views of the best modern commentators on this verse. Special attention is asked to the remarks of Vitringa.¹

Heb. ix. 28. This verse says of Christ προσερχθεὶς εἰς τὸ

¹ Vix uno verbo ἔμφασις vocis ἀναφέρειν exprimi potest. Nota ferre et offerre. Primo dicere voluit Petrus Christum portasse peccata nostra, in quantum illa ipsi erant imposita. Secundo, ita tulisse peccata nostra, ut ea secum obtulerit in altari. Respicit ad animantes, quibus peccata primo imponebantur, quique deinceps peccatis onusti offerebantur. Sed in quam aram? ξύλον, ait Petrus, lignum, hoc est, crucem. — See, also, Winer, who quotes this passage, N. T. Grammar, § 52, 4, 2) c).

πολλῶν ἀνενεγκεῖν ἁμαρτίας. The singular fact appears of ἀναφέρω as the final cause of προσφέρω. As the latter is the regular word for "offer" in the New Testament, we are confidently told that ἀναφέρω here, at least, cannot mean offer, and must mean *bear*. Let us see. Προσφέρω occurs forty-six times in the best texts of the New Testament. As ἀναφέρω is etymologically "to bring up," so προσφέρω is "to bring to," and this translation *may always be retained* (except Heb. xii. 7). This word is the technical one for offering gifts or sacrifices. Is it meant that these things were "brought to" the altar? A careful study of these texts will convince any one that the meaning always is "to bring to God." The whole series should be examined in support of this assertion; but it may be sufficient to refer to Acts vii. 42; Heb. xi. 4; John xvi. 2 ("will think to bring worship to God"), and especially a passage close to our text, Heb. ix. 14. In each case cited, πρὸς in composition governs τῷ θεῷ (μοι), while the only apparent exception (Matt. v. 23) is not a real one, as προσφέρειν ἐπὶ τὸ θυσιαστήριον means *offer* (bring to God) *upon the altar*. On the use of verbs compounded with πρὸς see Winer § 52, 4, 14); but his remark on προσφέρειν § 52, 3, is nugatory, as that reading in Luke xii. 11 must be abandoned.

Returning now to Heb. ix. 28, we translate: So also Christ, once brought to (God) in order to bring up (upon the altar) the sins of many, shall be seen a second time, apart from sin, by those who wait for him to save them.

1. This gives a plain sense, Christ was sacrificed in order to sacrifice sin.

2. It preserves one distinct meaning for ἀναφέρω throughout the New Testament.

3. It is in entire harmony with the context. I might add, with the whole book of Hebrews, and with the whole Bible; but read especially the ninth and tenth chapters. The great problem was: How shall sin be lifted off the guilty conscience, to return no more? The old ritual could not do it; the teaching and example of Christ could never have

done it. A direct word of forgiveness from Christ might lift the burden *for that time*; but back it would come with the next sin. The sins of many, *all* their sins, past, present, and to come, considered as ground of condemnation, must be, once for all, destroyed. Since there was no other way, lo, he came, at the end of the ages, to do the will of God. God prepared the body; laid upon him the iniquities of us all; and then in unfathomable love, the Lamb of God, bearing these sins, ascended the altar, to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself. *The sins were thoroughly burned up*; they can come no more to accuse us. The next time the Saviour shall appear, those who wait for him unto salvation will see no sin about him, no condemnation, for by one offering he hath perfected the saints forever. It is astonishing that Alford, *in loco*, after citing this explanation as that of the Peschito, Chrysostom, Oecumenius, and Theophylact, can assert that it "would introduce a new and irrelevant idea, and cannot be maintained." Far less relevant to the *context*, at least, is it to say: "Christ was once offered to *bear* the sins of many" — whether by way of punishment, or of suffering substituted for punishment.

4. This explanation is in entire harmony with Isa. liii. 12. The quotation is more explicit here than in Peter, and should any feel compelled to adopt the meaning "bear," there is not here, as there, a grammatical objection. But this is not the necessary *rendering*, for in saying, "Christ was offered to sacrifice the sins of many," the writer says: Christ was offered to bear upon him the sins of many, and destroy them by his death. The נָשָׂא חַטֹּאתֵינוּ of the prophecy is translated, and interpreted besides, in the Epistle.

Concluding Remarks.

1. The New Testament nowhere declares, *ipsissimis verbis*, that Christ has borne sin. But

2. The New Testament does declare it positively, explicitly, and necessarily, as involved in the meaning of *ἀρῶ* and *ἀναφέρω* in the four texts we have discussed.

3. The only way in which Christ is said in the New Testament to have borne our sins, is by bearing them to sacrifice. A nobler and greater than Winkelreid, has clasped to his bosom all the glittering spears of the law which enslaved us, and thus made way for our liberty. The spears no longer oppose us ; they are buried in the body of Christ.

4. The texts we have examined are consistent with the theology of either of the two prevailing schools of Calvinism. As the *πολλῶν* of the last passage does not refute the New England view, since it may be the qualitative designation of *πάντων* (Delitzsch), so neither does the *κόσμου* of John i. 29 refute the Old School, since it may only denote the extension of God's covenant to both Jew and Gentile. Again, as it is not distinctly stated that Christ bore the *punishment* of our sins, so neither is it distinctly denied. What *is* stated is, that the Saviour took upon him, carried to the cross, and immolated with himself, our sins. The statement is highly figurative, as every representation of the subject must be. Both sides agree that what Christ took upon him was our sins as a ground of condemnation. According to the one party this condemnation is removed, because the suffering of our substitute has paid the full penalty of the law ; according to the other, this condemnation is removed, because the suffering of our substitute has paid a full equivalent to the law. Neither party can explain *why* God should accept the punishment, or the substituted suffering, of the innocent Christ ; both agree that God is satisfied, and our sins expiated, by the death of Christ. It is simply a different speculative philosophy of the same ineffable facts.

5. In view of the insidious progress, in the church, of a theology which denies these great facts, and makes the death of Christ only a moral motive operating on men, does it not behoove all who believe in the expiation of sin through the blood of Christ to cross hands, instead of swords, and unitedly — Old and New, Calvinists and Arminians — hold up the slain Lamb as the only redemption from the curse of a broken law ?

NOTE. — The writer presents the following Table as an attempt at a critical translation of the passages involved. It is his belief that, owing to the nature of language, the meaning of any word frequently used may be determined by a careful and honest examination of the context wherever it occurs. No one man's life is long enough to do this for the whole Bible; but if a thousand students were to portion out the work, and execute it faithfully, we should soon have better grammars, lexicons, and translations, of the word of God. In the present case, the writer has aimed at a literal, not a smooth, rendering. Special care has been taken with particles and tenses.

A few words may be needful respecting λαμβάνω.¹ The word commonly means *to take*, when the subject puts forth effort; but sometimes *to receive*, when he is passive; and sometimes *to get*, when he receives in consequence of previous effort. The latter word is so often improperly used in English that we are in danger of giving up its use altogether; which would be a great loss to our vigorous tongue. The writer has generally employed it instead of *obtain*, *acquire*, etc. as more convenient and expressive. The difference between *get* and *receive* is brought out by λαμβάνω and δέχομαι in Matt. x. 41; also by λαμβάνω alone in Matt. xx. 9–11 compared with Matt. xxv. 16–24. The rendering of Phil. iii. 12 will certainly be approved by our friends who have “got the blessing,” though it seems Paul had n't got so far.

It has been thought best to group the passages according to the natural order of their principal meanings, rather than to present them heterogeneously in the order of their occurrence. By this means, the *proportion* of the various significations is at once brought into view. But as ἀναφέρω has one consistent meaning throughout, and as the same is true of φέρω, with the exceptions noted on page 480, the above course was not taken with these words.

Λίρω.

I. TO TAKE (catch, take along).²

- MATT. ix. 16 For the filling of it *takes* from the garment.
 xi. 29 *Take* my yoke upon you.
 xiii. 12 Even what he has shall be *taken* from him.
 xvii. 27 And the first coming fish *take*.
 xx. 14 *Take* what is thine and depart.
 xxi. 43 The kingdom of God shall be *taken* from you.
 xxiv. 17 To *take* the things from his house.
 xxiv. 18 To *take* his outer garments (or, his coat).

¹ See foot-note, p. 480.

² In all the passages under each main division, the verb expresses the same idea. But occasionally other words are more suitable in the translation. Such words are enclosed in parenthesis at the beginning of their respective sections.

- MATT. xxiv. 39 The deluge came and *caught* the whole of them.
 xxv. 28 *Take* therefore from him the talent.
 xxv. 29 Even what he has shall be *taken* from him.
- MARK ii. 21 The filling that is new *takes* from the old one itself.
 iv. 25 Even what he has shall be *taken* from him.
 vi. 8 In order that they should *take* nothing for a journey.
 xiii. 15 To *take* anything from his house.
 xiii. 16 To *take* his coat.
 xv. 24 Casting a lot who should *take* what.
- LUKE viii. 12 And *taketh* the word from their heart.
 viii. 18 Even what he seems to have shall be *taken* from him.
 ix. 3 *Take* nothing for the journey.
 xvii. 31 Let him not go down to *take* them.
 xix. 24 *Take* from him the mina.
 xix. 26 Even what he has shall be *taken*.
 xxii. 36 He that has a purse let him *take* it *along*.
- JOHN ii. 16 *Take* these things hence.
 x. 18 No one *takes* it from me.
 xvi. 22 No one *takes* from you.
 xvii. 15 That thou *take* them out of the world.
 xx. 1 The stone *taken* out of the tomb.
 xx. 2 They have *taken* the Lord out of the tomb.
- ACTS viii. 33 His life is *taken* from the earth.
 xxi. 11 And *taking* the girdle of Paul.
 xxii. 22 *Take* from the earth such a one.
- 1 COR. v. 2 Should be *taken* out of your midst.
 vi. 15 *Taking*, then, the members of Christ.
- EPH. iv. 31 Let all bitterness, etc. be *taken* from you.
- COL. ii. 14 And *took* it out of the midst.

II. TO LIFT UP (take up).

- MATT. ix. 6 *Lift up* thy bed.
 xiv. 12 His disciples *took up* the body.
 xiv. 20 And they *took up* the superfluous part of the fragments.
 xv. 37 And the superfluous part of the fragments they *took up*.
 xvi. 24 And let him *lift up* his cross.
 xxi. 21 Be *lifted up* and cast into the sea.
- MARK ii. 9 *Lift up* thy cot.
 ii. 11 *Lift up* thy cot.
 ii. 12 Having *lifted up* his cot, he went out.
 vi. 29 And *took up* his corpse.
 vi. 43 And they *took up* of the fragments twelve baskets full.
 viii. 8 And they *took up* superfluities of fragments seven baskets.
 viii. 19 How many baskets full of fragments did you *take up*?

- MARK viii. 20 The filling of how many baskets did you *take up*?
 viii. 34 And let him *lift up* his cross.
 xi. 23 Be *lifted up* and cast into the sea.
- LUKE v. 24 *Lifting up* thy little bed, go.
 v. 25 *Lifting up* that upon which he had lain.
 ix. 17 And there was *taken up* what remained to them.
 ix. 23 And let him *lift up* his cross daily.
 xvii. 13 And they *lifted up* a cry.
 xix. 21 Thou *takest up* what thou didst not lay down.
 xix. 22 *Taking up* what I did not lay down.
- John v. 8 *Lift up* thy cot and walk.
 v. 9 And *lifted up* his cot.
 v. 11 *Lift up* thy cot.
 v. 12 *Lift (it) up* and walk.
 viii. 59 Therefore they *took up* stones.
 x. 24 Till when dost thou *lift up* (excite) our soul?
 xi. 41 And Jesus *lifted up* his eyes.
- ACTS iv. 24 They *lifted up* a voice.
 xx. 9 And was *lifted up* dead.
 xxvii. 13 Having *lifted up* the anchors.
 xxvii. 17 Which having *lifted up*.
- Rev. x. 5 *Lifted up* his right hand.
 xviii. 21 *Lifted up* a stone.

III. TO CARRY.

- MATT. iv. 6 They shall *carry* thee.
 xxvii. 32 Him they impressed, in order that he should *carry* his cross.
- MARK ii. 3 Bringing a paralytic *carried* by four men.
 xv. 21 In order that he should *carry* his cross.
- LUKE iv. 11 They shall *carry* thee.
- JOHN v. 10 It is not lawful for the to *carry* thy cot.

IV. TO TAKE AWAY.¹

- MARK iv. 15 And *takes away* the word that was sown into them.
- LUKE vi. 29 From him that is *taking away* thy coat.
 vi. 30 From him that is *taking away* what is thine.
 xi. 22 He *takes away* his panoply.
 xi. 52 For you *took away* the key of knowledge.
 xxiii. 18 *Take away* HIM, and release to us Barabbas.

¹ It might seem that many passages cited under I. belong here. But when the idea of *away* is expressed by an additional word (from, out of, hence, etc.), it seems superfluous to incorporate it with the verb.

- JOHN i. 29 That *takes away* the sin of the world.
 xi. 39 Jesus says, *Take away* the stone.
 xi. 41 Then they *took away* the stone.
 xi. 48 And *take away* both our place and our nation.
 xv. 2 He *takes* it away.
 xix. 15 (*bis*) *Take away, take away*, crucify him.
 xix. 31 And that they might be *taken away*.
 xix. 38 That he might *take away* the body.
 xix. 38 He came therefore and *took away* his body.
 xx. 13 They have *taken away* my Lord.
 xx. 15 And I will *take* him away.
 ACTS viii. 33 His judgment was *taken away*.
 xxi. 36 *Take* him away.
 1 JOHN iii. 5 In order that he should *take away* sins.

Λαμβάνω.

I. TO TAKE (seize, catch).

- MATT. viii. 17 HE *took* our diseases.
 x. 38 Who *takes* not his cross.
 xii. 14 *Took* counsel against him.
 xiii. 20 With joy *taking* it.
 xiii. 31 Which a man *taking* sowed.
 xiii. 33 Which a woman *taking* hid.
 xiv. 19 *Taking* the five loaves.
 xv. 26 To *take* the children's bread.
 xv. 36 And *taking* the seven loaves.
 xvi. 5 Forgot to *take* loaves.
 xvi. 7 Saying: (He says this) because we did not *take* loaves.
 xvi. 8 Because you did not *take* loaves?
 xvii. 24 Those that *took* the double drachma.
 xvii. 25 From whom do they *take* taxes?
 xvii. 27 That *take* and give to them.
 xxi. 35 And the farmers *took* his servants.
 xxi. 39 And they *took* and cast him outside the vineyard.
 xxii. 15 Went and *took* counsel.
 xxv. 1 Who *took* their lamps.
 xxv. 3 Such as were foolish *took* their lamps.
 xxv. 3 And *took* not with them oil.
 xxv. 4 But the wise *took* oil.
 xxvi. 26 Jesus *took* bread.
 xxvi. 26 *Take*, eat.
 xxvi. 27 And *taking* a cup.
 xxvi. 52 For all that (ever) *took* sword.
 xxvii. 1 *Took* counsel against Jesus.

- MATT. xxvii. 6 And the chief priests *took* the money.
 xxvii. 7 And after *taking* counsel.
 xxvii. 9 And they *took* the thirty silver (pieces.)
 xxvii. 24 After *taking* water washed off his hands.
 xxvii. 30 They *took* the reed.
 xxvii. 48 And *took* a sponge.
 xxvii. 59 And after *taking* the body.
 xxviii. 12 And after *taking* counsel.
 xxviii. 15 And they *took* the silver (pieces.)
- MARK iv. 16 With joy *take* it.
 vi. 41 *Taking* the five loaves.
 vii. 27 To *take* the children's bread.
 viii. 6 *Taking* the seven loaves.
 viii. 14 And they forgot to *take* loaves.
 ix. 36 And *taking* a little child.
 xii. 3 And *taking* they beat him.
 xii. 8 And *taking* they killed him.
 xii. 19 That his brother *take* the wife.
 xii. 20 And the first *took* a wife.
 xii. 21 And the second *took* her.
 xiv. 22 *Taking* bread and blessing, he broke.
 xiv. 22 *Take*; this is my body.
 xiv. 23 And *taking* a cup, giving thanks, he gave to them.
 xiv. 65 And the servants *took* him with raps.
 xv. 23 But he did not *take* it.
- LUKE v. 5 We *took* nothing.
 v. 26 And amazement *seized* all.
 vi. 4 And the loaves of exhibition he *took*.
 vii. 16 And fear *seized* all.
 ix. 16 And *taking* the five loaves.
 ix. 39 And lo! a spirit *seizes* him.
 xiii. 19 Which a man *taking* cast into his garden.
 xiii. 21 Which a woman *taking* hid.
 xx. 21 And dost not *take* (with partiality).
 xx. 28 That his brother *take* the wife.
 xx. 29 Having *taken* a wife, died childless.
 xx. 31 And the third *took* her.
 xxii. 17 *Take* this, and divide it.
 xxii. 19 And *taking* bread and giving thanks, he broke.
 xxiv. 30 *Taking* the loaf, he blessed.
 xxiv. 43 And *taking* in their presence, he ate.
- JOHN vi. 11 Jesus therefore *took* the loaves.
 vi. 21 So they were glad to *take* him into the boat.
 x. 17 In order that I may *take* it again.

- JOHN x. 18 And I have power to *take* it again.
 xii. 3 Mary then *taking* a pound of ointment.
 xii. 13 *Took* the branches of palms.
 xiii. 4 And *taking* a towel girded himself.
 xiii. 12 And *took* his outer garments.
 xiii. 26 Dipping the sop, he *takes* and gives it.
 xiii. 30 So, having *taken* the sop, he went out.
 xvi. 14 For from mine he shall *take*.
 xvi. 15 "From mine he *takes*."¹
 xviii. 3 So Judas *taking* the band.
 xviii. 31 *Take* you him and judge him.
 xix. 1 So then Pilate *took* Jesus.
 xix. 6 *Take* you him, and crucify.
 xix. 23 *Took* his outer garments, and made four parts.
 xix. 27 And from that hour the disciple *took* her.
 xix. 30 When, therefore, Jesus *took* the vinegar.
 xix. 40 So they *took* the body of Jesus.
 xxi. 13 Jesus comes and *takes* the bread.
- ACTS i. 20 His charge let another *take*.
 i. 25 To *take* the place of this ministry.
 ix. 19 And, after *taking* food, he grew strong.
 ix. 25 But the disciples *took* him by night.
 xv. 14 To *take* from the gentiles a people.
 xvi. 3 And he *took* and circumcised him.
 xvii. 9 And after *taking* security from Jason.
 xvii. 15 And *taking* a direction to Silas and Timothy.
 xxiv. 27 Felix *took* Porcius Festus as a successor.
 xxv. 16 And *take* a defence concerning the charge.
 xxvii. 35 *Taking* bread, also, he gave thanks.
 xxviii. 15 Thanked God and *took* courage.
- 1 COR. xi. 23 That the Lord Jesus . . . *took* bread.
- 2 COR. xi. 20 If any one *catches* you (takes you in).
 xii. 16 With guile I *caught* you [eh?]
- GAL. ii. 6 God *takes* not man's face (partiality).
- PHIL. ii. 7 *Taking* the form of a slave.
- 2 TIM. i. 5 When I *take* a retrospect of the sincere faith.
- HEB. ii. 3 Which, *taking* a beginning to be spoken.
 v. 1 Being *taken* from among men.
 v. 4 And not for himself does any one *take* the honor.
 vii. 8 And here indeed mortal men *take* tithes.
 vii. 9 Even Levi who *takes* tithes was tithed through Abraham.
 ix. 19 *Taking* the blood of young bulls and of he-goats.
 xi. 29 *Taking* an attempt at which, the Egyptians were drowned.

¹ *ἔτι recitantis* is best translated by quotation marks.

- JAMES v. 10 *Take* as a pattern, brethren, the prophets.
 2 PET. i. 9 *Taking* forgetfulness of the cleansing. (Getting forgetful.)
 3 JOHN 7 *Taking* nothing from the heathen.
 REV. v. 7 And he came, and (lo!) he has *taken* (it).
 v. 8 And when he *took* the book.
 v. 9 Worthy art thou to *take* the book.
 vi. 4 To *take* peace from the earth.
 viii. 5 And the angel has *taken* the frankincense.
 x. 8 Go *take* the little book.
 x. 9 *Take* and eat it down.
 x. 10 And I *took* the little book.
 xi. 17 Because thou hast *taken* thy great power.
 xxii. 17 He that will, let him *take* the water of life.

II. TO GET (obtain).

- MATT. v. 40 And to *get* thy frock.
 vii. 8 For every one that asks *obtains*.
 x. 41 A prophet's reward he shall *get*.
 x. 41 A just man's reward he shall *get*.
 xvi. 9 And how many baskets you *got*?
 xvi. 10 And how many baskets you *got*?
 xix. 29 Many fold shall he *get*.
 xx. 9 Came and *got* each a shilling.
 xx. 10 Supposed that they should *get* more.
 xx. 10 And they also *got* each a shilling.
 xx. 11 And having *got* it, they began to grumble.
 xxi. 22 Whatever you ask in prayer, believing, . . . you shall
 obtain.
 xxi. 34 To *get* his fruits.
 MARK xii. 2 That he might *get* from the farmers.
 LUKE vi. 34 From whom you hope to *get*.
 xi. 10 For every one who asks *obtains*.
 xix. 12 To *get* for himself a kingdom.
 xix. 15 Having *got* the kingdom.
 JOHN iv. 36 Already he who reaps *gets* pay.
 v. 34 But I do not *get* my evidence from man.
 v. 41 I do not *get* glory from men.
 v. 44 You who *get* glory from one another.
 vi. 7 That each one may *get* a little something.
 xvi. 24 Ask and you shall *obtain*.
 ACTS i. 8 But you shall *get* power by the Holy Spirit's coming upon you.
 iii. 5 Expecting to *get* something from them.
 viii. 19 He may *get* the Holy Spirit.
 xxvi. 10 *Getting* the authority from the chief priests.

- ROM. vii. 8 Sin, *getting* a vantage-ground through the commandment.
 vii. 11 Sin, *getting* a vantage-ground through the commandment.
- 1 COR. iii. 8 And each shall *get* his own pay.
 iii. 14 He shall *get* pay.
 ix. 24 But one *gets* the prize.
 ix. 25 Now they indeed to *get* a corruptible crown.
 x. 13 Temptation has not *got* you, except what was adapted to man.
- 2 COR. xi. 8 *Getting* supplies to minister to you.
- GAL. iii. 2 Did you *get* the Spirit from the works of the law?
- PHIL. iii. 12 Not that I have *got* it yet.
- HEB. ii. 2 *Got* a just reward of merit.
 iv. 16 That we may *obtain* mercy.
 vii. 5 And those indeed who *get* the priesthood.
 x. 26 After our *getting* the knowledge of the truth.
 xi. 11 Even Sarah herself *got* strength.
- JAMES i. 7 That he will *get* anything from the Lord.
 iv. 3 You ask and you do not *obtain*.
 v. 7 Until he *get* the early and the latter rain.
- 1 JOHN iii. 22 And whatever we ask we *obtain* from him.
- REV. iii. 11 That no one *get* thy crown.
 xvii. 12 Who have not *got* a kingdom yet.
 xviii. 4 And that you may not *get* any of her blows.

III. TO RECEIVE.

- MATT. x. 8 Freely you *received*.
 xxv. 16 He that *received* the five talents.
 xxv. 18 He that *received* the one talent.
 xxv. 20 He that *received* the five talents.
 xxv. 24 He that had *received* the one talent.
- MARK x. 30 Unless he *receive* a hundred fold.
 xi. 24 Believe that you *received*.
 xii. 40 These shall *receive* more excessive judgment.
- LUKE xx. 47 These shall *receive* more excessive judgment.
- JOHN i. 12 But as many as *received* him.
 i. 16 For of his fulness we all *received*.
 iii. 11 And our testimony you do not *receive*.
 iii. 27 A man cannot *receive* anything.
 iii. 32 And his testimony no one *receives*.
 iii. 33 He who *receives* his testimony.
 v. 43 And you do not *receive* me.
 v. 43 Him you will *receive*.
 vii. 23 If a man *receives* circumcision.
 vii. 39 Of which those who believed on him were about to *receive*.

- JOHN** x. 18 This commandment I *received* from my Father.
 xii. 48 And does not *receive* my words.
 xiii. 20 He who *receives* whomsoever I send
 xiii. 20 *Receives* me;
 xiii. 20 And he who *receives* me
 xiii. 20 *Receives* him who sent me.
 xiv. 17 Whom the world cannot *receive*.
 xvii. 8 And they *received* them.
 xx. 22 *Receive* the Holy Spirit.
- ACTS** ii. 33 And *receiving* the promise of the Holy Spirit.
 ii. 38 And you will *receive* the gift of the Holy Spirit.
 iii. 3 Was asking to *receive* alms.
 vii. 53 Who *received* the law.
 viii. 15 That they might *receive* the Holy Spirit.
 viii. 17 And they did *receive* the Holy Spirit.¹
 x. 43 *Receives* forgiveness of sins.
 x. 47 Who *received* the Holy Spirit just as we ?
 xvi. 24 And he upon *receiving* such a precept.
 xix. 2 Have you *received* the Holy Spirit as believers ?
 xx. 24 Which I *received* from the Lord Jesus.
 xx. 35 Blessed is it rather to give than to *receive*.
 xxvi. 18 That they might *receive* forgiveness of sin.
- ROM.** i. 5 Through whom we *received* grace.
 iv. 11 And he *received* a sign, viz. circumcision.
 v. 11 Through whom, as it appears, we *received* the reconciliation.²
 v. 17 Those who *receive* the abundance of the grace.
 viii. 15 For you did not *receive* a spirit of bondage.
 viii. 15 But you *received* a spirit of adoption.
 xiii. 2 Shall *receive* judgment on themselves.
- 1 COR.** ii. 12 And we did not *receive* the spirit of the world.
 iv. 7 And what have you that you did not *receive* ?
 iv. 7 But if indeed you *received*, why do you boast,
 iv. 7 As though you did not *receive* ?
 xiv. 5 That the church may *receive* edification.
- 2 COR.** xi. 4 Or you *receive* another spirit,
 xi. 4 Which you did not *receive*.
 xi. 24 I *received* forty stripes.
- GAL.** iii. 14 That we might *receive* the promise.
- COL.** iv. 10 About whom you *received* directions.

¹ Impf. doubtless referring to verse 15. "Received" would be ἐλάβον.

² May not νῦν here mark the logical conclusion of the paragraph, cf. ἄρα νῦν chap. viii. 1. So frequently in the sense "Since these things are so," Robinson's Lexicon, s. v. 2, 6. Thus we preserve the aorist, which Paul does not use for the perfect.

- 1 TIM. iv. 4 If it is *received* with thanksgiving.
 HEB. ix. 15 The called should *receive* the promise.
 xi. 8 Which he was to *receive* for an inheritance.
 xi. 13 Not having *received* the promises.
 xi. 35 Women *received* their dead by resurrection.
 JAMES i. 12 He shall *receive* the crown of life.
 iii. 1 We shall *receive* a greater judgment.
 1 PET. iv. 10 Just as each *received* a grace, be serving it.
 2 PET. i. 17 For he *received* from God the Father honor and glory.
 1 JOHN ii. 27 And as for you, the anointing which you *received*.
 v. 9 If we *receive* the testimony of men.
 2 JOHN 4 Just as we *received* direction.
 10 Do not *receive* him into the house.
 REV. ii. 17 But he who *receives* it.
 ii. 27 As I also have *received* from my Father.
 iii. 3 Remember therefore how thou hast *received*.
 iv. 11 To *receive* the glory and the honor.
 v. 12 To *receive* the power and riches.
 xiv. 9 And *receives* a stamp on his forehead.
 xiv. 11 And whoever *receives* the stamp of his name.
 xix. 20 Those who *received* the stamp of the beast.
 xx. 4 Who did not *receive* the stamp.

Φέρω.

- MATT. xiv. 11 And his head was *brought* on a plate.
 xiv. 11 And she *brought* (it) to her mother.
 xiv. 18 *Bring* them here to me.
 xvii. 17 *Bring* him here to me.
 MARK i. 32 They were *bringing* to him all that were ill.
 ii. 3 *Bringing* a paralytic carried by four men.
 iv. 8 And were *bringing* forth unto thirty.
 vi. 27 Commanded to have his head *brought*.
 vi. 28 And *brought* his head on a plate.
 vii. 32 And they *bring* to him a deaf stammerer.
 viii. 22 And they *bring* to him a blind man.
 ix. 17 I *brought* my son to thee.
 ix. 19 *Bring* him to me.
 ix. 20 And they *brought* him to him.
 xi. 2 [^] Loose and *bring* him.
 xi. 7 And they *bring* the colt to Jesus.
 xii. 15 *Bring* me a shilling that I may see.
 xii. 16 And they *brought* (it).
 xv. 22 And they *bring* him to the place Golgotha.
 LUKE v. 18 And see! men *bringing* upon a bed a man who was par-
 alyzed.

- LUKE xv. 23 And *bring* the calf that is fatted.
 xxiii. 26 To *carry* it after Jesus.
 xxiv. 1 *Bringing* what spices they prepared.
- JOHN ii. 8 And *carry* to the master of the feast.
 ii. 8 And they *carried* (it).
 iv. 33 No one *brought* him anything to eat ?
 xii. 24 It *brings forth* much fruit.
 xv. 2 Every branch not *bringing forth* fruit.
 xv. 2 Every branch *bringing forth* fruit.
 xv. 2 In order that it may *bring forth* more fruit.
 xv. 4 Cannot *bring forth* fruit.
 xv. 5 He *brings forth* much fruit.
 xv. 8 Namely that ye *bring forth* much fruit.
 xv. 16 In order that ye go away and *bring forth* fruit.
 xviii. 29 What charge do you *bring* ?
 xix. 39 *Bringing* a mixture of myrrh and aloes.
 xx. 27 *Bring* thy finger here.
 xx. 27 And *bring* thy hand.
 xxi. 10 *Bring* from the fish.
 xxi. 18 And will *bring* you where you do not wish.
- ACTS ii. 2 As of a powerful wind *borne along*.
 iv. 34 Were *bringing* the prices of what was sold.
 iv. 37 *Brought* the money.
 v. 2 And *bringing* some part.
 v. 16 *Bringing* sick people.
 xii. 10 That *brings* (one) to the city.
 xiv. 13 *Bringing* oxen and garlands.
 xxv. 18 *Brought* no charge.
 xxvii. 15 Giving (her) up, we were *borne along*.
 xxvii. 17 Loosing the sail, so we were *borne along*.
- ROM. ix. 22 *Held up* in much long-suffering.
- 2 TIM. iv. 13 As thou art coming, *bring*.
- HEB. i. 3 And *holding up* all things by the word of his power.
 vi. 1 Let us be *borne along* to the completion.
 ix. 16 The death of the testator is necessary to be *brought in*.
 xii. 20 For they were not *holding up* what was charged.
 xiii. 13 *Holding up* his reproach.
- 1 PET. i. 13 For the grace that is being *brought* to you.
- 2 PET. i. 17 A voice like this having been *brought* to him.
 i. 18 We heard, as it was *brought* to him.
 i. 21 For not by the will of man was a prophecy ever *brought*.
 i. 21 Being *borne along* by the Holy Spirit.
 ii. 11 Do not *bring* a reproachful judgment.
- 2 JOHN 10 And^a does not *bring* this teaching.

- REV. xxi. 24 *Bring* their glory into it.
 xxi. 26 And they shall *bring* the glory.

'Αναφέρω.

- MATT. xvii. 1 And *brings* them *up* into a high mountain.
 MARK ix. 2 And *brings* them *up* into a high mountain.
 HEB. vii. 27 To *carry up* sacrifices.
 vii. 27 When he *carried up* himself.
 ix. 28 Once brought to (God) to *carry up* the sins of many.
 xiii. 15 Let us *carry up* a sacrifice of praise.
 JAMES ii. 21 When he *carried up* Isaac.
 1 PET. ii. 5 To *carry up* spiritual sacrifices.
 ii. 24 Who himself *carried up* our sins upon the tree.

ARTICLE V.

THE USES OF MATHESIS.

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THE word "uses," in the title of this Article, is intended only in its broader significations. We shall not touch, unless incidentally, upon the obvious applications of the mathematics to the practical arts of life, the arts of measurement and manufacture; but shall speak of their value in the cultivation of the intellectual, moral, and spiritual faculties; of their service in leading the student to a higher appreciation of the whole sphere of human joys, a clearer understanding of all objects of human thought, a better performance of all human duties.

The word "mathematics," on the other hand, we shall use in the older and narrower sense; not meaning, as Peirce has defined them, the science which draws necessary conclusions; but, for the present, restricting the word to signify the sciences of space, of number, and of time. This is not from any dissatisfaction with the wider definition, which is also true; but simply because we have no other word by which to class together geometry, algebra, and arithmetic; and it is these

of which we wish particularly to speak. They are three entirely discrete sciences, and were originally classed together because they were the only sciences in which deductive reasoning could be used; the advance of thought has in our century brought various forms of mechanics under the same category, and very properly included them under the same name. Nevertheless there are other points in which the sciences of space, time, and number deserve to be considered apart; and it is to them that the present Article is devoted.

The relation of space and time to the Divine Author of the universe is a matter beyond the reach of the human understanding, and a matter of no special consequence to our present considerations. Whether space and time be merely forms of human thought, having nothing directly answering to them in nature, and in the Creator of nature; or be modes of the divine existence, attributes of God's eternal substance; or be entities self-existent and independent of the Almighty Being and his power; in either case, the majority of our conclusions will hold good, and we shall, we trust, make manifest to the patient reader, the great value of geometry, algebra, and arithmetic as a foundation for all aesthetic, moral, and religious culture. But the reader who holds different views of the nature of space and time must not be surprised to find us betraying our faith in the common view of the unlearned, neither holding with Spinoza, nor with Carlyle's Kant, nor with Auguste Comte.

Geometry gives us the science of space in its formal or logical aspect; dealing with magnitudes of one, two, or three dimensions, and with zeros in one, two, or three dimensions, also with directions and with imaginary motions. Algebra deals with time in its flow, past or future, with zeros, or instants, and with quantity in one dimension. The language of algebra is then applied to space, and gives birth to the calculus, in its various forms from Descartes to Laugier; and more recently to quaternions and stigmatic geometry, which succeed in giving geometrical interpretations to all the ordinary forms of algebraic language. Arithmetic has, for

its material, only the abstract relation of number, which is suggested neither by space nor time in themselves; since in space there is no division of parts or aspects; and in time there is no division, except that made by ourselves in conscious thought; the simplest being into past and future. The relations of number are, then, suggested only by the material creation, and it is from the visible and tangible that we get our idea of number to apply to space and time.

All the properties of number, therefore, and all the operations of algebra, may be illustrated by forms in space; and for this reason the titles "geometry" and "geometer" are frequently used, in a larger sense, to include mathematics and mathematicians of every grade.

The modes in which geometry may be pursued are, at least, four. In its origin, as its name implies, it was cultivated simply as a practical art, for practical ends. Afterward it became a potent stimulant to fancy and imagination. Thirdly, it was made the first of demonstrative sciences, and remains to the present day the very type and pattern of deductive reasoning. Finally, it is the basis and root of the fine arts of statuary and drawing, and thus of painting. The practical uses of the mathematics, in the ordinary sense of the word practical, we pass by. In the wider sense of the word practical, we might say that what is useful is practical, and that the culture of the imagination, the reason, and the higher tastes, — inasmuch as it conduces most powerfully to human enjoyment and usefulness, — is the most practical of all ends.

The use of geometry in cultivating the fancy and imagination has, in modern days, been too much overlooked. Arithmetic, probably from its obvious utility, has been allowed by far too large a place in the common schools of this country, and geometry has been crowded out. This course has resulted in giving less quickness and expertness even in figures to the student, wearied of the over-work. The first lessons which nature gives in the school of life, are lessons in form. The child has been in the world but a few hours, when it begins to trace the outlines of the window-sash against the sky. In

a few months it has learned to recognize a multitude of objects by their shape, while as yet its notions of time and of number are wholly undeveloped. It learns to see likenesses and understand pictures, drawings of the shapes of things, of hundreds of things, before it begins to count, or to estimate the lapse of time. Careful experiments on children have convinced us that in the ordinary mode of neglecting the study of geometry, and forcing the arithmetical power, there is an actual diminution of the power to see the truths of space, and to imagine forms, during the first six or eight years of schooling. The course of nature evidently would be to train from the beginning this geometrical power, which the child displays as the first evidence of intellectual life.

The imagination of form, or shape, being the first act of imagination, is also the most valuable among the earlier acts. It is capable by training of being led to the utmost precision, and such training is the first lesson in accuracy of thought. The differences between the integral numbers is so great that the arithmetic of whole numbers gives but little training in exactness. In the approximation by decimal fractions, the pupil is taught to consider anything beyond the third or fifth place as too small to be considered; and thus, although learning, if properly taught, the great importance of knowing to how many places he should carry his approximation so as to get sufficient precision and waste no labor in superfluous nicety, he gets no training in the conception of absolute accuracy; that comes in the algebraic notation, by which he represents his fraction as a vulgar fraction, or his square root as a surd; not in decimal notation. It comes also more forcibly, and in vastly more interesting form, in his geometrical definitions and imaginations. More than once we have taken a boy of ten or twelve years old, and in fifteen minutes conversation drawn out of him—without telling him anything, but simply leading him by questions to see for himself, and tell us—a complete description of the genesis of an ellipse and ellipsoids of revolution, with the form and peculiarities of their sections by a plane. We began by a goat tethered to a

ring sliding on a cord fastened at each end to a stake; then passed to a dove tethered to a ring sliding on a thread fastened at each end to a telegraph pole; then for the rings put points; and for thread and cord, lines; and the thing was done. The child had passed from the concrete in material things to the concrete in pure space; from the approximation of a ring and cord to the absolute precision of a point and line; accurate not only to the fifth place of decimals, but to innumerable infinitudes of places — absolutely accurate. It may have been his first lesson in the clear, definite, precise exercise of the imagination. One such lesson may be a matter of great value to the intellectual life; a course of such lessons must be of benefit.

Definiteness, clearness of imagination, is one of the most important of intellectual qualities; and it is very apt to be wanting. It is important, because we cannot even observe correctly without it. No object is visible at a single view; the attention goes from part to part, and it requires imagination or memory to integrate the parts. Without clear and precise power of imagination the whole impression is thus confused, and the observer cannot tell what he has observed. The proof that this failing is common may be found by asking a man to draw with his pencil, from memory, a sketch of the most familiar and the most simple outline, and seeing how wide he will come of the mark, and how utterly unable he will be to correct his own drawing; or it may be found by appealing to the lawyers, who will assure you of the impossibility of getting any ordinary witness to describe accurately any object or any event which he is known to have seen. The reader may, indeed, test himself, and see how distinctly he can recall the form and appearance of the most familiar object not now in his sight, whether a piece of furniture, the face and figure of a dear friend, a favorite tree, or favorite landscape, and he will probably be astonished to find how faint and indistinct his recollection of some important details will prove to be.

Yet the whole work and business of life depends very

largely upon the accuracy of memory, and upon the vividness of imagination. The imagination has a double function, of recollection and of invention ; in one man it performs the one better, and in another the other. But, in one or both of its forms, its action is absolutely essential to the correct performance of every duty of life, and the enjoyment of every pleasure,—to the understanding of every problem. The present has no duration ; it is but the zero-point dividing the past from the future, and our lives consist in our memories, or our anticipations ; the zero of the present betrays, by the conversion of our purposes into our history, the clearness and accuracy of our imagination, and the strength of our will ; it shows what use we are making of memory and invention in guiding us to this conversion of our future into our past.

Geometry is the first study which directly and largely cultivates the power of imagination. The forms of matter suggest to us *a priori* laws of space, and stimulate us to the invention of new laws. The material object does not conform perfectly to the law which it suggests ; even in the minutest crystal the microscope would probably betray some slight variation from a perfect figure ; in the larger crystals the naked eye readily detects the variation. But the conformity is sufficient to suggest, irresistibly, the perfect form ; and when, under the stimulus of this suggestion, we have invented new *a priori* laws, we frequently find that nature has anticipated us, although we knew it not, and been building for ages upon the law which we have just invented. So constantly has this been the case, that Whewell, in his *Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences*, makes it the normal method of the discovery of scientific laws ; he thinks that we always invent them *a priori*, as hypotheses, and then find them embodied in the universe as facts.

But it is not in science alone, after rising above the merely practical, that precision of imagination is useful ; in the enjoyment of the fine arts it is equally essential. Not only must the sculptor and the painter draw and model correctly, as a basis for their more delicate touches of expression and feeling,

but the spectator must have a correct and trained power of imagination in space, or he cannot appreciate and be fed by their work. In music there is an equal necessity for the algebraic imagination of rhythm; but no ordinary mode of teaching algebra cultivates and trains this power, and we therefore omit the consideration of music. In poetry, fiction, and the drama the necessity of a trained and accurate imagination in space is also obvious. These artistic forms of composition all aim to arouse feeling and sentiment, rather than to produce intellectual assent. But feeling is aroused only by the sensible; poetry and fiction, therefore, always employ imagery, or describe what is visible and audible. The reader must, for the descriptive words or sentences, call up in his imagination the scene described or alluded to; and his emotion aroused from the poem will be, in large measure, directly dependent upon the vividness and accuracy with which he portrays the scene. The culture of the geometric imagination, tending to produce precision in the remembrance and invention of visible forms, will, therefore, tend directly to increase the appreciation of works of belles-lettres.

Our attention was first called to this use of geometry, in the culture of the imagination, over thirty years ago, by the late Theodore Strong, of Rutgers College; who, in a private conversation, from which I think that death has taken the seal, said that he thought his own mathematical power lay almost wholly in the vividness and clearness of his imagination of forms in space. We should express the same analysis by saying that his powers were geometrical rather than algebraical. The converse mathematical power lies in this power to conceive of time abstractly in its flow, and then of quantity in a state of continuous expansion or contraction. This is imagination in time, as contrasted with imagination in space, and leads to triumphs in the calculus. But for the highest mathematical success there is a third power requisite, and that is the power of using the language appropriate to the mathematics.

The vocabulary appropriate to discussing questions of time

and space and of quantity (considered as an abstract relation of time and space, or considered as the finitude of the finite), is somewhat limited, but very flexible, and capable of great precision of expression. The syntax of this language is energetic and forcible, — the symbols by which it is written are marvels of condensation. The most striking characteristic of the written language of algebra and of the higher forms of the calculus is the sharpness of definition, by which we are enabled to reason upon the symbols by the mere laws of verbal logic, discharging our minds entirely of the meaning of the symbol, until we have reached a stage of the process when we desire to interpret our results. The ability to attend to the symbols, and to perform the verbal, visible changes in the position of them permitted by the logical rules of the science, without allowing the mind to be perplexed with the meaning of the symbol until the result is reached which you wish to interpret, is a fundamental part of what is called analytical power. Many students find themselves perplexed by a perpetual attempt to interpret not only the result, but each step of the process. They thus lose much of the benefit of the labor-saving machinery of the calculus ; and are, indeed, frequently incapacitated for using it.

A curious example of this incapacity was shown, about thirty years ago, by the successive classes of sophomores in Harvard College being unable to master the reasoning by which Arbogast's Polynomial Theorem was demonstrated. The gist of the reasoning lay in the attempt to prove that Q might be obtained from P . From P we could obtain P , and from Q we might get Q ; but P was equal to Q , therefore we could get Q from P , therefore from P . It seems very simple ; it is but saying that if we can go from any seaport to the largest commercial port on our Atlantic coast and if we can go from New York to Pittsburg, then we can go from any seaport to Pittsburg — if in no other way, at least, by going by boat to New York, and there taking the railroad. But in this case the ideas of the metropolis and of the modes of travel are clear and familiar, and their

presence does not confuse the reasoning process. In the algebraical theorem the mind is confused by the attempt to carry, through the reasoning, conceptions of the nature of the four quantities P , P , Q , Q , and of the nature of the processes by which the passage is made from the Roman to the Italic, and back again. It is in vain that you instruct an ordinary student to refrain from the attempt, and simply to confine his attention to the already demonstrated fact, that the passage is easily made and the resulting quantities easily expressed; he will not, or cannot, refrain from entangling himself by making the attempt, and failing.

The language of mathematics, permitting great sharpness and accuracy of definition, conduces largely to their power of drawing necessary conclusions. Language is not only a means of recording the results of our thinking; it is an instrument of thought, and that of the highest value. I do not here refer to the fact that it is impossible for us to convey to another mind our conclusions without the aid of symbols, nor to the fact that we cannot usually bring our inferences to the test of the syllogistic form until we put the process into words; but rather to the broader fact that, until we have linked a conception to the mnemonic of a word or symbol, it is difficult for us to keep it distinctly in our own minds; and also to the equally important consideration, illustrated above, that when we have definitely fixed the meaning of a word or symbol, so that it shall include neither more nor less than we intend, we can discharge our minds of that meaning, and operate upon the symbol as a symbol, by the mere rules of the syntax of the language and the laws of logic, and be confident that every result thus attained upon the symbols as such, will, when properly interpreted, give a truth concerning the things originally symbolized. It is difficult to convey to readers not familiar with the practical use of mathematical symbols any conception of the generality and the minuteness of the conclusions thus frequently attained by a very brief process of transformation, and summed up in a short formula.

From these sciences of space and time the science of mechanics first borrowed the use of symbolic notation, and learned the art of drawing necessary conclusions. It divides itself into sundry branches. As kinematics, it deals only with the motion of forms, dismissing the idea of force; as statics, it conceives of forces in a state of equilibrium; as dynamics, of forces not balanced, and thus producing motion. Chemistry and logic also followed in this use of symbols; and in manufactures a curious special example was given by Charles Babbage, in the invention of a notation for machinery by which the complex machinery of an engine could be so represented on paper as to enable you to draw necessary conclusions; and the inventor, by the aid of this notation, actually simplified one of his marvellous calculating engines so as to produce by three turns of the handle all the effects which he had before produced by eight — if my memory is right as to the numbers.

Whether the other sciences will ever arrive at a state in which they can use notation and draw necessary conclusions remains to be seen — perhaps by our successors, perhaps by ourselves in the world to come. But as we go upward in the hierarchy of sciences it becomes more difficult to frame definitions, and more difficult to draw necessary conclusions. Shall we therefore say that the reasoning of mathematics is of no use to us in learning to reason upon social, political, moral, and religious questions? By no means. The process of reasoning is similar in all departments of thought, and varies chiefly in the proportion which induction and deduction bear to each other. In geometry the induction is very brief and rapid, while the deductions are sometimes wonderfully long and interdependent. Some of the propositions, absolutely demonstrated, would require two or three hundred connected syllogisms in order to trace them back to self-evident truths. In politics and theology, on the other hand, the induction is slow and cautious, and requiring often the consilience of many inductions to bring us to any tolerable degree of certainty; while the deductions that can be safely

made are very direct and few. Yet in both cases there is inductive and deductive reasoning; and in the mathematics both kinds have been carried to the utmost perfection, and may justly serve as models for reasoning in the probable sciences.

When Spinoza undertook to treat theology by the geometrical method he failed, because he took only the deductive part as a model, and did not assume his definitions and axioms with the carefulness and precision of the geometer. A geometrical conception is perfectly clear, and the term applied to it must be absolutely confined to that conception. A circle, for example, is a plane surface bounded by a line everywhere equally distant from a central point in that surface, and in geometry means nothing else — no point out of the plane, and no point in the plane and outside the line, belongs to the circle. Nor can the line be varied, or moved in any manner with reference to the central point, except by taking a new circle, larger or smaller, around the point. The straight line in the plane is a line that runs in every part in the same direction as in any other part. Now, out of these two definitions I frame the propositions, that a given straight line can cut the bounding line of a given circle only in two places; and that, if the line enters the circle, it must, if sufficiently prolonged, emerge from it; in other words, it cannot cut the boundary once without cutting it twice. The reader of these propositions will — if they chance to be new to him, and his interest in them is aroused to give assent or dissent — immediately look at a circle in space, and with the mind's eye look at innumerable straight lines, crossing it in all imaginable ways, simultaneously or consecutively. He will see that they all cross the boundary twice, and he rushes at once to the induction that it will always be so; nay, he says it must be so, because the definition of the circle and the line are so exact, and his conception so clear, that he sees no possible way in which the induction can be invalidated. Many of the inductions of simple molar mechanics are of the like character; they are so rapid, so exhaustive, so free from the

possibility of having overlooked cases, that we call them self-evident, and draw necessary conclusions from them. Not so when we arrive at molecular mechanics; there caution is requisite, and the myriad observations may require years of experimenting. Much less is it so when we reach the highest department — theology. As far as we know anything of theology from the light of nature alone, we gain it by the slowest and most cautious induction. It is true that there are instinctive judgments, and intuitions which give us light by an instantaneous flash. But I am speaking now of a scientific knowledge of theology that may be compared with geometry, when I say that such knowledge is gained only by cautious induction; the intuitions by which the soul recognizes the being of God, may be compared, in regard to geometry, rather to the artistic perception of the beauty of the circle and the ellipse, than to a scientific knowledge of those figures. Spinoza, however, begins with a rapid induction of the idea of substance, so rapid that he may have overlooked many ways in which it could be invalidated; he does not define this idea with absolute precision and definiteness, and yet brings out of it by deduction his long array of theological propositions.

Not such is the manner in which we would apply the lessons of mathematical methods to the reasoning of the statesman and the theologian. The geometer seeks, it is true, for self-evident axioms, and for the means of deducing his theorems from them. Yet, in some cases of great importance, he has been content for a long time to rest upon a careful induction. The binomial theorem of Newton, was the first of many cases in which the law of an infinitely long series was thus obtained from an examination of half a dozen of the first members of the series. There was not the shadow of doubt left concerning the truth of the law thus obtained; and yet it left a desire in the mind of the mathematician to discern a way in which he could found the law on self-evident principles. The student, in the higher branches, must be content, for the most part, with induction; let him learn from the geometer that he must exercise caution and prudence in

forming his induction, but having once with caution and prudence formed a sound judgment, hold to his view with confidence in himself, and in the truth.

One of the most important lessons which mathematical reasoning offers to the theological student is in the treatment of the infinite and of the infinitesimal. These two walls of mystery surround the geometer as they do the theologian. Space is the simplest of all possible objects of human contemplation, so that Hamilton of Edinburgh thought that the only reason that most people are deficient in geometrical power is, that they are too intellectual, and cannot bring their minds down to the contemplation of anything that is so nearly nothing as space. Yet space has its unfathomable mysteries in the infinite, and in the infinitesimal. To illustrate by an easy example in the infinitesimal, consider the simple idea of a curved line,—what is it? A line that bends continually and continuously. But these attributes are contradictories. If the line bends continually, then it bends at a given point in it, A, and changes its direction at A. There is, then, an angle or corner, however blunt, at A. But it bends continuously; there are no angles, and therefore none at A. The geometer is obliged to recognize this contradiction; and in his reasoning assumes that the line bends at A, or does not bend—either, neither, or both; and from any one of the four assumptions can deduce correct, or by carelessness erroneous, conclusions.

An easy example of the mystery in the infinite may be formed by imagining two lines rotating in a plane about their point of intersection. To render it easier to represent, let one line lie stationary, pointing north and south, while the other rotates. Now, when the rotating line lies east and west, let it extend one foot from the centre, but let it grow longer, as it approaches the north and south line, in exact proportion to its approach. That is to say, when pointing east its length is one foot; when north-east, two feet; when north-north-east, four feet; when north-by-east, eight feet, and so on; when it has swung past the meridian to north-by-

west, let it be again eight feet, at north-north-west four feet, and so on. It will at once be seen that on the meridian the line will be of infinite length, and that we cannot say at what point the end will cross the meridian. But that it does cross it is evident, because we swing the line from pointing easterly to pointing westerly. Yet it cannot cross, for the end constantly recedes from the meridian, as the line swings nearer to it — when pointing east the end is one foot from the meridian, and when we have swung it so near to the meridian that Arabic figures would fail to express its length, the end would be more than eighteen inches off, and the distance never could become less. Here, again, the geometer acknowledges that the results are contradictory, but, nevertheless, knows that both are true. He has proved conclusively that the law of non-contradiction does not hold for infinities or infinitesimals. Would that the theologian and metaphysician might learn it also. Here is the simplest possible species of infinite — the infinite of length — coming in to confuse irreconcilably two ideas which would seem also to be the simplest and clearest of all conceptions — the conception of a straight line rotating in one plane about a point in the line itself. It seems that nothing can prevent our imagining that it swings into and past the meridian drawn through that point. It seems that no increase in the length of the line can do more than make its end cross the meridian at an infinite distance. Yet, if it increases with sufficient rapidity, the end may recede from the meridian not only slowly, as in the case just given, but rapidly, and recede forever. If, for example, instead of doubling, we had quadrupled, the length of the line every time that we halved the angle, the end would have receded to an infinite distance east of the meridian. But, keeping to our original example, there is no difficulty in imagining the line to rotate until it coincides with the meridian; there is no difficulty in imagining the line to increase in length in the inverse ratio of its angle with the meridian; and there is no difficulty in demonstrating that its end will always recede from the meridian, and approach

a parallel line 1.5708 feet to the east of it. Yet this last demonstration is irreconcilably at variance with the first conception. If the introduction of the infinite thus introduces insoluble contradiction among these clearest and simplest possible of human conceptions, how well does it become us to hesitate in regard to higher matters of the infinite God and his attributes; to hesitate about accepting or rejecting either logical deductions, or the results of inductions, or apparent intuitions, when they involve infinity among their elements.

The Darwinian hypothesis that the slow variation of animals from their ancestral types has, through the variable circumstances around the animal, favoring certain variations in one place and not in another, produced all the variety of animals upon earth, is an example of the very loose and unjustifiable way in which infinity is sometimes introduced even into the physical sciences. It is acknowledged that no instance is known of the accidental variation of a species producing any approximation toward another species, except in the most external and least important particulars; but it is assumed that an infinite time would do what a finite time shows no tendency to do.

It is not thus that the geometer deals with the infinite and the infinitesimal. He obtains them by an irresistible induction from the finite, and never ventures to use them unless thus obtained. When his quantities become unmanageable from their magnitude, or from their minuteness, he ceases to use them; and uses only the ratio between them, which he has discovered by reasoning upon them in their finite magnitudes. In other words, the geometer draws from the consideration of finites certain conclusions concerning the finite relations of infinites and infinitesimals. From those relations he deduces again finite conclusions. But he never introduces the infinites and infinitesimals themselves as premises into his reasoning; nor is he able to discover their relations to each other, unless he has finite premises to start from. Otherwise he declares those relations to be absolutely indeterminate.

This is the Darwinian condition — that theory assumes infinitesimal variations and infinite times, and draws thence finite conclusions, without the slightest warrant from reason for the large drafts on the imagination.

A celebrated lawyer of Massachusetts was once much berated for speaking of the glittering generalities of the American Declaration of Independence. We shall not attempt his defence; for we would not join in anything like a disrespectful treatment of that immortal document. Yet the higher mathematics give us many proofs of the truth which lay concealed under his reproachful epithet, and which gives the basis for the popular distinction between theory and practice. It is painful to see how many men, otherwise sensible, retain a strong prejudice against books and against scientific men. After Agassiz has restocked the rivers of both Europe and America with valuable fish, and thus added to the annual income of practical men hundreds of thousand of dollars, we find men still sneering at pisci-culture, as mere scientific theory, and not a thing of practical utility. The causes for this prejudice against scientific theory are twofold. In the first place there are as many pretenders and charlatans in science as there are quacks in medicine, or weak heresiarchs in religion. An agricultural editor and lecturer who tells his audience that a cat runs up a board fence by means of vacuum suckers in her feet, should not expect much deference to his opinions upon any subject. But, in the second place, there is much truth which feeds the intellect and the heart which, nevertheless, we do not as yet know how to apply to practical uses. It is not for that reason worthless. Knowledge is an end in itself; the body is the servant of the soul, not the scul of the body; and I need food and clothing in order that I may study geometry, and teach geometry; I do not study and teach that divine science for the sake of obtaining food and clothing. Nor can we foresee what uses may hereafter come, of truths which now seem barren of applications. Many of the fine discoveries of the Greek geometers lay idle for fifteen or eighteen centuries before their value was rec-

ognized by other thinkers. "Art is long," and gathers her tools from among the stores of all ages.

Many of the finest inventions of our own and other times have been, as it were, accidental discoveries by unlearned men; thus much must be conceded to the practical objector to science. But, on the other hand, a majority of the most useful practical inventions of the present century have been the direct result of scientific labor, undertaken for scientific ends alone, without a thought of pecuniary benefit or commercial use; and it would be a suicidal policy for the men of business to discourage the pursuit of the highest and most abstract science on the ground of its want of practical utility. I have just alluded to the artificial impregnation of fish eggs; I might allude to the discovery of trichina; to the aniline dyes; to electrotyping, electroplating, and the magnetic telegraph, and to twenty other notable things of the present day — the gifts of pure science to the practical world.

Nevertheless, the concession must also be made that many of the most beautiful theorems of science delight us by their beauty and truthfulness alone, without regard to ulterior benefit. They minister to our highest needs; they satisfy the noblest ambition of the intellect, to discover truth; the purest sentiment, to admire beauty; but they do not show directly any mode by which we can produce a merchantable commodity. In the higher mathematics we have a curious illustration of this fact, since many of the finest theorems are not only incapable of being applied to practical problems, but are incapable of being used for the advancement even of mathematical problems. Some special problem has been started and solved; the solution immediately led the mathematician to a theorem of great generality, including the solution of innumerable problems; and yet this theorem, demonstrably true, and including the solution of all these problems, cannot lead you to the actual solution of a single one of them; that is to say, each one of them if solved at all must be attacked in some special way; or else be solved only by a method of approximation leading toward, but not actually to, the correct result.

To me this seems analogous to the fact that the widest moral axioms and loftiest moral sentiments are often found to be inapplicable, by our weak understandings, to a practical question of social or political duty; and we are obliged to make very coarse approximation to it. And although John Locke esteemed it a weakness of the human understanding that it would so often fain comfort itself in its conclusions by analogy, I would confess my human weakness, and acknowledge that I have often derived great comfort from having my faith in the eternal verities of ethical science thus confirmed by finding them subject to no more limitations of practicability than the eternal theorems of geometry.

In the year 1692, James Bernouilli, discussing the logarithmic spiral (that is, the spiral which makes at every part of it the same angle with a line drawn to its pole), shows that it reproduces itself in its evolutes, its involutes, and its caustics of both reflection and refraction, and then adds: "But since this marvellous spiral, by such a singular and wonderful peculiarity, pleases me so much that I can scarce be satisfied with thinking about it, I have thought that it might be not inelegantly used for a symbolic representation of various matters. For since it always produces a spiral similar to itself, indeed precisely the same spiral, however it may be involved or evolved, or reflected or refracted, it may be taken as an emblem of a progeny always in all things like the parent, *simillima filia matri*. Or, if it is not forbidden to compare a theorem of eternal truth to the mysteries of our faith, it may be taken as an emblem of the eternal generation of the Son, who as an image of the Father, emanating from him, as light of light, remains *ὁμοούσιος* with him, howsoever overshadowed. Or, if you prefer, since our *spira mirabilis* remains, amid all changes, most persistently itself, and exactly the same as ever, it may be used as a symbol, either of fortitude and constancy in adversity, or, of the human body; which after all its changes, even after death, will be restored to its exact and perfect self; so that, indeed, if the fashion of imitating Archimedes were allowed in these days, I should

gladly have my tombstone bear this spiral, with the motto, Though changed, I rise again exactly the same, *Eadem numero mutata resurgo.*"

The disposition which Bernouilli thus shows, to use a geometrical figure in illustration of moral truth, is inherent in human nature. Inasmuch as all our language is necessarily drawn in the first instance from that which is external to ourselves, and to which we can point in illustration of our meaning, it is natural that we should use freely geometrical form or figure, the first property of outward things which becomes the distinct object of intellectual apprehension. Thus we get in our familiar speech concerning moral and spiritual themes, such mathematical words as upright, straightforward, square dealing, rectitude, obliquity, tortuous, crooked, diametrically opposite, and many others. That which men in general thus freely do, without question as to its appositeness and propriety, the mathematician may surely be allowed to do to a larger extent. The more extensive a persons acquaintance with any subject, the more frequently will topics selected from it arise to his memory, by Locke's weakness, to illustrate other departments of thought. A special instance is given in the foregoing extract from Bernouilli; and other instances will come readily to the remembrance of those familiar with the history of mathematics and mathematicians. In one of the Bridgewater treatises some remark was made to the effect that the study of that rigid science rather hindered the mind from the appreciation of religious thought. Charles Babbage, one of the successors of Isaac Barrow and Isaac Newton in the Lucasian chair at Cambridge, replied to the taunt by writing a ninth Bridgewater treatise, in which he illustrated the subject both of revealed and natural religion, with wonderful power and beauty, by arguments and analogies drawn from the most recondite researches of the mathematician.

One of the most remarkable of Babbage's illustrations of miracles has never had the consideration in the popular mind which it deserves; the illustration drawn from the existence

of isolated points fulfilling the equation of a curve. The mathematicians definition of a curve requires more than the existence of a line bending everywhere imperceptibly, and thus having in it neither any angle nor any straight portion ; that is an artist's description. The mathematician's definition requires that the position of every point in the line should be described by describing the position of one point ; as, for example, to say that a certain point is at a given distance from a given point, describes the position of every point in the circumference of a circle with the given point as a centre, and the given distance as radius ; but of no other point whatever. There are, however, definitions of curves which will describe not only the position of every point in a certain curve, but also of one or more perfectly isolated points ; and if we should attempt to get by induction the definition, from the observation of the points in the curve, we might fail altogether to include these isolated points ; which, nevertheless, although standing alone, as miracles to the observer of the course of the points in the curve, are nevertheless rigorously included in the law of the curve. This illustration not only proves the possibility of the scripture miracles being in accordance with the highest laws of nature, and expressly provided for in the original constitution of matter—for which Babbage uses it ; but it has a direct bearing also on the great question which is so deeply stirring the world to-day—the question whether the doctrine of evolution is to be accepted or rejected.

On *a priori* grounds we should expect to find that the ordinary generation by descent had been going on unbroken from the beginning of life on the planet ; that existing animals and plants were the offspring of the extinct races in the preceding age ; and they the offspring of those of a still more remote age, and so on to the beginning. Many naturalists think that observed facts also warrant the induction that this hypothesis is true. Charles Darwin follows it out with a prodigious wealth of learning, endeavoring to show that he has discovered the causes which have changed the extinct

into the living species ; he finds them in two modifiers of the general law that like produces like ; the first being a slight disposition in the offspring to vary a little from the likeness to the parent ; the second being in the adaptation of these variations, under some circumstances to favor, under others to injure, the chance for life. But there are several fatal objections to Darwin's view, which, in spite of the popularity given to it by the ingenious and plausible arguments of its advocates, will finally cause it to be laid aside. One of these consists in the fact that there is in the rocks no record of any continuous change ; the variation is always abrupt and by discrete steps ; and the Darwinian explanation by blanks in the record, fails for two reasons : first, the inherent incredibility of the blanks being always so immensely longer than the records ; secondly, the great probability, from the temperature of the earth and sun, that the records themselves fill out all the time that has elapsed since the earth was red-hot at the surface. The evolutionist, however, not a Darwinian, may appeal to the existence of singular points in a curve, and say, The law of descent is not fully understood by us, and it has been subject to abrupt variations in its effects, without any variation in the real law itself. Another illustration of the same point might be drawn from the abrupt transition frequently made in the character of a curve by a change in some of the so-called constants in its law. If you change the diameter of a circle, you change only the size, not the shape of the curve. But if you change the proportion between the principal diameters of an ellipse, you obtain circles, ellipses, parabolas, hyperbolas, and even straight lines, parallel, or at right angles. Now it may be said that in the law of hereditary descent, there is a gradual change of the constants, betraying itself at certain points by a sudden change in the character of the offspring.

Agassiz was an earnest opponent not only of Darwin's views, but of every form of the doctrine of evolution of one species from another. He appeared to regard the discerning of differences as a higher and more important work than the

discovery of likenesses. The evolutionists appear always to confound likeness with identity. A few years since it was the fashion for botanists and zoölogists to multiply divisions, and divide old groups into new ; of late years the inclination has been strong to deny the real meaning of any divisions. The number of divisions, it is said, depends altogether on the number of specimens you have ; given specimens enough, and your divisions will disappear because you can find no place to make them. Each species will vary toward the cognate species until you always find individuals that can be referred to one species as easily as to the other. In Whewell's *Philosophy of the Classificatory Science*, he defines the members of a group to be those individuals which, on the whole, bear a stronger resemblance to the type of the group, than to any other type. He thus allows for that free variation which may produce these ambiguous members. His philosophy does not, however, suit those of our day who have adopted Darwin's views, and they press the fact of a frequent insensible gradation in individuals from one form to another as a sufficient proof of the identity of the two forms. To me the argument never seemed sufficient. I was talking one day on the subject with a botanist of great eminence, and he adduced the instance of the oak and the chestnut. "You cannot," he said, "frame a definition of oaks that will not cover some chestnuts, nor one of chestnuts that will not cover some oaks." "But," said I, "can you imagine a plant which you could not refer to one more readily than to the other?" "No," said he, "I confess that I think I could always discriminate."

Many of our clearest distinctions are thus made from indications which are certain and unmistakeable to the expert, although they are not capable of being so expressed in a formula of words as to enable the less expert to detect them. My botanical friend would argue the identity of oaks and chestnuts from their shading together in the chinquapin forms ; yet, on being pressed, confessed his secret conviction that he could tell one from the other under any disguise. And I

confess my conviction that in all cases in which allied species, or allied genera, run toward what are called connecting links, the difference is as real in the connecting links, as in the typical members ; as real, but less conspicuous.

The case can be illustrated by geometrical curves in this way. Take any two curves of the most strikingly different forms, and of an entirely different genesis ; you may, by a change of the constants, bring them together to an intermediate form ; but you cannot by any possibility convert one into the other. The intermediate form, although geometrically (that is in shape) the same, is yet intellectually, in the law of its formation, different, according to your mode of approach ; and when you have approached it in one direction you cannot recede in another, without an intellectual *saltum*, a forsaking one conception and taking up the other. Let the chestnut be represented by a long ellipse, for example, and by changing the ratio of the diameters we can bring it to the chinquapin form of a circle. Let the oak be represented by the *spira mirabilis*, and, by making the angle with the meridian become a right angle, we can bring that also to its chinquapin form of a circle. But we have not thereby rendered it possible to consider the spiral and the ellipse different forms of the same curve, or possible to pass by any law of variation from one to the other. The circle obtained from the ellipse, although of precisely the same size and form as that obtained from the spiral, is nevertheless intellectually and algebraically a totally different curve ; and although you can return from it to the ellipse, you cannot pass from it to Bernouilli's curve. That which makes an oak an oak is no mere outward form and appearance, but some intellectual law embodied in the ovule and in the pollen, and unfolding itself in the tree ; and it cannot unfold into the chestnut unless it be changed in its very essence. This is a case in which the *P* is not really equal to *Q*. Neither let any man say that this analogy of the curve is far-fetched. The trees are forms in space, undergoing periodic changes ; the law which builds up the atoms into these forms, must be a law of space and time.

There are many special examples in the mathematics which may be used for the illustration of special points in morals or politics. In the first volume, for example, of Peirce's *Curves and Functions*, there is a means provided of cutting a curve abruptly off at any point, by adding a term which shall be of infinitesimal weight, and produce no effect on the part of the curve which you wish to preserve, but the moment you attempt to pass the boundary shall become imaginary and reduce the whole to absurdity. It always seemed to me a striking symbol of certain mischief-makers, who seem powerless to do any good in the world; they are mere ciphers in doing anything useful, and in discovering truth; but prove effective hinderances in the way of others accomplishing good. Or it may be a symbol of the paralysing power of doubt. No man can accomplish anything worth doing, unless he acts in faith, with a lively and earnest zeal, born of conviction. Some doubter meets him, and suggests objections and criticism adverse to his conclusions. It may not destroy his conviction altogether, but it palsies his faith and zeal, and destroys his energy and usefulness.

There is a certain spiral of a peculiar form on which a point may have been approaching for centuries the centre, and have nearly reached it, before we discover that its rate of approach is being accelerated. The first thought of the observer, on seeing the acceleration, would be to say that it would reach the centre sooner than he had before supposed. But as the point draws near the centre it suddenly, although still moving under the same simple law as from the beginning, makes a very short turn upon its path and flies off rapidly almost in a straight line, out to an infinite distance. This illustrates that apparent breach of continuity which we sometimes find in a natural law; that apparently sudden change of character which we sometimes see in man.

The most important effect, perhaps, upon the mind of a true student of mathematics, is the habit which he gains of recognizing the presence of thought in the material universe. The things which are seen are temporal, but those which are

not seen are eternal. The geometer contemplates the realities of space and time until they become to him more real than the passing things of the world. To him, first of all men, the physical manifestations of the universe all became mere "modes of motion." He saw that the atoms of matter as manifesting force, can manifest it only in space and time, and the only phenomenon conjoining space and time is motion. Thus the ultimate analysis of a sensible property must result in giving motion as the cause, and if the atoms move according to any law, it must be an algebraic and geometric law. Henceforth, the investigation of these laws, as mathematical conceptions, became his chosen labor. Thus he was freed at once from the limitations of magnitude; the grandest starry system moves by the same laws that govern the Jovian satellites; and those laws would possess the same intellectual interest and grandeur if ruling the motes under the microscope. The whole interest of the physical universe, in its merely physical manifestations, concentrates, therefore, to the mathematician in the laws of geometry and algebra which it embodies. The creation is but a set of diagrams wherewith the Infinite Teacher would illustrate for us mathematical thoughts and lead us to their perception, and thus to a reverent recognition of his existence and of our likeness to him.

The students of the other physical sciences are gradually beginning to perceive that they need, and must have, the aid of the mathematician in their work. Molar mechanics first yielded, primarily in its grandest form of astronomy, afterwards in regard to terrestrial phenomena; then molecular mechanics, in optics, electricity, and other branches, began also to yield, not without some conflict. The sciences of natural history have yielded but little; and I have recently heard some of their highest scholars talking almost as bitterly against the dogmatism and conceit of the mathematician, as ever others have done against the tyranny of theology. The resistance is vain. There is but one universe in which we live, and it is a cosmos, pervaded with one spirit of beauty

and truth. The hierarchy of sciences which would interpret this cosmos must needs begin with space and time, and rise to God; and all the intermediate sciences of every kind must own the absolute sovereignty of those at each end of the series; there is no break, — what is physical is subject to the laws of mathematics, and what is spiritual to the laws of God, and the laws of mathematics are but the expression of the thoughts of God. Botany and zoölogy, in their classification, are in the condition in which crystallography was before there was any other classification of crystals than by the figures of the ancient geometry; and as the needs of the mineralogist called forth from the mathematician a new geometry by which the science assumed finer intellectual proportions, so the needs of the botanist and zoölogist will, when the epidemic of “natural selection” has spent its fury, call out new contributions from the mathematicians in the line in which Peirce began, when, in 1849, he showed that the plants embody the idea of extreme and mean ratio, and in which Chauncy Wright followed, in showing that this ratio distributes the leaves most evenly about the stem. It will finally be shown that the various forms of plants and animals are the embodiment, in their forms, of distinct mathematical ideas; that Agassiz is right in his *Essay upon Classification*, in declaring the presence of a connected plan, an intellectual scheme, in each of the great kingdoms of organic nature. And if we can clearly bring those mathematical ideas into algebraical form, we can decide upon the possibility of the evolution of one species into another, or upon the impossibility. To the mathematician the study of organic forms has always appeared as the most glorious exercise in which the geometric intellect could be engaged; and the truth of Darwin’s theory of a stumbling, staggering, hap-hazard production of these forms, would seem to the mathematician like the destruction of his sublimest hope of happiness in this life or in the life to come. Of course, if inexorable facts sustain Darwin, the mathematician must submit to this disappointment; but for the present he must be excused for his incredulity when he is

told that the organic world, which seems to him a volume of the richest geometrical and algebraical learning, full of the most beautiful geometrical forms, and the most wonderful algebraic laws of periodicity,—the meaning of which he has in many instances clearly unfolded to himself,—has, in reality, no meaning whatever, but is like pages set from a jumble of types, not even set in lines by the hand of a printer, but which have been accidentally sorted by falling over sieves, and accidentally brought into pages by being shaken accidentally in shallow boxes of the size of a page; and illustrated by wood cuts drawn and engraved by the accidental scratching of a block, kicked along a gravel walk. If the mathematician is ever brought to admit the theory of evolution, he will still hold it demonstrated that the evolution has proceeded according to intellectual laws, evolving simply what was contained in the original idea of the creation. Before the world existed in its actuality it existed in idea, and so far as that idea related to the external world, it was a mathematical idea,—an idea of form and period, that is of motion. To this spiritual view of the origin of the universe the mathematician must cling, whatever his views concerning evolution. He discovers everywhere in nature a manifest embodiment of his own *a priori* ideas of space, time, number, and mechanism. And in the words of the geometer at our Cambridge: “The solution of the problem of this universal presence of such a spiritual element is obvious and necessary. THERE IS ONE GOD, AND SCIENCE IS THE KNOWLEDGE OF HIM.”

ARTICLE VI.

EARLY HISTORY OF ITALIAN PAINTING.¹

BY REV. F. H. JOHNSON, ANDOVER, MASS.

THE existence of an authentic history of early Italian painting is a matter of deep interest to all classes of students, but to none more than to ministers. In addition to its value as a means of artistic cultivation, it has for them, in view of the close connection existing between the rise of art in the thirteenth century and the development of a religious movement that was the great fact of its age, a special — we might say, indeed, a professional — interest. The work of Crowe and Cavalcaselle, of which this Article aims at giving some outline, while it does not dwell on the fact of this relationship, or make any particular effort to illustrate it, is, as an art history, one of great thoroughness. It is specially full and satisfactory in its treatment of the earliest period of the revival — giving careful and discriminating analyses of the paintings of Giotto and other artists, the inspiration of whose works was that of a lofty idealism. Its generalizations, also, are, with a few exceptions, carefully made and well sustained.² We do not hesitate to say that a more clearly defined view of the growth of painting as a whole, and a more distinct impression of the lesser, as well as of the great, epochs in that growth may be obtained from it than from any other one work as yet given to English readers.

After a review of the course of Christian art during the period of its decline from pagan models, the birth-place of

¹ *A History of Painting in Italy.* By J. A. Crowe and G. B. Cavalcaselle. 3 vols. London: John Murray. 1864.

² A notable exception to this is to be found in the notice of Orcagna, the account of whom (Vol. i. p. 427), taken in connection with the outline, previously given, of the course of painting between Giotto and Ghirlandaio (p. 246), is calculated to puzzle the most careful reader.

distinctively Italian painting is found in Giotto.¹ Cimabue, though the forerunner of the new birth, is classed as belonging essentially to the old dispensation. From this starting-point the history of painting in Central Italy is followed, with an appearance of great circumspection, through the Giottesque period of idealism completed by Masaccio and Angelico, through the period of the descent into materialistic forms of thought and realism in painting, — when artists, struggling with technical difficulties and engrossed in the imitation of an unselect nature, lost sight of the higher purposes of art, — and part way through the grand period of the later development. Andrea del Sarto is the last painter treated of. Raphael, Michael Angelo, and Leonardo da Vinci are not touched upon. As has been said, a much larger space is devoted to the consideration of the earlier artists than in any preceding history. And to many readers the resulting slow progress of the work, in connection with a somewhat nerveless style, will prove tedious to a degree. The writers take for granted an enthusiasm on the part of the reader, and apparently make little effort to be attractive, or to stimulate the attention of the many who read works on art for the sake of having an interest in the subject awakened. It should be observed, however, that the nature of the work undertaken renders it almost necessarily less interesting to the majority of readers than those books whose chief aim is biographical, rather than scientific or artistic.

A history of painting has a different end in view from a history of painters. In the latter, interest centres round individuals. It is a succession of detached stories, admitting variety of treatment and the introduction of personal anecdote, which, however remotely connected with art, is calculated to enlist the sympathy of the reader. In the other, art is the unit; the artist is a factor; and, in the course of the one long story that it wishes to tell, much that is of general interest must be sacrificed. Taken separately, they furnish answers to two quite distinct questions. Standing

¹ A.D. 1276-1336.

before the Transfiguration, one's first inquiry will naturally relate to the immediate author of the work. What was the man like who could conceive and execute a painting of such perfection? What kind of a nature had he? Under what influences was he formed? The story of Raphael's life gives a satisfactory answer to these questions; but in the answering they suggest another, and send us back to ask, What is the *whole* history of this painting? Raphael is but the last one who had a hand in it. Coming to the end of what may be attributed to his particular genius, there is still disclosed a vast work that has been wrought out by the patience of other intellects — a great accumulation of artistic power — the common stock of his generation, and the result of centuries of growth. What is the history of this growth?

The work of Crowe and Cavalcaselle has for its chief object the answering of this question. While the lives of the prominent painters are more or less distinctly outlined, the larger share of attention is directed to their paintings, which are carefully analyzed and classed, with a view to determining the relation which each artist sustained to the growth of the great whole. Thus the history of painting is systematized; and, unquestionably, a great service has been rendered to the student of art by the faithful manner in which the task has been performed.

Every year adds new material for the production of an authentic history of painting. By the removal of whitewash from frescos that have been lost for centuries whole chapters are disclosed to those who can read their language; while public and private documents, hitherto inaccessible, or for some other reason unimproved, are now and again yielding important data to patient research. In the volumes before us there is evidence of much careful diligence in the collecting and sifting of new material of this kind. Partly from the new light thus obtained, and partly in their capacity as experts, the authors arrive at some conclusions which are widely at variance with opinions hitherto held. A few examples of this are as follows: The frescos of the Church

of the Incoronata, in Naples, are not the work of Giotto. This rests upon undoubted historical evidence. Giotto never went to France; the frescos in Avignon, attributed to him, are by Simone Memmi. The frescos of the Campo Santo of Pisa, said to be by Orcagna, are by a Siennese painter, probably by one of the Lorenzetti. The frescos of the Cappellone dei Spagnuoli are not by Simone Memmi, but probably by Antonio Veneziano.¹ Masolino did not paint in the Brancacci chapel.

The course of Italian painting, during its growth period, was far from being an even progress. It had its retrograde movements, its revolutions, its infatuations. It had also its double line of development, in rival schools. The school of Florence, represents the grand movement. But from the very outset another influence was at work. Duccio of Sienna flourished contemporaneously with Giotto; and his genius gave birth to a school of painting, which, for more than a century and a half—first in Sienna, and afterward in Umbria—held an independent course. This school, while it had some conspicuous excellences, was devoid of those qualities on which greatness in art depends. Duccio, unlike Giotto, clung to the past, and contented himself with reproducing, with great improvements in detail, its conventional compositions and worn-out types. The vehement and exaggerated action, also, which characterized the old art, and which in Giotto gave place to a noble repose and dignity, was retained by Duccio; and his followers, with whom conservatism became the rule, transmitted almost without alteration, these strongly-marked peculiarities from one generation to another. As has been said some of these peculiarities were excellences. The school of Sienna was pre-eminent as a school of sentiment. It expressed, even to exaggeration, the feminine qualities of tenderness and grace, and fostered the religious element, though not without much affectation. It was distinguished also for brilliant and lively color, for lavish ornamentation, and for a most elaborate finish in details.

At various points in the grand progress, these qualities

¹ In the use of proper names we have followed the orthography of the authors.

exerted a marked influence on individual Florentine painters, more especially on Orcagna and Fra Angelico. But it was not till the days of Perugino and Raphael — who, bred in the Umbrian school, already modified by Florentine influences, matured their style in Florence — that the two schools became thoroughly fused in the advanced painting of the close of the fifteenth century.

In the mean time, Florence had been occupying itself with the sterner problems of art. The period embraced between Giotto and Raphael — about two centuries — was a most remarkable one for the number of great Florentines which it produced. Orcagna, Masaccio, Angelico, Brunelleschi, Donatello, Ghiberti, Uccelli, Ghirlandaio, Verrocchio, Leonardo, Michael Angelo, are some of the more prominent names. But besides these, there were others who encountered boldly the limitations of which they were conscious, and who won important ground in the onward movement of their profession.

The magnitude of the advantage possessed by Florence in the broad and true foundation which Giotto laid is emphasized by Crowe and Cavalcaselle; and great prominence is given to the influence exerted, not alone in the early stages of progress, but throughout the whole course of the renaissance, by the grand principles which he developed. Giotto's was a mind of an eminently intellectual cast. "He was to the art what Dante was to the poesy of his country." Every subject that received his attention became elevated by his treatment of it. As an idealist he always aimed at producing a great whole, and he possessed a genius capable of grasping, without assistance, the great secrets of grandeur in composition. Masterly distribution, breadth of handling, and a severe simplicity in design, combined with repose, decorum, and great nobleness of mien in simple figures, were the distinguishing features of the art which he bequeathed to Florence. Nor was this all. Giotto was many-sided. He had a feeling for art in all its members. Besides giving a grand impulse to the artistic spirit of his age, he contributed largely to the growth of art in all its parts. "In composition, form, design,

expression, and color, he gave it one uniform stamp of originality in progress, an universal harmony of improvement."

With the single exception of Orcagna, no one from Giotto to Ghirlandaio was distinguished for a like many-sided development. "Art, after Giotto, became divided. Some clung to the more special aim of developing form, and in this were, at first, not very successful; others chose color or relief; others again sunk themselves in a search for accessories or detail. None took up art in all its branches where Giotto left it." The immediate successors of the great master, those who had been educated under his eye, did nothing for the progress of art, except in so far as their deficiencies showed what art had to avoid. "The melancholy, but unquestionable, truth respecting these, is that they reduced what in Giotto was art to the dimensions of a trade. Whilst they enjoyed the advantage of his compositions which they copied; whilst they considered themselves freed from the necessity of exercising the gifts of fancy, they were but too obviously induced to devote exclusive attention to ease and rapidity of hand." Taddeo Gaddi and Jacopo di Casentino were representatives of this class. "But by their side arose others that were freer participators of the impulse which Giotto had given."

Giovanni da Milano and Giotto were both innovators in the direction of a closer imitation of nature in details. Giotto, intent upon the grandeur of the whole, was, to a certain extent, neglectful of precision of detail. Giovanni was distinguished for careful minuteness of drawing and research of form, but his art was realistic, and he failed in that subordination of parts to the whole, which was the predominant element in the greatness of Giotto. Giotto, while he was, equally with Giovanni da Milano, a student of form and detail, and while he carried naturalism quite as far, yet did this without such detriment to the mass, and, to a good degree, observed the maxims of the great master. But it is in Andrea Orcagna¹ that the first worthy successor of Giotto appears.

Died about 1376.

“ Orcagna not only understood and grasped the great maxims and laws of Giotto, but he combined, like that great master, all the essentials which unite to make an art progress.” “ His was a mind of wonderful scantling — of that tough and durable material which is rarely found more than once in a century ; one which, by the very nature of its being, exercises a striking influence on its contemporaries, and gives a bias to all that comes in contact with it.” His contributions to Florentine art, consisted first in his happy combination of Siennese excellences with the art of Giotto. “ Orcagna introduces a more yielding and sensitive religious feeling into art, — the mild, soft mysticism which finds its culminating point in Angelico. He is a link in the chain of Giotto, Masolino, Masaccio. From the school of Florence he derives his greatest qualities, from that of Sienna, from Simone, and the Lorenzetti the lesser ones. He tempered the sternness of the first with the softness of the second, combining in his figures tenderness and grace with severity of form, decorum, and nobleness of deportment.” In the more careful rendering of form, also, as well as in the matters of foreshortening, perspective, and chiaroscuro he shows himself in advance of the art of Giotto.

Antonio Veneziano, the next link in the chain, while he was an industrious student and imitator of nature, is more especially important as marking a period of progress in technical execution. New methods of glazing were introduced by him, which were used to advantage by Masolino and Angelico, and in a much improved form by Masaccio. Masolino¹ — of whose style much more is now known than was known by Vasari, owing to the recent uncovering of an important series of frescos, signed with his name, in Castiglione — was in some respects the forerunner of Masaccio and Angelico. He developed the science of perspective, and made a more careful study of the nude than any of his predecessors. He was also distinguished for the expression of religious feeling akin to that of Angelico. But his art was characterized by

faulty distribution, and by a want of harmony in the parts. "In single figures, the head frequently did not correspond with the proportions of the frame, the figure with the group into which it was introduced, the group with others in the vicinity, the whole with the architecture."

Fra Angelico¹ and Masaccio² complete the Giottesque period. The former had his own peculiar inspiration and development in the realm of religious mysticism — a realm in which he has never been equalled. As to his art education, he was formed by Orcagna and Masolino. "Masolino gave him the artistical and practical; Orcagna's works acted on the peculiar bent of his mind." In the great essentials of art he ranks with the first. "The harmony of his lines in composition is equal to that of the greatest composers, — equal to that of Giotto." Angelico, more truly than Masaccio, closes the Giottesque period. Not simply because he outlived him by many years, but because he worked altogether in the spirit of the old art. Masaccio occupies a peculiarly isolated position in the history of painting. He is like an eminence thrown up by the meeting of opposing forces. Thoroughly imbued with the spirit and principles of Giotto, he at the same time received, and with wonderful skill combined, the science of the new art with the idealism of the old. In his rendering of the human form, in the application of the rules of linear and aerial perspective, in giving to architecture its proper place and proportion, he was closely related to the times of the higher development of art. "Masaccio treated art in general, perfecting that of Giotto, modernizing it, and holding out his hand to Raphael and Michael Angelo, but losing something of the sentiment and decorous grandeur of the early Florentine." "His representation is true, his perspective bold, his atmosphere almost perfect; but muscular form overweighs the idea of dignity and religious decorum."

As has been said, Masaccio occupied his eminence alone. After him a new set of influences absorbed men's minds, and a new art arose, which was at first a descent from the grand

¹ 1387-1455.

² 1402-1429.

style of the Giottesque. The early part of the fifteenth century was an age of novelties, an age of discoveries, and in painting it was an age of crudities. A powerful impulse had been given to the study of science, of nature, of architecture, and sculpture. The worship of antique statuary, which came in with the fifteenth century, had a most stimulating influence on the sculptors of the time; and Ghiberti and Donatello, men of great genius, elevated this branch of art to an imposing position. The effect of this upon painting is strongly marked. Nearly every artist, from Uccelli to Ghirlandaio, shows, in the hard lines and sculptural character of his figures, that the work of the chisel has been deeply impressed on his mind. In addition to this, the style of Donatello, distinguished as it was for the display of physical force and the choice of unselect muscular forms, exercised a dominant influence on the taste of two generations of artists. Another effect of the study of the antique was, that it sent men back to nature. They understood that nothing truly great could come from mere imitation; and in the study of all natural appearances they sought for a new perfection that should rival that of the past. But in this effort they illustrated the truth that art is long. "Most tarried by the way, lost sight of the aim toward which the subtile knowledge of nature should have led them, and became realistic imitators, who forget that the ideal is based on selection."

But, on the other hand, this was an age in which much honest and valuable work was performed, — work that had to be done before the perfected art of the later time was possible. The laws of linear perspective and foreshortening were now, for the first time, fully developed by Paolo Uccello.¹ He gave himself to this study as to a specialty; and so engrossed in the pursuit did he become, that the main motive of many of his pictures seems to have been to show how difficulties in this direction could be surmounted. At the same time, he was led by this study into a research of animal life, and into the careful delineation of details hitherto disregarded. He

Born 1396, and was living in 1469.

delighted in battle-pieces, in which he could display his knowledge of horses, armor, saddlery, and plumes, in subjects that allowed of profuse finery in dress and ornamentation ; and he embraced every opportunity to introduce into his pictures studies of dogs, cattle, wild animals, serpents, birds, and fishes, bestowing careful attention on such matters as plumage, scales, and the characteristic movements of different animals.

Great improvements were made, during this period, also, in the chemistry of painting. The method of painting in oils employed by the Florentines was not, according to Crowe and Cavalcaselle, that of the Van Eycks, introduced by Antonello da Messina, but an invention of their own, begun by the Peselli and Baldovinetti, and worked out by the experiments of a succession of artists. Again, the study of the human form, having received a powerful impulse from Donatello, was pursued with enthusiastic ardor. The first results of this study were crude, angular, and unlovely forms — the outgrowth of a conscientious study of coarse and muscular subjects, and a faithful copying of every defect. But the mistakes, as well as the achievements, of these workers with nature were important elements in the subsequent success of Signorelli, Raphael, and Michael Angelo.

Andrea del Castagno,¹ who, by the researches of Signor Gaetano Milanesi, has been finally cleared of the charge of having murdered Domenico Veneziano, was the contemporary of Uccelli and Donatello. He was of a coarser fibre than either, but an artist of great vigor, participating in the spirit of Donatello, and the imitator in painting of his sculptural boldness. "The action of his figures was, in truth, full of energy and swing ; but in expression he was one of the most vulgar of the realists. As a colorist he was distanced by almost all his contemporaries, and never produced anything but hard, raw, and unpleasant work. Yet the strength that was in the man is still imposing ; and Castagno deserves the place which he occupies in art history."

¹ 1390-1457.

A group of painters farther on in the fifteenth century — Antonio and Piero Pollaiuolo, Verrocchio, and Botticelli — combined this same careful study of the nude and the worship of unselect muscular forms, with the imitation in painting of silver and bronze works. Fashion had at this time given to articles of chiselled bronze and silver the precedence in art patronage; and pictures — which were very generally executed in the goldsmith's shop — came to resemble these in color and in other features.

Domenico Ghirlandaio,¹ who was probably bred a goldsmith, may be classed with the foregoing artists, as being one whose style was strongly affected by the influence of bronze sculpture. But taking a wider view of the history of painting, he is to be classed by himself. Like Giotto, he was one of the great landmarks in the history of Florentine art. He founded his style on the great qualities of the earlier masters; but he combined with their excellences the lessons taught by the research of a later generation. "He gathered and harvested for subordinate use the experience of architects, of students of perspective, of form, of proportion, and light and shade, and learnt to apply the laws of chiaroscuro to the human frame and to the still life that surrounds it. Without adding anything specially to the total amount of experience acquired by the efforts of successive searchers, he garnered the whole of it within himself, and combined it in support and illustration of the great maxims which he had already treasured up, and thus conduced to the perfection of the masculine art of Florence, which culminated at last by the joint energy and genius of himself, Fra Bartolommeo, Raphael, and Michael Angelo."

Piero della Francesca,² a pupil of Domenico Veneziano, has an unusually imposing place assigned him by our authors. He is described as "a man of a rare type, endowed with great penetration and powers of reflection, able to fathom the problems of abstruse science, and capable to search and

¹ Born 1449, died about 1498.

² Born at Borgo San Sepolcro in Umoria, between 1415 and 1420; still living, 1509.

co-ordinate the secrets of nature. He was, in a word, an artist enjoying a happy conjunction of the talents which adorned the Van Eycks and Leonardo da Vinci. With more science than Uccelli or Mantegna, he turned his knowledge of linear perspective to admirable account, and learnt not merely to fix rectangular planes in perfect order, but to measure them, and thus set his figures at their just proportional height in the most advantageous situations. He was the forerunner and superior of Domenico Ghirlandai in the mode of projecting shadows, and thus added to art a new perfection. He carried out improvements in the mode of oil-coloring that place him next in Italy to Antonello da Messina, not because he followed the Van Eyck method introduced by the Sicilian, but because he added something like perfection to the system of the Florentine innovators. And thus we have before us a vast genius, who only wanted the essential quality of selection in the human form to become one amongst the very greatest men of his country. It is but a just tribute to his memory to add, that, having formed the bold and vehement style of Luca Signorelli, their combined influence extended to all the schools of their native country."

It is to the influence of Piero della Francesca and his master, Domenico Veneziano, that the elevation of the Perugian school, not hitherto satisfactorily accounted for, is attributed. Through Bonfigli and Fiorenzo di Lorenzo, they contributed powerfully to the formation of Perugino, and through him, and still more directly through Giovanni Santi, the father of Raphael, to the early education of the greatest of masters.

As has been said elsewhere the life and works of Raphael are not touched upon in these volumes. But those of Perugino and his associates are treated at considerable length. A much higher place is claimed for Baldassare Peruzzi, the Siennese, as a painter, than has hitherto been accorded to him. Fra Bartolommeo, Albertinelli, Andrea del Sarto, and the group of Florentine artists connected with them, close the record for Central Italy as thus far given.

ARTICLE VII.

RECENT BOOKS BEARING UPON THE RELATION OF
SCIENCE TO RELIGION.

BY REV. GEORGE F. WRIGHT, ANDOVER, MASS.

No. I. — THE NATURE AND DEGREE OF SCIENTIFIC PROOF.

THE book¹ to whose guidance we willingly commit ourselves in this Article, is of exceptional value in this time so marked by fertile speculation and heated controversy. It covers a field which has been neglected entirely too much, by the interpreters both of nature and of the Bible. It may be of advantage to both parties, to be reminded that no facts are altogether foreign, either to science or religion, and that there is but one method by which to arrive at the truth, whether one call himself a scientist or a theologian. Logic is one; and holds alike all interpreters of facts to its rigorous postulates.

The authority of Christianity is not established by direct intuition; but as a conclusion of a syllogism, of which the objective facts contained in the Bible, and the circumstances attending its transmission to us, form the minor premise, and of which certain intuitions, which we will not here specify, compose the major premise.

The belief in the truths of physical science rests likewise on the conclusion of a similar syllogism, whose major premise is the same, and whose minor is a set of observations differing in many particulars from those in the other, but still similar to the others in this, that they are not proof, but only the basis of proof.

¹ The Principles of Science. A Treatise on Logic and Scientific Method. By W. Stanley Jevons, M.A., F.R.S., Fellow of University College, London, Professor of Logic and Political Economy in the Owens College, Manchester, England. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. 463, 480. London and New York: Macmillan and Co. 1874.

The central question of all reasoning is this: How do we join together the major and minor premise in a conclusion? Whence comes that new thought that is born neither of intuition alone, nor of observation? Has it the certainty of either? The defender of the Bible must answer, that he is not absolutely certain of its credibility and authority; for, from the nature of the case, one cannot be expected to establish these beyond a high degree of probability. But, on the other hand, is the physical philosopher able to do any better in his field? Is he able to eliminate all uncertainty from his conclusions regarding what are called the laws of nature? The author under review, who has made the physical sciences and their methods of proof a life-long study, answers, no; but expresses it as his "strong conviction that before a rigorous logical scrutiny, the 'reign of law' will prove to be an unverified hypothesis, the uniformity of nature an ambiguous expression, the certainty of our scientific inferences to a great extent a delusion."¹

The distinguished reputation of Professor Jevons makes it worth while to notice his able and elaborate work upon the Principles of Science at some length. We can do this no better than by furnishing a connected series of extracts from its leading chapters, adding upon some allied topics, a few remarks of our own.

I. NATURE OF SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE.

"Science arises from the discovery of identity amid diversity. The process may be described in many different words, but our language must always imply the presence of one common and necessary element. In every act of inference or scientific method we are engaged about a certain identity, sameness, similarity, likeness, resemblance, analogy, equivalence, or equality apparent between two objects."² "It must be the ground of all reasoning and inference, that *what is true of one thing will be true of its equivalent*, and that under carefully ascertained conditions *nature repeats herself*."³ "The fundamental action of our reasoning faculties consists in inferring, or carrying to a new instance of a phenomenon whatever we have previously known of its like, analogue, equivalent, or equal. Sameness or identity presents itself in all degrees, and is known under various names;

¹ Vol. i. Preface, p. ix.

² Vol. i. p. 1.

³ p. 2.

but the great rule of inference embraces all degrees, and affirms that *so far as there exists sameness, identity, or likeness, what is true of one thing will be true of the other*. The great difficulty of reasoning doubtless consists in ascertaining that there does exist a sufficient degree of likeness or sameness to warrant an intended inference."¹

In contrast to J. S. Mill, who held that all reasoning was really inductive, our author maintains the exact reverse.

"In a certain sense all knowledge is inductive. We can only learn the laws and relations of things in nature by observing those things. But the knowledge gained from the senses is knowledge only of particular facts, and we require some process of reasoning by which we may construct out of the facts the laws obeyed by them. Experience gives us the materials of knowledge; induction digests those materials, and yields us general knowledge." "In its ultimate origin or foundation, then, all knowledge is inductive, in the sense that it is derived by a certain inductive reasoning from the facts of experience. But it is nevertheless true—and this is a point to which insufficient attention has been paid—that all reasoning is founded on the principles of deduction. I call in question the existence of any method of reasoning which can be carried on without a knowledge of deductive processes. I shall endeavor to show that *induction* is really *the inverse process of deduction*. There is no mode of ascertaining the laws which are obeyed in certain phenomena, except we previously have the power of determining what results would follow from a given law. An inverse process is the undoing of the direct process. A person who enters a maze must either trust to chance to lead him out again, or he must carefully notice the road by which he entered. The facts furnished to us by experience are a maze of particular results; we might by chance observe in them the fulfilment of a law, but this is scarcely possible, unless we thoroughly learn the effects which would attach to any particular law. Accordingly the importance of deductive reasoning is doubly supreme."²

II. TWOFOLD MEANING OF GENERAL NAMES.

"A name is said to *denote* the distinct object of thought to which it may be applied; it *implies*, at the same time, the possession of certain qualities or circumstances. The number of objects denoted, forms the *extent* of meaning of the term; the number of qualities implied forms the *intent* of meaning. We increase the intent of meaning of a term by joining adjectives to it, and the removal of such adjectives, of course, decreases the intensive meaning. Now, concerning such changes of meaning the following all-important law holds universally true: *When the intent of meaning of a term is increased, the extent is decreased, and vice versa*. Singular terms, which denote a single individual only, come under the

¹ Vol. i. p. 11.

² pp. 14, 15.

same law of meaning as general names. They may be regarded as general names of which the meaning in extension is reduced to a minimum. Logicians have erroneously asserted, as it seems to me, that singular terms are devoid of meaning in intension, the fact being that they exceed all other terms in that kind of meaning."¹

"There is no distinction but that of degree between what is known as reasoning by *generalization* and reasoning by *analogy*. In both cases from certain observed resemblances we infer, with more or less probability, the existence of other resemblances. In generalization the resemblances have great extension and usually little intension, whereas in analogy we rely upon the great intension, the extension being of small amount."²

An important observation is made upon the indifference of logic to the order in which the adjectives which add intensive meaning to a term occur.

"A little reflection will show that knowledge in the highest perfection would consist in the *simultaneous* possession of a multitude of facts. To comprehend a science perfectly we should have every fact present with every other fact. We must write a book, and we must read it, successively, word by word; but how infinitely higher would be our powers of thought if we could grasp the whole in one collective act of consciousness. Compared with the brutes, we do possess some slight approximation to such power; and it is just conceivable that, in the indefinite future, mind may acquire a vast increase of capacity, and be less restricted to the piecemeal examination of a subject. But I wish to make plain that there is no logical foundation for the successive character of thought and reasoning, unavoidable under our present mental conditions. The fact that we must think of one thing first, and another second, is a logical weakness and imperfection. We must describe metal as 'hard and opaque,' or 'opaque and hard,' but in the metal itself there is no difference of order; the properties are simultaneous and co-extensive in existence."³

These remarks connect themselves, in a later portion of the work, with others of much significance to metaphysicians, to the effect that the independence of space and time, appearing in logical relations, and in the algebraical formulæ which represent in their variations certain curved lines in space, gives us a hint that space and time are not necessary conditions of every form of being.⁴

In our author's view, all logic rests on the principle of identity, and reasoning is the process of following the thread of identity through its multifarious transformations and

¹ Vol. i. pp. 31, 32. ² Vol. ii. p. 244. ³ Vol. i. p. 41. ⁴ See below, p. 555.

combinations with other things and in other statements. Deductive reasoning, like going into a labyrinth, is comparatively easy; but the inductive process is beset with the perplexities of getting out of a maze without any clew. It is proposed, with some approach to success, to simplify the process by the application of mathematical formulae. Hamilton and some others have endeavored to accomplish this object by the use of geometrical figures, exhibiting the mutual inclusion or exclusion of propositions by the relations of circles to one another; the spaces intercepted in common by them representing the identity, and hence the limitations of the conclusion. But in logic, as in mathematics, figures in space are cumbrous, and must yield to the symbols of algebra. For the proposition All A is B, or, transposed, B includes A, substitute the formula $A = B$, meaning that A is identical with a portion of B. Now, if also $B = C$, then a portion of C must be identical with A. And you have the formula $A = ABC$, which means, when read in extension, A is an A which is a B, which is a C; each letter adding to the fold a more general term; or, read in intension, it means A is an A which possesses the additional meaning B plus the meaning of C.¹

By introducing appropriate signs for negation, variation, and alternative propositions, and following simple rules of substitution, the whole mass of syllogisms, in all their moods and figures, is brought within the management of a few algebraical symbols. This enables our author to accomplish the same thing for logic which Mr. Babbage did in mathematics, namely, invent a machine which shall, when once the terms and propositions have been reduced to appropriate forms, dispense with the drudgery of the routine work, and lead to the conclusions which are involved in the premises.

We have not room here to give any adequate idea of this process, which is carefully elaborated by the author. We are not sure that we see all its advantages. It incorporates, however Hamilton's idea of quantifying the predicate, and

¹ See Jevons, Vol. i. pp. 15-194.

also that of inference being a mere explication of the concept of the subject of the minor premise. He does not, however, like De Morgan and others, make logic a branch of mathematics; but, on the contrary, calls mathematics a branch of logic, and places the law of identity at the foundation of the ordinary axioms of number and space.

III. THE PROCESS OF INDUCTION.

We come now to the vital point of interest: What degree of certainty can the inferences of induction have? According to our author,

"Inference never does more than explicate, unfold, or develop the information contained in certain premises or facts. Neither in deductive nor inductive reasoning can we add a tittle to our implicit knowledge, which is like that contained in an unread book or a sealed letter."¹ The question regarding this explication is, "Where does novelty of form begin?"²

The difficulties of explication increase in geometrical ratio with every ascending step of induction. The discovery of a new cause, or the appearance of a new connected phenomenon makes a fresh knot in the snarl we are disentangling. It is well to weigh the following sentences.

"Induction is the inverse operation to deduction."³ "Induction is the decyphering of the hidden meaning of natural phenomena."⁴ "We seldom observe any great law in uninterrupted and undisguised operation."⁵ "It is now plain that induction consists in passing back from a series of combinations to the laws by which such combinations are governed."⁶

"The following table shows the extraordinary manner in which the number of possible logical relations increases with the number of terms involved."⁷

No. of Terms.	No. of possible Combinations.	No. of possible selections of combinations corresponding to consistent or inconsistent logical relations.
2	4	16
3	8	256
4	16	65,536
5	32	4,294,967,296
6	64	18,446,744,073,709,551,616 "

The uncertainties regarding induction arise from the fact that, except in a few unimportant cases, it can never be perfect.

¹ Vol. i. p. 136, see also, pp. 171, 250.

² p. 137.

³ p. 139.

⁴ p. 143.

⁵ p. 145

⁶ p. 154.

⁷ p. 163.

An unknown, but most important, factor in our calculations concerning the permanence of the laws of nature, by which we prognosticate the future, or form judgments regarding the past, is the purpose of the Creator. Or rather we should say that this is the thing which, in our processes of induction, we are always, with very imperfect data, attempting to determine. Thus our author :

“There is no fact which I shall more constantly keep before the reader’s mind in the following pages, than that the results of imperfect induction however well authenticated and verified, are never more than probable. We never can be sure that the future will be as the present. We hang ever upon the will of the Creator; and it is only so far as he has created two things alike, or maintains the framework of the world unchanged from moment to moment, that our most careful inferences can be fulfilled. No experience of finite duration can be expected to give an exhaustive knowledge of all the forces which are in operation. There is thus a double uncertainty; even supposing the universe as a whole to proceed unchanged, we do not really know the universe as a whole. We cannot be sure, then, that our observations have not escaped some fact which will cause the future to be apparently different from the past; nor can we be sure that the future really will be the outcome of the past.”

“As the creation of the universe is necessarily an act passing all experience and all conception, so any change in that creation, or, it may be, a termination of it, must likewise be infinitely beyond the bounds of our mental faculties. No science, no reasoning upon the subject, can have any validity; for without experience we are without the basis and materials of knowledge. It is the fundamental postulate, accordingly, of all inference concerning the future, that there shall be no arbitrary change in the subject of inference. Of the probability or improbability of such a change I conceive that our faculties can give no estimate.”

“No net addition is ever made to our knowledge by reasoning; what we know of future events or unexamined objects, is only the unfolded contents of our previous knowledge, and it becomes less and less probable as it is more boldly extended to remote cases.”¹

It will thus be seen that doctors of science as well as of theology walk by faith, and not by sight. Physical science cannot divest itself of a metaphysical and theological basis. The scientist is searching after the ideas of God which are involved in both the past and the future of the material creation. At the very threshold he encounters the metaphysical

questions concerning the wisdom, goodness, and veracity of God, and the data for interpreting the marks of these are obtained from his own mental experiences.

IV. DOCTRINE OF PROBABILITIES.

Professor Jevons rightly gives to the doctrine of probabilities a high place in inductive reasoning.

"As Butler truly said, 'Probability is the very guide of life.' All our inferences concerning the future are merely probable; and a due appreciation of the degree of probability depends entirely upon a due comprehension of the principles of the subject. I conceive that it is impossible even to expound the principles and methods of induction as applied to natural phenomena, in a sound manner, without resting them upon the theory of probability. Perfect knowledge alone can give certainty; and in nature, perfect knowledge would be infinite knowledge, which is clearly beyond our capacities. We have therefore to content ourselves with partial knowledge — knowledge mingled with ignorance, producing doubt."¹

By probability is not meant random casualty. Our author is far enough from taking the position that we are simply observers of hap-hazard evolutions of blind forces. The dice we use in induction are all loaded, and we have some idea which side is heavier. He squarely asserts that there is no such thing as chance in the phenomena of nature. The "probability belongs wholly to the mind."²

"The theory of probability deals with *quantity of knowledge*. The theory consists in putting similar cases upon a par, and distributing equally among them whatever knowledge we may possess. The theory comes into play when ignorance begins, and the knowledge we possess requires to be distributed over many cases."³

"It is just possible that some regular coincidences which we attribute to fixed laws of nature, are due to the accidental conjunction of phenomena in the cases to which our attention is directed. All that we can learn from finite experience is capable, according to the theory of probabilities, of misleading us, and it is only infinite experience that could assure us of any inductive truths. At the same time the probability that any extreme runs of luck will occur is so excessively slight, that it would be absurd seriously to expect their occurrence."⁴

"Certainty belongs only to the deductive process, and to the teachings

¹ Vol. i. p. 224.

² See p. 225.
p. 236. See also, pp. 247, 248.

³ pp. 227, 228.

of direct intuitions; and as the conditions of nature are not given by intuition, we can only be certain that we have got a correct hypothesis, when, out of a limited number conceivably possible, we select that one which alone agrees with the facts to be explained.”¹

“Inductive inference might attain to certainty if our knowledge of the agents, existing throughout the universe, were complete; and if we were at the same time certain that the same power which created the universe would allow it to proceed without arbitrary change.”²

“We, with our finite minds and short experience, can never penetrate the mystery of those existences which embody the will of the Creator, and evolve it throughout time. . . . The word ‘cause’ covers just as much untold meaning as any of the words, *substance, matter, thought, existence.*”³

“Much has been said about the peculiar certainty of mathematical reasoning; but it is only certainty of deductive reasoning, and equally attaches to all correct logical deduction.”⁴

It should be noted, at this point, that probability may approach so near to certainty as to be indistinguishable from it. And there is danger of under-estimating an argument because it is called “probable.” For instance, Laplace estimated that the probability that the forty-three independent motions of the bodies in the solar system known in his day should coincide in direction by chance would be one half raised to the forty-second power: or “about 4,400,000,000,000 to 1 in favor of some common cause for the uniformity of direction.” We have further to combine with this by multiplication the independent “probability that the sum of the inclinations of the planetary orbits would not exceed by accident the actual amount ([about one tenth] of a right angle for the ten planets known in 1801)” which is one tenth raised to the tenth power, or one ten billionth, i.e. the probability in favor of some common cause for these two sets of phenomena would be expressed by 44,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 to 1.⁵ We may, or may not, agree with Laplace in adopting the nebular hypothesis; for we can plausibly reason that some idea of final cause has disturbed the orderly action of secondary causes. But when (not to pause here) we advance a step farther, and consider the uniformities resulting from the action of the geological, the molecular, the chemical, and

¹ Vol. i. p. 309. ² pp. 274, 275. ³ p. 255. ⁴ p. 270. ⁵ See pp. 288, 289.

the vital forces we can affirm, from the doctrine of probabilities as applied to the material creation, that bald atheism is as near an absurdity as any supposition can well be. For we have sixty-four chemical elements. What is the probability that these should combine in an orderly manner by chance? The following calculations will give a faint idea of the problem. There are fifty-two cards in a pack. The number of haps of thirteen cards each which can be produced is 635,013,559,600.

“But in whist four hands are simultaneously held, and the number of distinct deals becomes so vast that it would require twenty-eight figures to express it. If the whole population of the world — say, one hundred thousand million persons — were to deal cards, day and night, for a hundred million of years, they would not in that time have exhausted one hundred-thousandth part of the possible deals. Now, even with the same hands, the play may be almost infinitely varied, so that the complete variety of games which may exist is almost incalculably great. It is in the highest degree improbable that any one game of whist was ever exactly like another, except by intention.”¹

When, furthermore, we think of the variety which might be produced from the original elements if combined in different numbers and proportions, and in higher orders of complexity, the conclusions are startling. We have, for example, twenty-six letters in our alphabet. From these we can by combination form several trillions of pronounceable words. From these words we can construct an indefinitely larger number of sentences. With these sentences we can fill an indefinitely larger number of books. Verily, of “making many books there is no end.” And the variety of libraries that can be selected is indefinitely more numerous than that of the books that can be made. This last is what is called a combination of the fifth order. By combining two marks in all possible groups in similar ascending orders, the values would increase as follows:

First step, 2; next step, 4; third step, 16; fourth step, 65,536; fifth step, 65,536 *twos* multiplied together — a number “so great that we could not possibly compute it; the mere expression of the result requiring

¹ Vol. i. p. 217.

19,729 places of figures. But go one step more, and we pass the bounds of all reason. The sixth order of the powers of two becomes so great that we could not even express the number of figures required in writing it down, without using about 19,729 figures for the purpose."¹

The fifth order of the powers of two is indefinitely greater than the number of molecules required to fill a globe extending to the stars of the sixteenth magnitude (hence with a radius of 33,900,000,000,000,000 miles), supposing the number of molecules in each cubic inch of solid or liquid substance to be 3×10^{26} .² The problem which undisguised atheism has on hand is to get the uniformities by which we live and move and have our being, from generation to generation, out of chance combinations when increased to infinite orders of the powers of infinity.³ If a person denies design in the order and uniformity that reigns about him, and which he makes the basis of all his action, it is hardly worth while to reason with him, as Paley condescends to do, about the design manifest in a watch. Such condescension well merits the charge of being a leap from the sublime to the ridiculous. The uncertainties in science do not pertain to the question whether there is a design in nature, but to the very different question, How far is that design capable of interpretation by us, as to its ultimate and practical ends? A pure atheist is a rare product; and it is not strange that some—the Psalmist among them—question whether any who suppose themselves such are of a sound mind.

V. HYPOTHESIS AS AN ORGAN OF INDUCTION.

Nothing is more interesting, and few things more startling, in these volumes, than the remarks which contrast the Baconian philosophy with that exemplified in the investigations of Newton. Our author—and we think with much reason—rates the Baconian method as very low, when compared with the Newtonian. The interpretation of nature is beset with difficulties analogous to those which attend the understanding of the verbal revelation of the Bible. Mere grammarians

¹ Vol. i. p. 221.

² See p. 222.

³ See below p. 552.

and compilers of texts are not safe guides in the exposition of scripture, as the absurdities of many millennarians demonstrate. A true exegete must have, with his grammatical knowledge, a philosophical mind, which unifies and weighs the disconnected passages. The concordance and the multiplication table are not the only outfit which a student of the inspired record needs. Much that is said, in the following extracts, concerning the methods of the representatives of modern scientific thought applies also to the methods which are in vogue regarding the study of the Bible.

The question in exegesis is : How far shall the systematic theologian introduce what he knows from other sources of the general nature of the subject treated of, to modify and explain the particular passage under consideration? The present tendency in scientific investigation is exactly the reverse of that in biblical interpretation. Newton, Faraday, and Darwin, who represent the present predominant scientific tendency, insist on the right of rising above the mere enumeration of phenomena, and of giving superior weight to analogy, and of allowing — often without knowing it — enlarged views concerning questions of final causes to direct their investigations. That is, scientists are really turning themselves into metaphysicians and theologians, for what is called the positive philosophy has had its day; while there is a strange disinclination to the introduction of metaphysics into the pulpit, and a jealousy of the prominence which systematic theology has had in our methods of theological instruction. But to our extracts :

“Francis Bacon contributed to spread abroad the hurtful notion that to advance science we must begin by accumulating facts, and then draw from them, by a process of patient digestion, successive laws of higher and higher generality. In protesting against the false method of the scholastic logicians, he exaggerated a partially true philosophy until it became almost as false as that which preceded it. His notion of scientific method was that of a kind of scientific book-keeping. Facts were to be indiscriminately gathered from every source, and posted in a kind of ledger, from which would emerge, in time, a clear balance of truth. It is difficult to imagine a less likely way of arriving at great discoveries.”¹

¹ Vol. ii. p. 220.

"Newton did not less [than Bacon] found his method on experience; but he seized the true method of treating it, and applied it with a power and success never since equalled. It is wholly a mistake to say that modern science is the result of the Baconian philosophy; it is the Newtonian philosophy and the Newtonian method which have led to all the great triumphs of physical science; and I repeat that the 'Principia' forms the true 'Novum Organum.'"¹

The importance of having a clew or a hypothesis to direct our observations, and at the same time a body of facts to correct our speculations, is illustrated in the experience of our leading investigators.

"As Faraday himself said, 'The world little knows how many of the thoughts and theories which have passed through the mind of a scientific investigator have been crushed in silence and secrecy by his own severe criticism and adverse examination; that, in the most successful instances, not a tenth of the suggestions, the hopes, the wishes, the preliminary conclusions have been realized.'"²

Experiments at St. Helena showed that there was a tide in the atmosphere affecting the barometer, on the average, .00365, and even varying, according as the moon was farther or nearer from the earth, to the extent of .00056. Our author remarks upon this:

"It is quite evident that such minute effects could never be discovered in a purely empirical manner. Having no information but the series of observations before us, we could have no clew as to the mode of grouping them which would give so small a difference. In applying this method of means in an extensive manner, we must generally, then, have *a priori* knowledge as to the periods at which a cause will act in one direction or the other."³

It will be well to recall, in this connection, the famous but somewhat inconsistent passage from Sir William Hamilton upon the same general subject:

"This parital or one-sided cultivation is exemplified in three different phases. The first of these is shown in the exclusive cultivation of the powers of observation, to the neglect of the higher faculties of the understanding. Of this type are your men of physical science. In this department of knowledge there is chiefly demanded a patient habit of attention to details in order to detect phenomena; and, these discovered, their

¹ Vol. ii. pp. 228, 229.

² p. 223.

³ Vol. i. p. 427.

generalization is usually so easy that there is little exercise afforded to the higher energies of judgment and reasoning. [?] It was Bacon's boast that induction, as applied to nature, would equalize all talents, level the aristocracy of genius, accomplish marvels by co-operation and method, and leave little to be done by the force of individual intellects. This boast has been fulfilled. [?] Science has by the inductive process been brought down to minds who previously would have been incompetent for its cultivation, and physical knowledge now usefully occupies many who would otherwise have been without any rational pursuit."¹

More recently, Professor J. W. Dawson sounds the alarm with reference to his chosen field of study.

"Geology as a science is at present in a peculiar and somewhat exceptional state. Under the influence of a few men of commanding genius belonging to the generation now passing away, it has made so gigantic conquests that its armies have broken up into bands of specialists, little better than scientific banditti, liable to be beaten in detail, and prone to commit outrages on common sense and good taste, which bring their otherwise good cause into disrepute. The leaders of these bands are many of them good soldiers, but few of them fitted to be general officers, and none of them able to reunite our scattered detachments. We need larger minds, of broader culture and wider sympathies, to organize and rule the lands which we have subdued, and to lead on to further conquests."²

VI. MYSTERIES OF SCIENCE.

It is not theology alone which imposes mysteries upon our belief.

"There is nothing intrinsically absurd, except that which proves contrary to logic and experience. The truest theories involve suppositions which are most inconceivable, and no limit can really be placed to the freedom of framing hypotheses. Kepler is an extraordinary instance to this effect."³ "The smallness of the quantities which we can now observe, is often very astonishing. A balance will weigh to one millionth part or the load or less. Sir Joseph Whitworth can measure to the one millionth part of an inch. A rise in temperature of the 8800th part of a degree centigrade has been observed by Dr. Joule. The spectroscope can reveal the presence of the 180,000,000th part of a grain of soda, and the sense of smell can probably feel the presence of a far less quantity of odorous matter."⁴

"Provided there be no clear and absolute conflict with known laws of nature, there is nothing so improbable, or apparently inconceivable, that

¹ Hamilton's Logic, Lecture xxx., conclusion.

² Dawson's Story of the Earth and Man, p. 312.

³ Vol. ii. p. 222.

⁴ Vol. ii. p. 47.

it may not be rendered highly probable, or even approximately certain, by a sufficient number of concordances. In fact the two best founded and most conspicuously successful theories in the whole range of physical science involve the most absurd suppositions. Gravity is a force which appears to act between bodies through vacuous space; it is in positive contradiction to the old dictum that nothing could act but through some intervening medium or substance. It is even more puzzling that the force acts in perfect indifference to all intervening obstacles. The undulatory theory of light presents almost equal difficulties of conception. We are asked by physical philosophers to give up all our ordinary prepossessions, and believe that the interstellar space which seemed so empty, is not empty at all, but filled with *something* immensely more solid and elastic than steel. As Dr. Young, himself, remarked: 'The luminiferous ether, pervading all space, and penetrating almost all substances, is not only highly elastic, but absolutely solid!!!' Sir John Herschel has calculated the amount of force which may be supposed, according to the undulatory theory of light, to be exerted at each point in space, and finds it to be 1,148,000,000,000 times the elastic force of ordinary air at the earth's surface, so that the pressure of the ether upon a square mile of surface, must be about 17,000,000,000,000 pounds. Yet we live and move without appreciable resistance through this medium indefinitely harder and more elastic than adamant. All our ordinary notions must be laid aside in contemplating such an hypothesis; yet they are no more than the observed phenomena of light and heat force us to accept."¹

VII. NO NECESSARY ANTAGONISM BETWEEN SCIENCE AND THEOLOGY.

"There are scientific men who assert that the interposition of providence is impossible, and prayer an absurdity, because the laws of nature are proved to be invariable. Inferences are drawn not so much from particular sciences as from the logical foundations of science itself, to negative the impulses and hopes of men. Now I may properly venture to state that my own studies in logic lead me to call in question all such negative inferences. Those so-called laws of nature are uniformities, observed to exist in the action of certain material agents, but it is logically impossible to show that all other agents must behave as these do. The too exclusive study of particular branches of physical science seems, in some cases, to generate an over-confident and dogmatic spirit. Rejoicing in the success with which a few groups of facts are brought beneath the apparent sway of laws, the investigator hastily assumes that he is close upon the ultimate springs of being. A particle of gelatinous matter is found to obey the ordinary laws of chemistry; yet it moves and lives. The world is therefore asked to believe that chemistry can resolve the mysteries of existence."²

¹ Vol. ii. pp. 144, 145.

² Vol. ii. p. 429.

"A law of nature, as I regard the meaning of the expression, is not a uniformity which must be obeyed by all objects, but merely a uniformity which is, as a matter of fact, obeyed by those objects which have come beneath our observation. There is nothing whatever incompatible with logic in the discovery of objects which should prove exceptions to any law of nature."¹ "I demur to the assumption that there is any necessary truth even in such fundamental laws of nature as the indestructibility of matter, the conservation of force, or the laws of motion."²

"Let us assume, for a time at least, as a highly probable hypothesis, that whatever is to happen must be the outcome of what is; there then arises the question, What is? Now our knowledge of what exists must ever remain imperfect and fallible in two respects: First, we do not know all the matter that has been created, nor the exact manner in which it has been distributed through space. Secondly, assuming that we had that knowledge, we should still be wanting in a perfect knowledge of the way in which the particles of matter will act upon each other. To assume, then, that scientific method can take everything within its cold embrace of uniformity, is to imply that the Creator cannot outstrip the intelligence of his creatures, and that the existing universe is not infinite in extent and complexity, — an assumption for which I can see no logical basis whatever."³

"The original conformation of the material universe, was, so far as we can possibly tell, free from all restriction. There was unlimited space in which to frame it, and an unlimited number of material particles, each of which could be placed in any one of an infinite number of different positions. The problem of creation was, then, what mathematicians would call an indeterminate problem, and it was indeterminate in an infinitely infinite number of ways. Out of infinitely infinite choices, which were open to the Creator, that one choice must have been made which has yielded the universe as it now exists."⁴

"Life altogether is an exception to the simple phenomena of mineral substances, not in the sense of disproving those laws, but in that of superadding forces of new and inexplicable character. Doubtless no law of chemistry is broken by the action of the nervous cells, and no law of physics by the pulses of the nervous fibres, but something requires to be added to our sciences in order that we even explain these subtle phenomena."⁵

"It is a mere assumption that the uniformity of nature involves the unaltered existence of our own globe. There is no kind of catastrophe which is too great or too sudden to be theoretically consistent with the reign of law. For all that our sciences can tell, human history may be closed in the next instant of time. The world may be dashed to pieces against some intruding body; it may be involved in a nebulous atmosphere

¹ Vol. ii. p. 430.² p. 431.³ p. 432.⁴ pp. 434, 435.⁵ p. 436.

of hydrogen to be exploded a few seconds afterwards ; it may be scorched up or dissipated into vapor by some great explosion in the sun ; there might even be within the globe itself some secret cause of disruption, which only needs time for its manifestation.”¹

“I am inclined to find fault with mathematical writers, because they often exult in what they can accomplish, but omit to point out that what they do is but an indefinitely, nay, an infinitely, small part of what might be done. This may be excusable so far as the immediate practical result of their researches is in question ; but the custom has the effect of misleading the general public into the fallacious notion that mathematics is a perfect science, which accomplishes what it undertakes in a complete manner. On the contrary, it may be said that if a mathematical problem were selected by pure chance out of the whole variety which might be proposed, the probability is infinitely slight that a human mathematician could solve it.”²

“After two centuries of continuous labor, the most gifted men have succeeded in calculating the mutual effects of three bodies each upon the other, under the simple hypothesis of the law of gravity. Concerning these calculations we must farther remember that they are purely approximate, and that the methods would not apply where four or more bodies are acting, and all produce considerable effects each upon the other. There is every reason to believe that each constituent of a chemical atom must go through an orbit in the millionth part of the twinkling of an eye, in which it successively or simultaneously is under the influence of many other constituents, or possibly comes into collision with them. It is, I apprehend, no exaggeration to say that mathematicians have scarcely a notion of the way in which they could successfully attack so difficult a problem of forces and motions.”³

“If we are to apply scientific method to morals, we must have a calculus of moral effects, a kind of physical astronomy, investigating the mutual perturbations of individuals. But as astronomers have not yet fully solved the problem of three gravitating bodies, when shall we have a solution of three moral bodies ? ”⁴

“A science of history, in the true sense of the term, is an absurd notion. A nation is not a mere sum of individuals whom we can treat by the method of averages ; it is an organic whole, held together by ties of infinite complexity. Each individual acts and reacts upon his own smaller or greater circle of friends ; and those who acquire a public position, exert an influence on much larger sections of the nation. There will always be a few great leaders of exceptional genius or opportunities, the unaccountable phases of whose opinions and inclinations sway the whole body, even when they are least aware of it. From time to time arise critical positions, battles,

¹ Vol. ii. p. 443.² p. 451.³ p. 453.⁴ p. 458.

delicate negotiations, internal disturbances, in which the slightest incidents may profoundly change the course of history. A rainy day may hinder a forced march, and change the course of a campaign; a few injudicious words in a despatch may irritate the national pride; the accidental discharge of a gun may precipitate a collision, the effects of which will last for centuries.”¹

“Theologians have dreaded the establishment of the theories of Darwin and Spencer, as if they thought that those theories could explain everything upon the purest mechanical and material principles, and exclude all notions of design. They do not see that those theories have opened up more questions than they have closed. The doctrine of evolution gives a complete explanation of no single living form. While showing the general principles which prevail in the variation of living creatures, it only points out the infinite complexity of the causes and circumstances which have led to the present state of things. Any one of Mr. Darwin’s books, admirable though they all are, consists but in the setting forth of a multitude of indeterminate problems. He proves, in the most beautiful manner, that each flower of an orchid is adapted to some insect which frequents and fertilizes it; and these adaptations are but a few cases of those immensely numerous ones which have occurred throughout the life of plants and animals. But why orchids should have been formed so differently from other plants; why anything, indeed, should be as it is, rather than in some of the other infinitely numerous possible modes of existence, he can never show. The origin of everything that exists is wrapped up in the past history of the universe. At some one or more points in past time there must have been arbitrary determinations which led to the production of things as they are.”²

“My purpose [in this concluding chapter] is the purely negative one of showing that atheism and materialism are no necessary results of scientific method. . . . I draw one distinct conclusion that we cannot disprove the possibility of Divine interference in the course of nature.”³

“The same power which created material nature, might, so far as I can see, create additions to it, or annihilate portions which do exist. Such events are doubtless inconceivable to us in a certain sense; yet they are no more inconceivable than the existence of the world as it is. The indestructibility of matter, and the conservation of energy, are very probable scientific hypotheses; . . . but it would be a gross misconception of scientific inference to suppose that they are certain in the sense that a proposition in geometry is certain, or that any fact of direct consciousness is certain in itself. Philosophers, no doubt, hold that *de nihilo nihil fit*; that is to say, their senses give them no means of imaging to the mind how creation can take place. But we are on the horns of a trilemma; we must either deny that anything exists, or we must allow that it was created out of nothing, at

¹ Vol. ii. p. 459.

² p. 463.

³ p. 465.

some determinate date, or that it existed from past eternity. The first alternative is absurd; the other two seem to me equally conceivable."¹

"Go on as far as we will in the sub-division of continuous quantity, yet we never get down to the absolute point. Thus scientific method leads us to the inevitable conception of an infinite series of successive orders of infinitely small quantities. If so, there is nothing impossible in the existence of a myriad universes within the compass of a needle's point, each with its stellar systems, and its suns and planets, in number and variety unlimited. Science does nothing to reduce the number of strange things that we may believe. When fairly pursued it makes large drafts upon our powers of comprehension and belief."²

"Science will not deny the existence of things because they cannot be weighed and measured. It will rather lead us to believe that the wonders and subtleties of possible existence surpass all that our mental powers allow us clearly to perceive. The study of abstract logical and mathematical forms has seemed to convince me that even space itself, is no requisite condition of conceivable existence. Everything, we are told by materialists, must be here or there, nearer or farther, before or after. I deny this — and point to logical relations as my proof. . . . So far am I from accepting Kant's doctrine, that space is a necessary form of thought, that I regard it as an accident, and an impediment to pure logical reasoning. Material existences must exist in space, no doubt; but intellectual existences may be neither in space nor out of space; they may have no relation to space at all, just as space itself has no relation to time. For all that I can see, then, there may be intellectual existences to which both time and space are nullities."

"Now among the most unquestionable rules of scientific method is that first law, that whatever phenomenon is, is. We must ignore no existence whatever; we may variously interpret or explain its meaning and origin; but if a phenomenon does exist, it demands some kind of explanation. If, then, there is to be a competition for scientific recognition, the world without us must yield to the undoubted existence of the spirit within. Our own hopes and wishes and determinations are the most undoubted phenomena within the sphere of consciousness. If men do act, feel, and live as if they were not merely the brief products of a casual conjunction of atoms, but the instruments of a far-reaching purpose, are we to record all other phenomena and pass over these? We investigate the instincts of the ant and the bee and the beaver, and discover that they are led by an inscrutable agency to work towards a distant purpose. Let us be faithful to our scientific method and investigate, also, those instincts of the human mind, by which man is led to work as if the approval of a Higher Being were the aim of life."³

¹ Vol. ii. v. 466.

² p. 467.

³ pp. 468-470.

ARTICLE VIII.

ON THE METHOD IN THE HISTORY OF THE EARLIER
CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE.

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GERMANY.

UNDER this heading appeared, in the *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie* (Vol. xiv., 1871), an Article, by Prof. Dr. Albr. Ritschl of Göttingen, which contains so many important and suggestive thoughts that it will well repay an effort to make its contents accessible to wider theological circles. The occasion of the Article was the appearance of Fr. Nitzsch's (Professor in Giessen) *Outlines of the History of Christian Doctrine* (Part I., The Patristic Period, 1870). We might expect that Ritschl, the eminent author of the *Rise of the Old Catholic Church* (2d ed., 1857), and of the *History of the Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation* (vol. i.), would present fruitful views upon that period of doctrinal development. In undertaking to give here the principal thoughts of Ritschl's Article, we do not purpose to abide closely by the order there followed. Our object is rather to designate clearly the new points of view which Ritschl establishes for the examination and methodical treatment of the earlier history of Christian doctrine, and to do this with constant reference to Nitzsch's work.

In respect to the arrangement of material, Nitzsch himself departs from the usual track. He holds that it is unnatural, and contradictory to the actual course followed by the Christian dogmatical thought of the church Fathers, to begin, in a one-sided and abstract way, with the doctrine of God, and to reach the central subjects of church faith — Christ and the church — only when we are midway in the historical task, or even later. Thus, while we find in Néander and Baur, for example, the following order: theology, cosmology, anthropology, soteriology, doctrine of the church and the sacraments, eschatology, Nitzsch begins with a special section on the doctrine of the Divinity of Christ and on the doctrine concerning the church, as the two moving subjects in the development of doctrine in the patristic period. True, he then treats all other doctrines according to the customary plan.

Ritschl recognizes a certain advance in this, and yet brings weighty objections against it. Certainly, we must not suppose that the moving questions in the development of doctrine have at all times arranged themselves according to the order of the *loci dogmatici*, which the theologians

of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries followed in the division and arrangement of their material. If the office of the History of Doctrine is to lead us to understand how the church reached a completeness of form in her idea of truth, in her grasp of the true conception itself, and in her system of views, then the history must guard against an identity of scheme for every period. For the scheme to be used in each period must be formed according to the characteristic feeling of the period, and its central efforts. If we now start from this general principle, and view with Ritschl's eyes the divisions of Nitzsch's book, we find that his very title deserves severe criticism. According to the title, he proposes to discuss the Patristic Period. This period extends, according to Nitzsch, from the end of the apostolic age to the middle of the eighth century, and thus includes Augustine and Dionysius the Areopagite. This division is related to the fact that Nitzsch gives to the idea of the church, already, in the beginning of the patristic period, an importance which she did not obtain in the theories till Vincentius of Lirinum, nor in practice till Augustine and Dionysius the Areopagite. At the same time, it is true that everything in the earlier patristic period tends towards this idea. Nitzsch justifies the prominence he gives to the doctrine of the church in placing it beside that of the Person of Christ, thus (Outlines of the History of Christian Doctrine, p. 230): In the opinion of the church, then, the mediatorship of Christ required another new mediation between Christ and the believer; for the object of faith is not Christ in himself, but the Christ who is present to the believer. But this new medium was given, through the working of the Holy Spirit, in the church, that is, in the empirical, the lawfully-constituted church under the management of the apostolic episcopal office. But the church, in this sense,—that is, as objective principle of salvation,—is not looked upon as objective supplement of that which Christ is to us, until the mediaeval period. And, moreover, it was Augustine who essentially turned the idea of the church into this direction. He was thus the formulator of the programme of mediaeval Catholicism, and especially of the papal international policy. For, as Nitzsch himself shows, in detail, Augustine so distinguishes between the *civitas Dei* and the *civitas diaboli*, or *terrena*, that he finds in the Catholic church the kingdom of God which has existed, separate from the earthly kingdom, since the fall. And this earthly kingdom is the state, as Augustine saw it before him in the Roman empire of that time. Now, just as the church, as *civitas Dei*, is the organism of good, on the principle of the righteousness which pleases God, so, in Augustine's view, the state is the community of men, on the principle of sin. It was not Gregory VII. who first set forth this idea; it comes from Augustine, as the counterpart of the conception of the church as the kingdom of God. In this light, now, the views of Augustine upon inherited sin and absolute predestination gain their true meaning. It is customary to regard these as the groundwork

of the reform line of thought, and to see in Augustine, as it were, the father of the Reformation. And, in this connection, it is premised that he regards inherited sin as the motive to repentance for the individual descendants of Adam, and makes grace have respect to the individual consciousness of election or of justification. But this is incorrect. With Augustine, the idea of the absolute grace stands inseparably related to the episcopally governed church as the kingdom of God. His view of inherited sin, likewise, stands connected with his theory that the state is the organism of sin. This estimation of the church as the present kingdom of God, and of the state as the kingdom of the devil, belongs, along with its consequences, to the principles of mediaeval Occidental Christianity, and comes in this way into the history of doctrine. And so it is not wise to separate the history into a patristic and a scholastic period; but we must have, first, an old Catholic period, and then a mediaeval. And this latter must begin for the Latin branch with Augustine, and for the Graeco-Byzantine with the Areopagite. Augustine is closely related to the scholastic period by his conception of the church; but he stands clearly separated from the teachers who preceded him.

The history of the Christian church, starting from the apostles, begins with the expectation that the return of Christ — that is, of the kingdom of God — would occur very soon. As the Christians began to arrange themselves in the world as a religious body with settled forms, they were ever ready to make room for the kingdom of God, which they thought to be dependent on the return of Christ in his glory, and on no other conditions. In the course of events this expectation suffered, of course, many modifications. Against Montanism, it was decided that the nearness of the kingdom of Christ gave no just occasion for making church discipline stricter, or for giving it up altogether. Against a Judæo-Christian tendency in the expectation, the spiritual character of the kingdom of God was established. The period of persecutions was not adapted to strengthen love for the earthly home. On the other hand, the adoption of Christianity into the Roman empire by Constantine worked of necessity decidedly against the eschatological tendency. But it was Augustine who first converted the hope for the millennial kingdom of Christ into faith in the church as the present kingdom of God. He thus gave to the church that absolute importance which she had not at all possessed in the preceding period, because her historical development and the estimation of her essential conditions were controlled by the prevailing eschatological tone. Therefore the idea of the church appears in Nitzsch's book in a wrong light; for he does not treat of eschatology till the close, whereas it should stand at the beginning. Eschatology is not in its place at the close, until we begin to view from Augustine's stand-point, namely, that the kingdom of God is the church. Regarded from this point, the future relations of the saved are merely necessary consequences of existence in the church.

It is evident that the self-consciousness of the church had not risen so high in the old Catholic period that the church could contain the objective security of salvation, as it did with Augustine. This is shown especially in the principle laid down that those who were fully excommunicated were not denied all prospect of eternal salvation; but this was left dependent on the judgment of God concerning their penitence.

What must now, in accordance with the foregoing, be our course, as we proceed to seek the proper position of the conception of the church in the complex of the old Catholic Christianity? We may not define her, in this period, as offering an exclusive objective security of salvation. That came later. But she is to be treated, in her history, as the fellowship of Divine worship, of prayer, of offering; and, at the same time, this fellowship is an apprehending subject—apprehending God, Christ, and itself. Thus she apprehends dogmatically, containing in herself, as she does, all the conditions necessary for the operation of theologians in the technical sense of the term. Now although, undoubtedly, the dogmatical efforts of that period were occupied with the apprehension of the person of Christ,—in which men sought to comprehend that union of Divinity and humanity which effects the bringing of the human race to the divine life,—still, this intellectual work would be performed only on the presupposition of the fellowship above described—the fellowship of divine worship and of apprehension of God; that is, the church must be presupposed. Accordingly, the history of doctrine in that period must discuss the doctrine concerning the church before proceeding to Christology.

This doctrine of the church separates into several subdivisions. The office of the church as fellowship of apprehension of God is subordinate to the conception of her as fellowship of divine worship. But the discussion of the church as fellowship of divine worship includes the doctrine of offering; that doctrine reaches in this one of offering its climax. Now, in the Catholic view of the Lord's supper, the idea of offering is made more important than that of sacrament. In the Lord's supper the thank-offering of the assembly of believers itself finds complete expression, or that of the Son of God, whose body is that assembly. Therefore the Lord's supper, as offering of the church, and so as means of self-sanctification for her, presupposes the church. But the sacrament of baptism, on the other hand, must be treated as a presupposition to the conception of the church in order to explain how the Christian body of divine worshippers comes into existence. The decisions made concerning the authority of the sacred writings and tradition must be closely connected with the idea of the church, and are to be treated before Christology, because the church uses and confirms them in her theological labors on Christology. Further, the doctrines of God and the world belong also to the presuppositions which the church must make in her Christological work—in her effort to assert and explain the Divinity of Christ. Nitzsch treats of

these, after discussing the Christology, under the titles Theology and Cosmology, among the various particulars of the church system of doctrine. Now, in the first place, both must be treated *before* Christology, in connection with the idea of the church. For in the Logos-Christology was sought the union of God and the world, therefore these two ideas must precede. Then, secondly, they may not be discussed separately. For the oldest Christian theology, in its conception of God and the world, rested on what had been handed over from the later Platonism. But Neo-Platonism arrives at its idea of God by saying: The distinctive marks of the world — viz. variety, limitation, fixedness — do not belong to God. That is, Neo-Platonism says, God is not the world. Therefore the conception of God cannot be understood without that of the world. The two are correlates, and for this reason theology and cosmology may not be treated separately.

How shall these and other relations be properly arranged from the point of view which we have obtained, namely, according to the principle that the church felt herself to be the Christian fellowship of divine worship, and of apprehension of God in Christ? The old Catholic church, as perpetuator of apostolic Christianity, had to contest her existence against three powers: in opposition (*a*) to heathenism, (*b*) to heretical Gnosticism, and (*c*) to Judæo-Christianity. The development of doctrine in that period must be described in its antithetical relation to these three powers, in order to give the impression of liveliness. Now the history of doctrine links itself immediately upon the theology of the New Testament. The question, therefore, arises: how shall that New Testament theology be brought into account in writing the history of doctrine? Nitzsch justly designates faith in Jesus as the Messiah, as the fundamental Christian dogma in the thought of our Lord, and in that of the apostles, or as their starting-point in building Christian doctrine. With the apostles, this faith in him as Messiah took on the form, that the Messiah is at the same time the Logos, the Design of the world as the Bearer of the kingdom of God and the central Cause of the world. Nitzsch neglects, however, to point out in the New Testament theology a connecting point for the conception of the church. Of course, if he is right in saying that the mediaeval idea of the church was also that of the old Catholic period, then every good Protestant will expect to find a complete break between this period and the apostolic; and, moreover, it would have been Nitzsch's duty to formulate this break. But such a break is not to be found. As has been shown above, in the old Catholic period, the matter in hand is always the conditions under which the church is formed, as the assembly of true worshippers of God, and works out the theological knowledge therewith connected. Now the apostles' letters are all busied with this very topic. The apostles, who were themselves the first generation of the Christian church, saw that church already formed before them. Christ remained present in their thought

as the exalted head of the community of those who worship God and hope for reception into the future kingdom. The projection of the kingdom of God into the future, expressed in the eschatological tone of the old church, was occasioned by the apostles; for their use of language is in very few cases aimed to show that the exercise of moral duties and the culture of virtue bring the kingdom of God directly into being, even in the very present itself. When we find, now, that the conception of the church was tending already, in the second century, towards an over-estimate of forms of regulation, then we observe that the historian of doctrine has to describe exactly how the episcopate, in the opposition against Gnosticism and Montanism, attained to powers whose validity gradually restricted the religious attributes of the body of believers, and brought in its train that Catholic type of idea of the church, held by us Protestants to be contradictory to the character of Christianity.

The exposition of the conception of the church in the old Catholic period, where she is a body peculiarly worshipping God, and apprehending God and salvation in a peculiar manner, must therefore be linked upon a recapitulation of New Testament theology, by means of an exact distinction made between the position of Christ going before the church and standing over it, and the position of the apostles as representatives of the church which had been founded. The development of the Christology, however, must follow the exposition of the conception of the church.

We have now, therefore, to point out the course of development of the Christological dogma in that period. The importance attached by the ancient church to the doctrine of the person of Christ, was attached to it, not as an isolated doctrine, but as the expression of the value of the whole religion. Nitzsch is therefore right in giving that doctrine prominence as a leading article of dogma; but he should not have separated the subject of the two natures, that of the Holy Spirit, and that of the Trinity from the discussion which relates to the Divinity of Christ. The point of importance to the ancient church, for religious and also for intellectual grounds, was the Divinity of Christ. But the solution of the problem was not complete until the Divinity of Christ, as the substance of *this man*, was explained by the union of the two natures, and till this Divinity was reconciled with the oneness of God by the idea of the Trinity. Nitzsch has here made a mistake; but, on the other hand, he has justly portrayed the early forms of Christology in their proper connection, and in accordance with the more recent researches. The doctrine of the Divinity of Christ which is based on the idea of the Logos gained the victory over two other modes of representation, which are usually held to be utterly unauthorized and heretical. These are, (1) that which finds the human element to be the essential one in Christ, that is, the Nazarene-Monarchian view; and (2) the view which asserts that the Divinity is the essence of Christ, without making a clear distinction between him and the Father,

i.e. the Monarchian-Patripassian view. Certainly Clement of Rome, the real Ignatius, and the Letter to Diognetus had no theological aim when they suffered the human side of the conception of Christ to disappear entirely in the simple and unreserved assertion that he is God. And yet it is acknowledged that here lay the root of the view held by Praxeas, Noetus, and Calliopos, whose absurdity was termed Patripassianism by the later opponents. It is also to be borne in mind that this view was protected even at the time of the strife against it, by the direct or indirect authority of the Roman bishops Victor, Zephyrinus, and Calliopos. It is a token of the victory of the Logos-Christology, that this same Monarchian school accepted the Logos idea so early as the middle of the third century, through Sabellius. The exactly opposite view, viz. that Christ is essentially human, had, undoubtedly, likewise the right of citizenship in the early church, for it corresponds to the genealogies in Matthew and Luke, and is distinctly expressed in the Nazarene Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs. The fact of this original right of citizenship is much more plainly seen in the predication of the attribute of birth from the virgin, for this corresponds to the rule of faith which had become established in the second century. So when Artemon and the two Theodoti were excluded from church fellowship because of their profession of this belief, they could point with good right to the fact of the unchallenged existence of the belief within the church from the time of the apostles. Moreover this line of belief must have come to condemnation through the efforts of the representatives of Patripassian-Monarchianism, for Victor and Zephyrinus are named as the deciding opponents. Over this school of Christology also the Logos idea gained the victory, inasmuch as Paul of Samosata had to incorporate that idea into his view of the essential humanity of Christ. Both these schools of Christology, just described, lost, in open controversy, their right to existence in the church. But there is still a third line of Christology, of which traces appear in the second century, and whose roots may be followed back into the New Testament. It grew into a form in a measure analogous to the Logos-Christology, and in the growing prevalence of this latter it disappeared without any effort at resistance. Nitzsch characterizes it (p. 190) as the view of the "Shepherd" of Hermas; and its substance is, that on the one hand, the human personality of Christ is indeed to be recognized as his substance, but that on the other hand the pre-mundane Son of God, the Holy Spirit who created the world, and who is the highest archangel, became man. The tendency of this view is undoubtedly the same as that of the Logos-Christology of such a one as Justin; but his process of arriving at it would be different. It arose, undoubtedly, from the view concerning the Man whom God anointed with his Holy Spirit and with power (Acts x. 38), and was most nearly related to the Gnostic substitution of the Aeon Christ for the Holy Spirit, which from Cerinthus onwards was taught with the serious modification

that the connection of the Aeon Christ with the Man Jesus lasted only from the baptism up till the period of the passion. The view of the Essene-Ebionites, as reported by Epiphanius, is also to be classed here, viz. that Christ was the incarnation of the highest archangel. Finally, we may not pass without notice, in this survey of the early forms of Christology, the Ebionite representation of Christ as the primitive man (Urmensch). In this view there is also a leaning toward a supernatural acceptance.

All of these views may be reckoned among the early Christological forms, for the distinction between the later orthodoxy and heresy may not be applied to the Christological efforts of the second century.

In order, now, to see what system is gained from the above discussion for the history of development of doctrine in the ancient church, let us take a summary view of Ritschl's and Nitzsch's plans. Ritschl's plan for the history of Doctrine in the old Catholic church is as follows :

I. Prolegomena.

- § 1. The consciousness of Christ concerning himself as the Son of God, and as the Founder of the community of the kingdom of God.
- § 2. The faith of the apostles, the primitive community, in Christ as the exalted Head of the community.
- § 3. Judæo-Christianity.
- § 4. The heretical Gnosticism.

II. The Church as worshipper of God, and specifically as apprehending God in Christ.

§ 5. Eschatology.

A. Catholic Christianity in its opposition to heathenism.

- § 6. The proof of the truth of Christianity [With recognition of the religious groundwork in heathen humanity].
- § 7. Demonology [Discussed to show the actual falsity in heathen religion].

B. Catholic Christianity in its opposition to Gnosticism.

- § 8. The doctrine of tradition (rule of faith) and holy scripture.
- § 9. The doctrine of the unity of God's nature.
- § 10. The doctrine of the world, particularly of its creation through the Logos.
- § 11. The doctrine of man.

C. Catholic Christianity in its opposition to Judæo-Christianity.

- § 12. Christianity as the new law.
- § 13. The doctrine of the freedom of the will and of active sin.¹
- § 14. The doctrine of baptism.

D. The attributes of the church.

- § 15. Unity [Through the apostolic quality of its episcopate].

¹ This paragraph does not formally represent opposition to Judæo-Christianity, but is rather correlate of every view in which Christianity is a law, and therefore, also of the Catholic view of Christianity as new law.

§ 16. Holiness [In opposition to the schismatic treatment of cases of discipline].

§ 17. The offering in the Lord's supper.

§ 18. The standard of truth of articles of faith which the church laid down against those heresies which accepted the same rule of faith with her [Development of the rule of faith, which contained at first only what was received from apostolical tradition, being thus limited in its contents. At length the rule became that principle of tradition, not limited in respect to contents, which was obtained by agreement of the bishops in council].

III. Development of the Christological dogma.

§ 19. The humanity the essential element in Christ [In both gradations of the view, viz. the origin from human parents, and the birth from the Virgin. Down to Paul of Samosata].

§ 20. The divine nature the basis of the human appearance in Christ [Down to Sabellius].

§ 21. The essential element in Christ a principle of revelation differing from God the Father.

(a) The Essene-Ebionite idea of the primitive man.

(b) The Holy Spirit, or the heavenly Christ, or chief archangel.

§ 22. (c) The Divine Logos as principle of the world the essential element in Christ [Down to Origen, inclusive].

§ 23. The homoousia of the Divine Logos in Christ [In opposition to Arianism, to Marcellus, and Photinus].

§ 24. The ideas of reconciliation, and of the redemption of mankind from the devil by the God-man.

§ 25. The doctrine of the Holy Spirit [In relation to God and to the Logos].

§ 26. The doctrine of the Trinity [Down to the final settlement by Augustine].

§ 27. The doctrine of the humanity of Christ, his homoousia as Logos being presupposed; or, the doctrine of the two natures in the unity of the person.

The arrangement given by Nitzsch, in his *Outlines of the History of Christian Doctrine* is as follows:

Prolegomena.

1. The fundamental Christian dogma, or the point of departure for the construction of Christian doctrines [Belief in Jesus as the Messiah].

2. The idea of the kingdom of God and that of the Messiah as the common bases of Judaism and Christianity.

3. The specifically Christian acceptance and development of the idea of the Messiah by Christ and the apostles, and the baptismal formula.

I. How the foundations were laid for the old Catholic church doctrine.

In this section the principal opposing elements are described.—

Ebionism and Gnosticism, in their various modifications and stages, down to the establishment of the Rule of Faith as the expression of the Catholic dogma.

II. The development of the old Catholic doctrine.

A. The factors in the development.

Under this heading are led before us, first, the Greek church teachers, from the Alexandrian school of catechists down to John of Damascus ; then, the Latin church teachers, down to Gregory the Great and Isidore of Seville.

The discussion proper of doctrinal history begins with :

B. The results of the development.

(1.) Establishment of those dogmas which form the general groundwork of the consciousness of the Christian church and of the ecclesiastical doctrine of the faith.

1. *The doctrine of the Divinity of Christ.* Development thereof, down to the Arian controversy, and the establishment by the church of the homousia of the Son with the Father.

2. *The doctrine concerning the church.* Here is set forth the importance of this doctrine for the old Catholic church, in the sense above explained, and its development till towards the end of the fourth century, inclusive of the Donatist controversy.

(II.) Establishment of the formal criteria of orthodox church doctrine.

This section treats of the Rule of Faith as the decisive norm, and of the remaining norms of church doctrine, of the holy scripture, of secret tradition, and prophecies ; further, of tradition and inspiration ; and finally, of the principles respecting the criteria of orthodoxy, as Vincent of Lirinum fixed them.

(III.) Establishment of those dogmas which represent the more particular elements of the church system of doctrine.

1. *Theology* (the doctrine concerning God).

a. The being of the Deity absolutely considered. Here are discussed the existence of God, the possibility of knowing him, his essence, and attributes.

b. The being of the Deity as manifest in revelation. (His own nature and his relation to the world.) Doctrine of the Trinity and of the person of the historical Christ.

In this section is given, also, the doctrine of the Holy Spirit previously to that of the Trinity, and then the doctrine of the relation of the human to the divine in the person of Christ down to the Monothelitic controversies and John of Damascus.

2. *Cosmology* (doctrine of the world). The three paragraphs of this section are headed: Creation of the World, Providence and Theodicy, Doctrine of Spirits.

3. *Anthropology* (doctrine of man). In this section are first discussed

the constituent elements in man; the mode of origin of the individual human soul; the nature of man as the image of God; the fundamental attributes of human nature (freedom and immortality); then human nature and sin; the doctrine of sin held by the Greek and Occidental Fathers; and lastly, the controversy connected with this between Augustine and Pelagius.

4. *Soteriology* (doctrine of salvation). This section contains the following paragraphs: the objective founding of salvation by Christ (doctrine of redemption and reconciliation); the conditions of subjective appropriation of salvation; the doctrine of freedom and grace, and the Pelagian controversy; semi-Pelagianism; the means of appropriation of salvation; baptism; the Lord's supper.

5. *Eschatology* (doctrine of future things). The material belonging to this section is divided into the condition of the individual between death and the resurrection; the second coming of Christ and the resurrection; the general judgment.

On comparing the two systems together, we observe, besides the divergences above grounded, that Ritschl's plan includes only the doctrinal-historical material of the old Catholic period; while Nitzsch treats, under the title *The Patristic Age*, the time from the end of the apostolic age down to the middle of the eighth century. In accordance with this difference, the Pelagian controversy and semi-Pelagianism, for example, which Nitzsch discusses under anthropology and soteriology, would be placed by Ritschl in the second, i.e. the mediaeval, period; beginning with Augustine for the Latin branch, and for the Graeco-Byzantine with Dionysius the Areopagite. The reasons for this, as respects the conception of the church have been already given above. But if Augustine's views of inherited sin and grace can only be understood when we remember that he regarded the church as an objective saving institution, then it must be that the erroneous views of Pelagius, which Augustine opposed, had also a relation to the value of the church; and this relation must be elucidated. By his assertion of unlimited freedom, Pelagius wished to emphasize the value of the fulfilment of the Christian law. Now, Catholic Christianity, from the beginning, moved in equilibrium, as it were, between the pole of active fulfilment of the law and that of dependence on the grace precedent in baptism. So when Pelagius extended the idea of freedom so far that he held all grace to be only a support of freedom, — and that, too, in the form of instruction, — when he denied to infant baptism the character of means of forgiveness of sin, he disturbed that equilibrium which was a fundamental condition of Catholic Christianity. Augustine's aim, in the doctrine of inherited sin which he opposed to Pelagius, was solely to enable baptism, in the case of infants, as well as of others, to be regarded as a means of forgiveness of sin. By this doctrine Augustine denied

freedom in the sinful state, and the natural consequence was that freedom in the state of grace was sacrificed for the absolute power of predestination. The idea of absolute predestination was, however, modified, inasmuch as it was made to relate, not to the individual as such, but to the church as an objective saving institution. This view determined Augustine's conception of the sacrament and of predestination. The sacrament signifies incorporation into the church as the body of Christ and the kingdom of God. Justification unites together the precedence of grace and the form of freedom as the ground of active fulfilment of the law, or of any kind of merit. Thus he laid the foundation for the soteriology of the middle ages in the Occident which was built upon the idea of the church as the objective saving institution. But we have not thus completely exhausted Augustine's signification of grace. When, in pious self-contemplation, he suffers all merit to vanish before the all-absorbing worth of precedent grace, he means by grace in this train of thought the personal will of God towards the subject. This idea runs through all the mediaeval church as counterpoise to the tendency towards the idea of merits, till it breaks through the boundaries of Catholic Christianity in the Reformation. Therefore the central dogma of the second period would be the objective significance of the church as a saving institution, in distinction from the eschatological tendency of the old Catholic period.

This significance of the church as a saving institution comes into application more especially:

(1) In the mediaeval doctrine of the sacraments. Here are to be considered: the propagation of the Augustinian idea of the sacrament; the increase of the number; and especially, lastly, the production of the doctrine of transubstantiation in the Lord's supper, and the elevation of the *poenitentia* into a sacrament. For in these two latter points the representation of God by the organs of the church is realized in respect to omnipotence and omniscience.

(2) We have to show how the doctrine of the supreme authority of the church contains those ideas on the ground of which the Roman primate exalted himself over the episcopate, and undertook to concentrate the representation of God in himself. This development was occasioned by Augustine's view that the church is the *civitas Dei*.

(3) Here must be set forth that relation between church and state which gave expression to the idea of the primacy in God's stead. The determinate form of this relation was a direct descendant of the principles of Augustine. That it had dogmatical value is confirmed by present history; and therefore it must be set forth in the history of doctrine.

The discussion of Augustine's influence on the Occidental church ought to be preceded by a statement of the system of Dionysius the Areopagite,

who was as much the leader of an epoch for the Byzantine church as Augustine was for the Occidental. The church is to him, as it is for Augustine, the objective saving power vested in the hierarchy and the sacraments. But in his statement of the significance of the church for salvation, the importance of the liturgical element preponderates. And in this liturgical interest the Greek church has been resting ever since Dionysius. The preponderance of attention paid by the Greek church to manner of worship has produced a relation between church and state exactly the reverse of that formulated by Augustine. The church was subordinated to the state, and the Byzantine emperor was clothed with ecclesiastical attributes. But the analogy between Dionysius and Augustine appears again in the fact that the position established by each for the church — namely, that of an objective power for salvation — allows to theology no other form than that of traditionalism. For the church can be a saving power only on the ground that she is the absolute holder of truth and the objective limit of the knowledge of God and salvation. In this traditionalism, again, we find the explanation of scholasticism and mysticism. For we recognize, for example, the mediaeval character of Tauler's mysticism, not only in its regular use of the Lord's supper as the occasion for the mystical exaltation, but also, more generally, in the direct relation subsisting between the effort after a present enjoyment of the contemplation of God, and the idea that the church is the present kingdom of God.

ARTICLE IX.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

A. GERMAN WORKS.

The following are the contents of recent numbers of German Periodicals :

The *Studien und Kritiken*, edited in Halle by Professors Riehm and Köstlin, has, in the second quarterly Number for 1875, notices of Lic. Theol. Dorner's (son of Professor Dorner of Berlin) book on Augustine. We have not read this book, but hear its accuracy questioned. There is notice also of Professor Köstlin's new volume on Luther. Professor Köstlin has made the study of Luther a specialty, is one of the best authorities on the subject, and this volume is well commended. There is notice also of Diestelmann on Luther's last interview with Melancthon on the Eucharistic Controversy. The Articles in the Number are : 1. Professor Gustav Baur of Leipsic, on the Right of Theology to rank as a Necessary Member in the Body of the Sciences. This question deserves special study among us, because of the so-called controversy between theology and the sciences. Is this use of the word "science" the use we ought to encourage for scientific purposes? 2. The second Article, of a series, by Professor Bey-schlag of Halle, on the Authorship of the Fourth Gospel. 3. Ed. Engelhardt, Pastor, on the Epilogue of Ecclesiastes. There follow notes on "Days of Fasting and Prayer in the Palatinate during the Thirty Years' War," by J. Schneider, Pastor.

The *Zeitschrift für die gesammte Lutherische Theologie und Kirche*, published in Leipsic, by Professor Delitzsch of Leipsic and Professor Guericke of Halle, in the second Number for 1875 has, besides Notices, Articles : 1. A. Tattermann, on Millo in Jerusalem. 2. E. Wetzel, on the Apostles in the Apostolic Council. 3. Lic. Theol. Elster, Pastor, Against Determinism. 4. Fr. Biehler, on Lutheran Dogmatics in the Seventeenth Century in its Relation to the Scholastic Theology.

The Quarterly, edited by Professor Hilgenfeld of Jena, *Hilgenfeld's Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie*, seventeenth year (1875), in the first Number has, besides Reviews, the following Articles : 1. By Professor Hitzig, on the Names of God in the Old Testament. The value of the Article is much questioned. We may note here the recent death of Professor Hitzig. The best judges admit that he has been a brilliant writer in the department of Old Testament study, but also that he is often far from reliable. 2. E. Schürer, The Alabarchs in Egypt. 3. H. Holtzmann of Strasburg, on Hermas and John. 4. A. Hilgenfeld, on the Gnostic Apelles. 5. H. Tollin, Lic. Theol. and Pastor, Servetus and the Bible.

6. H. Rönisch, Pastor, *Xeniola theologica* (second series), on Jer. x. 2 in the New Testament.

The *Jahrbücher für Protestantische Theologie*, published in Jena. The first Number for 1875 has Articles as follow: 1. Professor H. Holtzmann, on the Theological Investigations of the Present Time, especially those concerning the Philosophy of Religion. 2. Professor Dr. Nitzsch of Kiel, author of the valuable work on the History of Doctrine, on the Historical Importance of the Enlightened School of Theologians (*Aufklärungs = Theologie*). 3. Dr. Pfeiderer of Jena, Contribution to the Study of the Origin and Development of Religion. 4. Dr. Schrader of Jena, on Semitic and Babylonian Character, — Concerning the Origin of the Hebrew Type of Character. 5. Dr. R. A. Lipsius, on Schleiermacher's "Reden." 6. By the same, on Peter's Draught of Fishes (Luke v. 1–11).

The *Jahrbücher für Deutsche Theologie*, published by Professor Dorner of Berlin and others, contains in the fourth Number for 1874 Articles as follow: 1. J. A. Dorner, For the Christological Question of the Present. 2. Ludw. Solms, on the Conception of a Miracle. 3. Nöldechen, on the Genuineness and Chronology of two Letters of William Tyndale, with Comments on them.

Recent Theological Works:

Seyler, Gotth., Pfr.: Materialien zu einer Revision und Reform des Bekenntniß-standes der protestantischen Kirche im Deutschen Reiche. 1 Abtheilung. Gotha: F. A. Perthes. 1874. (gr. 8. S. xxii, 145.) 3 Mark (= 1 Thaler) — Materials for the Revision and Reform of the Declaration of Faith of the Protestant Church in the German Empire. By Pastor Gotthold Seyler. Of the book in question it is said, that the thoughtful historical care shown is praiseworthy, especially in respect to the actual formation of the so-called Confessions. It was long well known by correct students that here we have not writings in which the Christian church had expressed and written down her faith, but that princes and their theologians alone made herein their profession. The author not only states this, but gives clearly the historical facts.

Rothe: Vorlesungen über Kirchengeschichte, hrsg. von H. Weingarten. 1 Theil. Heidelberg: J. C. B. Mohr. 6 Mark. Rothe's Lectures on Church History, edited by H. Weingarten. First Part.

Thomae Kempensis de Imitatione Christi, libri quatuor. Textum ex autogr. Thomae nunc primum accuratissime reddidit, distinxit, novo modo disposuit; capitulorum argumenta, locos parallelus adiecit Car. Hirsche. Berlin: Lüderitz. 1874. (8. S. xxvi, 375.) 4 Mark. 60 Pf. (= 1 Thaler 16 sgr). In this edition from the author's autograph, we have, as the table indicates, much valuable matter beyond the ordinary text. This will make it the standard text.

Johannes Gossner: Ein Lebensbild aus der Kirche des 19 Jahrhunderts. von Herm. Dalton. Berlin, 1874. Verlag d. Gossner'schen Missions-Ver-

eins. (gr. 8. S. viii, 440.) 4 Mark. 50 Pf. A Biography of Joh. Gossner, the distinguished leader of the Gossner Missionary Society, by H. Dalton. Published at the Gossner Missionary House.

Weiffenbach, Dr. Wilh., Lic.: Das Papias-Fragment bei Eusebius H. E. III., 39, 3-4 eingehend exegetisch untersucht. Giessen: Ricker. 1874. (gr. 8. S. viii, 150.) 3 Mark. A thorough Exegetical Examination of the Papias Fragment in Eusebius (as quoted), by Dr. Wilh. Weiffenbach, Lic. Works of this aim, careful preparatory studies of the sources of material for church history, should be always welcome.

Preger, Wilh.: Das Evangelium aeternum und Joachim von Floris. München, 1874. Franz in Comm. (gr. 8. S. 39.) 1½ Mark. Investigation concerning the Evangelium aeternum and Joachim of Floris, by W. Preger (from the Treatises of the Royal Bavarian Academy of Sciences. Cl. III. Vol. xii. Sec. 3).

Herrmann, G.: Inaugural Dissertation, by G. Herrmann, in Halle. Gregorii Nysseni sententiae de salute adipiscenda. This treatise by one just entering the instructor's career is hailed by able judges as very valuable. Mr. Herrmann is another to be added to the list of university teachers who have served an important part of their preparatory years as assistants to Professor Tholuck.

Hammerich, Fr., Prof.: Aelteste christliche Epik der Angelsachsen, Deutschen und Nordländer. Ein Beitrag zur Kirchengeschichte. Aus d. Dänischen von A. Michelsen. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann. 1874. (8. S. vii, 280.) 4 Mark. 50 Pf. The oldest Christian Epic Poetry of the Anglo-Saxons, Germans, and Scandinavians. A contribution to Church History. By Fr. Hammerich, Professor of Theology in Copenhagen. Translated into German from the Danish by Pastor Michelsen of Lübeck. The book wins a new interest for us when we are told that the largest space is taken up with the old Christian poetry of the Anglo-Saxons; because that is the richest — at least, of it there is most extant. And again, these are also really the oldest, reaching from the end of the seventh century down to the tenth, while the German do not appear till the ninth century, nor the Scandinavian till the eleventh century.

Levy: Neuhebräisches und chaldäisches Wörterbuch über die Talmudim und Midraschim. 1 Lieferung. Leipzig: Brockhaus. 6 Mark. Levy. Lexicon of New Hebrew and Chaldee for the Talmudim and Midraschim. First Part.

Delitzsch: Das Lehrsystem der römischen Kirche. 1 Theil. Gotha: Besser. 1875. 8 Mk. The System of Doctrine of the Roman Church, by Delitzsch.

Reuter: Geschichte der religiösen Aufklärung im Mittelalter. 1 Bd. Berlin: Hertz. (gr. 8. S. 335.) History of the Religious Enlightenment in the Middle Ages, by Reuter.

Bleek: Introduction to the New Testament, edited by Professor Wilh.

Mangold of Bonn University (3d ed.). Berlin: Georg Reimer. 13 Mk. 50 Pf.

Knobel, Dr. Aug.: Commentary on Genesis (3d ed.), newly revised by Professor Dillmann of Berlin University. Leipsic: S. Hirzel. 7½ Mk.

Hilgenfeld: Historisch-kritische Einleitung in das Neue Testament, von Professor Dr. Ad. Hilgenfeld. Leipzig: Fues's Verlag. 1875. (R. Reisland. gr 8. 52 Bogen.) 13 Mk. An Historical Critical Introduction to the New Testament, by Professor Hilgenfeld.

Recent Philosophical works:

Brentano, Dr. Fz., Prof.: Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte. In 2 Bdn. 1^{ter} Bd. Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot. 1874. (gr. 8. S. xvi, 350.) 7 Mk. 20 Pf. Psychology viewed empirically, by Professor Dr. Franz Brentano. First of two volumes. This work is recommended by Professor Lotze of Göttingen, in his Lectures on Psychology in the past winter, as the latest German work on its topics, and worthy of study.

Grün, Karl: Ludwig Feuerbach in seinem Briefwechsel und Nachlass sowie in seiner philosophischen Charakterentwicklung. 1 Bd. Mit dem Bildniss Feuerbach's. Leipzig: Winter. 1874. (gr. 8. S. viii, 435.) 9 Mk. Ludwig Feuerbach, his Correspondence and Literary Remains, and the Development of his Philosophical Character, by Karl Grün, with portrait of Feuerbach.

Meynert, Th., Prof.: Zur Mechanik des Gehirnbaues. Ein Vortrag gehalten in der Naturforscher-Versammlung zu Wiesbaden u. in der Wiener anthropolog. Gesellschaft, veröffentlicht in der "Presse" No. 158 u. 159. Wien: Branmüller. 1874. (S. 20. Lex. 8.) 1 Mk. 20 Pf. Professor Th. Meynert, On the Mechanism of the Brain.

Plath, Dr. Joh. Heinr.: Confucius und seiner Schüler Leben und Lehren. III. Die Schüler des Confucius, Nach chinesischen Quellen. München, 1873. Franz in Comm. (98 S. gr. 4). 3½ Mk. Dr. Joh. H. Plath, the Lives and Teachings of Confucius and his Scholars. Part III. The Scholars of Confucius, according to Chinese Sources (in the Treatises of the Royal Bavarian Academy of Sciences, Cl. I. Vol. xiii. Sec. 1). Twenty-seven of the pupils are here described.

Landmann, Dr. Rud.: Hauptfragen der Ethik. Eine Darstellung der Grundlehren der Moral und Rechtsphilosophie mit analytischer Entwicklung der ethischen Ideen u. einer Umgestaltung der Ideenlehre Herbart's. Leipzig: Findel. 1874. (gr. 8. S. xi, 389.) 6 Mk. Dr. Rud. Landmann. Main Questions in Ethics. An exhibition of the Fundamental Doctrines of Moral Philosophy, and the Philosophy of Law, with Analytical Development of the ethical Ideas, and an alteration of Herbart's Doctrine of Ideas.

Many of the above notes are taken from the "Litterarisches Centralblatt" published in Leipsic. The change in German money from Thalers and Groschen to Marks and Pfennigs, requires us to note that 1 Mark = 10 Gr., i.e. = ½ Thaler; also that 1 Mark = 100 Pf.; thus 1 Gr. = 10 Pf. D.

FUNDAMENTAL DOGMATICS.¹—The work whose full title is given below treats of the questions which lie at the foundation of all systems of dogmatic theology, with questions which are sometimes gathered up under the title of Prolegomena to Theology. To our mind, especially if by dogmatic theology be meant the science of revealed religion, the questions included by Dr. Voigt in fundamental dogmatics ought to be discussed in connection with the philosophy of religion or religious philosophy. Authority, however, is on the side of our author; though the designation “Fundamental-dogmatik” strikes us as unusually clumsy. Starting with the idea of religion,—its nature, origin, the variety of its forms, and its relation to philosophy,—Dr. Voigt goes on to discuss divine revelation in its two great forms or stadia; namely, general or natural revelation, and special or supernatural, adding an apologetic section on the possibility, necessity and actuality of the latter, and on its relation to human reason. In the following section the differences, first, between the two revealed religions, Judaism and Christianity, and then between Catholicism and Protestantism, Lutheranism and Calvinism, are discussed. Then the doctrines of inspiration, the canon, the interpretation of scripture, and the relation of scripture and tradition are passed in review. The last section treats of the science of revealed religion, and the nature, divisions, and method of theology in general, and of dogmatics in particular.

Dr. Voigt's previous works have been mainly historical, and he everywhere shows his familiarity with the history of doctrines in particular, by more or less full references to the views, on the various questions, which have been previously propounded. This feature is one of great value to the student. As the title tells us, the treatment is also at once critical and apologetic; so far as it is critical, he may seem to some occasionally to go too far in the one or the other direction. We commend the work—which we trust will not remain, like the similar work of Twisten, an incomplete torso—as a thoroughly solid and workmanlike contribution to the subject to which it is devoted

ISTAR'S DESCENT INTO HELL.²—Dr. Schrader, whose work entitled *Die Keilinschriften und das Alte Testament* was noticed some time ago in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, has again published interesting and valuable results of his investigations of the cuneiform inscriptions of the Assyrians discovered among the ruins of Babylon. The volume whose title is given below comprises several remains of Assyro-Babylonian poetry, translated into

¹ Fundamental-dogmatik. Eine zusammenhängende, historisch-kritische Untersuchung und apologetische Erörterung der Fundamentalfragen christlicher Dogmatik. Von Dr. H. Voigt, Prof. d. Theol. in Königsberg. Gotha: F. A. Perthes. 1874. Price, 4 Thl. 12 sgr.

² Die Höllenfahrt der Istar. Ein altbabylonisches Epos. Nebst Proben assyrischer Lyrik. Von Dr. Eberhard Schrader. Giessen. 1874.

German. The poem which is mentioned in the title is supposed by Dr. Schrader to be an epic, and belongs to the cycle of the so-called Iztubar Legends, one of which, that relating to the Flood, was first deciphered by Mr. S. Smith. The subject of the poem is the tradition of the imprisonment of Istar (Astarte), the goddess of love, the Babylonian Aphrodite, in the realm of death, which she had presumptuously ventured to enter at the command of the queen of the earth, i.e. the ruler of the lower world. The description of hades reminds the reader of Isa. xiv. 9-21; and some of its details of corresponding descriptions in Job and the Psalms. Besides this longer poem, the author has translated and commented upon a number of short lyric poems, resembling Psalms, and which he has classified as "Royal Psalm," "Supplicatory Prayer," "Penitential Psalm," "Didactic Psalm." Peculiar is the "Song of the Seven Spirits," which relates to seven evil spirits or demons. Considerable light is thrown, both by the poem and the two poetical charms adduced by the author, on the religious superstitions of the Babylonians.

In this connection we may refer also to an article by Dr. Schrader in the *Theologische Studien und Kritiken* for 1874, Heft II., entitled "Assyrisch-Biblisches," which throws great light on the names of the gods of the Babylonian mythology, mentioned in the Old Testament. The Article in question discusses the names, Kewan and Sakkuth (Hebrew), mentioned in Amos v. 26; Baal and Bel; and the Babylonian origin of the seven-day week. It will well repay careful perusal.

THE NEW KNOWLEDGE AND THE NEW FAITH.¹ — Professor Frohschammer, author of this work, is an excommunicated Roman Catholic, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Munich. In a very important sense he was the herald of the movement which culminated in "Old Catholicism," and for refusing to retract views which he had published, was excommunicated. He would now scarcely call himself a Roman Catholic at all; but takes his position in the ranks of the large and increasing number of the *detached*. The general point of view from which this new work is written is, that the view of the world and man hitherto taught by the churches is no longer tenable, having been either undermined or set aside by the progress of science; that this is more or less distinctly felt by the cultured of all nations; and that there are permanent elements in the old system of which the true welfare of humanity requires the rescue from the general ruin. The author deems himself in a position, to say the least, to aid in the building up of a new edifice of faith, in which both the intellect and the heart of man may find the congruous and safe shelter which is denied it in the existing ecclesiastical faiths

¹ Das neue Wissen und der neue Glaube. Mit besonderer Berücksichtigung von Dr. F. Strauss' neuester Schrift: "Der alte und der neue Glaube." Von J. Frohschammer. Leipzig: Brockhaus. 1873.

and organizations. Without doubt a praiseworthy, but difficult, undertaking. The line of thought unfolded in the book is the following: I. The Old Faith: Introduction; General ground of the conflict between religion and science; 1. The Rise and Development of the Dogmatic and Hierarchical Church System in Christianity; 2. The Overthrow of the Dogmatic and Hierarchical Church System by Modern Science and its Untenableness in the Face of Modern Culture. II. The New Knowledge: 1. The Mechanical System of the World; 2. Critique of the Mechanical System of the world. III. The New Faith: 1. Origin and Essence of Religion; 2. The Possibility and Rule of a Personal God; 3. Nature of Religious Reform — The New Faith. IV. The Christianity of Christ: 1. The Ecclesiastical Disfigurement and Perversion of Christianity of Christ relatively to the Doctrines and Person of Jesus; 2. The Christianity of Christ freed from the Christianity of the Church.

Professor Frohschammer's general position on the question of religion resembles, as the following extract will show, that which is held by, perhaps, most scientific and philosophical writers in Europe. "According to the principles of inductive research it is assuredly far more probable that if all other religions are false, the only remaining one (i.e. the Christian) is also false, than that this latter should be an exception. The age of privileges, even as regards the history of religions, is past, and all must be deemed subject to universal laws. The universal need of divine revelation cannot have been met by privileges for individuals, but solely by an universal revelation, such as we find in the rational capacity of man. At the same time it cannot be denied that the various religions differ very widely both in intellectual and moral value and perfection, though akin in essence and in their power over the soul. That this should be so is in harmony with the law of development, change, perfection, and degeneration to which this domain of earthly things is subject." We need scarcely say that this point of view is not ours; nor that, in our opinion, the distance between the Christian religion and all the rest — whether we regard it as a series of facts or a system of teachings — is so vast, that it can only be explained by reference to special interferences of Him whose revelation, as Dr. Frohschammer says, is an "universal need." There is much, however, in the chapters on religion and Christianity which is worthy of being laid to heart by all, but especially by those who, like the writer, live in the midst of a population drilled and steeped in Roman Catholicism.

With the second chapter, entitled *The New Knowledge*, we have found ourselves in almost entire agreement; indeed, so fully do we admire it, both as to matter and form, that we should like to see it translated. As a sample, take the following few words directed against those who would reduce everything to mere mechanism, and thus logically, if not intentionally, shut out everything ideal or teleological: "One may fairly maintain

that the scientific man, if his aim be truth, has his eye fixed on an ideal goal, at the very moment when he repudiates all ideality, and aims to show the prevalence of merely mechanical, aimless causality. His own efforts, guided as they are by the idea of truth, refute his assertion, that the world is ruled by mechanical necessity."

CONTRIBUTIONS TO APOLOGETICS.¹—This is the third, and probably the concluding, part of Dr. Düsterdieck's Contributions to the Apologetics of Christianity. The two preceding parts—which were noticed, as they appeared, in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*—embraced the following subjects: The search for truth; the way to the truth; the firm foundation; the sacred records; God and his creation; man and his sin. The present part treats of the God-man and his redemption; faith; the church. The present part is marked by the same sobriety, candor, and care as characterized the former ones. Dr. Düsterdieck is not so brilliant an apologist as either Luthardt or Christlieb, but we are not sure whether he is not more solid and trustworthy. As a sample, we may quote the following extract from the very able chapter on the God-man and his work. Referring to the demand, set up by Strauss, Renan, Schenkel, and their followers, that the life of Christ be treated as a purely historical question, he says: "We have to do, it is true, with history, but then it is a religious history. The peculiar mode of dealing with history depends on the special character of the historical subject-matter. Is it possible to write the history of a great general from the same point of view as that from which the life of a great painter is narrated? There is no such 'purely historical' point of view as that which is talked about; and just because there are no 'purely historical' facts. Life is a series of concrete forms of manifestation, motives, designs, actions, events, and circumstances, none of which are purely historical in the abstract sense. . . . Attempts may be made to sketch the portrait of Christ from the point of view of culture, or politics, or religious philosophy, or ethics, or paedagogics, or even of art, or any other that may be deemed right and important; against none of them can I protest; but let no one talk about a 'purely historical' point of view."

IDEA AND FORM OF PHILOSOPHY.²—Dr. Alois Riehl, the author of this Introduction to the study of philosophy,—philosophy in the German sense,—is Privat-Docent of philosophy at the University of Gratz in Austria. His definition of philosophy differs from that given by many German writers; it is "The scientific investigation of consciousness, its objects and laws." "Philosophy differs from science in taking as its specific object, what natural science as such eliminates; viz. consciousness. It differs, again, from psychology, with which it would seem, from the definition, to

¹ Apologetische Beiträge. Von Dr. F. Düsterdieck. Göttingen. 1872.

² Ueber Begriff und Form der Philosophie. Von Dr. Alois Riehl. Berlin: Duncker's Verlag. 1872.

have everything in common, herein : that whilst philosophy examines the contents of consciousness without reference to their rise or to their quality as constituting matter of thought, psychology is especially concerned with the question of the processes by which consciousness arrives at its contents." The following is a *resumé* of the table of contents. I. Idea of Philosophy : 1. Outlines of a historical development of the idea of philosophy ; 2. Idea of philosophy ; 3. Philosophy and natural science. II. Form of Philosophy : 1. Method common to philosophy and science ; 2. Criticism of peculiar methods in philosophy ; 3. Present form of philosophy. The book does not quite meet our own notion of an introduction to philosophical study ; but it may be useful to others whose point of view is different. s.

B. ENGLISH AND AMERICAN WORKS.

CHRIST AND HUMANITY; with a Review, Historical and Critical, of the Doctrine of Christ's Person. By Henry M. Goodwin. 12mo. pp. 404. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1875.

The author of this volume pursued his theological studies at Union Theological Seminary, New York, also at the Theological Seminaries in New Haven and Andover. For several years he was pastor of a Congregational church in Rockford, Illinois, and during the last two years has spent much of his time at the University of Leipsic, Germany. He is distinguished for his love of truth, his reverence for the scriptures, his independent style of thought, his extensive investigations, and carefulness of statement.

The aim of the present work is to present such a conception of the person of Christ as will avoid the confusion and seeming contradiction of the common doctrine of two natures united in one person, and preserve at once the true Divinity and the real humanity of our Lord ; and to do this in a way that shall completely abolish the dualism presented in the creeds, and furnish to the reason a single, entire, and perfect image of the Redeemer coincident with that intuitional image presented to us in the Gospels, and preserved in the Christian consciousness and the unformulated faith of the church. The problem is a high and difficult one, being in substance the same that has been before the church, in one form or another, for almost fifteen centuries, and touches in its relations nearly every deepest question concerning Christ and redemption.

The form of the book, following its genesis or historical development in the mind of the author, is, first, a series of Discourses, seven in number, on the following subjects : The Divine Humanity of Christ (first published in the *New Englander* in 1860) ; The Son of Man ; Christ the Root of Humanity ; The Human Development of Jesus ; The Image of God ; The Human Trinity ; and Man's Place in the Creation. Second, a Historical and Critical Review of the Doctrine of Christ's Person, consisting of two parts ; in the first of which the various opinions and speculations concerning

this doctrine from the early Christian Fathers to the present time, drawn chiefly from Dorner's great work, are presented in a carefully condensed form, with comments and criticisms by the author. The second part contains the results of this historical survey, in which the author's own view of the person of Christ is set forth in connection with an elaborate unfolding of the "fundamental principles of a true Christology"; these are the essential unity of the Divine and human; the divine or heavenly humanity of Christ; and the doctrine of the Kenosis, or the self-limitation of the Logos in the incarnation. In connection with this last doctrine or theory, many citations from writers on Christology, especially among the Germans, are given, showing the tendency of modern Christian thought in the same direction, or towards a similar solution of the problem.

The idea which is unfolded in these various discourses and discussions is that the Divinity and the humanity of Christ — understanding by the latter his true and essential humanity, not the flesh or body with which it was clothed — are not two heterogeneous substances brought together from without, and coalescing in a common, or co-existing in a dual, consciousness, but one and the same personality, which existed from eternity as the Word or Son of God, and in the form of God, and which in the incarnation became man, not by the assumption of a foreign nature, but by the revelation of his own, in human form and under human conditions. This identity of the Divine and human in Christ, in place of the common conception of a union of natures, presupposes a relationship between the two closer and deeper than the common theory allows. This is expressed by the doctrine of *the essential unity of the Divine and human*; a unity which has its ground in their original identity as they exist in God. There is a humanity in the Deity, which is the original from which our humanity is derived, and which is no other than that image of God in which, or after which, as the prototype of humanity, man was created. There is also something divine in man, which is indicated by his divine origin and filial relation, and the possibility of union and communion with God. The ground and possibility of the incarnation is found in this divine humanity which always existed as the eternally begotten Son in the bosom of the Father, but its reality was effected by the Word actually becoming man through a reduction of his infinitude to the human form and consciousness, and his subjection to all human conditions and limitations.

The difference between Christ and other men is the difference between the divine ideal or prototype, and the actual and imperfect copy. In Christ the divine and the human are *identical*, while in men they constitute only a *unity* by virtue of a likeness or community of nature, which unity is realized only in the regenerate man by a divine indwelling. The personal Ego in Christ is purely divine, the same that was in the beginning with God; in men it is purely human, however much they may be filled with God; a difference indicated by those words of Christ: "Ye are from beneath; I am from above. I came down from heaven," etc.

This view is distinguished from the Eutychian or Apollinarian heresy, in the greater truth and reality which it gives to the *humanity* of Christ. In the words of the author: "The truth of the humanity is preserved in its completeness, a free, moral and historical development is allowed to it, while the unity of the person is secured, without division or confusion, by the identity of the Divine and human in his personality." "The essential Deity of Christ is preserved in the fact, distinctly and unequivocally maintained, that the person who appears in the flesh is the divine Logos which was with God, and was God; and this, notwithstanding his human form and human consciousness as the Word made flesh. His essential Divinity is not abrogated by the incarnation. Deity is not converted into humanity, thereby losing his divine identity, but Christ is *God as man* self-emptied of his deific form and consciousness, and coming under the laws and limitations — physical, moral, and spiritual — of humanity. His true humanity is also secured, without curtailment or abridgment, in the fact of his possession of true human *nature*, derived from Adam, to which his divine personality, the Logos, sustained the same relation which a purely human personality, or the rational soul, sustains to the flesh or nature to which it is united; in the fact also that he passed through a true human development, growing in wisdom and character as other men, and 'tempted in all points like as we are'; and this, notwithstanding he was without sin, and that the humanity he exhibited was an ideal and divine humanity, not derived from the race, but the original and prototype of ours."

It belongs to the view here presented that the *trichotomy* indicated by Paul, and held by many of the early Fathers, is advocated by our author, according to which man consists of *body*, *soul*, and *spirit*; the two latter being distinguished in kind, and not merely in form or degree. Christ in becoming man assumed a human *psyche* with the flesh derived from his human mother, but not a human *pneuma*.

The fundamental difference between this conception of Christ's person and that of the commonly accepted doctrine is thus indicated: "The latter starts from the diversity of the Divine and human, as they are commonly conceived, and attempts to bring them together *from without*, so as to form a unity in the person of Christ. The former starts from their essential unity, or *identity*, as they exist in God, or the Divine Word, and seeks to develop this unity first of all from *within*. The true unity of the divine and human in Christ is not a *synthesis*, or the union of two opposite and incongruous natures, which is the common view, but a development or determination of the divine in the form of the human. In other words, the divine and human in Christ are identical in their root and essence, both being eternally contained in him who is at once the Son of God, and the prototype of humanity; but the Divine first determines itself as the human in the incarnation, when the Word which was God *became* man,

by being born of a woman and coming under human and finite limitations. The true humanity of Christ is thus not derived from the race into which he was born, therefore not partial or sinful, like ours, but determined from within, while conditioned from without; viz. by the flesh in which it was incarnated. It is therefore a truly Divine humanity. His nature is the Divine-human, and his person the *God-man*."

GOD IN HUMAN THOUGHT; or, Natural Theology traced in Literature, Ancient and Modern, to the Time of Bishop Butler. With a Closing Chapter on the Moral System, and an English Bibliography, from Spenser to Butler. By E. H. Gillett, Professor of Political Science in the University of the City of New York; author of the "Life and Times of John Huss," etc. In two Vols. 8vo. pp. 416, 418. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Co. 1874.

"The attempt to prepare an historical and critical introduction to Bishop Butler's Analogy, to be delivered in the form of lectures to students in the University, has resulted in the production of this work. . . . In order, therefore, to present connectedly the lines of thought to which Butler was either directly or indirectly indebted in what he assumed or attempted to prove, it was necessary to go back to the earliest periods of which we possess any record, and trace the successive phases of human thought concerning the subjects which Butler has discussed" (Preface, p. iii.).

This work is divided into forty-three chapters. Their subjects are as follows: Early Monotheism; Religions of the Egyptians, Hindoos, Persians; Chinese, Assyrians, Jews; Early Greeks — Homer, Hesiod; Greek Philosophy; The Seven Wise Men; The Greek Tragedians; Socrates; Plato; Aristotle; The Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics; Thucydides, Demosthenes; Roman Philosophy — Lucretius, Cicero; Plautus, Terence, Virgil, Horace, Persius, Juvenal, Ovid; Caesar, Livy, Tacitus, Pliny; The New Cynics; Seneca; Epictetus; Plutarch; Marcus Aurelius Antoninus; Decline of Philosophy; Christian Apologists and Neo-Platonism; Gnosticism; Manicheism; The Mohammedan and Jewish Philosophy as related to the Christian Fathers; the Scholastics; Revival of Classical Learning; Hooker, Bacon, Montaigne, Grotius, Lord Herbert; The Cambridge Platonists; The Royal Society and Robert Boyle, — Writers on Natural Theology; English Poets — Sir Thomas Browne, R. Baxter, Bishop Parker; Gale, Stillingfleet, Hobbes, Blount, Wolsley, Whitby, Sharrock, Mackenzie; Des Cartes, Spinoza, Malebranche, Norris; John Locke, Deistical Writers, Controversy of Locke and Stillingfleet; The Boyle Lectures; Controversies on the Resurrection of the Body and the Immortality of the Soul; Origin of Evil; Deistic Controversy; Immortality of the Soul, Liberty and Necessity, etc.; Reaction against Pagan Philosophy; Reason and Faith, The Foundation of Morals, Pope's Essay; Bishop Butler's "Analogy"; The Moral System.

Of course, it is impossible, in eight hundred and thirty-four octavo pages, to discuss these various subjects in other than a summary way. Injustice will almost inevitably be done to some authors by a *brief* statement of their doctrines. In his analysis of ancient theories, however, Dr. Gillett has succeeded in showing the tendency of pagan writers to exalt virtue and to condemn vice; to advocate the principles leading to theism, and even to that form of theism which is delineated in the Old and New Testaments. Of course, these writers advocate many principles antagonistic to the Christian religion; but, with a happy inconsistency, they advocate many truths which lead to a correct theological system. The rubies are rubies, though found amid pebbles.

We are not so well satisfied with Dr. Gillett's treatment of the modern authors as with his treatment of the ancient. He sometimes sacrifices the logical to the chronological order of his thoughts. We think that Whichcote, Dr. Samuel Clarke, and Locke are not represented exactly as they should be. We are interested, however, in both volumes of this work, and regard the whole as a valuable addition to our theological literature. It is a signal tribute to the merit of Butler's Analogy that it requires so extensive an Introduction. That must be an immense temple of which the portico is so capacious.

THE APOSTOLICAL AND PRIMITIVE CHURCH POPULAR IN ITS GOVERNMENT, INFORMAL IN ITS WORSHIP. A Manual on Prelacy and Ritualism, Carefully Revised and Adapted to these Discussions. By Lyman Coleman, D.D., Professor in Lafayette College; author of "Ancient Christianity Exemplified," "Historical Text-Book and Atlas of Biblical Geography," etc. Third Edition. pp. 413. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott and Co. 1875.

The first edition of this work appeared at the time when Hon. Rufus Choate spoke of the Puritans as finding in Geneva "a church without a bishop and a state without a king." That celebrated phrase was the tocsin for ecclesiastical polemics between Doctors Potts and Wainwright, and various other so-called churchmen and dissenters. Dr. Coleman's volume was hailed as an arsenal of arguments and authorities at hand for convenient use in the controversy, and soon passed through several editions in this country and in England.

The book which thus served so well its generation now reappears even more opportunely. On the one hand, ritualism was never so rampant; on the other, the Church of England, disestablished in Ireland, is hard pressed by the irrepressible conflict at home. Whatever of evangelical spirit survived when the Puritans were cast out is now struggling, on both sides of the Atlantic, to reform the Episcopal church from the inside. It is laboring to assert the rights of laymen, and to make the rites of Episcopal worship not the imposing ceremonials of outward

worship, but an impressive and devout mode of worshipping God in spirit and in truth.

In this crisis, no book on Dr. Coleman's theme can well be neglected, least of all, one like his, which is just that selection of patristic lore, compactly stored, which few theological students, and fewer ministers, have both time and opportunity to glean, but which most of them need to use, "here a little and there a little." It straightway supplies present need, and gives guiding clews to those who would explore farther.

The revised edition has two additional chapters, on Apostolical Succession and Presbyterian Ordination, and, by a severe compression, contains forty pages less than the former editions; suppressing all rhetorical declamation, and proving by the logic of facts the popular character of the primitive church, in point both of organization and of worship, with a notice of its progressive corruptions. B.

LATIN HYMNS, WITH ENGLISH NOTES. For use in Schools and Colleges.

By F. A. March, LL.D., Professor of Comparative Philology in Lafayette College. 12mo. pp. 333. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1875.

THE ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY OF EUSEBIUS. The First Book and Selections. Edited for Schools and Colleges, by F. A. March, LL.D. With an Introduction by A. Ballard, D.D., Professor of Christian Greek and Latin in Lafayette College; and Explanatory Notes by W. B. Owen, A.M., Adjunct Professor of Christian Greek. 12mo. pp. 287. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1875.

Lafayette College is not the first to use the Christian Latin and Greek authors for the purposes of college instruction, but the first to place them side by side with the classic authors as equal in importance and value. Thus Eusebius, Justin Martyr, Athenagoras, Greek Hymns, Josephus, Chrysostom, and the Septuagint, stand in the Catalogue as "electives" for Xenophon, Herodotus, Homer, Thucydides, Demosthenes, and the Greek Tragedies; Tertullian, Cyprian, the Vulgate, Latin Hymns, Augustine, Lactantius, Boethius, and Orosius are offered as "electives" for Livy, Horace, Tacitus, Cicero, Juvenal, and Persius. The two courses are placed on an equality as respects honors, prizes, and instruction, two professorships in the Douglass course being already ably filled. The above works are the first of a series of the text-books needed to place the new course on an equal footing with the old, and they are altogether creditable as specimens both of editing and of book-making. Each is supplied with the usual critical apparatus.

The Latin Hymns will receive a wide circulation, as it is not so much a school-book as a book for the oratory and the library. One hundred and fifty-two hymns are presented in attractive form, with notes, biographical, bibliographical, and illustrative, choice citations, and bits of translation,

and a few critical and grammatical references, such as the average college student needs. Persons even moderately acquainted with Latin can enjoy them. Minds at once cultivated and devout have always prized them for their religious fervor and for their rich associations. The only other available collection of considerable size, Trench's "Sacred Latin Poetry," which served as a model for this collection, contains only fifty-four hymns, and of these Dr. March has selected forty-four. That book will be more acceptable to scholars, but this more generally useful. It is already used in several colleges, and the severe classicists will welcome it as worthy of a place in the college curriculum. It is not necessary to say, with the editor, that for vigor, harmony, and simplicity of thought the Hymns are better than any Augustan Ode, but no man claiming a liberal culture would wish to be ignorant of the old Latin Hymns.

Buttmann's translation of Luther's "Ein feste Burg," and Gladstone's version of "Rock of Ages," (Trench gives the former) are out of place, for they are simply ingenious grammatical exercises, and were conceived and executed with none of that spirit and purpose of devotion which render the mediæval hymns so sweet and noble. Oxford and Cambridge could furnish volumes of similar mechanical marvels. Waiving minor criticism, it is fair to ask if the traces of Mariolatry in this volume are not as dangerous to young men as Horace's apostrophes to heathen goddesses.

The Eusebius raises another inquiry: Eusebius is just as valuable in English as Greek, and more so, for it is easier understood. The thought is modern, and a modern dress is more becoming. The same may be said generally of the Christian authors. The study of them in the original may have, as is claimed, "the highest educational power," but it is misleading to represent it as a power the same in kind as that derived from the classics, but superior to it. The formative and disciplinary value of the classics is chiefly due to the fact that the thought and its expression are both unlike those of to-day. The pupil who imagines he can catch the Greek spirit from the Septuagint because its characters and words are Greek, will perhaps never be undeceived; but if he be, his indignation will equal his chagrin. Not all Greek is Greek; and young men should be taught at the outset that the Douglass course is as unlike the classical in disciplinary value, as the ancient and modern languages. Having chosen intelligently the Christian writers, they will find this Eusebius a good book for their purpose.

C. F. P. B.

THE LOGIC OF REASON, UNIVERSAL AND ETERNAL. By Laurens P. Hickok, D.D., LL.D. 8vo. Boston: Lee and Shepard. 1874.

In this work Dr. Hickok has given the maturest presentation of that distinctive view of the reason on which his whole philosophy hinges. It is the fundamental thought of the book, that all forms of abstract logic — i.e. a logic dealing only with abstractions from experience — are neces-

sarily defective, and that neither experience can be expounded, nor absolute truth attained, save by a logic of reason, concrete and universal. The difference between these two kinds of logic, as here unfolded, is as follows: All forms of abstract logic begin with experience, from whose particular facts they abstract what is particular, and thus rise to a generalization of the universal. In this way the phenomena of experience are classified in ever widening generalizations, and from these generalizations we are able to deduce the attributes of whatever particulars they embrace. But the farther this process is extended, the more empty do these generalizations become, and the more impossible is it to form judgments and declare predicates respecting them. The more we seek to know, therefore, in this way, the less do we actually know, and the necessary termination of every form of logic which deals only with what is abstracted from experience is utter nescience. We therefore entirely reverse this abstract logical process, — with which it is not possible to satisfy the human mind, — and, instead of attempting to put the facts of experience in some abstract generalization, we shall rather seek the bond which will hold all parts of experience together in a concrete unity. This will be found in truths which are older than experience, without which experience could not be, and by which it is made to be exactly as it is. These truths, though not abstracted from the facts of experience, yet find in these facts their appropriate and expressive symbols, by occasion of which the reason comes to the knowledge of their necessary and universal being. The knowledge of these truths, thus, is not an independent, self-originating knowledge from past reason, but one which, though needing the facts of experience to awaken it, yet contains what could never be gained by any abstraction from these facts. This knowledge, instead of becoming less definite and more empty, increases in precision and fulness with the wider facts which it is able to embrace and explain, until, in its advancing progress, not only does the whole experience — including the facts of the inorganic and organic world — become known, but absolute being, above all finite experience, is also clearly revealed. In the knowledge of the absolutely eternal reason, in whom we live and move and have our being, — a knowledge which not only excludes, but annihilates all scepticism, — the concrete logic finds its triumph and its termination.

A more important contribution than this profound book to the highest achievements of speculative thought has not recently been made. Nowhere else have the prominent forms of the abstract logic — the logic of mathematics, the syllogistic logic, the transcendental logic, and the logic of force — been subjected to a more rigorous and exhaustive criticism. Dr. Hickok himself has hardly shown elsewhere more power than in the masterly analysis and profound criticism here given of the Hegelian form of the transcendental logic. The book is not an easy one to read.

The statement of the thought is marvellously condensed; but the thought is there, and it reaches to the very heart of the profoundest speculations of our time. *

CONDITIONS OF SUCCESS IN PREACHING WITHOUT NOTES. Three Lectures delivered before the Students of the Union Theological Seminary, New York, Jan. 13th, 20th, 27th, 1875. With an Appendix by Richard S. Storrs, D.D., LL.D., of Brooklyn, New York. 12mo. pp. 233. New York: Dodd and Mead.

The first of these Lectures relates to Dr. Storrs' personal experience in cultivating the power of extemporaneous address. This experience illustrates the general suggestions with which the lecture closes. They are the following: 1. Never begin to preach without notes with any idea of saving yourselves work by it; 2. Always be careful to keep up the habit of writing, with whatever of skill, elegance, and force you can command; 3. Be perfectly frank with your people in regard to this matter of your method of preaching; 4. Discharge your mind of the sermon, when once you have preached it; 5. Never be discouraged by what seems to you, perhaps to others, comparative failure; 6. Do no violence to your own nature; and if you find, after sufficient conscientious trial, that you can do more useful service with the pen than without it, then use the pen without reluctance, etc.

The second Lecture details the physical and mental conditions of success in extemporary discourse. These conditions are: 1. Physical vigor, kept at its highest attainable point; 2. Keep your mind in a state of habitual activity, alertness, energy; 3. Be careful that the plan of your sermon is simple, natural, progressive, easily mastered, and is thoroughly imbedded in your mind; 4. Have command of sufficient subordinate trains of thought to aid you in unfolding and impressing the subject.

The third Lecture details the moral and spiritual conditions of success in extemporary preaching. They are: 1. A distinct and an energetic sense of the importance of that particular subject on which you are to preach at the time; 2. A definite end, of practical impression, which your discourse is to have on the minds before you; 3. Have in view individual hearers in the congregation; 4. Always carry with you into the pulpit a sense of the immense consequences which may depend on your full and faithful presentation of the truth; 5. Always carry with you into the pulpit a sense of the personal presence of the Master; 6. Be perfectly careless of criticism, and expect success.

All these topics are illustrated by striking facts or interesting statements. The three Lectures are characterized by sound sense and great wealth of diction. They are evidently the result not only of profound meditation, but also of varied and extensive reading.

CHRISTIAN BELIEF AND LIFE. By Andrew P. Peabody, D.D., LL.D.,
Professor of Christian Morals in Harvard University. 12mo. pp. 326.
Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1875.

These Discourses are written in the easy and graceful style which characterizes all the writings of Dr. Peabody. They abound with expressions of high moral sentiment. We imagine ourselves to be reading a sermon of some old Puritan divine when we peruse such a passage as the following: "Every developed moral nature knows and feels that there are things in themselves fitting and right, that there are things in themselves unfitting and wrong, and that an eternity of happiness consequent upon it could not make a lie, or a fraud, or an act of cruelty virtuous. It was such human nature as there is in you and me that has embalmed in a tragedy, which the world will never let die, Prometheus chained to eternal torture for his benefits to man; and were the order of the universe such that a Prometheus could be thus doomed by despotic omnipotence, no stress of the divine will and no intensity of suffering in threat or in experience could convert you or me, or any human being not prepossessed by a theory, from sympathy with the world's benefactor to reverence for its tyrant" (p. 321).

Dr. Peabody is a Unitarian, yet his views of Christ are exalted and grand. He says: "Meanwhile leaving all other considerations aside, Jesus himself is our best proof of the divinity of the revelation which he gave, or, rather, which he was, and is. The effort has been made by unbelievers and sceptics — and never more earnestly than in our own time — to bring him down to the level of ordinary humanity. His story has been pared and pruned of all that seems marvellous. The authorship of the Gospels by their long-reputed authors has been discredited. The character of Jesus has been subjected to the most minute and searching criticism, — the lens of the microscope adjusted by no friendly hands. But let men do what they will, they cannot lower, or dwarf, or desecrate the revered form. That name still remains above every name, — if not by God's special gift, then by its own right and power, — by the grasp which it holds on the homage, gratitude, and love of mankind. His is the most potent spirit that ever dwelt on the earth. From the day when he left his life-work to the charge of the eleven Galilean peasants, his has been the mightiest force at work in our world, from the very first, 'conquering and to conquer,' so that within three centuries from his meeting the doom of a felon-slave, the cross — meant as the token of eternal infamy — outblazoned all the insignia of title, power, and victory. His teachings underlie all our modern civilization, all progress, all philanthropy, all hope for the depressed, suffering, and sinning. There is not a maxim in the improved philosophy of life, of society, of commerce, of polity, of finance, which has not emanated from his gospel, and may not be retranslated — and for the better — into the very words that fell from his lips. Then,

too, as for character, you could count on your fingers the greatly good men since his time who have not owed their excellence to him; while of those who, if crowned, would cast their crowns at his feet, and cry, 'Thou alone art worthy,' there has been a multitude of pure, holy, beneficent souls that no man can number. In fine, Jesus Christ, considered merely as to his character and influence, is not one of a class, first among his peers, — he is a class by himself; not unequalled, but unapproached; not brightest among kindred stars, but sole sun of righteousness, making the stars grow pale in his light. Were I to approach him from without, merely as an impartial student of history, I am sure that I should see in him a being for whose upspringing no spiritual Darwinism, no development theory, would enable me to account; whom I could not co-ordinate with his time or his surroundings; whom I should be constrained to regard as himself the most stupendous of miracles. As I trace his way among men, my soul is suffused at every step by a sense of his blended meekness and might, majesty and mercy; I must confess with the Jewish ruler, 'Thou art a teacher come from God'; and as for his heavenly birth-song, his marvellous works, his resurrection and ascension, so far are they from weakening my faith in the primitive records that relate them (which on merely critical grounds I have as good reason for believing to have been written by those friends of his whose names they bear as I have for believing the genuineness of any work three centuries old), that such events appear to me no more than a fitting exterior manifestation for a spirit like his. It seems as natural that his voice should break his friend's death-slumber as that we should call our departed friends in vain, — as natural that he should rise from the sepulchre as that our dust should lie there undisturbed" (pp. 15-18).

The whole volume is characterized by a reverence for the word of God and a truly devout spirit.

PASTORAL THEOLOGY: A Treatise on the Office and Duties of the Christian Pastor. By the late Patrick Fairbairn, D.D., Principal of the Free Church College, Glasgow; author of "Typology of Scripture," "Commentary on the Pastoral Epistles," etc., etc. With a Biographical Sketch of the Author, by Rev. James Dodds, Dunbar. 12mo. pp. 386. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark; New York: Scribner, Welford, and Armstrong.

Many of our readers have had a personal acquaintance with Dr. Fairbairn, and nearly all of them are probably acquainted with his works on the Typology of Scripture, and on Prophecy, also with his Hermeneutical Manual, and with his Imperial Bible Dictionary. It is needless to say that the present volume is characterized by practical wisdom. The style is sometimes colloquial; and, perhaps, on such a theme a homeliness of phraseology may be allowed. In one of his notes Dr. Fairbairn makes

allusion to an American, whom he designates as "a Mr. Everett," and who is no other than our Hon. Edward Everett. We are very glad to see this volume, and we doubt not that it will be productive of much good. The instructions of a Scotch divine may be eminently serviceable to an American pastor.

HOURS OF CHRISTIAN DEVOTION: Translated from the German of A. Tholuck, D.D., Professor of Theology in the University of Halle; Councillor of the Supreme Consistory, Prussia; by Robert Menzies, D.D. Second Edition. 12mo. pp. 559. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Co. 1875.

This work of Professor Tholuck has been for thirty-six years a favorite volume with German Christians. It has been, perhaps, more popular than any other work of its distinguished author. The mind of Dr. Tholuck is peculiarly adapted to this species of composition. Many thousand readers have been inspirited by his earnest and affectionate words. We hope that the present work will be as acceptable to British and American Christians as it has been to the Germans.

DISCOURSES AND SAYINGS OF OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST, illustrated in a Series of Expositions. By John Brown, D.D., Professor of Exegetical Theology to the United Presbyterian Church, Edinburgh; author of "Expository Discourses on First Peter," "Discourses on the Sufferings and Glories of the Messiah," etc. Two vols. in one. 8vo. pp. 667, 611. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers. 1875.

The author of this work was the grandson of the excellent John Brown of Haddington, and the father of Dr. John Brown, the accomplished author of *Rab and his Friends*. He is well known as a sound divine and a most conscientious exegete. In the history of the Christian church there have been very few men equal to Dr. Brown in manliness and purity of character. We hope that the present volume will have an extensive circulation.

A COMMENTARY ON THE GOSPEL OF LUKE. By S. Godet, Doctor and Professor of Theology, Neuchatel. In two volumes. 8vo. Translated from the second French edition. Vol. I., by E. W. Shalders, B.A., Newbury. pp. 453. Vol. II., by M. D. Cusin. pp. 470. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark; New York: Scribner, Welford, and Armstrong.

Professor Godet was once a teacher of the present crown prince of Prussia. He is the author of a Commentary on the Gospel of John; and we are happy to see that Messrs T. and T. Clark intend to publish an English translation of that Commentary. All his writings give proof of his great learning, and also of his excellent Christian spirit. The present Commentary on Luke's Gospel is written with great care. It contains some very acute argumentation. It may be read with profit by educated laymen as well as by technical theologians.

MARK'S MEMOIRS OF JESUS CHRIST: A Commentary on the Gospel according to Mark. By James Morison, D.D. 8vo. pp. 589. London: Hamilton, Adams, and Co. 1873.

Dr. Morison's style is often clumsy, but his thoughts are strong. It is difficult to read his Commentary on Mark, as well as that on Matthew; but both of these Commentaries, as well as that on the third chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, will repay thorough study.

INTRODUCTION TO THE PAULINE EPISTLES. By Paton J. Gloag, D.D. Minister of Galashiels; author of "A Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles," etc. 8vo. pp. 488. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark; New York: Scribner, Welford, and Armstrong.

Dr. Gloag's works have attained a wide popularity among English and American scholars. The present volume is one of great excellence. It is distinguished as much for its sound common sense as for its extensive learning.

THE DOCTRINE OF HOLY SCRIPTURE RESPECTING THE ATONEMENT. By Thomas J. Crawford, D.D., F.R.S.E., Professor of Divinity in the University of Edinburgh; author of the "Fatherhood of God," "The Mysteries of Christianity," etc. Second edition. 8vo. pp. 548. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Son; New York: Scribner, Welford, and Armstrong. 1875.

We have already referred to Professor Crawford's work on the Atonement (see Vol. xxviii. pp. 603-4; Vol. xxx. pp. 338, 353-54). The second edition is revised, amended, and enlarged. We renew our expression of regard for the volume. It has great merit, exhibits much learning and sound judgment.

THE MYSTERIES OF CHRISTIANITY; being the Baird Lecture for 1874. By T. J. Crawford, D.D., F.R.S.E., Professor of Divinity in the University of Edinburgh; author of "The Fatherhood of God," "Doctrine of Holy Scripture respecting the Atonement," etc. 12mo. pp. 418. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons. 1874.

Like the other volumes from the pen of Dr. Crawford, this abounds with judicious and timely remarks. It discusses the mysteries of Christianity in relation to the doctrine of the Trinity, the twofold nature of Christ, the atonement, the work of the Holy Spirit, the divine purposes, etc. It makes clear distinctions, and is characterized by sound common sense.

ESSAYS AESTHETICAL. By George H. Calvert. 16mo. pp. 264. Boston: Lee and Shepard; New York: Lee, Shepard, and Dillingham. 1875.

This volume contains nine Essays, of which the subjects are: The

Beautiful; What is Poetry? Style; Dante and his Latest Translators; Sainte Beuve, the Critic; Thomas Carlyle; Errata; National Drama; Usefulness of Art. The essays are well written. Some of the author's criticisms on words are very just; others, we think, are too indiscriminate. He insists that "the double *as* should only be employed when there is direct comparison." He objects to the phrase, "They go astray *as* soon *as* they be born." The "principle" of the language, he thinks, requires us to substitute *so* for *as*. We are willing to admit that the general rule requires it; but a general rule is often violated by reputable usage; and in some cases this usage allows us to employ the word "*as*" where no direct comparison is intended. The author objects to the word "propose" as an equivalent to the word "intend." We admit that his objection is well founded; the two words are distinct in meaning; but we apprehend that very reputable and recent usage allows us occasionally to employ the two words as synonymous. The author fitly condemns the use of such phrases as "by no manner of means"; "by reason of"; "conduct," as equivalent to "behave"; "come off"; "I am free to confess"; "in this connection"; "indebtedness"; "intellects"; "leave," as a neuter verb; "in our midst"; "our author"; "periodical," as an adjective; "predicated upon"; "reliable," in the sense of trustworthy; "religion," as synonymous with mere virtue; "ventilate," as applied to a subject or person. He makes a fine distinction between "consider" or "intend" or "reflect," and the word "contemplate." He says: "Contemplation is an exercise of the very highest faculties, a calm collecting of them for silent meditation — an act, or rather a mood, which implies even more than concentrated reflection, and involves themes dependent on large, pure sentiment. An able lawyer has to reflect much upon a broad, difficult case, in order to master it; but when in the solitude of his study he is drawn, by the conflicts and wrongs he has witnessed during the day, to think on the purposes and destinies of human life, he more than reflects — he is lifted into a contemplative mood" (pp. 230, 231).

BOURDALOUE AND LOUIS XIV.; or, The Preacher and the King. Translated from the French of L. L. F. Bungener, Geneva. 12th edition. With an Introduction, by the Rev. George Potts, D.D. A new edition, with a Biographical Sketch of the Author. 12mo. pp. 338. Boston: D. Lothrop and Co.

M. Bungener, the author of this work, is a minister of the Reformed Church of France. It was published quite a number of years ago, and was received with no little favor. It is, more than anything else, a series of essays on eloquence, especially sacred eloquence, though it has the form of a story; different characters, such as Fenelon and Claude being made to utter strictures on the pulpit performances of certain eminent preachers. The work is replete alike with entertainment and instruction.

THE HISTORY OF GREECE. By Professor Dr. Ernst Curtius. Translated by Adolphus William Ward, M.A. Fellow of St. Peter's College, Cambridge, Professor of History in Owen's College, Manchester. Revised, after the last German edition, by W. A. Packard, Ph.D., Professor of Latin in the College of New Jersey. Vols. IV. and V. 12mo. pp. 524, 413. New York: Charles Scribner and Co. 1871.

The first three volumes of this work have already received a very favorable notice at our hands. We are disposed in speaking of the fourth and fifth volumes to dwell in still stronger terms on such features of the work as we then had occasion to commend. One feature which we then took occasion to commend was its manifest impartiality as contrasted with Mr. Grote's History. Its moral tone we think decidedly superior to that of the latter work. This remark is strictly applicable to the account given by Curtius, of the effect on the welfare of the Grecian states, during the period just subsequent to the Peloponnesian War, of the decay of the religious sentiment. We are sorry to have to criticise, in still stronger language than before, the style of the work. Its faults in this respect are, we think, more glaring than in the previous volumes. We cannot but think the execution of the work in this respect altogether discreditable to both translator and editor.

THE ENGLISH IN IRELAND IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. By James Anthony Froude, M.A. In three volumes. Vols. II. and III. 12mo. pp. 520, 506. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Co. 1874.

We see no reason for modifying the opinion we expressed of the merits of this work in our notice of the first volume. Nothing is brought to view in these concluding volumes which in our judgment relieves the English government of the blame we then imputed to it in view of the miserable state of the Irish people. The whole work, however, is of great value, and oftentimes furnishes the means of correcting the errors in reasoning into which it falls.

FROM THE PLOW TO THE PULPIT. 18mo. pp. 121. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers. 1874.

This is at once an entertaining and stimulating little book. It gives us a sketch of the life and labors of Rev. John Spaulding, known best of all, perhaps, to the majority of readers as Secretary of the American Seamen's Friend Society. It deserves to be carefully read; and can hardly be read without great advantage being gained from it.

EAST INDIAN LITERATURE. — We have received Nos. 3, 4, and 5 of the **INDIAN EVANGELICAL REVIEW.** The first two numbers of this Review have already been noticed by us. Among the Articles in the last three numbers which have most interested us, and which we think deserving of careful attention, are, in the number for January 1874, one on the

Indian Church of the Future ; another entitled Hints on Itinerary ; and one on Ritualism and its Influence on Indian Missions. The fourth number, for April, has, among others, valuable Articles on a Paid Native Ministry, on Progress of Missions in Bengal, 1861-1871, and on Education as related to Christianity. In the number for July we notice one on Indian Disestablishment and Disendowment. This Article is peculiarly suggestive, as it regards the prospects of Christianity in India. There is also a valuable Article on Female Education in Benares, and another containing a Sketch of the Life of the late Dr. Levi Spaulding of Ceylon, prepared by Rev. T. S. Smith, whose father was for so many years connected with Dr. Spaulding in the Ceylon mission. This Review is interesting in its information and suggestions in regard to the present state of Brahminism.

It may, perhaps, appear improper for us to notice **THE BOMBAY CHRISTIAN ALMANAC FOR THE YEAR OF OUR LORD AND SAVIOUR JESUS CHRIST, 1875**. This is a quarto of sixty-four pages, and is published for the benefit of those who can read the English language in the Mahratta mission. Its astronomical calculations, scientific and statistical information are very accurate. The moral and religious paragraphs in the Almanac are selected with excellent taste. Every Christian reader in our own country would be interested in reading them. The Almanac is published by the Bombay Tract and Book Society, on tinted paper, and contains many attractive plates. It is the work of a missionary of the American Board, whose wife has prepared the Dnyanodaya Almanac for 1875, in the language of the Mahrattas. We are unable to read this language; but are very much pleased with the typography, the pictorial illustrations, and the general outward appearance of the pamphlet. Both of these pamphlets are as attractive in their outward form as the majority of our English and American Almanacs. They afford a good illustration of the educational work which is done by our foreign missionaries. They exert a signal influence over the pagan mind by their literary and scientific character.

We ought to have noticed, before this time, several other works, which are good specimens of East Indian literature. Among them are: **LECTURES AND TRACTS BY KESHUB CHUNDER SEN**, First and Second Series; also **KESHUB CHUNDER SEN'S ENGLISH VISIT**. Both of these works are edited by Sophia Dobson Cullet, and are published by Strahan and Co., London. Mr. Sen's Lectures, Tracts, and Speeches furnish valuable information in regard to the views of the Brahma Somaj, and to the character of those Brahmins who have rejected the ancient faith, but have not accepted Evangelical Christianity. He is very acute, and some of his suggestions are very valuable. We cannot exactly understand the difficulties with which our missionaries are contending in India, unless we understand the habits of thought and the aims and policy of such writers as Mr. Sen. He reminds us of the celebrated Rajah Rammohun Roy. His criticisms on the English character and policy are expressed frankly and severely, yet kindly.

THE

BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

JESUS AND THE RESURRECTION.

BY REV. L. P. HICKOK, D.D., LL.D., AMHERST.

THE doctrine of the resurrection of the dead body is essential to the validity of Christianity. Christ was crucified, dead, and buried; he passed within the unseen world; and, aside from the verification of his own assertion that the third day he should rise again, his resurrection is necessary to our faith in him as a present and eternal Saviour; and in his resurrection we have the promise and pledge of our own.

The Jew had from his sacred books historic evidence that the dead had been made to live again, and in the days of Christ and his apostles he had the present experience of such occurrences. To the Jew, therefore, the doctrine of a resurrection was familiar, and though the sect of the Sadducees disbelieved all spiritual existence, they well knew the prevalent faith of their nation to be that the spirit lived after death, and at a coming day would reanimate the body long separated from it. But to a heathen hearer of the first preaching of the gospel, nothing could give greater astonishment than to be called on to believe that the dead bodies of all past generations should rise again. A Socratic philosopher, a speculative Platonist, and even an Aristotelian, who comprehended first and final causes in his dialectics, might accept the doctrines both of pre-existence and a future state

for the spirit; but a philosophy resting alone upon the uniformity of nature, and the prevalent convictions of mankind from common experience, could recognize nothing in the teaching of Christ's raising the dead body but an incredible absurdity, to be met only with contemptuous rejection. Accordingly, when Paul preached the gospel first at Athens, "Jesus and the resurrection" was the setting forth of "strange gods" and "new doctrines"; and the Epicureans and Stoics encountered him by the derisive inquiry: "What will this babbler say?" And so with modern pagan people, who have been instructed only in the mechanical forces of nature and the laws of matter, the same incredulity appears. The educated, English-speaking Hindus feel the strongest repugnance to Christianity, on account of its two fundamental doctrines of the divinity of Christ and the resurrection of the dead; and, but for these doctrines, many of them do not scruple to say that it would be a desirable thing that the gospel should be preached to the whole world. Yet, as a plan of salvation for the lost, the gospel must go to the heathen nations with the truth of Christ's divinity, tested by Christ's resurrection, and that of his second coming to raise the dead and judge the world; for, stripped of these doctrines, its preaching would lose all power to change the heart and life.

Objections to the doctrine of the resurrection find their greatest force from the loss of adequate conceptions of man's essential constitution, as combined of body, soul, and spirit, according to the scripture representation; and with a spiritual gospel philosophy, the rising of the dead, and even the divinity of Jesus Christ, would at once lose most of their speculative difficulties as articles of religious faith. A true conception of the essential constitution of humanity is conditional for an intelligent belief in either of these doctrines. We need thus to find:

I. Some adequate Idea of Man's essential Constitution.

II. To recognize its full Accordance with Scriptural Representation.

III. Thereby to believe in the actual Identity of the Human Resurrection.

I. WHAT IS A PHILOSOPHICAL IDEA OF ESSENTIAL HUMANITY?

The author of this Article must refer its readers to his previous writings for a comprehensive view of fact and philosophy in reference to material and living creation. All that is here needful is the presentation of such distinctions in inorganic and organic being as shall serve to accurately discriminate man from all existing species. The essence of matter is force, and the leading varieties of forces come from their internally distinctive order of working energies—the impulses working to, and the expulses working from, a common point. The former determines gravitating matter, and the latter the etherial essence of heat and light; and the interworking of both is purely mechanical. The essence of life is a want pervading force, which, as a feeling of its need, prompts the force it pervades to the specific end of the want; and this interworking of specific want and its possessed force is purely spontaneous. In plant life the end of the want is an embodying organism, in which the life may abide and therein reproduce successors of its own kind. In animal life, the want is a nervous organism, in which through sensation the life may wake in conscious activity for its own gratification as a living soul. In human life, the want is not merely to embody itself in an organism and reproduce its kind, as does the plant, nor merely for its own sentient gratification, as does the animal, but for the ultimate end of rising to full self-consciousness and acting in free personal responsibility. The human life-want so constructs the human body that it shall subserve both the ends of the animal soul in sentient gratification and the rational spirit in pure and perpetual self-approbation.

Whatever the bare life in any case may be in its own essence, it cannot manifest itself otherwise than in the construction of its appropriate organism by the spontaneous working of its possessed forces, and therein using the organ-

ism for its own respective ultimate end, as the plant for reproduction, the animal for conscious gratification, and the man for responsible self-approbation. The actual creation of the life is this origination of the specific want in pervasion of its possessed force, and then the created life-force constructs its organism spontaneously to the end, and thus according to the type, of its own want. The plant never rises above mere spontaneous activity; the animal soul rises in its spontaneously constructed body to conscious sense-activity; and the man to full personal responsibility. The human spirit is originally superior to animal soul, as that is to vegetable life, and while created in the "image of God," is a distinct individuality from God. This God-like human spirit gives to man his peculiar prerogatives of personality and responsibility above the brute, and, as superinduced upon animal sense and made accountable for keeping all the appetites of sense subject to its approbation in all the period of its trial, it thus becomes incumbent that as one in probation so both sense and spirit must be one in retribution. The living soul in the animal is thus made immortal soul in the man, and while the rational spirit is expressed in its ethereal forces, it secures also that the sentient soul of the man shall have its permanent expression in the material forces which it possesses and uses. The merely animal sense goes out in the dissolution of the brute body; but the human soul is held in balanced forces which never have their dissolution. On these permanently possessed and balanced forces are arranged the bodily adaptations for nutrition, sense-perception, locomotion, and reproduction, necessary to man's terrestrial economy and experience, but which will be useless for the employments of his eternal abode. Man's "earthy" body has as its basis both soul-body and spirit-body in the same individuality.

Death to man and animal, so far as the earthy organism is concerned, comes alike in its dissolution. All that has ministered to merely terrestrial experiences passes off in this dissolving, and the old modes of nourishment, special senses,

and movement from place to place, are known no more. In the brute, however, all life and sensation go out with the dissolving form forever, while in man the balanced forces of the sentient life continue indissoluble, and therein the human soul is made immortal. The earthy husk drops off, while the essential kernel of the sense-life abides, and its appetitive capabilities are persistently retained within it. But the great peculiarity of death to man is not the dissolving of the earthy body, and the persistence of the sentient soul, so much as in the sudden painful sundering of the soul and spirit. In the death of man, the integrity of his human constitution is invaded, and there is actually "the dividing asunder of soul and spirit," and created sense and reason are for the time in separate existences. After the parting pang the spirit reluctantly bears the separation, and waits in expectant hope the coming assured reunion.

Thus we conceive of man's constitution; and of this we farther extend our speculation in the case of Jesus Christ, as a being specially constituted for the work of mediation between God and man. "By the power of the Highest" he was made in the womb of the virgin completely a human being in rational spirit and sentient soul and earthy body, and for the completion of his Messianic constitution the Divine Word took this prepared human form, and united essential Deity to humanity. As literally Immanuel, the God-man works out the mediatorial plan of redemption in both saving the sinning subject and sustaining offended sovereignty. Being born as man, Jesus could live and suffer and die and rise again; and as being also God, he could control nature and command angels, good and bad, and on earth commune on terms of equality with the Father in heaven. He could lay down his life, and take it again, and can come the second time to raise the dead and judge the world. In such a constitution we have the conception of a perfect Saviour.

Summarily, then, we conceive man to have been constituted of body, soul, and spirit in living unity, and in such combined

individuality the human species is distinguished from all others. Man's earthy body of flesh and bones, though fitted instrumentally to serve the rational spirit as well as sense, is destructible, like the brute body; but this corruptible body has, beneath its coming and passing elements, an indissoluble base of balanced forces held in permanent colligation by the perpetually active sentient life, and in this is the constitution of an immortal human soul. This imperishable human soul is thus elevated above mere brute-sensation by the claims of the rational spirit which, in his own image, the Creator breathed into man. As created individually distinct from the absolute uncreated Reason, the spirit has its abiding lodgment in substantial ethereal forces, which it possesses and uses, and its moral character is given in the disposition it takes toward ruling, or toward serving, the sentient soul; and inasmuch as the disposing must be in alliance with sense in probation, so the sentient soul must be held together with the spirit in eternal retribution. The undying spirit in its forces holds the soul immortal in its balanced existing forces, and thus rational spirit superinduced upon sentient soul, in one individuality within the earthy body, acts out its conscious responsible agency during its period of terrestrial probation. And now, this philosophical conception is not only conformed to, but is necessary in explanation of, the scripture representation. The speculative idea underlies and expounds the recorded facts of revelation.

II. WHAT IS THIS ACCORDANT BIBLICAL REPRESENTATION OF HUMANITY?

Discriminative terms for distinctive elements of man's constitution will be found applied in the Bible, and which have a precise peculiarity of meaning, though often some one will admit of a use inclusive of others. The scriptures repeatedly and clearly recognize the distinctions of body, soul, and spirit, as entering into the complex being of each human individual, and each distinctive element fills its place and bears its share in the entire construction of the man, though

it is not always necessary that either term should be rigidly restricted to its primary, specific signification. When that which is common to all is to be expressed, then either term may be used, and so all may be interchangeable, and when the entire being is meant, any one of the essential elements may be comprehensively put as expressive of the whole. The context in all such cases easily prevents all misapprehension, and a careful note of what is prevalent in the expression will determine its own shade of specific meaning, which may have been intended in the selection of the term. Especially will the occasional use of equivalent words for these common terms make manifest a very precise and discriminate signification. There are very many such occasions for attaining the teaching of the scriptures in reference to what their doctrine of the constitution of humanity may be ; but full satisfaction may be attained by noticing only what may be given in a few comprehensive examples. If we carefully note how the Bible represents *personal character in human life*, and also how it represents *the perpetuation of personality in human death*, we shall find abundant verification that our above speculative view of man is in full accord with revelation. The scripture facts necessarily presuppose the philosophical determining ideas. Having attentively followed out these in their order, we shall be fully prepared for the last general head, as a ground of faith in the resurrection of the identical human body.

1. *Scriptural Representation of Distinction in Human Character.*

Brute life is merely sentient ; angelic life is wholly spiritual ; human life is a complex of the animal and angelic, and carries along in its experience the blended peculiarities of both. Animal sense and rational insight into the experiences of sense induce a thinking process, which opens a sphere of speculative philosophy and practical activity, that is peculiarly the province for man to occupy, and in which he will meet responsibilities and form distinctions in character that can

belong only to those of his own race. From a few scripture representations, we may attain a general conception of the distinctively human constitution and its processes of fixing a permanent disposition, such as, while exclusive of all but human character, shall be inclusive of all varieties of moral standing among men.

We begin with the following text, most remarkable in its human application, and its comprehension of all that is human: "For the word of God is quick and powerful, and sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing even to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit, and of the joints and marrow, and is a discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart" (Heb. iv. 12). Divine truth is here contemplated solely in its application to man. It cannot be made to reach animals, nor does it refer here to angelic experience, good or bad. Creatures compounded of body, soul, and spirit are alone included, and the truth of God is represented as cutting down into such a constitution, and laying bare every secret spring to action which can be found within it, and forcing to a moral discrimination of character in the conscious aim and end of the personal agent. Divine truth has a meaning for the spirit, and becomes keen and penetrating to a spiritual insight, fixing imperative obligations and forcing out the decisions of an excusing or accusing conscience. Ultimate and immutable right, and eternal obligation to it, as opposed to all considerations of prudential expediency and utility, is the distinction between spirit and soul, and the divine word cuts clean down to that line, and then penetrates to the ministering joints and sensitive marrow in the bodily appetites, and compels to the discernment of the character, as the heart's thought and intention have been directed to the claims of the spirit, or to the interested plans of the soul and the lusting impulses of the body. Moral truth searches and tries the entire moral man, by determining the disposition taken by the spirit.

The prompting from bodily appetite and that from the soul's deliberate planning for gratification may both be said to come from nature, and thus to mark the natural man,

since both press upon the spirit to yield itself in servitude to natural impulse — in the first case, impulse to present passion, and in the last case, to the greatest gratification, carefully considered, in the long run ; but the New Testament writers, more especially, make a clear distinction in terms between the immediate impulse of bodily appetite and that of the soul's carefully estimated interest from prudential economy. So Peter, speaking of the naked sensuality and habitual licentiousness of some who blindly "walk after the flesh in the lust of uncleanness," and "having eyes full of adultery that cannot cease from sin," says they are "as natural brute beasts," or more literally rendered, "thoughtless *physical* animals" (2 Pet. ii. 12). Both their calculating soul and their responsible spirit have become thoroughly absorbed in the indulgence of bodily lusts ; and so also Paul describes others of the same sort, "who being past feeling have given themselves over unto lasciviousness, to work all uncleanness with greediness" (Eph. iv. 19). This term of "physical animal" may also be as appropriately given to all such as become engrossed in the indulgence of any bodily appetite, as the glutton and the drunkard. Even in the more cultivated sensuality in many forms of art and literature, genius has been utterly prostituted to voluptuousness.

But a different term than that by Peter is used by Paul where he says, "the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God ; for they are foolishness unto him ; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned. But he that is spiritual judgeth all things, yet he himself is judged of no man" (1 Cor. ii. 14, 15). The "natural man" is here literally the "*psychical* man" ; the man of cultivated judgment according to sense, who may have "excellency of speech and of wisdom," and whose "preaching" may be "with enticing words of man's wisdom," which "the princes of this world" may "know" ; but to this considerate soul, spiritual things are foolishness, and utterly unintelligible, and however much of worldly wisdom and practical skill the psychical man may attain, he can have no discernment of

supersensible truths and realities. The physical and the psychical man are distinguished in this, that the physical permits himself to be governed unresistingly by the impulses of animal appetites and passions, and thoughtlessly surrenders himself to sensual indulgences, while the psychical learns discretion from experience, and knows how to restrain his gratifications from prudential considerations of utility and expediency. But the "psychical man" is, in this passage, put in opposition to the "*pneumatical*," and with all his cultivation, derived from observation of nature's order and the teaching of experience, has no insight to discern through nature the supernatural and spiritual verities which always underlie the empirical appearances. To these deeper truths the most cultivated soul is as undiscerning as the grossest sensualist. But the "*pneumatical*," which is the spiritual man, discriminately judges all things, even "searches the deep things of God"; but is himself beyond all scrutinizing judgment other than that of Omniscience.

It is the province of the spirit to control the calculating soul as closely and constantly as the impulsive senses, for the character is as truly depraved, if not as brutally debased, in carefully getting and prudentially hoarding in the end of coming sense-indulgence, as in giving loose to passionate propensities. The spirit is the rational, responsible ruler of the entire human individuality, and to yield itself to the end of immediate gratification, or that of more prudential happiness in time to come, against the end of its own dignity and integrity, is to dispose itself perversely, and thus basely and wickedly. The "physical" is utterly sensuous; the "psychical" controls present indulgence from prudential considerations of greater gratification to come; the "spiritual" knows in itself what is due to itself, and controls all gratification in the end of ultimate righteousness. The highest soul-discernment is in the way of the most economical happiness; but the spirit's insight is beyond all happiness as end, to the higher end of its own approbation. Just so far as the spirit gives way to gratification over approbation the

man is "carnally-minded," and so far as the spirit controls gratification in the end of approbation the man is "spiritually minded" (Rom. viii. 6). And even when the spirit so far rules as prevailingly to maintain the warfare, the eruptions of sense-indulgence may be so frequent as to force the appellation of "carnal," even to real Christians, and which the apostle does apply to those very Corinthians, "called to be saints," to whom he was here writing; and he goes on to say that they were yet such "babes in Christ" that he could not "speak unto them as unto spiritual, but as unto carnal."

And this conflict of the physically lusting, or the psychically planning, sense against the rationally controlling spirit is habitually recognized by Paul: "The flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh, and these are contrary the one to the other" (Gal. v. 17). "I see another law in my members warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members" (Rom. vii. 23). This stated disposition of spirit either to the end of impulsive or of prudent gratification is one thing, and to the end of its own approving is quite another thing, and in such stated disposition is the human "heart," out of which, according to its direction, the Saviour says, proceedeth all good and all evil things (Matt. xii. 35; xv. 19). The same conflict was, indeed, in the original trial of the race, and the fall of man was in his commitment of the spirit to both the lusts of the flesh and the speciously considered interests of the soul. And so also the regeneration of man is the recovery of just the pristine authority of the spirit over carnal impulse and calculating expediency. The flesh in its depraved concupiscence is brought under the recovered dominion of the spirit (John iii. 6). And so, too, perseverance in holiness and complete sanctification is sought for by the apostle Paul when he "prays God, your whole spirit and soul and body be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ" (1 Thess. v. 23). And this prayer is answered when the spirit holds all appetites of the body and all interested schemes of the soul subject to its

own approval. So far, speculative philosophy and the Bible go together.

2. *Scripture Representation of Human Death.*

Geological records abundantly teach that in the vegetable and animal kingdoms death has from the first prevailed, for their fossil remains are older than the fall of man and the curse of death upon him. But that at his creation man was designed for immortality is clearly witnessed by the scripture record of the tree of life in paradise, which was both the pledge and procuring cause of an undying constitution. The primitive penalty threatened for eating the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, was eternal death in perpetual exclusion from divine favor; and the promise of a Redeemer gave occasion for a delay in the execution of eternal death, and the opportunity for a second probation. But the curse of temporal death was instituted in the universal sentence, "Dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return" (Gen. iii. 19). And now, in the sense of organic dissolution, man and beast alike die, and return to dust. When we come to the more particular representations of the resurrection, we shall attain more full and clear recognition of the distinction made between the animal and the human constitution; but even the consideration of scripture statements about the dying and the dead will, of itself, pretty fully indicate that the point of difference is this, the individual brute perishes in the dissolution of the organism, but both the human soul and the human spirit survive organic dissolution, and while sundered themselves in death, they still keep the body in its identity for its resurrection in their reunion.

Old Testament saints, while they saw organic death and dissolution to be in man and beast alike, still believed that in the human there was that which survived the organic destruction. So Job, "Man lieth down and riseth not; till the heavens be no more they shall not awake nor be raised out of their sleep." Yet his faith still holds on to continued

existence, and coming up again in full consciousness: "Thou shalt call, and I will answer thee; thou wilt have a desire to the work of thine hands" (Job xiv. 12-15). David says: "My flesh shall rest in hope; for thou wilt not leave my soul in hell" (Ps. xvi. 9, 10); and again, "As for me I will behold thy face in righteousness; I shall be satisfied when I awake in thy likeness" (Ps. xvii. 15). And so of Solomon: "For that which befalleth the sons of men befalleth beasts, even one thing befalleth them; as the one dieth, so dieth the other; yea they have all one breath; so that a man hath no pre-eminence above a beast; for all is vanity. All go to one place; all are of the dust, and all turn to dust again." And yet he says, "The spirit of man goeth upward, and the spirit of the beast goeth downward to the earth" (Eccl. iii. 19-21). And also, "Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was; and the spirit shall return unto God who gave it" (Eccl. xii. 7). And Isaiah prophecies: "Awake and sing ye that dwell in dust, for thy dew is as the dew of herbs, and the earth shall cast out the dead" (xxvi. 19). In the Old Testament faith, something survived in the death of man which perished in the dying brute, while the New Testament faith has life and immortality more clearly brought to light. The following representation will be substantially sustained by what we shall find in the New Testament teaching of the process and results of human dying.

Vegetable life never rises into consciousness, and so vegetable death is vegetable disorganization. Animal life has instinctively built up an organization by which the spontaneous life-want comes into conscious recognition, and awakes in experience in the phenomenal forms of varied sensations. Conscious sensation continues in and with the nervous arrangement of the animal organism, and perishes when the nervous irritability ceases; and the individual animal is lost in the dissolution of the nervous organism. This is animal death, and in it the animal itself is forever destroyed and lost. Human life has superadded to its animal sense a rational spirit, which is in the image of God its

Creator. The putting of the spirit in possession of the substantial forces it occupies and persistently uses is its created manifestation, and it has its express individuality and distinct personality in no other manner than in and through its possessed substantial forces; and therein is found each man's distinction from other men, and that of all men from God in their personal identity. The rational spirit is in union with the animal sense in the man's probationary period, and thus makes a demand for the perpetual preservation of the sense in coming retributive experiences. So, immortalized in the claim of the spirit, the animal fleeting sense becomes the permanently enduring human soul, and in its substantial forces permanently underlies the earthy elements continually taken in and thrown off to constitute the fleeting organism which subserves the ends of man's terrestrial abode. Human death is essentially the sundering of this union of soul and spirit, followed by the dissolution and destruction of the earthy organism; while the underlying, substantial soul-force is still the identical substantial body, awaiting its reunion with the essential spirit.

And now this speculative idea of human death pervades and expounds the New Testament representations of it. To die is graphically presented by either of two compound words in the original — one indicating the dismissing of the spirit, and the other the dismissing of the soul. The meaning is a departing, in each case, of one from the other, and so a separation of the two, whether spoken of the spirit or of the soul. In some cases the same statement is given by a distinct verb in the dismissal, without compounding the spirit in the verb.

We will first take some prominent cases of the dismissal of the spirit: "Jesus cried with a loud voice, and gave up the spirit" (Mark xv. 37); "When Jesus had cried with a loud voice, he said, Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit; and having said thus he gave up the spirit" (Luke xxiii. 46). Distinct verbs are used for the same dismissing of the spirit (Matt. xxvii. 50; John xix. 30). This solemn commending of his spirit to God is sufficient evidence that on

its departing it went to God. Then we have the first martyr, Stephen, who, while being stoned and looking into the open heaven, saw Jesus sitting at the right hand of God, and prayed: "Lord Jesus receive my spirit" (Acts vii. 55-59). In the spirit only is proper personality, and not in the soul; and hence the declaration of Jesus to the dying thief, "This day shalt thou be with me in paradise" (Luke xxiii. 43), should be understood as teaching that his spirit went to heaven; and so, also, it is to be taken that Paul expected his spirit to depart and be with Christ," when he desired such departure rather than life (Phil. i. 23). It is a safe conclusion from the above, that the spirits of the righteous go immediately to Christ in heaven when they die. And the parable of the rich man and Lazarus is in the same way to be interpreted of the personal spirit, and not the impersonal soul. The scene is precedent to the resurrection; for the five brethren are still alive on the earth (Luke xvi. 19). The spirit of Lazarus is borne by angels to the heavenly feast where all good spirits are, and laid in Abraham's bosom, just as the beloved disciple lay on Jesus' breast at the last paschal supper. But the rich man's spirit went to the eternal torment of Gehenna—the proper hell of future punishment. Good spirits thus at death go at once to heaven, and wicked spirits go immediately after death to hell, and the impassable gulf separates them.

We now turn to look at cases where there is said to be the dismissal of the soul. Of both Ananias and Sapphira the original record is, they "gave up the soul" (Acts v. 5, 10). And so of Herod Agrippa, the father of King Agrippa, it is said, "He was eaten of worms, and gave up the soul" (Acts xii. 23). This giving up of the soul was a parting of soul and spirit in death as truly as in giving up the spirit; and both alike would, in the order of nature, be followed by the dissolution of the earthy organism. But, while we fairly conclude from scriptural representation that the spirit at death goes to heaven or hell directly, according to its character, it is left less clear where we are to understand is the abiding-

place of the soul immediately after death. The soul of Christ was in hades after death; but this can determine nothing further than the literal import of the word, as out of sight—beyond perception—in the unseen state. Indeed, the carefulness of statement in David's prophecy, "Neither wilt thou suffer thine Holy One to see corruption" (Ps. xvi. 10), and Peter's very significant comment upon it (Acts ii. 25-31), and Paul's also, to the same purport (Acts xiii. 35-37), strongly intimate that, while Christ's spirit went direct to God, his soul lingered with the uncorrupted earthly organism, and the earthy elements did not dissolve and fall away from the permanent psychical body. There was real death, for there was separation of spirit and soul; but there was no bodily dissolution; and even if it were in the body, the soul was in hades, the unseen world; but it was not left there, since the reunion with the spirit reanimated the dead, yet uncorrupted organism, and the whole being of the Saviour lived again. This is much strengthened from the fact that of Jesus only it is said he dismissed his spirit, while of men it is said they dismiss the soul. And still further, Stephen prayed, "Lord Jesus, receive my spirit," and Jesus doubtless did; and having so prayed, "he fell asleep." Not the departed spirit slept; the soul only rested, and the earthy body crumbled. The soul does not die, nor the psychical body dissolve. Man may kill the body, not the soul; God can destroy both soul and psychical body in hell (Matt. x. 28).

The spirit, then, after death, is in its heaven or hell, and the soul is separate from it, and is somewhere on earth; for the resurrection call is heard "in the graves" (John v. 28, 29), and "the sea gives up the dead which are in it" (Rev. xx. 13). And the spirit and soul, thus widely sundered, come from "death and hades" up again, and in their reunion constitute the incorruptible resurrection-body.

While thus it seems plain that spirit and soul are sundered in dying, and that the spirit goes at once in perpetual rationality to its heavenly reward or its woful retribution, and that the soul remains on earth unseen; yet a question less clearly

decided is, whether the soul has full and uninterrupted consciousness in its separation from the spirit. Old Testament saints, with all their faith in covenant promises and coming spiritual inheritance, had less distinct conceptions of death and the resurrection than were attained through gospel instructions. Their view was through the stillness of the dead in their dark sepulchres as apprehended by sense, yet the revelation made to them, and the inspiration communicated by them, fully recognize continued existence, and expected conscious experiences to come. Deceased patriarchs and kings slept with their fathers, but the sleepers individually were there together. The spirit departed and the soul detained below were dimly conceived, yet a slumbering sense and an enduring personality was held sacred and constant in the Old Testament faith. Still the slumbering part was to them most prominent. So with Job: "Oh that thou wouldst hide me in the grave, that thou wouldst keep me secret until thy wrath be past, that thou wouldst appoint me a set time and deliver me" (Job xiv. 13). David says of his enemies slain in battle: "The stout-hearted are spoiled, they have slept their sleep; and none of the men of might have found their hands" (Ps. lxxvi. 5). And Solomon writes: "There is no work nor device nor knowledge nor wisdom in the grave whither thou goest" (Eccl. ix. 10). Especially is to be noted the solemnly striking scene, when the prophet represents the king of Babylon cut down in his pride and sent into the abodes of the dead: "Hell from beneath is moved for thee, to meet thee at thy coming; it stirreth up the dead for thee, even the chief ones of the earth; it hath raised up from their thrones all the kings of the nations" (Isa. xiv. 9). These kings were quiet and still in their tombs, "lying in glory, every one in his own house," and though roused at his coming, they yet fall back in their slumber, and this mightiest monarch of them all is denied a place among them, and "cast out as a carcass trodden under foot." The dead sleep, but have occasional wakings in partial consciousness.

The New Testament representation is also that of rest or

sleep in death: "Our friend Lazarus sleepeth; but I go that I may awake him out of sleep" (John xi. 11). And a voice cries from heaven to John in his Patmos exile, "Write, blessed are the dead which die in the Lord, from henceforth; yea, saith the Spirit, that they may rest from their labors" (Rev. xiv. 13). The souls of the martyrs cry out from their seclusion "under the altar" for avenging judgments on living persecutors, and though robed for glory it was said to them, "that they should yet rest for a little season" until all coming persecutions shall have ended (Rev. vi. 9-11). In the coming millennial glory "the souls" of beheaded witnesses for Jesus live and reign with Christ after a special resurrection (Rev. xx. 4); but all through the gospel, while the spirit is free the soul, like Stephen's, sleeps or rests. The separate soul, even in wakeful consciousness, could have only animal sense and not spiritual reason, and this may account for the obscurity in which the Bible leaves its experience during its isolation. However it may be in this intermediate state, it has participated with the spirit in forming character in time, and with the spirit must participate in the rewards of eternity.

We have thus, both a speculative and a scriptural conception of the human constitution, and they are manifestly alike, each to each. The conception is no abstract deduction *from* the facts, but an universal and a necessary prerequisite *for* the facts. The facts themselves could not have been, if precisely this constitution of humanity had not first been. It is a truth for the insight of the comprehensive reason, and not at all for the reflective understanding. It fully prepares us for apprehending an intelligent ground of faith for our last general proposition.

III. THE CERTAINTY AND IDENTITY OF A RESURRECTION BODY.

Man's constitution is body, soul, and spirit, and death separates soul and spirit, and dissolves the earthly body, and there can be no *rising again* except as in the rising we have the identical body, soul, and spirit which were in the dying.

Many scripture passages, and some extended paragraphs,

teach the doctrine, and present varied points of view of a general resurrection, but the one comprehensive account is that of the Apostle Paul in 1 Cor. xv. A careful exposition of the entire subject is here made, and a plain, passing commentary on this will admit also all desirable reference to any other scripture notices of the doctrine.

From the beginning of the chapter to the thirty-fifth verse, attention is confined to the facts of Paul's preaching the truth of Christ's crucifixion and resurrection, in accordance with all apostolic example, to the Corinthians, and their confession of faith in the same, and, then, reasoning therefrom to their consequent obligation to accept the faith of the resurrection of all those fallen asleep in Jesus, and to live in accordance with such a belief. The course of the argument here admits of embracing in the conclusion only the resurrection of Christian believers, and were there only this statement of the doctrine we should not have any revelation of the raising up of the wicked from death. Other portions of scripture reveal all we need to know of the rising of the wicked dead ; and what is here given will satisfy all speculation about the identity of all raised human bodies. But well aware that there was, and still would be, much question and scruple about the doctrine, and that, from alleged intrinsic absurdity and self-contradiction in the very conception of raising up the old dead to a new life in the same body, there would be unbelievers, the apostle proceeds to a full philosophical elucidation of the mystery. "How are the dead raised up? And with what body do they come?" (vs. 35). There is herein condensed the many sources of disbelief and perplexity concerning the doctrine of the resurrection, and the questionings about it may be proposed either captiously or honestly. The apostle, in his answer, regards first the "what body," not the "how raised."

"Thou fool, that which thou sowest is not quickened except it die ; and that which thou sowest, thou sowest not that body which shall be, but bare grain, it may chance of wheat or some other grain ; but God giveth it a body as it hath

pleased him, and to every seed his own body" (vs. 36, 37). The whole import is, that a criminal ignorance lies at the source of all your scruples. The old body must die, and the new body must come out of it, and not in elemental matter and form as the old body, but modified according to God's pleasure, and yet to each individual still his own body. The analogy is not to the power working, but to the necessity of the dying of the old that the new may be raised from it. Jesus Christ also used the same analogy, not to the point of teaching how his dead body could be raised to life again, but the necessity for his death and resurrection in order that an extended church of believers might be raised up in the world. "Verily, verily, I say unto you, except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone; but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit" (John xii. 24). All the mystery of how the dead shall be raised is left unsolved by this reference to the sprouting wheat; but the necessity for its dying in order that the fruit may come is made plain, as is also the fact that the raised product is a changed body, and yet an outcome from the old body.

And now that God may make any such modification of elemental matter and form in bodies as he pleases is manifest from what he is everywhere doing, not only in the vegetable world, but in the animal kingdom, and the material bodies on earth and in the heavens. "All flesh is not the same flesh; but there is one kind of flesh of men, another flesh of beasts, another of fishes, and another of birds. There are also celestial bodies, and bodies terrestrial; but the glory of the celestial is one, and the glory of the terrestrial is another. There is one glory of the sun, and another glory of the moon, another glory of the stars; for one star differeth from another star in glory" (vs. 39-41). Universally, God is making bodies differing in splendor and excellency at his discretion. "So also in the resurrection of the dead. It is sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption; it is sown in dishonor, it is raised in glory; it is sown in weakness, it is raised in power; it is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body.

There is a natural body, and there is a spiritual body" (vs. 42-44). We may pass all comment on the changes specified in the preceding verses till we come to the forty-fourth verse, and here is a distinction occurring of much deeper meaning. It discloses the conception already observed in the human constitution of the combined soul and spirit in each individual, and in such a way as to clear up the mystery in the perpetuation of the same body through the transformations of the resurrection. The "natural body" here is not the "*physical* animal," as before referred to by us in 2 Pet. ii. 12, for the merely physical animal has no independent sentiency, as a soul which can survive death and pass essentially over into an imperishable resurrection-state, but that which is sown is a "*psychical* body" of essentially balanced forces held by the sentient life in substantial combination, and which cannot be separated when the elements of corruptible flesh and blood and bones built upon it shall dissolve in death. There can be no creation, as an outer manifestation in space and time, of either pure sense or pure reason, except as they are made to take on and be infused through substantial forces that may be used by them as their essential bodies; and thus in our mortal constitution "there is a psychical body," and "there is a pneumatical body,"—more vernacularly rendered a soul-body and a spirit-body,—which now underlies and sustains our earthy organism of continually fleeting elements. The soul-body is sown in death; the spirit-body is not sown with it, but goes to God at the dying moment. So much is to be understood of the apostle's explanation of the query: "With what bodies do they come?"

He then turns to teach "how the dead are raised up." "And so it is written, the first man Adam was made a living soul; the last Adam was made a quickening spirit. Howbeit that was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural, and afterward that which is spiritual. The first man is of the earth, earthy; the second man is the Lord from heaven" (vs. 45-47). That there is in the human constitution such a psychical body as above affirmed is here conclusively proved

from the inspired record of man's original creation. "The Lord God formed man from the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul" (Gen. ii. 7). The inspiration of the Creator, conferring the rational spirit in the image of God, superinduced the spiritual upon the sentient, and so man's "living soul" was originally a divinely inspired soul. And such constitution of the first Adam as combined spirit and soul is the occasion for introducing the desired statement of how the last Adam was constituted; not as man, with merely the human soul and spirit, but a higher spirituality, which was "a quickening," or a "life-making, spirit." The precise meaning of this superior prerogative of the second Adam is given by the evangelist: "For as the Father raiseth up the dead and quickeneth them, even so the Son quickeneth whom he will" (John v. 21). And to the same purport the same evangelist gives Christ's words again: "I am the resurrection and the life: he that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live" (John xi. 25). Sentient animals preceded man, and man's sentient life is first in order, and the spirit is superinduced upon it in conferring rationality on man; and so the humanity in the last Adam is precedent in order, and the life-making Spirit is superimposed on the human. The first man as soul and spirit was enveloped in an earthy body, and was thus "earth-made"; but the second man — truly human, as earthy, sentient, and spiritual — was yet the pre-existing "Lord from heaven."

And now, just here, we shall attain additional light on this pre-existing spirit of Christ and his power to raise the dead, if we compare this text of 1 Cor. xv. 47 with that in 1 Pet. iii. 18–21: "For Christ also hath once suffered for sins, the just for the unjust, that he might bring us to God; being put to death in the flesh, but quickened by the Spirit: by which also he went and preached to the spirits in prison; which sometime were disobedient, when once the long-suffering of God waited in the days of Noah, while the ark was a preparing, wherein few, that is eight souls, were saved by water.

The like figure whereunto even baptism doth also now save us (not the putting away of the filth of the flesh, but the answer of a good conscience toward God) by the resurrection of Jesus Christ; who is gone into heaven, and is on the right hand of God; angels and powers being made subject unto him." The two scriptures reciprocally elucidate each other. In Peter we have the quickening which raised Christ from death, and in Corinthians we have that which raises all the dead. Christ was "quickenened by the Spirit"; but in order unmistakably to designate this Spirit by which Christ was quickened, Peter refers to the clearest and earliest case on record where the Jehovah-Spirit had wrought in the world, and affirms that the spirit which quickened the crucified, dead and buried body of Christ was the Spirit which preached to spirits in prison in the days of Noah, and so his own pre-existing Spirit, and nothing that pertained to his mere humanity. Such design in Peter's reference to the times of Noah determines the interpretation to be given of his version of the Mosaic account found in Gen. vi., about which there has been so much diversity and perplexity. It must be understood of what Christ's pre-existing Spirit did in Noah's days. The account gives the licentious intercourse of the sons of Seth, called "sons of God, with the daughters of Cain, called "daughters of men," at the early peopling of the earth; and this rejection of religious restraint induced the most ambitious and monstrous crimes, constituting the "giants" and "mighty men" of those days. And Jehovah said: "My Spirit shall not always strive with man, for that he also is flesh" (vs. 3). Man was so given to the lusts of the flesh, the divine honor demanded a cessation of the gracious spiritual striving, and God fixed the period of forbearance by saying: "Yet his days shall be an hundred and twenty years." This final determination of Jehovah shut up the spirits of the antediluvians to certain coming retribution, just as his vindictive purpose reserves the angels that kept not their first estate "in everlasting chains under darkness unto the great day" (Jude vs. 6). To these spirits, im-

prisoned in the period of fixed forbearance, the Jehovah-Spirit went and preached in and by the preaching of Noah (2 Pet. ii. 5), and saved the few, eight souls, of the family of Noah in the ark from the flood of water—a like typical figure of salvation as that of Christian baptism through the resurrection and ascension and reigning of Jesus Christ. This “striving” and “preaching” while the ark was preparing was by the same Spirit that “quickened” Jesus’ dead body, and also that which Paul, in the Corinthian Epistle, says made “the last Adam a quickening spirit,” and also “the last Adam the Lord from heaven.” “How, then, are the dead raised up?” Jesus Christ answers: “I have power to lay down my life, and I have power to take it again” (John x. 18). “This is the will of him that sent me, that every one which seeth the Son and believeth on him may have everlasting life, and I will raise him up at the last day” (John v. 40). And thus both questions of “what body” and “how raised” are fairly answered.

But though Jesus Christ be “a quickening spirit,” and “the Lord from heaven,” and has “power” to raise the dead, as he will, yet in this change of the dying and the rising there is still farther difficulty. “As is the earthy, such are they also that are earthy; and as is the heavenly, such are they also that are heavenly. And as we have borne the image of the earthy, we shall also bear the image of the heavenly” (vs. 48, 49). Jesus’ human body was earthy, as ours is earthy; his pre-existent personality was heavenly, as we are to become heavenly; here is a glorious transformation, but how shall the body pass from what it has been to what it shall be?

“Now this I say, brethren, that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God; neither doth corruption inherit incorruption. Behold, I show you a mystery; we shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed, in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump; for the trumpet shall sound, and the dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed. For this corruption must put on incor-

ruption, and this mortal must put on immortality. So when this corruptible shall have put on incorruption, and this mortal shall have put on immortality, then shall be brought to pass the saying that is written, Death is swallowed up in victory" (vs. 50-54). Here is farther explanation about the "coming body." To suppose that the earthy elements making the flesh and bones of our terrestrial organism constitute the proper body, and have in themselves its permanent identity and individuality, is to introduce absurdity and self-contradiction into the very conception of the resurrection, and preclude the possibility of any intelligent faith that the same dying body shall be perpetuated in the rising body, and enter upon an eternal spiritual inheritance. Material flesh and blood continually change their elements, passing on and off, while the essential body abides, and this corruptible "cannot inherit incorruption." The earthy dead bodies, and the earthy bodies that when the trump shall sound shall not then have died, neither of them can "bear the image of the heavenly." The apostle directly and very plainly applies the conception of the human constitution here just as we have before considered it.

The psychical body of substantial forces, which the sentient soul pervades and holds in permanent combination, is essentially the body of the man, and on which the fleeting elements of the earth-made organism gather and successively pass away; and this, with its material envelopment, at death it is that is sown as the grain in the ground. At the sound of the last trumpet the separated spirit reunites with the soul, and this essential psychical body, with its earthy elements left behind, is "raised incorruptible"; and because the spirit henceforth keeps and guides it, this psychical body, as sown, becomes in the resurrection the glorious spiritual body. Instantly as the dead arise, the material flesh and blood of the living generation dissolves in "the twinkling of an eye," and the soul and spirit not having been separate in death hold still their unity and integrity in the case of each individual. The entire human family of dead and living at the

resurrection morning stand thus together, immortal and indestructible, and universally "death is swallowed up in victory." Here closes this wonderful apostolic exposition of the general resurrection.

This raising the dead and immediately thereafter changing the living is in accordance with another representation by the same apostle: "For this we say unto you by the word of the Lord, that we which are alive and remain unto the coming of the Lord shall not prevent them which are asleep. For the Lord himself shall descend from heaven with a shout, with the voice of the archangel, and with the trump of God; and the dead in Christ shall rise first. Then we which are alive and remain shall be caught up together with them in the clouds, to meet the Lord in the air; and so shall we be ever with the Lord" (1 Thess. iv. 15-17). The like order is here as before; the dead in Christ first arise, then the living are changed, and both enter together the heavenly state. And so also we get help to interpret the account of Christ's resurrection. At his crucifixion the parted spirit went to God in heaven. The soul staid behind, and may have still retained the fleshly organism about it which "saw no corruption," and remained there in the unseen state, as hades, till his resurrection. From the necessity of giving sensible testimony to his rising, the reunion of soul and spirit quickened the whole earthy body of "flesh and bones," and Jesus spoke and walked and ate and was handled as before his death. But though raised in flesh and blood, as was Lazarus, he died not again as Lazarus did. The earthy part was dissolved at his ascension, "and a cloud received him out of sight," just as at the last day the earthy bodies of living saints are changed, when caught up to meet the raised dead "in the clouds."

We have yet another remarkable passage, in Paul's second Epistle to the Corinthians, generally inclusive of the condition and experience of good men after death, although the end in view does not induce to the particular distinguishing between soul and spirit, nor to their separation in death and reunion

at the resurrection. It assumes the human constitution to be, as so carefully represented by him in his first Epistle, a combination of an earthy body, sentient soul, and rational spirit, and uses so much of this conception as is needed for his immediate design, without regard to the old difficulties about "how the dead are raised," and "with what bodies they come," which had been already obviated by him. Both what he here uses and what he passes over corroborate the truths taught in the more minute specifications of the first Epistle. In the early part of the second Epistle he is defending the authority of his apostolic office and maintaining the consistency of his apostolic deportment against the calumnies of opposers; and, among other appropriate considerations, he appeals to their consciousness of the sincerity and fidelity of his plain preaching the truth to the Corinthians, and the perpetual persecutions thereby induced, and then he proceeds to state the abundant consolation he finds under his trials from the clear anticipation of the "eternal weight of glory" which is to follow. And it is in this connection we have the remarkable passage referred to above.

"For we know that if our earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved, we have a building of God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens" (2 Cor. v. 1). The body of flesh, blood, and bone in which is our terrestrial abode, and where we pass our probationary life, is but a frail tent, fabricated of perishing materials, and if at any time it shall be taken to pieces, we have another house not manufactured of dissolving elements, but God-built and eternal in heaven. In the contemplation of this there was sufficient support for every affliction, and he expands the theme to the Corinthians, as he habitually had it in his own spirit amid his perils, and in the prisons to which his apostolic fidelity had so often brought him. And if we will keep close to the expression and intention of the apostle in this communication, we may set before us the very vision which so sustained him in his persecutions, for our support in all terrestrial tribulations.

"For in this we groan, earnestly desiring to be clothed

upon with our house which is from heaven ; n so be that being clothed we shall not be found naked. For we that are in this tabernacle do groan being burdened ; not that we would be unclothed, but clothed upon, that mortality might be swallowed up of life" (vs. 2-4). The literal meaning is here as closely kept by saying "covered with our house" as "clothed upon with our house," and the unseemly figure of taking a house as a garment should, if practicable, be by all means avoided. In our common rendering this violation of metaphor, with other more serious errors, has manifestly been occasioned by the mistake that "the building of God, a house not made with hands," means the resurrection-body, just as "the earthly house of this tabernacle" means our terrestrial organism. But such meaning is inadmissible. The body raised is the body that has been sown, which is the "psychical body," yet not inclusive of the perishable elements of "flesh and blood, which cannot inherit the kingdom of God." Nor can the several additional solecisms hence following be tolerated ; viz. that the resurrection body is put over the flesh and blood organism ; and that while the earthly body is here in probation, the resurrection body is in heaven, and to come "from heaven" ; and that living saints "earnestly desire" to have the heavenly body first put on to the earthly body, lest in the interval between earth and heaven the saint "shall be found naked." If we strictly observe the rules for metaphorical representation, and keep in clear view the apostle's intention to show how he was supported in his official burdens and persecutions, we may avoid all these improprieties and positive errors.

The following free paraphrase will give correctly what we apprehend to be the apostolic meaning. While in this perishable tent of our earthly body we continually suffer, both from its own frailty and its insufficient protection ; and we earnestly desire to be sheltered in our house which is from heaven, since thus protected we shall no more be open to these afflictions. Not that we want merely to get away from bodily trials, but we long for the home where all mortal ills are

lost in endless life. The personality here, "groaning" and "earnestly desiring," is the rational human spirit seeking for immortal heavenly rest, and there is no occasion for the sharp distinctions made between the *psychical* and *pneumatical* in order to explain the severance of soul and spirit in death and identical reunion in the resurrection, as had been the case in his former Epistle (1 Cor. xv. 44). Not any question is here about sameness of body, and only the consideration of a better dwelling; and the entire figure is kept throughout by the passing from a frail and suffering residence to a permanent and safe abode with no notion of a body put off or put on like a garment. This was Paul's habit of mind and method of relief amid his trials, to look away from all perils in the house below to the house above, and so to kindle and keep in constant intensity a "desire to depart and be with Christ" as better than anything earthly.

Even Old Testament saints confessed they were strangers and pilgrims on earth, and that they desired a better country, that is, a heavenly (Heb. xi. 13-16). And Abraham looked also "for a city which hath foundations, whose builder and maker is God" (vs. 10). How much more clearly and fully could New Testament saints anticipate going from the earthly to the heavenly house, since Jesus, on the eve of his crucifixion, had said to his defenceless disciples: "In my Father's house are many mansions; if it were not so, I would have told you. I go to prepare a place for you. And if I go and prepare a place for you, I will come again and receive you to myself, that where I am there ye may be also" (John xiv. 2, 3). The earthly tent falls in ruins; the spiritual personality goes out from it into the God-built house — the "Father's house" — which has its prepared mansions sufficient for all his spiritual children.

"Now he that hath wrought us for the self-same thing is God, who also hath given unto us the earnest of the Spirit. Therefore we are always confident, knowing that whilst we are at home in the body we are absent from the Lord; for we walk by faith, not by sight: We are confident, I say, and

willing rather to be absent from the body, and to be present with the Lord. Wherefore we labor, that, whether present or absent, we may be accepted of him" (vs. 5-9). God has wrought in us, and prepared us for this heavenly house, just as he has prepared this abode for us, and has given the pledge of his Spirit for our inheritance of it; hence our confidence of its possession. And we know that while our home is in the earthly body we are exiled from the home where the Lord is; for we journey onward to it in faith, and have not yet its fruition; and in this our confidence we choose rather to be exiled from this terrestrial home, and be at home where the Lord is, in the heavenly mansions. His approbation alone gives home-contentment anywhere, and thus our great effort is to be accepted by him, whether in the heavenly or the earthly house.

"For we must all appear before the judgment-seat of Christ; that every one may receive the things done in his body, according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad. Knowing, therefore, the terror of the law, we persuade men; but we are made manifest unto God: and I trust also are made manifest in your consciences" (vs. 10, 11). The apostle evidently expected, when he went out from the perishing earthly house, to go at once to the heavenly home, and there be in communion with the Lord. But his acceptance by the Lord, and the reasons for it, must be made publicly manifest, and the retribution rendered for every deed done in the body, good and bad, must be openly shown to be righteous; hence "all must appear before the judgment-seat of Christ." It would have been a needless repetition to have introduced here the particulars of the resurrection before the judgment. The apostle had already, in his first Epistle to them, taught fully this doctrine, and let them know that in the human constitution there was a "psychical body" and a "pneumatical body"; that the psychical was sown in death, and the spiritual lived with God; that at the resurrection there was to be a reunion of soul and spirit combined in an imperishable body — the same that had lived on earth, with

its material elements of flesh and blood fallen off and passed away ; and he omits all representation of this resurrection scene, that he may contemplate the more intently the personal going out from the earthly to the heavenly home ; but it is important to admonish them of the great and terrible judgment-day which is coming, as a motive for constant solicitude to have Christ's approbation. He and they were to pass this rigid scrutiny, and the terror of it made him faithful to persuade, and should make them prompt in yielding to his persuasion. He knew that this his apostolic fidelity was manifest to God, and he also trusted that he had their consciences as witnesses of his sincerity.

And now, interpreted as above, this passage of 2 Cor. v. fully accords with 1 Cor. xv., and goes directly to confirm our above idea of humanity as the constant truth of man's constitution running through the scriptures. On earth, man is made up of a psychical and a spiritual body in a perishable flesh-and-blood body ; in death, his individuality is impaired by the separation of soul and spirit, but his personality is preserved entire in the spirit's constant rationality ; and in the New Jerusalem the reunion of soul and spirit gives the imperishable resurrection-body in the same essential individuality that had stood under the fleshly elements, and the putting off of this corruption has been the putting on of the incorruptible. With this comprehensive conception of humanity we harmonize all scripture declarations descriptive of human probationary life and destined retribution. The facts of man's creation, his trial and fall, his renewed probation under a Mediator, and final return to dust, his state after death, and his standing up again in the resurrection, and then the judgment-day and eternal retribution,—all are seen to be harmonious parts in one design, self-consistent, and perfectly parallel with the most rigid exactions of reason and conscience. The Bible view and the most comprehensive speculative view of human being and destiny are truly one and the same in the history of the past, the experience of the present, and the opening of the unending future.

ARTICLE II.

THE ENDORSEMENT OF THE SEPTUAGINT.

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Did the writers of the New Testament endorse the Septuagint Version?

This question is often answered, without hesitation, in the affirmative; and the reason commonly given is, that these writers have generally quoted the Septuagint translation, instead of the Hebrew original. There is not, however, perfect agreement among scholars upon this latter point.

One¹ affirms that of three hundred and fifty quotations of the Old Testament in the New, there are not more than fifty which differ from the Sept.; while another² reckons one hundred and thirty-six citations (or rather Old Test. passages cited), and says that of these there are seventy-two in which the New Test. exactly corresponds with the Hebrew, and but seventeen in which the Sept. is followed, though it diverges to some extent from the Hebrew. And yet another³ says that of two hundred and sixty-six citations there are but six passages which differ materially from the Hebrew.

Believing that these diverse statements are not necessarily contradictory, and wishing, for our own satisfaction, to ascertain the truth, and especially to determine the justice of Dr. Hessey's claim, we have been led to attempt anew a comparison of the Hebrew and Sept., with the citations in the New Testament.

We were forewarned, indeed, by Ayre, in Horne,⁴ that "the uncertainty attending all such attempts [i.e. to construct tables representing this agreement] is too great to render a

¹ Grinfield's Apology for the Septuagint, p. 145.

² Fairbairn's Herm. Man., p. 452.

³ Hessey's Moral Difficulties of the Bible (Second Series), p. 250.

⁴ Introduction (13th ed.), Vol. ii. p. 178.

classification of the kind of practical use"; and by Thrupp, in Smith,¹ that "It could only result in failure were we to attempt any merely mechanical account of variations from the Old Test. text, which are essentially not mechanical."

But while we freely admitted that the tables formerly published in Horne were far from satisfactory, inasmuch as the work was not very thoroughly done, and the New Test. text used was the Textus Receptus; and while we saw that many facts in the comparison could not be expressed mathematically, we did not see that these considerations should restrain us from reducing to mathematical form those facts which *could* be thus exhibited. We thought that it would be possible, on the basis of certain specified texts, to determine *exactly how many* distinct quotations in the New Test. agreed literally with the Sept., and approximately how many of these did not agree substantially with the Hebrew; that it would be possible to determine how many quotations agreed exactly in sense with the Hebrew, and how many of these did not agree substantially with the Sept.

We thought that the determination of such questions as these could not fail to afford us aid in deciding, further, whether the New Test. writers did generally quote the Sept.; and that, in any case, such data must be more valuable than those assumptions and *indefinite* mathematical statements which are often made the basis of an answer to this question.

We have reckoned two hundred and fifty-three direct quotations of the Old Test. in the New. Some of these might, perhaps, reasonably be rejected, and some others might be added, but these include those which the writers of the New Test. claim as quotations, and present a fair sample, to say the least.

The New Test. text used is that of Tischendorf's Eighth Critical Edition, and the Sept. text is the Roman, with the single exception that we quote Heb. i. 6, from Psalm xcvii. 7; though the exact words of the New Test. occur in the

¹ Dictionary of the Bible, p. 2239 b.

Roman text in Deut. xxxii. 43. We do so because the words are here wanting in the Hebrew, and the reading of Cod. Vat. at this place is more diverse from the New Test. than is that in the Psalms.

It is, of course, to be remembered, in comparing the figures we give, that the citations differ much in extent; the longest, in Heb. viii. 8, etc., being more than fifty times as long as the shortest in Rom. vii. 7.

We have made the New Test. text our standard of comparison, marking the Old Test. texts according to their agreement with it in a scale from zero to eleven. Those passages in the Sept. which are identical both in sense and form with the New Test. we have marked eleven. Ten, in both Sept. and Hebrew, indicates identity in sense, such, in the case of the Hebrew, as we might expect if those who quoted had no knowledge of the Sept., but translated with literal exactness from the Hebrew. All marked above four agree in substance with the New Test., and those below five do not. Inasmuch as the vowel-points of the Masorites did not exist when these citations were made, we have not felt bound to adhere to them in all cases. We give a summary of the results:

	Whole N. T.	Epistle to Heb.
Total number of citations,	253	33
Marked 10 in Hebrew,	77	13
9 in Hebrew,	56	8
between 9 and 4 in Hebrew,	100	10
below 5 in Hebrew,	20	2
11 in the Sept.,	58	9
10 in the Sept.,	23	5
9 in the Sept.,	50	8
between 9 and 4 in the Sept.,	93	10
below 5 in the Sept.,	29	1
10 in Hebrew and 11 in the Sept.,	46	9
10 in Hebrew and between 4 and 11 in the Sept.,	29	4
10 in Hebrew and below 5 in the Sept.,	2	0
9 in Hebrew and below 5 in the Sept.,	4	0
above 4 in Hebrew and below 5 in the Sept.,	14	1
11 in the Sept. and between 4 and 10 in Hebrew,	13	0
11 in the Sept. and below 5 in Hebrew,	0	0

	Whole N. T.	Epistle to Heb.
Marked 10 in the Sept. and below 5 in Hebrew,	0	0
9 in the Sept. and below 5 in Hebrew,	3	1
above 4 in the Sept. and below 5 in Hebrew,	5	2
below 5 in both Hebrew and the Sept.,	15	0

It thus appears that those quotations which are substantially identical with the Sept. are *four* more than those which thus agree with the Hebrew, but that the quotations which in the Sept. do not substantially agree with the New Test. are *nine* more than those which in the Hebrew thus disagree.

In the Hebrew, the extreme cases of substantial agreement are with the quotations in Matt. xiii. 14; Acts xxviii. 26 and Eph. vi. 2, 3; and the extreme cases on the other side of the line, or below five, are with Acts xiii. 41, xv. 16, and Heb. x. 5. In the Sept. the line of substantial agreement is drawn between such passages as those quoted in Rom. x. 11; xi. 8, marked five, and such as are quoted in Matt. xxvii. 46 and Rom. x. 15, marked four.

While there are no passages which are marked ten or eleven in the Sept. and below five in the Hebrew, there are two which are ten in Hebrew and below five in the Sept. And while there are but five passages which are above four in the Sept. and below five in the Hebrew, there are fourteen which are above four in the Hebrew and below five in the Septuagint.

It is often said that the Sept. is constantly quoted in the Epistle to the Hebrews. Tholuck¹ speaks of "the universal use of the Sept. instead of the Hebrew text" in this Epistle, and hence concludes that it is not infallible scripture. We have given, in the second column of our summary, the results of an examination of these quotations. The most that can be said, is, that the Sept. is quoted somewhat more frequently than the Hebrew. Even this statement is rendered doubtful by a consideration of the character and extent of the quotation at viii. 8, etc. It comprises more than three times as much matter as the average of New Test. quotations, is more than twenty-five times as extensive as some others in this

¹ Bibliotheca Sacra, Vol. xi. p. 612.

Epistle, and includes more than one-sixth of the matter therein quoted. It is not, however, identical with the Sept. in sense, but is an exact translation of the Hebrew throughout, with the exception that the words, "saith the Lord," are in the New Test. omitted at the close of vs. 11. How any one can speak of "the *universal* use of the Sept. *instead* of the Hebrew," in view of such passages as this, and the quotations in x. 30 and xii. 20, 21, we cannot comprehend.

It may be said, indeed, that passages may be quoted from the Sept. though its text is not given with literal exactness. True, but how much more likely would translations from the Hebrew be to depart from literal exactness?

An inspection of our summary fully justifies the language of Dr. Hessey, but affords nothing contradictory to the statements of Grinfield or Fairbairn. These last, however, give us *partial* statements which *seem to be complete*, and which are thus, though not false, misleading. Fairbairn is not just to the Sept., for he does not tell us definitely how many quotations agree with the Sept. Grinfield, on the other hand, like many others, fails to inform us how many quotations agree with the Hebrew.

We may say then, that on the whole, the New Test. citations, according to the texts which we have used, agree somewhat better with the Hebrew than with the Sept.

We cannot, therefore, adopt the view of those who, finding it much easier to compare Greek with Greek than Greek with Hebrew, and observing that the Sept. text very much resembles the New Test. quotations (and especially in that it is in the same language), leap to the conclusion that the writers of the New Test. quote the Sept. almost invariably. This would be very much like the inference that a man must be derived from his mother's brother, rather than his mother, since he resembles him in almost as many particulars, and above all is of the same sex.

In regard to the texts which we have used, we may remark, that evidently the Jews, who were the almost sole custodians of the Hebrew Bible from the time of Christ to that of our

oldest Hebrew mss., if they altered the text at all, would be far more likely to depart from the New Test. text in those passages which were quoted than to conform to it.

The text of the Sept. is as yet undetermined. As Dr. Davidson says,¹ "The text of the version never attained a stable condition." The Roman text is at present a *textus receptus*, but it was edited in 1586, under the supervision of the pope, by men who thought it an inspired version, but useful chiefly as an aid to the interpretation of the Latin Vulgate and the holy Fathers, and who everywhere exhibit the critical acumen which we might expect to find in men of that age, holding such views.

Mr. Selwyn² has, like many others, assumed that it is identical with Cod. Vat. 1209. But, as Mr. Abbot has said,³ "This is a grave error. It is safe to say that in the forms of proper names alone, it differs from the Vat. ms. in more than one thousand places." Tischendorf, in the *Prolegomena* to his edition of the Sept., though quoting from the preface to the Roman edition what is there said concerning a literal transcription of Cod. Vat., yet says in conclusion,⁴ "And thus has been clearly proved, what was for a long period readily suspected, that the Roman editors did not recede from the (Vat.) ms. in the orthography merely, as they professed, but also in the readings in a great many instances."

Mr. Selwyn finds upon comparing the Roman text with ten other editions and mss. through the first eight chapters of Exodus, that it is more unlike the Hebrew than any of them are, and hence concludes that it is nearer the true text, and that their better agreement with the Hebrew has arisen from Hexaplar mss. But a comparison of the Roman text with a fac-simile of Cod. Vat.⁵ through the first eighth of these eight chapters gives us thirty-one variations of Cod. Vat. from the Roman text. Of the three which are significant two agree with the Hebrew, and the other is indeterminate

¹ Biblical Criticism, Vol. i. p. 197.

² Smith's Dictionary of the Bible, Art. "Septuagint."

³ p. 2913 b.

⁴ Bibliotheca Sacra, Vol. x. p. 90.

⁵ Vercellone and Cozza, Rome, 1869.

on account of difference of idiom. If we might venture to multiply here by eight, we might find Cod. Vat. to differ nearly as much from the Roman text as do some of the editions and mss. which he mentions.

The variations of the Roman text from Cod. Vat. were surely not derived from older mss., for the ms. next in age used by the editors, was of the eighth or ninth century.

A collation of the citations in the Epistle to the Hebrews (which in view of the language of Tholuck above we may presume to be a fair specimen) with the three oldest mss. of the Sept. accessible; viz. Codices Vat., Sin., and Alex. gives us the following :

	Vat.	Sin.	Alex.
Total number of variations in,	24	48	¹ 47
Total significant variations,	8	32	36
Number of latter agreeing with Hebrew,	4	13	8
Number of latter differing from Hebrew,	1	9	12
Number of latter agreeing with New Test.,	2	11	20
Number of latter differing from New Test.,	4	17	13

Thus it is seen that the earliest authorities, the Vat. and Sin., differ from the Roman text, in that they agree more nearly with the Hebrew but are more unlike the New Test., while the Alex., which is later, differs in that it agrees better with the New Test. but is more unlike the Hebrew. We naturally infer that mss. earlier than the Vat. and Sin. would, if we had them, exhibit a greater contrast with the Roman Text and the later mss. than these do, and hence that the Sept. text of the time of the apostles would differ yet more from the Roman text in the same respects; viz. that it would resemble the Hebrew more and the New Test. less in those quotations in which the New Test. differed from the Hebrew.

A consideration of the history of that period leads us to the same result. The New Test. text was current for more than two hundred years before our oldest mss. were written or Origen's Hexapla was copied. It was commonly bound in

¹ The readings of Cod. Alex. were taken from Tischendorf's Sept., hence the variations of orthography do not all appear. The other mss. were collated in fac-simile.

the same volume with the Sept., and this Greek Bible was to the mass of Christians their only scriptures. Naturally the Sept. text drifted, in those passages which differed from the New Test., away from the unknown Hebrew, and toward the well-known New Test. text. When Christian scholars began to learn Hebrew the tendency, in some localities, was in the opposite direction, as the character of Cod. Alex., and others mentioned by Mr. Selwyn, indicates. This is all which his facts can prove.

Thus many passages in which the quotations seem to be so closely conformed to the Sept. but deviate from the Hebrew, may be simply examples of assimilation of the Sept. to the New Test. in ignorance of the Hebrew. Christians of that age would certainly reverence the words of Jesus and his apostles quite as much as those of the Old Test. writers, and would also feel much more sure of the purity of their New Test. than of their Old Test. text, since the former had been just now committed to writing, but the latter was known to be a translation and often transcribed.

The fact which appears in our summary above, that the Sept. surpasses the Hebrew in substantial identity with the New Test. but not in substantial agreement in sense, is one which needs explanation, and it can hardly be accounted for on any other hypothesis than this.

There are also passages which seem to have been thus tampered with. In Rom. iii. 10 etc., we have a quotation of passages evidently gathered from six different places in the Old Test. But in the Roman text of Psalm xiii., where, as all agree, the first one of these occurs, we find the rest interpolated in exactly the order of the New Test. Scholars are generally agreed as to the explanation of this phenomenon.

In Heb. i. 6 we read "*προσκυνησάτωσαν αὐτῷ πάντες ἄγγελοι θεοῦ*," and in the Roman text of Deut. xxxii. 43, exactly the same words. Cod. Sin. does not now contain the Pentateuch, but Cod. Vat. reads "*προσκυνησάτωσαν αὐτῷ υἱοὶ θεοῦ*," in Deut. xxxii. 43, thus betraying an assimilation of this kind, later even than the time of Cod. Vat. Many

such changes must, from the nature of the case, ever remain undetected ; but there are doubtless many which patient investigation would reveal.

Jesus, quoting Gen. ii. 24, says, " And they twain shall be one flesh " (Matt. xix. 5). The words for " twain " being found in the Roman text of the Sept., but not in the Hebrew, it has of course been said that Jesus has here endorsed the Sept. Some have even understood this to imply that Jesus thought the whole Sept. Old Test., including its senseless paraphrases of Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Daniel, to be inspired scripture. And, indeed, if he deliberately preferred the Sept. to the Hebrew, it may be difficult to escape this conclusion. But is there not another alternative ? If Jewish translators had naturally added these words three hundred years before, because seen to be so obviously implied in the Hebrew, and, unchallenged and approved by the Jewish nation, these words were now received as authoritative scripture, is it not strange that their bearing upon this question of divorce had not been perceived before ? Is it not strange that Jesus' unanswerable argument, which was thus but a quotation of words long familiar, was not anticipated, and thus the attempt to ensnare him seen from the first to be futile ? If, however, the Jews, though acquainted with this passage in the Sept., esteemed the Hebrew the supreme authority, and Jesus founded his argument upon the Sept., would not his deadly enemies have objected to the propriety of his quotation, as indeed their posterity afterward did when Christians quoted the same Septuagint ?

We say, Jesus evidently here assumes his divine right to use scripture according to its real meaning ; and, as in the case of the words " at the bush," to develop that which was latent in the word, but which, when once developed, could not be gainsaid nor resisted. We would ascribe the wisdom of this exegesis to Jesus, rather than to the Sept. translators ; and the existence of *οἱ δύο* in the Roman text to the mistaken zeal of a mediaeval transcriber. Especially when we remember that this passage has perished from Cod. Vat. (as

well as Cod. Sin.), and that the compilers of the Roman text used, upon this portion of the Pentateuch, no ms. so old as the ninth century.¹

Another question arises: *Did the writers of the New Test. quote the Sept. intentionally?* Of course, if they did not, they did not endorse it as such. The masses of the Jewish people of that age must have gained their knowledge of the scriptures chiefly through the reading and interpretation in the synagogue. This instruction began in early youth and continued through life; and by means of it, the devout Jew, cultivating his memory as we need not at this day, would become very familiar with the Old Test. scriptures, the sole text-book used in his education, and the subject-matter of almost all his investigations and discussions. He might possess and read for himself a ms. of this book; but, on account of the expense involved, this privilege would depend more upon his wealth than upon his intelligence. He did not greatly feel the need of this ms. copy when a large portion of this law was read to him every Sabbath, if not every day; and when he could obtain at any time any information he might wish from men supported by the people and set apart by God for the special work of interpreting this book; when, indeed, his nearest neighbor might, upon request, repeat to him whole sections of this treasured word. In such an atmosphere as this the writers of the New Test. were born and lived. Moses of old time had in every city them that preached him, being read in the synagogues every Sabbath-day.

As the Hebrew was read, it was translated into the vernacular of the people who heard.² This would generally be Greek throughout the Roman empire. In Palestine it might sometimes be Aramaic, but commonly (as a Greek New Test. intended for similar public reading proves) it was Greek even here. Those who read and interpreted would be acquainted with the Sept. version. They would find it very

¹ See *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Vol. ix. p. 589, 590, note 1.

² See Lee on Inspiration, p. 359, note 3, and Kitto's Cyclop. of Bib. Lit., Art. "Synagogue."

useful in this translation and interpretation, and would borrow its words, its phrases, and its sentences. These would be stored in the memories of a Greek-speaking people, and become to them an integral part of their Old Test. scriptures. Judging, also, from our own observation, not to say experience, we should expect a farther modification of phraseology in their daily quotations in conversation and worship.

Now, suppose men thus educated to engage in a work which would require them to quote the Old Test. scriptures in public preaching and private conversation habitually, and for many years; and then, at last, to commit this preaching and conversation to writing. Suppose the Spirit of Truth to bring all things to their remembrance which Jesus had spoken to them, which were written in the Law of Moses and the Prophets and the Psalms concerning him,—all things, indeed, which pertain unto life and godliness,—and so to guide them into all truth that they shall approve no error, but shall have in many cases a deeper spiritual insight than the original writers had; and we shall be able to give a better explanation of the phenomena of New Test. quotations than we could give on any other hypothesis. And yet all this might occur without any intention to quote or approve the Sept. We could only say that the Inspirer of the New Test. considered those passages which agreed with the Sept., whether derived from it directly, indirectly, or not at all, to be a satisfactory expression of his divine truth.

In confirmation of this we may observe that though the reading of the Old Test. is mentioned at least twenty-one times in the New, there is not one undoubted example of reading which was not either in the synagogue or by a learned man. We cannot be sure concerning the Ethiopian eunuch, but it is very probable, to say the least, that he was a learned man. The word translated “searched” in Acts xvii. 11 may mean “read,” but it is not the same word as that used of the Jews who sent Pharisees to John the Baptist, and who are thereby proved to have been learned (comp. John i. 19, 24 with v. 33, 39). It often means simply “sift,” or, as it is twice translated in 1 Cor. ii. 15, “judge.”

How remarkable, if the apostles possessed MSS. of the Old Test., and read for themselves, that in all his recorded expositions to them of the Old Test., Jesus never once reminds them of what they had read, or counsels them to read those words which testify of him ; but tells them (Matt. v. 21, etc.), quoting, in part at least, the Decalogue, "Ye have heard," etc., and advises them (Matt. xxiii. 3) to "observe and do all whatsoever" the learned Scribes and Pharisees, though "hypocrites, fools, and blind," *bid* them to observe. At the same time he often reminds these learned men of what *they* had *read*, and advises them to "search the scriptures" (John v. 39).

Again, these apparent quotations of the Sept. are often very peculiar. Warrington¹ has conclusively shown that it is impossible to assign good reasons for the choice of the Sept. in those instances in which it seems to be preferred. Fairbairn² says of the Sept. : "Sometimes it is followed with great regularity for a series of passages, and then it is suddenly abandoned, at places where its rendering is not less, or is even more, exact. Thus at Matt. xxviii. 9, 10. So again at John xv. 25, the Sept. is departed from where it literally renders the original, but in the two following citations it is implicitly followed." He admits that this treatment of the Sept. is to him inexplicable.

If the writers of the New Test. quoted from MSS., how shall we explain the fact that in many passages they depart from both Hebrew and Sept., as in Matt. xxi. 5, 13, and in many other places ?

Shall we suppose a corruption of our MSS. of both Hebrew and Sept. texts, and, as would be often required, both to the *same extent*, and in the *same way* ? We might about as easily thus explain *all* variations of the New Test. citations from the Old Test. texts. Besides this, it has been observed³ that the writers of the New Test. sometimes agree with each other with great verbal exactness in passages in which they

¹ The Inspiration of Scripture, chap. 3.

² Herm. Man., p. 455.

³ Lee on Inspiration, p. 358.

agree with neither the Sept. nor the Hebrew (comp. Matt. xi. 10 with Luke vii. 27, and Mark i. 2; also 1 Pet. ii. 6, 8 with Rom. ix. 33).

These facts cannot be explained on the supposition that these writers quoted directly from mss. in their possession, but all becomes plain and consistent on the hypothesis which we have suggested above.

We therefore conclude: 1st, That, on the whole, the Hebrew text agrees more nearly with the New Test. citations than the Roman text of the Sept. does. 2d, That the Roman text is not the same as that of our earliest and best mss., and doubtless differs still more from the Sept. text of the time of the apostles. 3d, That it would appear that many passages in the Sept. which agree literally with the New Test. quotations have been assimilated to the New Test. text. 4th, That this assimilation often involved a departure from the Hebrew. 5th, That thus the true text of the Sept. would doubtless differ more from the New Test. citations than the Roman text does, and thus much more than the Hebrew text does. 6th, That we do not find any positive evidence that the writers of the New Test. used mss. of either the Sept. or the Hebrew. 7th, That we find much to indicate that these writers obtained their knowledge of the Old Test. scriptures chiefly through the oral teaching of others. 8th, That we also find evidence that they have often quoted this oral scripture as guided by the Holy Spirit. 9th, That we do not find any difficulty in supposing that they *always* quoted the Old Test. scriptures thus. 10th, That we find it impossible to explain *all* the peculiarities of New Test. citations on the hypothesis of a direct quotation from mss. 11th, That we find no decisive proof that the writers of the New Test. ever intended to quote the Sept. version. 12th, That finally, we fail to find the evidence that the writers of the New Test., or their Divine Guide, have endorsed as inspired scripture, or as a faithful translation, the Sept. version of the Old Testament.

ARTICLE III.

RECENT CRITICAL TREATMENT OF THE PSALTER.

BY REV. JAMES F. MCCURDY, PRINCETON, N. J.

THE critical attention bestowed upon the Psalter has always been out of proportion to the admiration and reverence with which that book has been regarded. And it is also worthy of remark that, in those countries where, in recent times, its influence upon the hearts of men has been most widely felt, the desire to study its form, character, and history, has been less intense than in lands where its spiritual power has been less generally experienced. Great Britain and America have produced but few expositions of the Psalms marked by independence and critical skill. In this country, while their practical teachings have been unfolded with some degree of success by various expositors, their true exegesis has had but a single worthy representative, the Commentary of Dr. J. A. Alexander.¹ In Great Britain also the Psalter has received much less than its due share of attention in the efforts that have been made to profit by and emulate the achievements of German scholarship.

In the latter country, however, something has been done of late years towards taking away occasion for this reproach. For there the critical study of the Psalms has received a strong impulse from the growing interest felt in the interpretation of the Old Testament generally. J. F. Thrupp² was the first English writer to present at all fully or satisfactorily the results of the investigations of continental critics. Seven years after the publication of his work an anonymous

¹ The Psalms, Translated and Explained by J. A. Alexander. New York, 1850. Few critical commentaries have been so popular as this work. It is largely based upon the Commentary of Hengstenberg, hereafter to be considered, but is much more than a mere compilation or adaptation.

² Introduction to the Psalms. 1860.

treatise appeared,¹ containing a good deal of suggestive matter; but impaired in value by following the arbitrary chronological arrangement of Ewald, hereafter to be noticed. The Commentary of Bishop, then Archdeacon, Wordsworth,² issued in the same year, was a return to the ancient patristic methods of exposition, and gave but small place to the labors of modern commentators. The allegorizing principle of interpretation has no contemporary representative of greater consistency or devotion than Wordsworth. The Commentary of A. R. Fausset, forming part of a well-known exposition of the whole Bible republished in this country, is worthy of mention for its condensed and valuable notes. Attention must be specially called, however, in our survey of the English exposition, to two works,³ which, on account of their representative character, as well as their intrinsic merits, are more worthy of the attention of American Bible-students than any of those just mentioned.

The work of Professor Perowne is the most comprehensive and elaborate Commentary upon the Psalms that has appeared in the English language. In its systematic treatment of the several departments of the exegesis, and in the fulness of its criticisms upon the text, it stands alone among the productions of English interpreters of the Psalter. Its style also is clear and fresh. There is an agreeable freedom from the habit of dogmatic assertion, and the opinions of other critics are fairly and candidly stated. On turning to the more special features of the work, it appears that the one most valuable and characteristic of the author is presented in the analyses and introductions prefixed to the several Psalms, in which he displays fine insight into the feelings and mental posture of the inspired poets, and traces, usually with great beauty and attractiveness, the progress of their thoughts and

¹ The Psalms Chronologically Arranged. By Four Friends. 1867.

² The Holy Bible, with Notes and Introduction. Vol. IV. Part II. Book of Psalms. London, 1867.

³ The Book of Psalms: a New Translation, with Introduction and Notes. By J. J. Stewart Perowne, B.D. (2d ed.). London, 1870. The Psalms: their History, Teachings, and Use. By Wm. Binnie, D.D. London, 1870.

the current of their emotions. In this respect he has achieved in his own country a distinction similar to that which Ewald retains, without a rival, in Germany. He has succeeded not only in penetrating deeply into the general spirit of the poems, but also in discovering the mutual interdependence of their several sections or strophes—a task whose difficulty is in proportion to its importance. In the translation he shows good taste and judgment in being as literal as possible, and in avoiding far-fetched and unnatural renderings. When we come to Professor Perowne's more minute exegesis we find that his exegetical notes have been prepared with scrupulous care, and that the choice he makes between conflicting opinions is usually marked by a due appreciation of their respective merits. Yet we miss the independence¹ and power that characterize his psychological and moral analysis, and receive the impression that he is more at home in the latter region than in the department of philological criticism.

In this connection it may be proper to remark, that an English commentary worthy of being ranked with the great productions of German scholarship and criticism in this department has yet to appear. It may be true that, owing to the influence of traditional interpretation, and of the profound genius and learning and patient investigation that have been

¹ For example, the *dicta* of Hupfeld upon grammatical points are often received with too little caution. A curious instance of the same disposition occurs in the introduction to Psalm cxxxvi. An hypothesis is there cited which had been advanced by Delitzsch in the first edition of his Commentary, that vs. 19–22 originally did not belong to this Psalm, but were introduced from the one preceding, and that there were thus, in the first instance, only twenty-two verses, corresponding to the number of verses in the Hebrew alphabet. Of course this is only a specimen of the fanciful ingenuity which Delitzsch occasionally exercises. The Psalmists had no preference for the number twenty-two in the structure of their poems, except in the case of the Alphabetical Psalms, to which class the one in question does not belong. Delitzsch, in his second edition (1867), withdrew this conjecture; but Mr. Perowne retains and tolerates it in his second edition, published three years after the hypothesis was cancelled. This circumstance, which might seem too unimportant to be noticed, is mentioned chiefly because the proposed transposition would take a liberty with the text which is dangerous in principle, and which the history of that text does not at all justify.

brought to bear upon the study of the Psalter, any commentator of the present time must, if he is to achieve a commanding position, owe his success more to the diligent accumulation and judicious selection of the treasures of other minds than to the collection furnished by his own. Yet there is still a boundless field for the beneficent and happy exercise of a well-disciplined historic imagination, of well-trained linguistic skill, and of an acute and penetrating exegesis, whose clear and profound insight into the depths of sacred thought and feeling shall be guarded by caution and reverence, following spiritual instincts that are finer and truer than mere intellectual judgments.

Dr. Binnie's admirable work is not exegetical in its character; its aim being to discuss, in a popular style, matters introductory to the study of the Psalms. It is divided into three Books: the first treating of the history and poetical structure of the Psalter; the second of its theology; and the third of its use in the church. We agree with the statement of the author, in his preface, that there is room for a work of this kind; and we think that his book just supplies the need. It is true that a large portion of the information he gives may be gathered by a diligent comparison of other works; but in none of them would it be found so clearly and forcibly presented. "Introductions" or "Treatises" appended to commentaries must of necessity be so formal and condensed as to render them unsuited for popular reading. This remark applies with special emphasis to German commentaries. The transparency of Dr. Binnie's style allows a clear light to fall upon everything he holds up to view, and even the most unlearned will follow him with satisfaction and appreciation.

The part of Dr. Binnie's work which is of the greatest value is the Second Book, devoted to the Theology of the Psalms. The importance of this subject cannot be over-estimated. It awaits an exhaustive and original treatment, in a work devoted to it exclusively. In the commentaries it has received by far the ablest elucidation from Hengstenberg.

Besides being treated in the other great German commentaries, it has formed the subject of a few separate works, such as that of Professor Kurtz of Dorpat,¹ which relates almost exclusively to the Messianic Psalms; and that of Professor Koenig,² of the Roman Catholic University of Freiburg. The latter work leans chiefly upon Hengstenberg; and while giving much useful information on minor points, seems to be lacking in independent generalization. Dr. Binnie treats upon topics not treated by other writers, as in the section devoted to Social Religion in the Psalms. We give a somewhat lengthy account of this work, because we think it deserves to be known far and wide throughout the church.

It is gratifying to find in Dr. Binnie's book a recognition of the true place of Hengstenberg in the history of the interpretation of the Psalms. His exposition is regarded as "forming an epoch in the reverent and erudite study of the Psalms." In defending the "much decried name of Hengstenberg," we do more than endeavor to uphold a mere personal reputation. Such defence implies an adherence to certain principles of interpretation as applied to the Psalter. The adoption of these principles has not quite as much practical significance for us as for the people of Germany; but their application has resulted indirectly in incalculable good to the world. English students of the Psalms had not been compelled to contend against that rationalizing process, which, it is not too much to say, would strangle the life out of those sacred poems, by eliminating from them the foreshadowed presence of the Messiah. They were, by virtue of this immunity, not brought into such close contact with those vital questions that are involved in the subject of Old Testament Psalmody. Their conceptions of the teachings of the Psalter were, in consequence, unintelligent and vague on many important points. The labors, therefore, of that greatest of exegetical apologists, who opened up the way to the more exact and profound understanding of the reflections of the saints of old which are there embalmed, must be of unspeakable value to all to

¹ Zur Theologie der Psalmen.

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² Theologie der Psalmen.

whom that precious treasure has come. To appreciate at all the present state of the exposition of the Psalms, it will be necessary to indicate the position which this writer occupied, and the nature of his extended influence.

When the Commentary¹ of Hengstenberg appeared, the field was occupied by a class of writers who followed a system of interpretation that refused to see anything in the Psalms but the reflections of gifted spirits, who did not rise at all above the results of their own personal experience, and that of their nation, as gathered from tradition and the national records. It was thus a thing impossible to those critics that the Psalmists could give utterance to truths which could find no realization in their own age. They refused to acknowledge that the feelings and aspirations of the sacred writers were part of a great system of revealed truth, of which one part could be regarded as the complement or the fulfilment of another. Such a system was to them a thing inconceivable. Their theory was, that whenever by grammatical criticism the plain sense of any passage or Psalm was determined, then its allusions must invariably be sought in the relations of the poet to the present and past history of his nation, and that no light could be thrown upon them by disclosures of the future, which must have been to him, as it is to us, undiscovered and unrevealed. This "grammatico-historical" method of interpretation was coupled with a contempt for all traditional opinion and sentiment, especially as bearing upon the authorship of the Psalms, and the periods of their composition. It was applied to the exposition of the Psalter by a series of writers, most of whom were distinguished by their learning and literary taste. Foremost among these stood De Wette,² the most original of all commentators upon the Psalms that had appeared since Calvin, and the first who treated the subject with grammatical strictness and accuracy, in which direction he was impelled by the powerful influence of

¹ Commentar über die Psalmen. Berlin, 1842-1847; 2d ed., 1849-1852.

² His Commentary was first published in 1811; a fifth edition in 1856, by Gustav Baur.

Gesenius that was being exerted in every department of Hebrew philology. In his conception of the spirit of Hebrew Psalmody, he was greatly influenced by Herder, who had excited much interest in the study of the Psalms as poetical compositions, by pointing out their manifold literary beauties, and had, at the same time, emphasized their historical significance by dwelling upon the patriotic fervor and devotion that breathes through them. De Wette, accordingly, treated the Psalter as a collection of beautiful and inspiring national poetry. But the people of Israel were to him the Hebrew monarchy, not a theocracy, and the divine government and controlling influence were as much as possible ignored. Hence, while he introduced a new era in the literary and historical, as well as grammatical, criticism of the Psalter, he failed to unfold its full spiritual meaning, and its relations to the rest of revelation. Yet the exegetical accuracy and taste of his Commentary extended and perpetuated a commanding influence far beyond the circle of those who sympathized with its theological spirit.

With regard to the important question of the authorship of the Psalms, the results of De Wette's criticism were entirely negative, as he rejected the received opinions, and substituted none in their place. Hitzig,¹ the next great expositor of this school, tried to show that only fourteen of the Psalms were written by David, and that most of them belonged to the Maccabean period. His exposition is based upon the same historical, anti-dogmatic, system as was that of De Wette, and is marked by equal originality, combined with great critical and exegetical acuteness. He was soon followed by Ewald, whose penetrating and almost intuitive genius is not less conspicuous in his treatment of the Old Testament poets than in the various other subjects to which it has been applied. His Commentary,² with its magnificent general introduction, and its analyses of the several Psalms, which describe so

¹ Die Psalmen übersetzt und ausgelegt, 1835, 1836. New and enlarged edition, 1863-1866.

² Die Dichter des alten Bundes. 1st ed., 1839, 1840; 3d ed., 1866.

discriminatingly, in every case, the conflicts and yearnings of the poet's heart, is marked by the rejection of all higher and true inspiration, as decided as his utter and undisguised contempt for the achievements of all other investigators.

The influence of such weighty critics as these had to be met by a force of learning and science equal to theirs, moved by unshaken faith in the word of God, and ardent love of the truth it reveals. Such force was wielded by Hengstenberg. In two respects must the right interpreter of the Psalter advance upon the rationalists. Still occupying their standpoint, he must seize upon two others; he must not regard the sacred poets simply as the inheritors of grand but vague anticipations of Israel's future greatness, and the rapt seers of coming national glory, which gradually assumed more definite form under the workings of their fervent spirit. He must also interpret the Old Testament songs as expressing a religious life, which did not rest merely upon the promises and threatenings of the law, but had a deeper foundation in the desire for the blessings of pardon and justification, as a preparation in the heart of the true Israel for the advent of a Redeemer. And, further, he must complete his view by endeavoring to determine the true position which the Psalter and its several songs, and even their individual expressions, hold in divine revelation; discerning the continuity of each line of development, and the identity of each central doctrine under its varying exhibitions. It was the merit of Hengstenberg to contribute more largely than any other expositor of this century to such a vindication of the Old Testament and of the Psalms. Umbreit¹ and Stier,² in their treatment of certain Psalms selected for the purpose, had made an attempt, praiseworthy and valuable as far as it went, to promote the same end. But Hengstenberg, peculiarly fitted and prepared for his task by the constitution of his mind and his earlier studies, undertook a more thorough and exhaustive investigation. While subjecting the grammatical forms to a severe

¹ *Christliche Erbauung aus den Psalmen*, 1835.

² *Siebenzig ausgewählte Psalmen*, 1834-1836.

scrutiny, and aiming to fix the true historical position of the several Psalms, his Commentary is specially distinguished from all that had preceded it, by the efforts made in it, both by exegetical proof and systematic discussion, to show the presence of the Messianic element in its higher sense; to establish the fact that the religious life under the law, while drawing upon no fresh revelations of divine truth, had yet one side presented to the future redemption, preserving at the same time the Old Testament relations, by showing that the outflow of religious feeling rested upon, and was prompted by, the abiding presence of the law in the heart. In this last subject — the relation of the law to the religious life of the true Israel, as exhibited in the Psalms — his Commentary is altogether unrivalled.

Hupfeld¹ has analyzed the grammatical forms in the Psalms more fully and minutely, and perhaps, on the whole, more successfully, than any other commentator. But the student needs, even with him, to be on his guard in following the discussion of points of verbal criticism, the conclusions he presents often failing to justify the authoritative manner in which they are announced. His conjectural emendations of the text, also, frequently do not even mend the sense. He displays an unworthy and most bitter opposition to Hengstenberg in all departments of investigation, but is especially at variance with the "theological" spirit manifested by the latter. With regard to the Messianic Psalms, he advances beyond the grammatico-historical school already noticed, recognizing, as he does, the organic unity between the various parts of revelation, which is pervaded throughout by the Divine Spirit, who controls history, organizes its elements, and "develops in the New Testament the germs that he concealed in the Old." But this "organic" system of interpretation becomes very limited in its results, for, according to it, the Messianic references are always "general and ideal,"

¹ Die Psalmen, übersetzt und ausgelegt von Dr. Hermann Hupfeld. 1ste Auflage, 1855-1862. 2te Auflage, nach dem Tode des Verfassers herausgegeben von Dr. Eduard Riehm, 1867-1871.

never referring to particular circumstances in the life of Christ, or to special functions of his mediatorial office. Those who have bestowed loving meditation, with profound study, upon Ps. xxii., lxix., or cx, will find very little satisfaction in such a jejune theory as this, which virtually excludes the living and suffering Messiah from the place in the Old Testament dearest to the Christian heart.

The Messianic Psalms have, we think, been best treated by Delitzsch.¹ His classification of them (which is adopted substantially by Dr. Binnie) is exhaustive, and shows a deep insight into the typical and prophetic aspects of the Psalter. In this respect his Commentary may be regarded as an improvement upon that of Hengstenberg. The latter had himself modified, with regard to some of the most important of the Psalms, the views which he had previously maintained in his Christology; but the change was not frequently, as we think, for the better. At all events his two works should always be studied together in the investigation of this most interesting and ever-fruitful subject. With regard to the general features of the Commentary of Professor Delitzsch, we have to speak in terms of enthusiastic praise. As regards its style, it is probably the most readable of all the German expositions. It is marked by great beauty and force of expression; and the critical and exegetical remarks are as condensed and, at the same time, as clear as could be thought possible. The course of thought in each Psalm, is admirably traced through the several strophes and verses, and exhibited with a wonderful degree of penetration into the heart and soul of the poet. His insight into the spiritual meaning of scripture, which is perhaps the highest endowment of his gifted mind, shines conspicuously in his treatment of the Psalter. And a devotional spirit breathing through his Commentary, as it does through that of Hengstenberg, and which has earned for him an unmerited sarcasm from Hupfeld, seems to confer upon it

¹ *Biblischer Commentar über die Psalmen*, 1859, 1860. *Neue Ausarbeitung*, 1867. Prof. Delitzsch had already done good service in the same direction by his *Symbolae Isagogicae ad Psalmos illustrandos*, 1846.

many of the advantages of a practical treatise. In his version he attempts to follow closely the rhythm of the original, as he has also done in his Commentary on the Book of Job. In this the plasticity of the German language enables him to succeed better than might be expected; but it is perhaps, on the whole, to be regretted that he has allowed himself to exercise his ingenuity upon this plan, for it is inevitable that the renderings should often lose greatly in force and naturalness and simplicity, under the exigencies of such a peculiar method of translation.

The aim of Dr. Moll,¹ who has prepared for Lange's Bibelwerk the most important and valuable of the more recent German expositions, is to represent, comprehensively and concisely, the results of the modern exegesis of the Psalter. Without possessing the grasp of Old Testament principles that characterized Hengstenberg, or the critical acuteness and suggestiveness of Hitzig, or the philological tastes of Hupfeld, or the poetical insight and manifold erudition of Delitzsch, he has yet perhaps the very best qualifications for the task he has undertaken — the execution of a historical and representative commentary, containing results rather than discussions — a book for the Bible-class and the family, as well as a thesaurus for the student. He is extremely cautious, reverent, and judicious; his choice among the various opinions which he holds up to survey in their historic or genetic order being usually almost instinctively safe. But perhaps the most distinctively valuable feature of his exposition is his original and sagacious unfolding of the doctrinal and moral teachings of the Psalter — discerning, as he does, the individuality and true place and value of each Psalm, and thus furnishing various instruction and edification where a superficial interpreter would inevitably indulge in monotonous repetition. In this department he supplies a long and deeply felt want, and merits the thanks of every earnest student of the Psalms. His work has many inter-

¹ Der Psalter, theologisch-homiletisch bearbeitet, von Dr. Carl Bernhard Moll, 1869, 1871.

esting points of resemblance to that of Perowne, especially in their exegetical methods and principles and their appreciation of the true course and tendencies of modern exposition. With much that they have in common, there is a striking difference in one respect, in which they may be regarded as mutually supplementary. Mr. Perowne, as we have already remarked, is specially at home in portraying the inward feelings of the sacred poets; while Dr. Moll is equally eminent and successful in unfolding the objective truths of divine revelation which underlie the form and the spirit, the reflections and the emotions, of their productions.

Before closing this hasty and imperfect survey of the attempts which have been made in recent years to bring to light the treasures of this inexhaustible storehouse of truth and consolation, it is surely not out of place to express a regret that so little, comparatively, has been done in this country to further the great enterprise. The force of such a reproach cannot be weakened by urging that the practical teachings of the Psalter have not been neglected, and that this, after all, realizes the purpose for which it was given to mankind. For the practical exposition rests directly upon the critical and exegetical treatment, and is affected by the decline or progress of the latter. It is not to be doubted that many a precious gem of truth lies unperceived and unsuspected very near the surface of the familiar ground over which the faithful student of the Psalms moves so constantly and lovingly. Many a valuable lesson is also to be learned from the attentive consideration of the exact circumstances and mental posture of the Psalmists when their hearts were made to overflow with thanks and praise, or when "rivers of water ran down their eyes"; when transient doubt of God's providential care assailed and bruised their souls, or when a presage of immortal glory thrilled their fainting and failing flesh and heart from the invincible assurance that he was their everlasting Portion and Helper. But it is the province of the critic and the exegete to investigate each word, each phrase, each passage, each Psalm, independently and in their mutual

relations, and in their relations to the rest of God's word. Such study and comparison must always be unfinished, as the depths they would sound and the heights they would scale are infinite. The results which they achieve they hand over to the practical expositor, the preacher, and the great multitude of those to whom the Psalms are a treasure and delight. As a proof of the correctness of the position here assumed, it should be mentioned that Germany is now producing more practical works upon the Psalter—called forth, in large measure, by its scientific and critical treatment—than all other countries combined.

Another result of such study must be regarded whose achievement is an object worthy of untiring pursuit. An enlarged and more profound understanding of the Psalms among our people would certainly be followed by their wider and more frequent use in the service of praise. In this part of our worship they must always hold some place. The Christian heart has found in the Psalter a sanctuary and a resting-place. It would, as moved by the Spirit, employ the words there found to express its sorrows and to sound forth its joys. And, as Dr. Tayler Lewis has said, "there must be something unsound in that religion that would prefer a popular hymn to an ancient Psalm." We believe that the present wide-spread neglect of the Psalter in public and private praise, though in some measure the result of a depraved taste, is also largely due to the want of an intelligent appreciation of these sacred songs as regards the place they hold in revelation, and the conditions under which they were composed, as these are connected with their inner and divine disclosures. Let knowledge of all that relates to the Psalms be widely diffused, and not only will the imagination and reason of growing multitudes be satisfied as they sing the songs of Zion, but their hearts also will be strengthened and cheered.

ARTICLE IV.

THE EARLY BRITISH AND IRISH CHURCHES.

BY HON. JOHN D. BALDWIN, WORCESTER, MASS.

THAT part of Great Britain known to us as England was occupied by the Romans about four hundred years. The time from the invasion by Julius Caesar, in the year 55 B.C., to the final withdrawal of the Roman army of occupation, in 409 A.D., was four hundred and sixty-four years ; but nearly a century passed after Caesar's fruitless attempt at conquest, before their establishment in the island was assured. A full and authentic history of the British people during the time of this Roman occupation would give us important information, not only in regard to their social, industrial, and political condition, but also concerning the introduction of Christianity into the island, and the organization of the early British churches.

But there is no such history. Fragmentary notices of Britain under the Roman rule are found in Tacitus, Suetonius, Pomponius Mela, Fabius Rusticus, and others ; but they tell us nothing relative to the introduction of Christianity among the Britons, which is not surprising when we consider that Christianity itself was so insignificant in the eyes of Roman writers, so little comprehended, that scarcely a dozen references to it can be found within the whole range of Roman literature. Bede and the Saxon Chronicle are but little more satisfactory, although it appears in what they say that there were Christians and Christian churches in Britain, three or four centuries previous to the arrival of St. Austin, in 597 A.D., as a missionary-bishop, sent by Rome to the Saxons. The old Welsh books tell us more, for they give what professes to be an accurate account of the beginning of Christianity among the Britons, and say something of the early

Christian churches and schools in Wales. These books are not often quoted, for we have inherited from the Saxons and their Romish priesthood, the custom of not including any portion of the Celtic writings within the pale of authorized literature; and yet it is not easy to show that some of the old Welsh and Irish books are less truthful and trustworthy than Bede and the Saxon Chronicle.

The Welsh writings state that Christianity was introduced into South Wales in the first century; and this cannot be regarded as incredible or improbable when we consider that Britain was then a part of the Roman empire. The early Christian preachers could go there without difficulty; and there is evidence which appears to show that the gospel was preached successfully there, and in most of the Celtic countries, previous to the middle of the second century, and in some of them during the life-time of the apostles. In the last half of the second century there were many Celtic churches, especially in Gaul, Britain, and Ireland, which regarded the pastors of the church at Lyons as their metropolitans; one of these pastors, who was installed there in the year 177 A.D., being the celebrated Irenaeus, a disciple of Polycarp.

Eusebius¹ says: *Ἐτέρους ὑπὲρ τὸν ὠκεανὸν παρελθεῖν ἐπὶ τὰς καλούμενας Βρετάννικας νήσους.* "Some of the apostles passed over the ocean into those called the British Islands." Clemens Romanus² says: Paul preached the gospel "to the utmost bounds of the west" (*ἐπὶ τὸ τέρμα τῆς δύσεως*). Tertullian, writing previous to the year 211 A.D., said, in his work against the Jews: "Some countries of the Britons which have proved impregnable to the Romans, are, nevertheless, subjected to Christ." Theodoret³ says: *Καὶ Βρετάννους — καὶ ἀπαξαπλῶς πᾶν ἔθνος καὶ γένος ἀνθρώπων δέξασθαι του σταυρωθέντος τοῦς νόμους ἀνέπεισαν.* He is speaking of the nations and races converted by the apostles, and includes the Britons among them. He says in another place:⁴ "St. Paul brought salvation to the islands that lie in the ocean."

¹ Demonst. Evang. lib. 3, cap. 7.

² Ep. ad Cor.

³ Sermo ix. de Legib. Opp. tome 4, p. 610.

⁴ Tome 1, in Ps. cxvi.

These are some of the statements made by early Christian writers relative to the introduction of Christianity into Western Europe and the British Islands. They connect Paul with this work ; but it does not necessarily follow that he himself ever went to Britain, for evangelists may have been sent there under his direction. Nevertheless, the following from Rev. Dr. Gibson's edition of Camden's "Britannia," assumes that Paul went to that island in person :

"From these authorities (especially that of Clemens Romanus), it follows, not only that the gospel was preached in Britain, in the time of the apostles, but also that Paul himself was the preacher of it. This is further confirmed by observing that from the time of his being set at liberty, in the fifth year of Nero [59 A.D.], to his return to Rome, was eight years, which the ancient writers of the church generally agree were spent in the western parts ; that having taken his solemn leave of the eastern parts, and assured them that they should see his face no more, it cannot be supposed that he returned thither, but that he employed his time in planting the gospel elsewhere."

While in Rome, after his appeal to Caesar, Paul must have become acquainted with many Gauls and Britons, and learned much of their countries, which would naturally arouse in him, the great apostle to the Gentiles, a lively desire to preach the gospel in those western regions. Therefore the repeated statements that he actually went there are not improbable. It is not certainly *proved* that Paul himself visited Britain ; but he sent other preachers there. At any rate, it seems necessary to believe that Christianity was preached successfully in Britain some time previous to his death ; for what is said on this point by Eusebius and others, is fully confirmed by old British writers of the Celtic race, as will presently be shown.

The venerable Bede was an Anglo-Saxon, and he tells but little of what occurred in Britain previous to the Saxon invasion. All he says of affairs in that island before the arrival of St. Austin, in 597 A.D., seems to have been compiled from

Orosius, Eutropius, and Gildas. His account of Christianity there begins with what occurred in the time of Lleirwg (called Lucius by the Romans), king of South Wales. Lleirwg was one of those British princes who ruled some of the conquered provinces in subordination to the Romans, and whom Tacitus describes as *instrumenta servitutis*. The dates assigned to his reign vary; but all agree in placing it at some period between the years 137 and 199 A.D.; and those who appear to have investigated the point most carefully, agree in saying he reigned from 161 to 180 A.D. Bede says:

“While Eleutherus, a holy man, presided over the Roman church, Lucius [or Lleirwg], king of Britain, sent a letter to him, entreating that by his command he might be made a Christian. He soon obtained the effect of his pious requests, and the Britons preserved the faith which they had received, uninterrupted and entire, in peace and tranquillity, until the time of the emperor Diocletian.”¹

It is not certain that such a correspondence ever took place. The best criticism is inclined to regard it as one of the “pious” forgeries of the Romanists, who, in later times, sought to connect the Roman church with the first preaching of the gospel in Britain. It is certainly improbable, for the Keltic Christians looked to Lyons, and not to Rome, for direction. At any rate, the reply said to have been made to Lleirwg’s letter shows that the Welsh prince did not ask to “be made a Christian.” It appears, on the contrary, that he merely asked Eleutherus to send him a copy of the Roman laws, as he desired to examine those relating to the Christians. It is manifest in what is said in Bede that there were many Christian churches in Britain three or four centuries previous to the arrival of St. Austin, and that Christians were numerous there about the year 305 A.D., when many of them suffered death in the bloody persecution directed by Diocletian. Speaking of this persecution, Bede’s history says: “At length it reached Britain also, and many persons, with the constancy of martyrs, died in the confession of their faith;”

¹ Book i. chap. 4.

and "when the storm of persecution ceased, the faithful Christians, who, during the time of danger, had hidden in woods, deserts, and secret caves, appeared in public, rebuilt the churches and founded temples of the holy martyrs."¹

There were Christians in Britain long previous to the time of Lleirwg. An old Welsh book entitled "The Genealogy of Iestyn ab Gwrgant" says: "Cyllin, the son of Caradog [called Caractacus by the Romans], was a very wise and gentle king, and, in his time, were many of the Cymry converted to the Christian faith through the teaching of the Choir of Eurgain; and many godly men from Greece and Rome were in Wales in his time."

This Cyllin, who is sometimes styled "Cyllin the saint," was Lleirwg's grandfather. He began to reign in South Wales some time in the latter part of the first century; and yet there were Christians there before he was king. Gildas, who lived before the time of St. Austin, and whose writings show that he was a Celtic Briton, states that the gospel was received in Britain soon after the middle of the first century, or, as the passage appears in Camden, previous to the defeat of the Britons under Boadicea, which occurred in the year 61 A.D. In the Welsh books there is a particular account of the first introduction of Christianity among the Britons, which appears to be true, for it is wholly free from monkish fables, and is given in connection with other historical facts which are recorded substantially as we find them in Tacitus. In fact this Welsh record completes the Roman history of the defeat and subjugation of Caractacus.

Caradog, or Caractacus, having been carried to Rome, was released by Claudius, and allowed to go home as tributary ruler of South Wales; but hostages were retained in Rome as security for his good behavior, among whom were Bran, his father, and Eurgain, his daughter. Bran was the supreme bard of South Wales, anciently known as Siluria. In the druidical organization of the Celtic countries there were three distinct classes set apart for special studies and services — the

¹ Book i. chap. 8.

bards, who wore sky-blue robes, and were the statesmen, philosophers, poets, and publicists ; the druids, who wore white, and, being the priestly class, had charge of the religious ceremonial ; and the ovates, who wore green, were devoted to the arts and sciences, practised medicine, and rendered any other services for which the studies and training of their order gave them special preparation. In Siluria, or South Wales, Bran was the foremost personage of the highest of these three orders. He and the other hostages remained at Rome seven years ; and the Welsh books tell us that he was converted to Christianity while there, and that after he went home he converted his countrymen. Origen [4 upon Ezekiel], stating that the Britons received the gospel very early, remarks that they were prepared for it by the doctrine of their druids, who had always taught that there is but one Supreme Being. That Bran became acquainted with Christians at Rome, studied their doctrines, and was in this way led to embrace Christianity, is nowise improbable. At any rate, the fact that he became a Christian while there is so constantly asserted in old Welsh books, and so intimately associated with important events in Welsh history, that it seems unreasonable to doubt it.

According to Tacitus, the British captives arrived in Rome in the year 51 A.D. At that time there were many Christians in Rome, and there is mention of "saints of Caesar's household." Paul, having appealed to Caesar against his enemies at Jerusalem, was brought to Rome during the time of Bran's residence there. According to the chronology of Eusebius and Jerome, he arrived in the year 56 A.D. Others fix the time four or five years earlier. But, in either case, Bran might have visited Paul during the time when "he dwelt two whole years in his own hired house, and received all that came unto him." He could not have failed to do so, if his mind had been awakened to such earnest study of the character and claims of Christianity as led to his conversion. The fact of his conversion is mentioned repeatedly in the Welsh historical Triads, as follows :

“Bran the Blessed brought the faith in Christ first into this island from Rome, where he had been in prison through the treachery of Aregwedd Voeddawg, daughter of Avarwy the son of Lludd.” This Aregwedd was queen of the Brigantes, and lived at York; she betrayed Caractacus, and delivered him to the Romans, when he trusted her friendship after his final defeat. The following Triad is more explicit:

“The Three Sovereigns of the Isle of Britain who conferred Blessings:

“Bran the Blessed, son of Llyr Llediaith, who first brought the faith in Christ to the nation of the Cymry, from Rome, where he had been seven years a hostage for his son Caradog, whom the Romans had taken captive after he was betrayed by treachery, and an ambush laid for him by Aregwedd Voeddawg.

“The second, Lleirwg, the son of Coel, who was son of St. Cyllin (surnamed Lleuver Mawr), who made the first church [edifice] at Llandaf, and that was the first in the Isle of Britain, and who bestowed the privilege of country and nation and judgment, and the validity of an oath, upon those who should be of the faith in Christ.

“The third, Cadwaladr the Blessed, who granted the privilege of his land and all his property to the faithful who fled from the infidel Saxons and the unbrotherly ones who wished to slay them.”

We read, also, in the Welsh Genealogies of the Saints of the Isle of Britain, that “Bran was the first of the nation of the Cymry who embraced the faith in Christ,” and “the first who brought the Christian faith to this country.” Rev. John Williams discusses this point very carefully in his *Ecclesiastical Antiquities of the Cymry*. He says:

“The Genealogy of the Saints mentions the names of four Christian missionaries who accompanied Bran on his return to his native country, namely, Ilid, Cyndau, and his son Mawn, who are styled ‘men of Israel,’ and Arwystli Hen, ‘a man of Italy.’” Mr. Williams says, in another place, “Arwystli is supposed to be the same person as Aristobulus, mentioned

in Paul's Epistle to the Romans. The formation of the name from the Greek would be in perfect accordance with the analogy of the Welsh language. But what adds the greatest support to this hypothesis is the fact that, in the Greek Menology, Aristobulus is said to have been ordained by Paul as a bishop for the Britons. In this case, the Greeks and the Welsh are witnesses wholly independent of each other; so that collusion is out of the question."

This statement of the Greek Menology is quoted by Usher in his *Britann. Eccles. Antiq.* p. 9, who adds that "we read in the Synopsis of Dorotheus that Aristobulus was made a bishop of Britain." We shall see presently, however, that the word "bishop" or "*episcopos*," in the early churches with which the Celtic Britons were most intimately connected, did not have the meaning given it in later times by the Romanists and other supporters of diocesan episcopacy.

It is stated in the work of Mr. Williams, that a farmstead in Glamorganshire, called Trevran, is pointed out by tradition as the place where Bran resided; and that not far from it is Llanilid, or the church of Ilid, which is regarded as the oldest church in Britain. Among the British captives who became Christians at Rome were a son and a daughter of Caradog, or Caractacus. This son appears to have been Cyllin, his immediate successor; the daughter, named Eurgain, is described as a woman remarkable for intelligence and force of character. She is celebrated in the Genealogies as "the first female saint among the Britons." It is said that Ilid came to Britain at her request, and that she organized in Wales a Christian establishment, or school, which was long known as "Eurgain's Choir."

Not much that we read as history of Great Britain in the first ten centuries of the Christian era is more fully warranted by credible records than the fact that Christianity was introduced into that island in the time of the apostles. All the Welsh records assert that it came first into Siluria, or South Wales, and that most of thek ruids there became Christians through Bran's influence. One of the "Cymro

Triads" found in the Myvyrian Archaiology is as follows: "Three ways in which a Cymro is primary above every other nation in the Isle of Britain—primary as a native, primary as regards social rights, and primary in respect of Christianity."

The gospel seems to have been preached successfully in Ireland at a very early period. If, as there is reason to believe, the most eminent of its early preachers in that island was named Patrick, he must have lived several centuries earlier than the legendary Patricius whom the Roman church canonized as St. Patrick. The Romanists tell us that this Patricius was sent to Ireland in the year 431 or 432 A.D.; and the Catholic hagiologies give us marvellous stories of his miracles, and of his amazing success in converting all Ireland. These tales appear to be unwarranted fictions. This pretended mission of Patricius is so little in accordance with known facts, and what is told of it is so incredible, that some learned investigators regard the Irish St. Patrick as "a saint of the imagination." They believe that no such person ever existed. There was a Patricius, in the fifth century, who was made bishop of Auvergne, in Gaul, where he lived and died. It may be conjectured that he, like Palladius, made a brief visit to Ireland; but there is no evidence to support this conjecture. In Usuard's and the Roman Martyrology, the day of this bishop Patricius is the same as that of the Irish St. Patrick.

There seems to be no room to doubt that the St. Patrick of the Romish calendar was manufactured for ecclesiastical uses, as late as the ninth century, if not later. He is not mentioned in the Ecclesiastical History of Bede, who was born in 673 A.D., and wrote his history in the beginning of the eighth century. Bede mentions the brief visit of Palladius to Ireland, but says not a word of Patricius, which would be astonishing if the Romish Patricius had actually done what is alleged; for Bede, who shows that in his time the Irish Christians were not Romanists, could not have failed to mention Patricius, the wonder-working apostle of Ireland in the fifth century,

if he had then been heard of; and he would have explained why the Irish converts of this fabled missionary of Pope Celestine, and the Irish churches he is said to have established, were all invincibly antagonistic to the church of Rome. Ledwich says, in his *Antiquities of Ireland*: "It is an undoubted fact that St. Patrick is not mentioned by any author or in any work of veracity in the fifth, sixth, seventh, or eighth century." The Roman priests and monks began their manufacture of a Romish St. Patrick for Ireland, one or two centuries later than the time of Bede, aiming to have him used in aid of their attempt to win over the Irish churches to the papacy.

And yet, according to the uniform testimony of Irish tradition, the most eminent of the early preachers of Christianity in that island was named Patrick, or Padrig. In the *Ulster Annals*, at the year 457 A.D., there is mention of an "old St. Patrick," which is accompanied by the following note: "There can be no doubt that there were two early promulgators of Christianity, of this name, in Ireland, and that their acts and dates have been confounded." The writer of this note felt bound to retain the Romish Patrick of the fifth century, while admitting that the genuine St. Patrick, the "old St. Patrick" of Irish tradition, lived at an earlier period. We read in the Welsh books that Padrig, head of the great Christian college of Illtyd, in Wales, and many others connected with the institution, were captured by the Irish in the fourth century, and carried to Ireland. This Padrig may have distinguished himself as a preacher of the gospel to the Irish; but there were influential Christian churches in Ireland previous to his time. In the *Irish Annals* there is an account of King Cormac Ulfadah, who reigned in Ireland in the third century. It is stated that in the year 257 A.D. he established three colleges at Tara, one for military instruction, one for historical studies, and one for instruction in the laws. The *Annals* add that "Cormac was converted to Christianity seven years before his death." This indicates that Christianity had at that time grown to much importance and influence in the island.

That there were many Christians in Ireland long previous to the fifth century appears to be certain. This fact was recognized in the commission given to Palladius, in 430 A.D., by the Roman bishop, Celestine, who sent him to Ireland as a missionary. This document, which is still preserved, states explicitly that Palladius was sent "to the Scots who believe in Christ." He was sent, not to convert the Irish people to Christianity, but to convert the Irish churches to Romanism; but "the Scots who believed in Christ" would not receive him, and his stay in the island was short. There is no evidence of any kind to show that Patricius went there in the following year, or in any other year. Sir James Ware cites an abundance of testimony to show that the Irish in ancient times were called Scots. They gave their name to Scotland when they went there, at the beginning of the sixth century, and began a political establishment which at length gave them control of the country. The Romans called that country Caledonia, and, previous to their time, its inhabitants called it Albainn.

Celebrated Irish saints, who lived long previous to the missionary attempts of Celestine, have been placed in the Roman calendar, in later times, although they were very far from being Romanists. Sir James Ware says, in his great work on Irish Antiquities: "It is certain there were many Christians in Ireland before the arrival of Palladius, in 431 A.D., or of St. Patrick [meaning Patricius], in the year following. St. Kieran, St. Ailbe, St. Declan, and St. Ibar, whom Usher calls the precursors or forerunners of St. Patrick, are pregnant proofs of this. They were all of the birth of Ireland." These saints, and others of Irish birth who have been feloniously appropriated by the Roman Catholics for use in their calendar, lived long before the time of Palladius. They were all born and bred in districts of Ireland in which Christianity had been established and made influential previous to the age in which their parents lived, and were baptized by pastors of Irish churches. Declan, when seven years old, was placed under the tuition of a faithful Christian man, by

whom he was educated. If Patricius of the legends actually existed and went to Ireland, in the fifth century, he went there, as Palladius went, to Romanize the Irish churches, and had no better success; for the Irish Christians continued to live without either the papacy or diocesan episcopacy until after the beginning of the twelfth century.

In the early Christian ages only a small portion of the churches looked to the Bishop of Rome as their metropolitan, or accepted the Roman discipline and order of worship. If the political history of Southwestern Asia and Northern Africa could have been different, from the close of the fourth century to the beginning of the twelfth, or if the religious and ecclesiastical history of the Teutonic race in Western Europe had been like that of the Celtic people, a Roman Catholic church would have been impossible. As it was, the churches of Asia and Africa became less influential in Europe through the downfall of the Western empire, and were finally swept away by crusading Mahometanism; while in Western Europe, the political predominance of the Teutonic race, after the conquests of Gaul by the German Clovis and his Franks from beyond the Rhine, secured the ecclesiastical predominance of Rome.

In the early times the most important churches were in Asia. The oldest church was at Jerusalem, and others in Syria and Western Asia were older than the church at Rome. Even in the fourth century there were many more churches in Asia and Africa than in Europe. Irenaeus, in the second century, writing against the heretics, and Tertullian, some years later, writing against the Jews, mentioned Libya, Egypt, Mesopotamia, Armenia, Phrygia, Cappadocia, Pontus, Pamphylia, and "the East," as countries or regions where the gospel had been received. In the year 189 A.D., Pantaeus, a venerable preacher, was sent from Alexandria to Hindustan, where the gospel had already been preached with success; and there he found a valuable copy of the Gospel by Matthew in Hebrew, which he carried back to Alexandria, where it was seen by Jerome. Frumentius, the apostle of Abyssinia,

preached the gospel successfully, it is said, in Southern India; and in 326 A.D. he was made "primate" of the churches in India. But Frumentius was not the first who held this position; for in the Council of Nice, held in 325 A.D., a "primate of India" was present, and subscribed his name. Theophilus, the famous Arian bishop, who established churches in Arabia, was a native of India. In 383 A.D., Marutha, a native of Hindustan, was bishop of Suphara, and was present in the Synod of Sides in Pamphylia. Cosmos Indicopleustes, who visited India about the year 522 A.D., states that there were "churches and pastors with the whole liturgy" in Ceylon, on the Malabar coast, and in the northeastern part of India. The Syrian churches were important and influential in the ages previous to the rise of Mahometanism. The statement that they sent missionaries to China, who preached there with success and established churches, has been confirmed by the discovery of an inscribed monument in China, which preserves the names of some of these missionaries, and gives a brief account of what they did. They went to China as early as the year 635 A.D., and perhaps earlier; and their successors were still there in the year 781 A.D., when the monument was erected. It is said that they found favor at court, but were persecuted in the year 698. It seems not difficult to understand that, if the subsequent history of the Asiatic churches had brought them prosperity, instead of disaster, the ecclesiastical history of the Christian world would have been different; for these churches did not follow Rome any more than the Greek church follows it now.

The gospel was received in all the Celtic countries before the Romans withdrew from Britain; and we can see, in what is known of the Celtic churches, that they looked to Asia Minor for sound doctrine and correct discipline. They spurned the pretensions of the Roman bishops from the beginning, and asserted that their discipline and ceremonial observances had come to them from St. John, through Polycarp, his disciple. The Roman attempt to assume the lead in ecclesiastical affairs made its first appearance towards the

close of the second century, when Victor presided over the church at Rome. This enterprising pastor thought Rome, the capital of the empire, should also be recognized as the supreme head of the Christian world. Therefore he demanded that the rules and ceremonial observances approved by his church should be adopted by all other churches; and, taking a very lofty and imperious tone, he sent forth a letter to the churches in Asia, requiring them to follow the example of Rome in the observance of Easter. In later times, such letters from Rome have been called "bulls."

This bishop Victor was not successful. The Asiatic churches repelled his impertinence with just indignation, whereupon he foolishly menaced them with excommunication, and was answered with ridicule. In Europe his pretensions were moderated by the influence of Irenaeus, pastor of the church at Lyons, who spurned his arrogant demands, and made him feel his impotence. Irenaeus, like Pothinus, his predecessor, came from Asia, where he had been a disciple of Polycarp, and had never admired either the customs or the aspirations of the Roman church. Previous to this time, probably, there had been differences in discipline and ceremonial; but henceforth the distinction between the Romanists, on one hand, and the Asiatic and Celtic churches, on the other, was everywhere recognized. Rome was then in a small minority. The tone and strength of the general antagonism to her innovations may be inferred from the language used by Irenaeus in denouncing them. He spoke of them thus:

"The presbyters who lived before our times, and who were also disciples of the apostles, did in nowise deliver these opinions. I, who saw and heard the blessed Polycarp, am able to protest in the presence of God that if that apostolic presbyter had heard these things, he would have stopped his ears, and cried out, according to his custom: 'Merciful God, for what times hast thou reserved me, that I should suffer such things!' If these things had been uttered in his presence he would have fled from the place where he was sitting or standing."¹

¹ See Eusebius, lib. v. c. 20.

In Great Britain, the Celtic churches continued to reject Rome, and adhere to the Asiatic discipline, for centuries after the time of Victor and Irenaeus ; and it was not until the twelfth century that their subjugation to the papacy was completed, the Irish having stood out until Ireland was conquered by Henry Second. The Saxons and Normans were in harmony with Rome from the time of their conversion ; but it was late in the fifth century before the Saxons invaded England, and towards the beginning of the seventh century when St. Austin was sent there to convert them. Bede says he was commissioned for this work "about the hundred and fiftieth year after the coming of the English [Saxons, Angles, etc.] into Britain" ; and that he brought with him "interpreters of the nation of the Franks," whose language was like that of the Saxons, and who had previously received Christianity from Romanists. At Rome, this mission to the pagan Saxons seemed hopeful, because, as Bede tells us, Ethelbert, the Saxon king, had "a Christian wife of the royal family of the Franks, called Bertha."

St Austin's commission made it his business to preach the gospel to the heathen Saxons, Angles, and Jutes, and bring the Celtic churches into harmony with the growing and aspiring papacy at Rome. Bede's history gives some accounts of his proceedings. He began his mission to the Celtic Christians in a very haughty and arrogant way, demanding immediate submission to Rome ; and he was met as his arrogance deserved. He was everywhere rejected and treated as a heretic, unworthy to have the fellowship of good Christians. Nevertheless, St. Austin continued to believe he could either persuade or compel the Celtic churches of Britain to become Romanized, and accept him as their archbishop. Therefore, in the year 603 A.D., through the agency of king Ethelbert, he drew together the Celtic preachers of "the next provinces" for a conference. But neither by his overbearing manner, nor by his pretended miracle, could he bring them to regard him with favor. Bede says : "When, after a long disputation, they did not comply with the entreaties, exhortations,

or rebukes of Augustine (or Austin) and his companions, but preferred their own traditions before all the churches in the world, the holy father, Augustine," proposed to settle the question by a miracle, and thereupon pretended to restore sight to "a blind man of the English race"; but the miracle failed as badly as the entreaties and rebukes.

There was another conference, in which he became more moderate and lowered his demands. Bede says he now addressed the Celtic preachers as follows: "If you will comply with me in these three points, namely, to keep Easter at the due time, to administer baptism, by which we are again born to God, according to the custom of the holy Roman apostolic church, and jointly with us preach the word of God to the English nation, we will tolerate all the other things you do, though contrary to our customs"; and they answered that they "would do none of these things, nor receive him as their archbishop." Submission to the pope and recognition of himself as archbishop he must have at any rate; and to get these he would for the present withdraw everything else in his demand but the three points specified. When the Celts had made him understand that they would have nothing to do with Romanists, he gave way to violent wrath, became prophetic, and menaced them with bloody destruction; knowing very well that his influence with the Saxon king could secure a fulfilment of this prediction. Bede tells us how the Saxons fulfilled it: "they raised a mighty army, and made a very great slaughter of that perfidious people." Attempts have been made to rescue St. Austin from the reputation of having caused this slaughter; but they have not been successful. Bede, a devoted Romanist, could not see that he did anything wrong, and did not suppose such a vindication necessary.

St. Austin's successor, Laurentius, labored very earnestly to Romanize the Celtic churches of Britain and Ireland, but could make no progress whatever. Their antagonism to Rome appears to have been as vehement as that of the most emphatic Protestants of our time. A letter of Laurentius

addressed to the Irish churches shows how strong and uncompromising he found it. He says: "Becoming acquainted with the errors of the Britons, we thought the Scots [so he calls the Irish] had been better; but we have been informed by Bishop Dagan, coming into this aforesaid island [Britain], and the abbot Columbanus in France, that the Scots [Irish] in no way differ from the Britons in their behavior; for Bishop Dagan, coming to us, *not only refused to eat with us, but even to take his repast in the same house where we were entertained.*"¹ Bede states that "Laurentius and his fellow bishops wrote a letter to the priests of Britain, suitable to his rank, by which he sought to confirm them in Catholic unity; but what he gained by so doing the present times still declare." That is to say, he gained nothing. Bede, born in 673 A.D., wrote in the first part of the eighth century.

It strikes one oddly to see that the pope addressed the Saxon kings of the seventh century very much as English prelates of our time might address the ruling chiefs of the New Zealanders. In his eyes they were vigorous barbarians, just beginning to feel the influences of civilization, who could be converted and made useful in extending the sway of the papacy. Two letters written in 625 A.D., by Pope Boniface IV., to King Edwin and his wife Ethelberga, have been preserved. They are full of pious exhortations, and similar in tone to what might at any time, under similar circumstances, be written to any semi-barbarous rulers. In concluding the letter to King Edwin, the pope says: "We have sent you the blessing of your protector, the blessed Peter, the prince of the apostles, that is, *a shirt* with a gold ornament, and one garment of Ancyra." Peter's "blessing" to the queen consisted of "a silver looking-glass and gilt-ivory comb." Very appropriate presents, it may be, for Saxon princes of that age, in which we see what the pope thought of the Saxons. At any rate, they were received with great satisfaction; but it requires some effort to realize that King Edwin's "palace" was more like a rude hut than a sumptuous dwelling place; and fancy

¹ Bede, Book ii. chap. 4.

him in one corner of it admiring his shirt and awkwardly trying it on, while the queen and her attendants, in another part of it, were catching glimpses of their faces in the looking-glass, and making the "palace" noisy with laughter.

The situation of the Romish preachers in Britain, at that time, was not very comfortable. They had but few followers. The Saxons favored them for political reasons, and they made converts, although some of the converted Saxon princes were terrible backsliders. The old churches of the country treated them as heretics, who should be sternly excluded from fellowship. In a letter to the king of Cornwall, written in 692 A.D., one of the Romish prelates complained of the "enormities" of the Celtic preachers, and described their misdeeds as follows :

"The priests of Southwest Wales, puffed up with a conceit of their own purity, do exceedingly abhor communion with us, insomuch as they will neither join in prayers with us in the church, nor enter into society with us at table. Yea, moreover, the fragments which we leave after refection they will not touch, but cast them to be devoured by dogs and unclean swine. The cups, also, in which we have drunk, they will not make use of until they have rubbed and cleansed them with sand and ashes."

The old documents and records relating to those ages show nothing more clearly than that the Celtic Christians of Britain and Ireland were not Romanists. In this respect, their position was like that of the eastern Christians, most of whom finally became—so far as they were not swallowed up by Mahometanism—what we know as the Greek church. It is equally clear that the early British and Irish churches were not organized according to the method of diocesan episcopacy. They were churches without the clerical orders of the papacy, bound together in the various localities where they existed by the feeling of brotherhood and the need of mutual counsel and support, and having, probably, some customs and peculiarities of organization, borrowed from the druidical times. The bards and druids were the first pastors, and the druid circles

were the first places of their Christian worship. Dr. Jamieson tells us, in his *History of the Culdees*, that in his time the words "going to the stones" were still in use in some districts of Scotland to signify "going to church." It does not appear that a church edifice was constructed in Wales previous to the middle of the second century. Certainly there were no diocesan bishops. The old records and documents still remaining have come down to us through the prejudiced hands of Romanists and English Episcopalians, who have sometimes obscured the facts, and constantly created confusion by changing the meaning of ecclesiastical designations, and using the ecclesiastical terminology of Romish episcopacy, in describing the early churches. Mistranslations of Bede have been used to hide the truth, as Dr. Jamieson shows; nevertheless, the facts remain to be found by those who search for them.

In 1854, Rev. Robert King, diocesan curate of Armagh, Ireland, published a "Memoir introductory to the Early History of the Primacy of Armagh," in which he presented the results of a careful investigation of this subject. Mr. King was a devoted Episcopalian; but he was constrained to admit that no such personage as "the Archbishop of Armagh was ever known, heard of, or mentioned," previous to the year 1105 A.D. He declares it to be an incontrovertible fact, "That the churches of Ireland, in the previous ages, not being subject to episcopal jurisdiction, were subject to the successors (appointed by a certain mode of election, and in many cases from particular families exclusively) of certain eminent early missionaries and founders of churches, venerated as the old saints of Ireland and fathers of the Irish church. These successors were, in the early ages, mostly presbyter-abbots, but sometimes, also, bishops, though not forming regular or continued episcopal successions. To such abbots or successors the bishops, during that period, were subordinate."

This is an important admission from an advocate of diocesan episcopacy; but truth required it, and he was too candid to suppress the truth, although he could not see clearly what was meant by a bishop in those days. In the

early Christian ages, as has been shown again and again, the word "bishop" or "episcopus" meant simply an overseer or pastor. Some of the presbyter-abbots, or presiding presbyters, as they should be called, were pastors, and some were not. In some cases, the presbyters sent forth as missionaries to unconverted pagans were called bishops, because a special work had been committed to their charge. It was in later times that the papal organization succeeded to give this term a new meaning. The conclusions reached by Mr. King are in accordance with those of every candid investigator of the ecclesiastical antiquities of the British Islands. And what was true of Ireland was true, also, of England, Scotland, and Wales. Everywhere, in these countries, the Celtic churches rejected the Romanists, knew nothing of what is now called episcopacy, and admitted no ecclesiastical rank higher than that of presbyter.

All this appears distinctly in the history of the Culdees. The peculiar order or section of the Celtic Christians known in the sixth century, and in several subsequent centuries, as Culdees, or Keldees, consisted of closely-affiliated Christian communities, located in Ireland, Scotland, the northern parts of England, and some of the adjacent islands. Columba, its founder, was an Irish presbyter of royal lineage, eminent for learning, piety, and persuasive eloquence. He was about as far as possible from being a Romanist. This was so well understood in his own time, and so well remembered in the struggle of the Culdees against the papacy, that Rome did not venture to appropriate and canonize him until the year 1741, when they believed his memory sufficiently dim among the living, and his bones no longer in a condition to rattle in their grave. And now this celebrated Christian teacher, who spurned the ways of Rome, is made to figure in the Roman calendar, and do honor to the papacy as a Romish saint. Many other eminent Christians of the early ages have been treated in the same way.

Columba was born in Ireland, in the year 521 A.D., and his first religious establishment was founded in that island, at

Durrough, when he was twenty-eight years old. The members of this establishment became conspicuous for learning and sanctity of manners. He is described as a man of great ability and wonderful energy of character; and it is said that he acquired great influence, political, as well as religious. One account of him states that he "instigated a bloody war, without just cause, and, being made sensible of its injustice, voluntarily exiled himself, and went on a mission to the unconverted Picts." He went to Britain in the year 563 A.D. Bede fixes the date two years later, and mentions his mission as follows: "In the year 565 A.D., there came out of Ireland into Britain a presbyter and abbot, a monk in life and habit, very famous, by name Columba, to preach the word of God to the provinces of the Northern Picts. King Bridius reigned over the Picts, and it was in the ninth year of his reign that Columba converted this nation to the faith of Christ."¹ The Southern Picts had been previously converted by missionaries from Wales. "The Northern Picts," says Bede, "are separated from the Southern parts by steep and rugged mountains." King Bridius gave Columba the island called I, or Hi, by the Gaelic Scots, and Onas in the ancient Pictish speech, which in the hands of the Culdees became famous as Iona. Columba died there, in 597 A.D.

Dr. Jamieson's History of the Culdees gives the best and most complete account of them. It is said that they had not less than three hundred establishments like that at Iona. In the vocabulary of Romanism these have been called monasteries; but this name misrepresents their character. They were schools of learning, as well as religious establishments, and appear to have had some resemblance to educational and religious institutions of the Druids, who had formerly occupied Iona in the same way. These institutions were each managed by thirteen presbyters, one of whom officiated as principal or president. The actual number was sometimes less than thirteen, but never more. Bede and the Romish writers call these presiding officers "abbots";

¹ Lib. 3, c. 4.

but in the Latin writings of the Culdees themselves they were described as "principes," and sometimes as "seniores." The managing presbyters lived in families, having wives and children; and they were teachers in the schools, as well as preachers and ecclesiastical counsellors. Bede says there were "about five families, according to the English computation," at Iona, which may or may not have been correct when he wrote. In all this, however, the Culdee organization was not materially different from that of other Celtic Christians. The institution at Iona was, doubtless, very much like the famous "Choir of Eurgain," in Wales. Nor was there any material difference in doctrine; for they were never regarded by their Celtic brethren as heretics or schismatics. Their peculiarity appears to have consisted chiefly of some variation of discipline, combined with greater strictness of life. The relation of Columba's establishment at Iona to the churches around it was evidently like that of Eurgain's Choir to the first Welsh churches. What it was is told by Bede, as follows:

"Habere autem solet ipsa insula rectorem semper Abbatem Presbyterum, cujus juri et omnis provincia, et ipsi etiam episcopi, ordine inusitato, debeant esse subjecti, juxta exemplum primi Doctoris illius, qui non episcopus, sed presbyter extitit et monachus.

This passage in Bede's history played an important part in the controversies concerning church organization, which followed the Reformation, and very naturally, for it confounds the false assumption that diocesan episcopacy was coëval with Christianity in the British Islands. It is usually translated as follows:

"That island [Iona] is always accustomed to have for its governor a presbyter-abbot to whose authority both the province and even the bishops themselves, by an unusual rule, must be subject after the example of their first teacher, who was not a bishop but simply a presbyter and monk."

Mr. Pennant, in his *Tour in the Hebrides*, referred to this statement of Bede, and thought the words "omnis provincia"

should be rendered "every province," which increases its significance. The meaning is plain enough when we remember the old meaning of the word "episcopi," and understand that it signified nothing more than pastors of churches. It meant no more than this in the early ages, before the Romish innovations introduced the ecclesiastical terminology, which gave it a meaning wholly new and strange. According to Irenaeus, Polycarp, bishop of the church at Smyrna, was merely a presbyter; Columba the venerated head of the Culdees was nothing more; presbyter-abbots presided at Armagh where archbishops and diocesan episcopacy were unknown until the twelfth century. The word "episcopus," or bishop, is perverted and falsified when it is assumed that its meaning in the early churches was the same as that given it, at a later period, in the lordly system of church government contrived at Rome. Diocesan episcopacy did not exist among the Culdees, nor in the other Celtic churches, nor among the early churches in any part of the globe. It was an invention devised and matured by those who created the papacy.

The Roman Catholic church was a gradual growth from small beginnings. The tendency to create such an institution was disclosed by the Roman bishop Victor; but he could do nothing beyond his own immediate neighborhood. After this, there was a vehement contest for supremacy between the bishops of Rome and Constantinople, which went on until the year 607 A.D., when the usurping Centurion, Phocas, issued an imperial decree, giving the supremacy to the bishop of Rome, who had expressed extravagant joy over his usurpation. Phocas was soon suppressed; but his decree may be regarded as the formal public beginning of the papacy. Boniface, the Roman bishop, now claiming to be pope by the endorsement of imperial authority, found it still impossible to enforce his pretensions among those who refused to accept him. But an influence more effective than impotent edicts of Eastern emperors had begun a century earlier to work in aid of ecclesiastical Rome, which ultimately established the papacy in all the continental countries of Western Europe.

This was the conquest of Gaul by the Salian Franks under Clovis.

These Franks were Germans, similar in race and speech to the Saxons and Angles. They came from beyond the Rhine, where they had heard something of Christianity from Romish missionaries. St. Austin, in 597 A.D., found among them Romanist interpreters, who went with him to Britain. Clovis, the wife of Clovis, was a Christian and a Romanist; and Clovis himself, after his great victory over the Alemanni, or Suabians, near Cologne, with more than three thousand of "the flower of his nation," was baptized at Rheims, on the feast of Christmas, in 496 A.D., with a Roman ceremonial of "all possible pomp and splendor." From this time onward he was supported by the bishop of Rome and by the Romanists in every part of Gaul. Romanism became the principle of unity which gave him strength to complete the conquest, and established his empire. It followed, as a matter of course, that all whom he conquered were compelled to change their ecclesiastical ways, and submit to be Romanized. Thus the political and ecclesiastical history of Western Europe, from the beginning of the sixth century, was determined chiefly by the conquests and the Romanism of Clovis. Without his aid the papacy could not have become what it grew to be in the twelfth century; and without the alliance of the Roman church he might have failed to conquer Gaul.

In Britain, the influence of Rome grew with the growth of Saxon power and predominance. The old Celtic churches, deprived of support in Asia and Gaul, and constrained by the political power of Saxon Romanism, yielded one after another to the subjugating pressure of the papal bishops. The Romish crusade against the Culdees began in the eighth century, and was continued until their organization was suppressed. They had a long experience of oppression; and it is manifest in the history of this struggle, that when they finally submitted, in Scotland, to the papal bishops, they were constrained, but not convinced. The Scottish Culdees never became sincere Romanists; and this, it may be, explains why

the anti-papal rising in Scotland, at the summons of the Protestant Reformation, not only renounced the papacy, but also cast away the whole episcopal system of the Romanists, and established an organization which finally became the Presbyterian kirk. Most of the old churches there had been connected with the Culdees, who were undoubtedly among the purest and most enlightened Christians of their time. In the eighth century their institutions, having suffered no loss or decay of the earnest convictions by which they were supported, were still full of life and vigor; their preachers had great reputation for learning and piety; they were felt as a beneficent power, and some of the best things in Scotland are due to their influence.

In Ireland the old churches were not subjugated by the papacy until the twelfth century, when the island was conquered, almost without a struggle, by the English Henry Second. The power and persuasion of Rome, supported by the English king, seem to have frightened or corrupted most of the Irish clergy, and submission became inevitable. The English conquest was aided, and even sought, by ecclesiastical influences in the island, where Rome had already made some progress, as well as by the wretched political condition of the people at that time. The ecclesiastics who favored the change gained an increase of wealth and power; but in submitting to the English king and his friend, the pope, the Irish people lost both national and ecclesiastical independence. The present condition of Ireland is largely due to this disastrous submission to the papacy. To secure it, Pope Adrian IV., in a formal "bull," gave Ireland to the king of England, claiming a right to do this because, as he asserted, "all islands, of ancient right, belong to the church of Rome by donation from Constantine." This was a notable mixture of papal pretense and romance; nevertheless, his plot to pervert the Irish churches was successful.

The papacy was now a reality. It had acquired power to persecute, overawe, and compel. Submission to Rome was the established rule. There were some secluded Christian

communities, like those in the Vaudois valleys, which contrived to escape the submission demanded, and preserve their ancient freedom and discipline; they found safety in being isolated and obscure. Some of the Culdees kept their freedom and adhered to their old ways. Dr. Jamieson states that there were Culdees in Ireland as late as 1625 A.D., who held considerable religious property at Armagh.

That is a strangely perverted condition of mind which allows any sincere man to prefer the papacy to the doctrine, discipline, and unassuming organization of the early churches. The papacy was a monstrous manufacture of the dark ages, contrived to suppress freedom of thought and action in religion, put authority in the place of reason, and establish a relentless spiritual despotism in the name of Him whose truth brings light and liberty. How unwarranted is the pretense that the ritualism of the Romanists is that of the early Christian ages, and what amazing disregard of historical truth in the assumption that their episcopal organization is apostolic. It may be education, it may be indifference, or it may be some lunatic mood of mental desperation, but it is not reason, nor any unbiassed influence of truth, which disposes any intelligent man to respect these pretensions, and allow them to determine his ecclesiastical relations.

ARTICLE V.

CONSCIOUSNESS.

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THERE is one universal condition of all knowledge, whether of external or internal facts, and that is consciousness. As the very words "to know" cover conscious or real knowledge, consciousness, as the condition of the act, becomes also the condition of all that the act yields.

However complete our philosophy aims to be, it starts with consciousness — with the impressions afloat in it, as clouds in the sky, and inquires into their origin, nature, and connections. It habitually errs by clinging only too closely to those inner visions, by refusing to recognize the constructive power of the mind, which, laying hold of these appearances as the mere symbols of being, imparts quite another stability to itself, and to the world about it. Philosophy, through the long range of speculation that separates Fichte from Taine, refuses to believe in the powers, the faculties of mind, because as faculties they are not phenomena witnessed in consciousness.

Whatever aid to mental science any may hope to derive from purely physical inquiries, they cannot interpret or apply this aid without that science itself as shaped by the facts yielded in consciousness. The crudest of the endeavors to substitute external for internal observation is that of phrenology; yet it well illustrates the complete dependence of the exterior suggestion on the interior facts. The skull alone, whatever its shape, and howsoever well defined may be its protuberances, tells us absolutely nothing of the number and nature of mental powers. Nor can these be reached by comparing the form of the skull with the actions of the man to whom it belongs. These actions must themselves be interpreted in consciousness by psychology before we can decide

on the powers which they indicate. They are, moreover, very complicated in the emotional and intellectual activities indicated, and must be subjected to psychological analysis before we reach the simple, primitive powers included by them. Thus the phrenologist must have his philosophy first, derived from consciousness, before he can make use of the aid which he claims to be rendered by the formation of the skull. If he starts with a false philosophy, with inadequate analysis, his physical adjunct cannot correct it, and will most likely confirm it. If there were clearly twenty divisions of the brain and no more, we might conjecture that they indicated twenty powers, but should find no clue therein to the nature of these faculties. For that, we must still be remanded to consciousness. The twenty directions of intellectual activity must be made out prior to their reference to the twenty compartments.

It is so generally admitted by all schools, or so involved in their method of procedure, that consciousness is the primary and essential source of the facts of philosophy, that we accept the conclusion as granted, and proceed to our real discussion, the Nature of Consciousness; the futile, abortive appeals constantly made to it; and the methods of proof in establishing mental powers.

If consciousness is the indirect condition of all knowledge, and the direct condition of all the phenomena of mind, it is certainly most important that it be clearly defined, and that philosophers adduce its testimony in one correct and accordant way. No discussion that is in the least searching can be lost on so preliminary a point as this, more especially as there are here much uncertainty and diversity of opinion; vague, irreconcilable, unsatisfactory appeals on all sides to an authority which no one recognizes in the same sense and way as his neighbor. So long as proof, intended from its nature to be final, — as the testimony of consciousness, if plainly and fairly put upon the stand, must always be, — commands not even a moment's attention, and takes upon itself every form of conflicting, contradictory statement, we can certainly make no general or satisfactory progress in philosophy. If the

differences between systems and methods lay at some point at which they could be recognized and reached, at which they could be increased or reduced by additional proof, then diverse minds could concur in forwarding philosophy ; since, as in science, they could see the conclusions to be established, and the line of proof called for. But when, as now, men are taking an appeal to consciousness, final to themselves and final to no one else, there is endless confusion and contradiction, with little hope of progress and reconciliation. It is thus fundamental to philosophy to settle under what conditions and for what facts this reference to consciousness can be made, and when it is the mere evasion and retreat of an adversary who cannot bring to the front sufficient reasons.

Consciousness is not to be regarded as itself a power. Thus Dr. Porter and Taine speak of it. No act or state of mind can be understood without it. There is no knowledge that is not knowledge, that is, conscious knowledge ; no feeling that is not conscious feeling. The moment we understand the simplest act of perception, we have recognized consciousness as its condition, its essential characteristic. To put back of the first act a second wherewith we are to know the first, is to bear with us to this second act the entire difficulty. If we can understand this second act as an act of mind known to the mind, we can understand the first act in the same way, and the rear act becomes a superfluity. Nor can it be urged convincingly against this view that the word "consciousness" is constantly employed in connections that seem to imply that it is a power. Language is not the precise measure of intellectual facts, but often accommodates itself to ease in their expression. It does not prove that the trees actually glide by us as we float swiftly down a river, because this is our method of stating a fact just the reverse of the apparent one.

Nor are different forms of consciousness to find the ready admission which many grant them. Thus we have in Morell the perceptive consciousness, the emotive consciousness, the intellectual consciousness, the logical consciousness ; in Presi-

dent Porter, the natural consciousness and the reflective consciousness. These divisions of the one inseparable and uniform condition alike of thought, feeling, and volition, seem sometimes to spring from a confusion of ideas, sometimes from a confusion of language, leading to a confusion of thought. The emotive consciousness, the perceptive consciousness, with Morell, are awkward circumlocutions for the emotions and perceptions, and seem ready to convey the idea of an intellectual activity beyond the naked fact that an emotion as an emotion is known to the mind. The inferences, the clustering judgments, that gather about a perception, are not included in consciousness in any other way than are other intellectual actions, one and all. To speak of a natural consciousness and a reflective consciousness as in their nature distinct, is to double the error already made by President Porter, of regarding consciousness as a distinct power. It has now become two powers, presiding in two inscrutable ways over distinct kinds of phenomena. We venture to believe that the difference is to be found wholly in the mental phenomena, and not at all in their common condition, consciousness.

We are equally reluctant to admit of any sub-conscious facts that are strictly mental. Hamilton has a cumbersome mechanism of these, whose sole office is to explain the conscious facts of mind, and whose proof of existence is simply the interpretation they are thought to give. There are thus assumed facts, of whose being no independent proof can be offered, which are brought forward to expound familiar facts. A fact of a nature entirely unlike any known facts, hypothetical in the form and place of its being, — for what form and what whereabouts can an unconscious thought or feeling have? — can offer very feeble and very unprofitable explanation to any difficulties, since it itself presents a difficulty of the most formidable kind. Such solutions shift, without removing, the obscurity. There are doubtless physical facts transpiring in the nervous system that immediately and mediately affect the mind. If these are termed sub-conscious

facts, no criticism is to be passed upon the language, provided it be understood to apply to physical facts, and not to mental ones. The essentially invariable characteristic of the latter is, that they are known to some mind whose states and activities they are. Facts transpiring in darkness, under or beyond the reach of consciousness, are purely physical facts. This is the very pith of the distinction between the phenomena of mind and of matter. Taine says : " Beneath the ordinary sensations which we know by consciousness there descends an indefinite series of analogous mental events, more and more imperfect, and more and more removed from consciousness, without our being able to put a limit to this series of increasing degradations ; and this successive lowering, which has its counterpart in the attenuation of the nervous system, leads us to the foot of the zoölogical scale, while connecting together, by a continuous sequence of intermediate links, the most rudimentary outlines and highest combinations of the nervous system and mental world." ¹

Here we have a sufficiently wide region for sub-conscious facts. The mind is identified with the nervous constitution, and through it there descends a " series of mental events " into we know not what darkness and depths of the physical world. Consciousness is thus a vision, a light that tarries above, and expires in a feeble, flickering way, at no definite bound in the " increasing degradations." Taine has this justification, that he strives to identify the highest nervous fact with the mental one which is its conscious counterpart. He explains the diversity between the impression made by " molecular movements of nervous centres " and the feeling or the thought which is their concomitant by the very different way in which they are approached, the one from without, the other from within ; the one by the senses, the other by " a special inward process we term consciousness." Thus the two conceptions which the mind forms, the one of molecular change, the other of thought, are the diverse poles of one fact, due to opposite approaches. Much in the same way we see,

¹ Taine on Intelligence, p. 176.

and at the same time smell, a rose, uniting two irreconcilable sensations in one thing by virtue of double organs.

The image and comparison are alike illusory. If consciousness is an organ, regarding from within the molecular change of the nervous centres, then is it a separate faculty, centered in some second thing, the mind. Nor can consciousness, the common condition and ground of every sensation, be likened in a philosophical, instructive comparison to any additional sense yielding new diversities of impression. The mind cannot take rank with its own senses, consciousness with the separate faculties it conditions, and then be referred with them to some other mind or consciousness, back of all, that gathers up and collates the facts. The molecular changes of the brain cannot be at once an outside fact to be seen or conceived in their physical aspect, an inside fact in some way to be seen or conceived by consciousness, and also the entire fact, physical and mental, of the complete process. Or, if this can be so, the method needs more exposition. We still hold that the division between conscious and sub-conscious facts must be made to coincide with that between mental and physical ones, and that the highest nervous changes in the mind's chief organ, the cerebrum, are, in their physical, material aspect, no more mental than the twitchings of a galvanized muscle. Next in value to giving a sufficient reason for a fact, is the denial of the value of insufficient reasons. The mental state and the physical one which accompanies it stand as far apart as ever. No lines of connection that have been started from either shore have touched the opposite. We do not hereby exclude the many gradations of consciousness, its slow passage into oblivion, the gradual lapse into a purely physical product: the point made is, that the two classes of facts, the conscious and the unconscious ones, still remain apart, distinct in kind, the one mental the other material.

If we look upon consciousness as an inseparable characteristic of every mental state, that which makes it to be a mental state, we shall have occasion for two uses of the word,

an exact and a popular one, — a use that precisely covers the facts, and one that enables us easily to express a consequence of them. Exactly employed, consciousness will mean the characteristic form, the comprehensive idea, that includes all acts and states of intelligence, all mental facts. Submitting to the freedom and ease of expression, it will mean the knowledge which the mind has of its own states, as states, in their passing, complex forms. We may take an unhesitating and certain appeal to consciousness, in the second sense, for the general, unanalyzed contents of human experience, for the facts of thought and its varieties, of emotion and volition and their varieties. Under this appeal we shall meet with no contradiction, shall stand on common ground with all. Such is not the reference which is continually had to consciousness, and there is, therefore, no harmony of results, no starting-points for productive inquiry, no tests for profitable debate. This we will strive to make plain by a few, out of the many examples open to us.

Says Reid : "Consciousness assures us that in perception we are immediately cognizant of an external and extended non-ego."¹ Reid must here cover by consciousness the cognitive power on which it attends. Hamilton defines consciousness as "The recognition by the thinking subject of its own acts or affections." Under this definition, he returns again and again to assertions like the following : "We may lay it down as an undisputed truth, that consciousness gives, as an ultimate fact, a primitive duality — a knowledge of the ego in relation and contrast to the non-ego ; and a knowledge of the non-ego in relation and contrast to the ego."² Morell makes the kindred statement : "Perception, viewed alone, indicates simply the momentary consciousness of an external reality standing before us, face to face."³ President Porter gives this presentation of the same theory : "We inquire of consciousness what is, in sense-perception, the psychical act

¹ Works of Reid, collected by Hamilton, p. 755.

² Hamilton's Lectures, p. 202.

³ Philosophy of Religion, p. 45.

or state? She replies, It is a process complex in its nature, but instantaneous in time. It is complex, because the soul, in its single act discerns two objects, its own condition and some material reality.”¹ “What the soul directly perceives, i.e. distinguishes from itself, is its own sensitive organism so far as it is excited to sensation.”²

Such are the appeals taken to consciousness by modern systems of philosophy — appeals characterized by their fearless, earnest reiteration. Restrict now the meaning of consciousness to the necessary knowledge which the mind has of its own cognitions, and how surprising is it that consciousness has not reported clearly, satisfactorily, till the advent of this modern school, a fact momentarily and universally present to it. If this appeal be now wisely taken, we can only say that we have not, as is supposed, common grounds of knowledge and inquiry in consciousness. These philosophers, far from establishing their own position, have rather overthrown the basis of all positions; have swept away the grounds of any agreement, by showing that the phenomena under discussion, to wit, those found in consciousness, are in different minds hopelessly diverse. We agree in the existence of thoughts, affections, volitions, in the various subdivisions of these, as perceptions, sensations, recollections, images, judgments. Whatever may be the tendencies of our theories, whether toward idealism, materialism, or realism, we accept these facts; but this additional fact, put side by side with them, as resting on exactly the same basis, we do not and cannot accept. It is the dogma of a school, which, whether true or not, is not self-evident, and cannot be ranked with undeniable, primitive facts, given as such in consciousness, without destroying the evidence, impeaching the authority, of those with which it stands.

It may be asked, does not the mere reference of a statement, so very partially received, to the authority of consciousness, show that there are no grounds for metaphysics in common phenomena to be investigated? It does show that the bounds

¹ Porter, on the Human Intellect, p. 127.

² Ibid. p. 132.

and conditions of those phenomena are not recognized, and that a first step to profitable inquiry is a new settlement of limits, a new determination of the facts under discussion, their source, their authority, and the methods of their investigation. If such references to consciousness cannot be checked, that carry no conviction to an adversary, and are in his eyes mere dogmatic assertions, then the schools of philosophy must stand hopelessly apart, and the proofs of each be denounced by every other as insufficient and inconclusive.

It was argumentation of this sort which led Hume to say: "There are some philosophers who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call ourself. Undeniably, all these positive assertions are contrary to that very experience which is pleaded for them; nor have we any idea of self after the manner it is here explained."¹

When one philosopher can flatly contradict another as to the testimony of consciousness proper,—that is, as to the very facts under consideration,—there is no hope of any unity of result, till this primary disagreement is overcome. Consciousness must mean one thing to us all, and the facts yielded by it be the same, before we can begin to build a common philosophical structure. Science is one, because its phenomena are understood alike, and have one practical test for their truth.

The reason why it has been possible thus to confound the testimony of consciousness, and confuse at the very beginning the subject of inquiry, we will point out a little later, when we have finished the instances of it to be adduced. It must be allowed, we think, that the philosophers of the sceptical and materialistic school have much less frequently fled unadvisedly to consciousness for defence than have intuitionists. Hume is less open to the accusation than Hamilton, Spencer than Hodge. Yet even Hume has stepped into the slough. He says: "There is no impression, nor idea of any kind, of which we have any consciousness or memory, that is not conceived as existent; and it is evident that from this con-

¹ Hume's Works, Vol. i. p. 311.

sciousness the most perfect idea and assurance of being is achieved.”¹ He then proceeds to draw the conclusion: “The idea of existence is the same as an idea of that we conceive to be existent.” He here makes simple and single an act which correct analysis would make double, to wit, the sensation and the mind’s contemplation of it as real. For the truth of this defective rendering he, too, goes dogmatically to consciousness. Says Hodge, in his *Systematic Theology*: “Consciousness teaches that the soul is an individual subsistence.”² “We are conscious of an abiding, unchanging self, which is the subject of our changing thoughts and feelings.”³ “We get the idea of power from our own consciousness, that is, we are conscious of the ability of producing effects.”⁴ “This doctrine [the denial of second causes] contradicts the consciousness of every man. We know, as certainly as we know anything, that we are free agents, and that free-agency is the power of self-determination, or of originating our own acts. We are conscious of our own existence; we are, in one sense, conscious of the existence of other men.”⁵ “They [those who connect sin with choice] still insist that even evil innate, inherent sin, must be referable to our own voluntary agency, or it cannot be guilt in us. But this is contrary to our own consciousness.”⁶ A like direct appeal to consciousness is habitual with this author. He seems to find his entire creed legibly written on the mental tablets, though very few of us share his insight.

Dr. Carpenter makes this statement, in the *Popular Science Monthly*: “The psychologist of the present day views matter entirely through the light of his own consciousness; his idea of matter in the abstract being that it is ‘something’ which has a permanent power of exciting sensations.”⁷

Dr. McCosh, somewhat in contradiction to what he has just before asserted, says: “Man is conscious that he has a power of will and spontaneity.”⁸

¹ Works, Vol. i. p. 91. ² Hodge, Vol. i. p. 377. ³ p. 389. ⁴ p. 406.

⁵ p. 595.

⁶ Vol. ii. p. 189.

⁷ Oct. 1873, p. 693.

⁸ The Divine Government, Physical and Moral, p. 283.

Dr. Hickok, in the following passage, includes the ego in the objects of consciousness. "They [appearances] are the reflection, or other side, of the ego itself, and could not be in consciousness but for the ego, and so the ego could not be in consciousness except for them."¹ He seems to hold that a knowledge of liberty is contained in self-consciousness. "Each knows his own freedom, and acknowledges the freedom of others; and thus the ego comes to complete self-recognition, and passes wholly through the second phase of knowing, termed 'self-consciousness.'"²

Morell makes this presentation of intuitions: "The subject stands immediately in presence of the object, and perceives it; hence we term the process, in some instances 'perception,' as when we come in contact with the external world through the senses; and sometimes 'intuition,' as when we have a direct knowledge, through the interior eye of consciousness, of higher and more spiritual realities."³

We need not analyze these assertions separately. It is evident the difficult truths of philosophy—the existence of matter, mind, power, freedom, right, and even of God—are by some referred directly to consciousness, and thus put out of the range of proof. By others they are as stanchly denied as first facts of consciousness, and then looked upon as disproved. We wish to make clear the ground of confusion between these contradictory methods—to show how it is that the swords of these vehement adversaries so often pass each other in the darkness, so rarely meet in well-directed blows.

The source of difficulty is found in the confusion which attends the word "consciousness." Definitions have not harmonized; and, still worse, the use of an author often departs from his own definition. This has arisen from the subtle nature of consciousness. It is not itself an entity, but the form, the comprehensive idea, of certain entities. We need not add anything to the acts of knowing and feeling to make them conscious acts of knowing and feeling. They can only be knowing and feeling at all under this condition

¹ *Creator and Creation*, p. 69.

² *Ibid.* p. 70.

³ *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 125.

of consciousness. The simplest possible affection of mind is as much characterized by this form of its being as the most complex. Consciousness, like space and time, is one of those conceptions — forms of being — abstract entities — that give essential and radical character to things and events ; on their appropriate application, a knowledge of radical character depends. Yet a cognitive act of mind, while in itself simple, bears a double aspect. It, itself, as an affection, is known to the mind, and it also, as an active affection, discloses something else. The mind knows it, and knows through it, in one indivisible act, as the eye sees the telescope and also sees with it. The word “consciousness,” always falling below its true application, has vacillated between these two bearings of thought. When carefully defined, it has inclined to the first meaning, and been more frequently employed to indicate the mind’s recognition of its own action as such ; when used in actual discussion, and made a final appeal, it has often sunk to the second, and designated the knowledge given as their product by any and all acts of cognition. It has sometimes, in definition, been made to cover this ground. James Mill thus regarded it as the generic knowing of the mind, that is, the combined knowing made up of each specific form. Hamilton clearly draws the distinction above given between the two aspects of a cognition, and warns his readers against the danger of confounding them. Yet he seems to us to have fallen signally into the same error, both in defining consciousness and in his method of appealing to it. We have already given one of his definitions : “The recognition of the thinking subject of its own acts or affections.” This does not prevent his saying : “Consciousness is not a special faculty ; but our special faculties are only modifications of consciousness.”¹ He does not recognize the real nature of consciousness, but seems to think that the question concerning it can be expressed under the alternative, “Is consciousness the genus under which our several faculties of knowledge are contained as species ? or, Is consciousness

¹ Hamilton’s Lectures, p. 145.

itself a special faculty, co ordinate with, and not comprehending, these?" He would accept the first branch of the dilemma. Thus, also, Dr. Hopkins says: "Consciousness is the generic form of intelligence."¹

It is plain that an idea of consciousness, that is constantly causing it to include every form of cognition, while the mind thus using it, is yet, from time to time, reverting back to its central office of revealing mental affections, and has no other word than it to designate this common condition of thought, will give rise to inextricable confusion. So defined, consciousness belongs, in a peculiar sense, to the powers of knowing. Indeed, if it be "the generic form of intelligence," it is difficult to see what it has to do with emotions and volitions. The knowledge which the mind has of its own affections is absolute, undeniable, indisputable. All philosophy assumes it at once. The knowledge which the mind has through its several powers of cognition, is more or less uncertain, admits of qualifications and limitations, and is that which philosophy is constantly engaged in discussing, enlarging, confirming. There is, therefore, a very wide difference between appealing to consciousness in the first and in the second sense; between asking after the floating, general affections of the mind, and the veracity, authority, of each of them, as indicating or declaring something else. That I seem to see a ghost, is undeniable; that I do see one, not easily to be believed. That I think I remember a transaction, may be a certain fact; that I do so remember, may be a question of grave doubt. That I am reasoning, none will be disposed to deny; the truth of my conclusions, none may accept. To take an appeal on each of these points to consciousness with the same confidence and dogmatic assertion is utterly to confound philosophy.

Our cognitive faculties are not only less direct, and generally possessed of much less authority, than consciousness, they vary greatly among themselves as to the reliability of each and all their affirmations. One sense is less certain than

¹ Lectures on Moral Science, p. 218.

another; memory is less reliable than the senses; the validity of the judgment depends on the conditions of its exercise; the intuitions are trustworthy according to the precision which use has imparted to them. An appeal to the faculties should, therefore, in all cases, be made in a specific, and not in a generic form.

The faculty should be designated, and the conditions of its activity, and then we are prepared to estimate the value of its conclusions. Though no philosophy can stand that distrusts the faculties by which it is developed, and has no right to cast suspicion on those with which these are indissolubly associated, yet one faculty may criticise, confirm, limit another. Experience does teach us the field within which each power is reliable; and thus the faculty to which we refer our knowledge must, in each instance, be named, as constituting an essential part of the proof. There is hardly more difference between general rumor and individual testimony, than between an off-hand appeal to consciousness and an exact quotation of the mind's action confirmatory of a given conclusion.

The facts, also, rendered in consciousness are, even when very simple in form, very complex in origin, involving the present or past action of many faculties. When we say that we see a house of given form and dimensions at a certain distance, though we have used the single word "see" to express our knowledge, it is truly the result of the action of the greater part of our faculties, and of our past experience. This complex character of the states which consciousness reports in the most immediate, simple way, points to a very remarkable difference between the truths of the conclusions involved in them, and the certainty which attaches to their own existence. One may thus refer to consciousness—and many are referring to it—for the results of a faculty whose very being a large share of philosophers are denying. If such is to be the method of metaphysics, it will richly deserve the contempt so freely expressed for it.

We have a right to assume, and only to assume, the general,

unanalyzed states or affections of the mind — perceptions, judgments, emotions. These all freely grant us, all accept as the products to be explained. Here lies our first, only, and final recourse to consciousness in its appropriate form ; a recourse in which the thought accommodates itself to the convenience of language. The problems of mental science being thus clearly propounded, and being essentially the same to all, we have occasion to enter instantly on the most difficult and obscure analysis, that of the states of mind, that we may see the simple powers implied in them. The process may be compared to that so familiar in chemistry. The substance which resists all farther decomposition is accepted as elementary, and for this reason simply, that analysis has exhausted its methods upon it. The affections of the mind are resolved by intellectual analysis into their simplest and most primitive form ; and when any state can be separated into no parts or acts simpler than itself, or referred to no activity primitive to it, then it is accepted as a final, elementary constituent of the mind, and referred to a mental power or susceptibility of which it is the product. Nothing more is meant by a mental power than that capacity which is the ground or cause of a given affection. Hence to point out an affection as simple and primary, is to establish the implied faculty. The method pursued by Spencer, in his *Psychology*, is this of analysis. Indeed, the various forms of philosophy differ from each other in their value, chiefly in the steadiness and skill with which they analyze mental facts, the firmness with which they attribute every simple product to a mental power, the care with which, its existence being recognized, they define and measure it in the form and conditions of its putting forth.

When such a method is relied on, however diverse the conclusions reached, the way of correction and proximate agreement is open ; since we have only to repeat the analysis, mark the points of divergence between ourselves and others, and test more faithfully the correctness of our methods. Harmony may not be the immediate result, but there will almost certainly be an approach to it, while the real grounds of

divergence will be brought distinctly forth. This, in itself, is a great gain. Nothing is to be despaired of while anything remains to be done. Disagreement is only hopeless when it is accompanied by blind dogmatism and arrogant assertion that leave no room for inquiry. Appeals taken, as they repeatedly are, to consciousness, are precisely, though they may be unwittingly, of this nature. They cover up and confound the points of diversity, and sweep away the grounds of investigation by calling in what is claimed to be a final and undeniable authority. It is as if the chemist should constantly refer to the compounds which contain his elements for a proof of their existence, while declining to disclose his processes of analysis to those whose results contradicted his own. An inquiry into the elements reached, and the methods of reaching them, speedily settles discrepancies in this department. The path of progress, though more difficult in mental science, as elements do not here offer the same final, satisfactory evidence as in chemistry, is yet essentially the same.

This purely speculative analysis of the affections of consciousness—those common complex affections whose existence all readily admit—finds confirmation of its conclusions in various palpable external tests. The daily actions of men are the products of these affections; and a correct division of faculties will show itself in a general correspondence of hypothetical with actual results — of the lines of action which would naturally flow from the alleged attributes and those which do follow from real powers. If the speculations of philosophy give a dreamy unreality to that life which is to us all a most palpable daily fact, then some element has been omitted, some root of connection sundered, and the ground of substantial, wide-awake existence in the senses overlooked. Every system must be realistic in this sense, that it at once embraces the outline and substance of the facts which are the products of mind, and thus discloses its character. Every action may be termed the secondary stage of an affection, and is, therefore, to be looked on as a key to it. Thus, when Hume, in his analysis of cause and effect, comes to the conclusion that we

have of it "no other notion but that of certain objects which have always been conjoined together,"¹ he does not sufficiently explain that labor by which we are constantly striving to hitch new results on to old forces through a recognition of their nature. If the lifting of the lid of a tea-kettle has nothing to do with the power of steam, but is a naked sequence, it does not at all follow that a piston-head will be lifted likewise by it. Or, when he says, that our idea of time is one "merely of the manner or order in which objects exist,"² he overlooks the fact that we understand the order of sequence by the idea of time, not time by the fact of sequence; and that the world is full of pieces of mechanism designed to measure time, as if it itself were a formal law to all events. It is true that these time-pieces, one and all, depend on a sequence, but they draw no attention to that sequence. The sequence is incident to the determining of equal divisions in a strictly formal element. It is possible for us to conceive that all sequences, everywhere, should follow each other more rapidly than they now do, with a maintenance of their present relative ratio; but if time were only this sequence such a conception would not be open to us, for the fact and form of sequence would be identical in the two cases. A time-piece does indicate something beside sequence, to wit, a rate of sequence, a rate, indeed, which we cannot measure without a second sequence with which to compare it, but which we can conceive by itself to be increased or diminished.

A second source of confirmation in mental analysis is language. This stands in most intimate union with the mental affections to which it is designed to give expression. While the distinctions of language, arising as they often do from the convenience of speech, and trusting to some secondary or suggestive force for a correct interpretation, are not the exact counterpart of the states and acts to which they apply, they nevertheless maintain a close and general correspondence with them. A philosophy that finds its divisions gathering up and harmonizing those hinted at in language

¹ Hume's Works, Vol. i. p. 124.

² Ibid. Vol. i. p. 60.

receives decided support from that fact. A system that should deny the existence of memory must struggle hard against the entire current of expression. That the word "right," leaving behind one after another of its lower applications, comes to take up an ethical meaning, which makes it in so many connections the language of highest praise, goes to show that there is a corresponding supreme affection, its counterpart in the human mind. The quiet way in which the word "infinite" holds on its course, notwithstanding the laborious proof by which it has been shown to stand for an inconceivable *pseudo-idea*, affords evidence that the human mind does so grasp the notion expressed by it as to find an ever returning practical demand for it in the utterance of thought. The refusal of such a word to disappear from among the visible symbols of thought, after the chemistry of mind has pronounced it altogether volatile and deceptive in the idea indicated, discloses a grasp of the inner, spiritual senses more certain than that of the imagination and logical processes.

The history of philosophical beliefs also presents tests, though wavering ones, of the truths of mental analysis. Probability is given to a conclusion concurred in by many and diverse schools. The distinction between substance and qualities, force and phenomena, is one confirmed by a vast weight of authority, which, when it is rejected as authority, does yet indicate a controlling tendency, an insight, most likely in accordance with the facts. When, therefore, either idealism or materialism assumes a form that obliterates this distinction, a form that can put no substance under qualities, no agents back of activities, the gravest *a-priori* doubt is cast upon its methods.

When Hamilton, for the time being, sets aside this distinction in affirming that the mind in perception, "is immediately conscious of itself, and of something external to itself," our suspicion is excited, and we scan the new doctrine very closely. This assertion of a perceptive, sensational knowledge, of a substantial, non-phenomenal fact, — of real being, — is one quite out of the range of previous universal belief.

While all the conclusions of philosophers are freely criticized, they gain by concurrence, by accumulation, a power at least a little in advance of the reasons on which they rest. Not to feel the historic force of events and beliefs, is to lack one just and protecting sensibility.

The physical facts which accompany mental ones as their inseparable conditions, are another guide to correct analysis. Though sensation, as a mental affection, cannot be explained by a study of the senses, yet, we are aided in acquiring a knowledge of its divisions, limits, and method of cultivation by a careful study of its physical organs. The fact that the superior senses of sight and hearing find a nervous centre below the cerebrum sufficient to be the ground of reflex action, through the eye and ear, and yet, when the cerebrum is removed, fail to give a practical, working knowledge of the outside world, lends strong confirmation to the belief that the larger part of perception is a product, in the animal, of a spontaneous correlation, in man, of one established by experience, between the seat or centre of the sensations and the cerebral action which attends on them, puts them to service, and gives them, in connection with mental associations, the force of practical guidance. The crude sensation is transformed into perception by a superior activity, of which the cerebrum is the seat, and which stands in the closest affinity with the inferior sensational centre. The sensations can exist, as shown by reflex action, yet their entire external power and value be lost. "Here is a pigeon whose cerebral lobes are entirely removed, but whose corpora quadrigemina remain; when I suddenly put my hand near it, it makes a slight movement of the head to avoid the threatened danger."¹ Yet the animal so treated loses all intelligence, is unable to avoid obstacles, or help itself to food.

The relation of the voluntary to the involuntary powers affords another instance of a topic which can be most suc-

¹ Experiments of Flourens and Longet, as given in Taine on Intelligence, p. 156.

cessfully studied in connection with the nervous system. We find inferior nervous centres, working with automatic efficiency, yet made subject in various degrees to the pure mental powers that rule in the cerebrum. There is here an independence of position and of office, together with a union and subordination of structure, which present obvious physical counterparts of the facts of consciousness.

We refer to one other aid, that afforded by comparative psychology, a study of the powers and habits of animals. The extent to which the intelligence of the animal can be explained by a spontaneous correlation of constitutional functions, of the appetites and of the senses with the muscular system in what is known chiefly as instincts, and by the associations of true mental affections through memory in experience, seems to us to show that there is here a form of life to which necessary, organic, and sensational states are made to minister effectively and sufficiently. So far, we would accept the philosophy of Spencer. Here are combinations of inner states and outer actions, intelligent in form, appearing largely in consciousness, yet essentially the product of the physical circumstances under which they arise. When, however, this phase of intelligent being is made the type and measure of rational life, comparative psychology does not seem to us to favor the conclusion. The one fact of language shows that the human mind no longer works exclusively by concrete facts and their images, but chiefly by ideas — ideas which are a true product of intellectual powers, not the shadows and faint remainders of sensations. The starting-point of a being who moves intellectually by language, and of one which progresses by sensations, is radically diverse. A closer study of these two forms of intelligence, as shown in animal and in rational life, will go far to settle some of the more difficult problems of philosophy. The philosophy of fixed associations works its way fairly up to the bounds of reason; it has not, for us, by one step transcended them.

It remains the task of philosophy, by ever renewed analysis, and an increasingly patient and fair application of these tests,

to settle the powers of the mind, to run out and establish the limits of knowledge. But is not this precisely what philosophy has been about, with very partial results? Yes, and no; and the negation has more weight than the affirmation. A great deal of philosophy has overlooked the dependence of deduction on induction, of *a priori* on empirical truths, and has wrought diligently at relations which, at the best, lie purely between ideas, and do not give the measure of facts. Idealism is necessarily *a priori* and deductive, and prides itself on this feature, on this necessary sequence of its conclusions. But such a philosophy is no more mental science or ontology than pure mathematics is mechanics or astronomy. All that it can possibly be is logic, and, if a logic, it may be one utterly out of relation to facts since its notions, its enucleated ideas, may not correspond to these.

The sceptical philosophy of Hume — and the same is true of many of its numerous progeny at the present time — was almost purely deductive. Strange as it may seem, a school that has so closely affiliated with the inductive, scientific tendency rests on the purest deductions. Given the premises, that the phenomena of the mind are divisible into impressions and ideas, and that “the difference between these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness with which they strike upon the mind,”¹ and all his other conclusions follow in order. “All our ideas are copied from impressions.”² Space and time are not distinct ideas, but “merely of the manner and order in which objects exist.”³ “The idea of existence is the very same with the idea of what we conceive to be existent.”⁴ “We have no other notion of cause and effect but that of certain objects which have always been conjoined together.”⁵ “All reasoning consists in nothing but comparison.”⁶ “Belief is nothing but a strong and lively idea, derived from a present impression related to it.”⁷ “Belief is more properly an act of the sensitive than of the cogitative parts of our nature.”⁸ “The sceptic still con-

¹ Hume, Vol. i. p. 15.

² Ibid. p. 99.

³ Ibid. p. 60.

⁴ Ibid. p. 92.

⁵ Ibid. p. 124.

⁶ Ibid. p. 100.

⁷ Ibid. p. 140.

⁸ Ibid. p. 223.

tinues to reason and believe, even though he asserts that he cannot defend his reason by reason."¹ "I have shown that the understanding, when it acts alone and according to its most general principles, entirely subverts itself, and leaves not the lowest degree of evidence in any proposition, either in philosophy or common life. We save ourselves from total scepticism only by means of that singular and seemingly trivial property of the fancy by which we enter with difficulty into remote — that is new — views of things."²

A volume is too much for a philosophy of this purely deductive character. A vigorous mind can step directly from the first of these propositions to the second, from the second to the third, and so on to the last. If our knowledge is only impressions in different stages of decadence, then, of course, the senses have the lead, and what is in the mind is better than what is out of it, up to the full force of its present being. Yet this proof may be displaced in ten minutes by a second conclusion, endowed with the same validity. Possession is not merely nine points of law; it becomes the entire ten, in the mental structure. When philosophers as vigorous and as influential as Hume work in this fashion, what progress are we to expect? The entire labor of establishing his system lay properly before these, his postulates, enunciated on his first pages. The great mass of his work is the relatively child's play of drawing conclusions and multiplying corollaries. If it be said that much of the analysis insisted on by him is, nevertheless, involved in the stages of development, we grant it; but urge that at the critical moment the original principle is brought in to decide the result. The mind is not allowed to reach any other elements than those which can be covered by impressions and ideas which are their shadowy counterparts.

The most modern forms of English philosophy are well represented by Hamilton and John Stuart Mill. We have, in both, either a defective analysis or a stubborn disregard, in the conclusions reached, of the tests of correctness we

¹ Hume's Works, Vol. i. p. 237.

² Ibid. p. 330.

have mentioned. In the instances already adduced, Hamilton and his followers insist on the direct testimony of consciousness, both to the "ego and non-ego." Under these affirmations, if consciousness be used to express the mind's knowledge of its own affections, then both matter and mind, in their real substance, become affections of mind. In other words, there is no reality, but fluent states of consciousness, and we are, against the entire drift of this school, landed in idealism. If consciousness is employed as a generic term for all our cognitive powers, then, obviously, there is here no analysis; and a knowledge of the "ego and non-ego" is referred to that very complex mental activity which accompanies perception, without deciding on the special power or powers to which it is to be assigned. Can this knowledge be ascribed to the purely sensational element in perception? We think not; for, if so, the sensation ceases to be a state wrought in the mind,—an effect enveloped, permeated by consciousness,—and becomes, in part, matter or mind, in their permanent, absolute, hidden essence. It is inference alone that reaches something beyond the data, back of the premises, hidden under them as a substratum of force. If the senses directly grasp this also, then the phenomenal and substantial flow together, and mingle in one turbid stream, like the rains and snows of spring. Form and substance cease to be distinguishable.

Here is defective analysis. The idea of cause and effect is overlooked at the very point at which it renders its most efficient aid. Perception is full of inference, is slowly built up on inference, till, in the simple yet complex whole, the crude sensation is only the hidden foundation of the framework of knowledge—the rock that scarcely rises above the surface. The stubborn conviction with which this doctrine of direct perception is held to springs from the fact that a knowledge of matter and of mind is really contained in perception, though not in that element of it to which it is referred.

We gave, above, quotations in which the proof of human freedom is sought directly in consciousness. Now freedom

turns on the connection between states ; is not itself a state. It cannot, then, be established by consciousness. Liberty is an idea, like cause and effect, which the mind brings to the explanation of certain facts, and must rest for proof on that particular power which furnishes it. If this faculty be discarded or discredited this notion goes with it, *maugre* consciousness.

Hamilton overlooks cause and effect in its real character and chief office. Mill, in his analysis, eliminates it altogether. Therein he does the utmost violence to universal action and language. These tests of correctness are not only not met ; they are violated in the most flagrant possible way. Life, science, language are all constructed on the idea of force — firm efficiencies to be laid hold of and used. Simple antecedence is the travesty of daily speech and action — the merest shell of appearances, with which this living, germinant fact invests itself. The doctrine equally fails to meet the test of the history of philosophy, or that of physiology. The study of the arrangements and connections of the nervous system proceeds on the supposition that these indicate real dependencies — are the basis of efficient interaction. The idea that they are mere dumb show — false indications of forces never at work — is not the basis of physiological research.

Taine, whose work is the latest and most extreme presentation of this view, is compelled to regard most of the products of mental action as “hallucinations.” “External perception is a true hallucination.” “All these operations” — judgment, reasoning, abstraction, generalization, combination of colors — “comprise an hallucination, at all events, in an incipient state.” “But whether the hallucinatory process be commenced or completed, matters little ; and the states of our mind, when we are awake and in health, may be defined as a *series of hallucinations which do not become developed.*”¹ By so much we are saved from insanity. If we chance on development, we pass into madness. Quite

¹ Taine, *On Intelligence*, p. 220.

true is this conclusion, if there is no foundation for the notion of cause and effect, and no corresponding mental power. Then are we in our mental states forever played on by false images, begetting ungrounded beliefs; and the sane man is better than the insane one, only in that he believes in harmony with his fellows. But what are we to think of a philosophy that resolves all its own conclusions into hallucinations, and makes such a wreck of thought and language, that there is hardly enough left that is real and true to steady and explain by contrast "the hallucinations" and "hallucinating" processes everywhere afloat! Such a philosophy falls not much short of a *reductio ad absurdum* for itself and associated views.

Observe the definition of matter which belongs to it: "The permanent possibility of particular sensations." Rest on the word "possibility"; what does it imply but something which is the ground or occasion of the possible sensation? No cause or ground or reason yields no possibility. Why a *permanent* possibility? No answer can be given, except on the idea of causation. If there is no exterior or interior cause for the sensations, then they are not conditioned in their own being to permanent appearance. Nor is the mind, by the mere fact of their repetition, bound to anticipate them. If it were, there would be at least one efficient circumstance working conviction in the thoughts, that is, one cause. Without this idea of causation, thought falls to pieces, equally with facts.

This definition is self-destructive; not only can no reason be given for it, it scouts the only idea on which a reason could be given, and hence confounds reason and philosophy. All empirical reasoning about facts — and strange enough, this is all the reasoning that Mill is willing to accept — is left absolutely without connection or ground, by a denial of causation. The mere fact of continuity can be the basis of no conviction without a restoration of the discarded idea of an efficiency in facts. There must be given to sequence a governing power over the mind explaining its anticipations, otherwise the field of mental phenomena — reasoning, reasons

and all — is an “hallucination,” a fleeting, feathery, disjointed vision.

Are we not, then, right in insisting that philosophy shall commence with a careful analysis of the general, complex, universally accepted facts of consciousness? That each result shall be closely, repeatedly, tested by the criteria of action, language, the history of thought, physiology, comparative psychology? That every element so reached and so approved shall be regarded as the sufficient proof of a corresponding power, and that all powers, in their own departments, under the limitations established by experience, shall be regarded as possessed of final authority? It is a shame to set down philosophy among the impossibles, till we have tried every method, put forth every effort. The wild conclusions of the past are much better than this. We are not shut up to the alternative. Sober, patient processes will yield sound results, here as elsewhere.

Dr. Hopkins, in his recent work, *An Outline Study of Man*, furnishes another example of the diversity and confusion of opinions that prevail on the subject of consciousness. Such a division, on so central a point, is a reproach and a weakness to philosophy; and we shall be glad to do even a little to remove it. “We would define consciousness to be the knowledge by the mind of itself as the permanent and invisible subject of its own operations.”¹ The objections to this definition are manifest. It withdraws consciousness from the field to which it belongs, and assigns it an office already performed by other powers. It withdraws it from its proper field. Consciousness is brought forward to explain the knowledge of the mind of its own states. This is the riddle; and to define consciousness without reference to it, is to leave it unsolved. This is the habitual, philosophical use of the word. We do not wish to discover some activity which we may call by this name, but we wish to answer the question wisely, How does the mind know its own states and actions?

¹ p. 107.

We respond, that as states and actions they cannot exist otherwise than in the conscious grasp of the mind, and that consciousness, therefore, is the characteristic of every mental condition, the one regulative notion under which we group them. The above definition makes consciousness perform a work due to other powers. The phenomena of mind, like those of matter, we refer inevitably, under the idea of causation, to a force or power which underlies them — is the source of them. This is all the knowledge the mind has of itself as essential being, and this it reaches by instant inference under the intuition of causation. To insert consciousness here as a power, is to make of it a fifth wheel.

Dr. Hopkins, in the same discussion, briefly speaks of the view we have urged: "Is not consciousness one of those original and primitive ideas of which we have spoken? This has been said; but since consciousness accompanies our knowledge of those ideas in the same way as it accompanies our other knowledge, if consciousness were one of them, we should need another consciousness back of that, and so on forever."¹ This objection proceeds on so slight a grasp of the doctrine, that it is difficult to give any color to it. Every mental act is characterized by consciousness. Consciousness is not some one thing or particular quality, but a common condition or regulative idea of a whole class of acts and states. The mind assigns an event to a certain place and time. The use of these ideas involves a mental action, and hence the common condition of such actions — consciousness. There is no more difficulty in attributing this peculiar quality to one kind of knowledge than to another. The act of mind by which I recognize consciousness to be a constitutional condition of all mental states, is itself characterized by it; but there is no embarrassment to the view in this fact. If consciousness were a distinct power, then the exercise of it should involve a second act to cognize the first; but, as a condition of all mental states, it is, of course, present in the act which discloses this truth.

¹ p. 106.

ARTICLE VI.

WORDS IN NEW TESTAMENT GREEK BORROWED FROM
THE LATIN.

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INSTRUCTION in New Testament Greek, presupposes a knowledge of classical Greek. How grievously contrary to fact this supposition is, some Professors in Theological Seminaries would state, I fear, with hearty emphasis. Yet there seems to be no other way. The little that we know, when we leave college, of the Greek of Plato and Demosthenes, must, somehow, be made the basis of learning a little about the Greek of John and Paul. Hence there must be New Testament Lexicons, which all good theological students use; and there must be New Testament Grammars, which only the extraordinarily good students use. The lexicons must show us the new words and the old words with new meanings. The grammars must show us the new inflections and new syntax. Yet the lexicons have the new so inextricably interwoven with the old, and the grammars not only do likewise, but contain so much that is of use merely to finished scholars, that practical learners sometimes despair of knowing anything definitely about New Testament Greek. They lay up their manuals "for reference" only; that is, they seldom refer to them. The commentator is the main dependence.

The present Article does not aspire to the dignity of either lexicon or grammar. Retiring to a small corner of the wide field, it aims at gathering up and using what can be there gleaned.

The following alphabetical list, the result of notes taken during a reading of the entire text, is believed to contain the whole number of Latin words found in the New Testament, as also every passage (or its parallel) in which they are used.

Ἀσάριον — Latin *as*, with the Greek diminutive ending -άριον. So that it may more strictly be said to be *derived* than borrowed. The *as*, in New Testament times, was worth about eight mills of our money. “Are not two sparrows sold for a *farthing*?” Matt. x. 29. “Are not five sparrows sold for two *farthings*?” Luke xii. 6.

Δηνάριον — Latin *denarius*, from the distributive *deni*, ten (*decem*), equal, originally, to ten *asses*, or sixteen cents, before the *as* was reduced to its lowest value. In New Testament times it was equal to sixteen *asses*, or about thirteen cents. Thus, to American readers, the translation “shilling” would be more nearly correct than “penny.” The denarius (from which comes the “d,” for pence, of English sterling currency) was a silver coin, bearing on one side the image of the emperor. Hence the question of Jesus, “Whose image,” etc. The pay of the common Roman soldier was ten *asses* a day after the *as* was reduced. At the accession of Tiberius (A.D. 14) the soldiers in Pannonia revolted, and, among other complaints, they said that “soul and body were estimated at ten asses a day,” and that out of this clothes, arms, tents, etc. had to be purchased. Their demand was, that “their daily wages should be a *denarius*” (i.e., I suppose, a sixteen-as denarius), although the praetorian cohorts, or imperial guards, received *two* denarii.¹ This will illustrate the wages in the parable of the vineyard. A penny, or a shilling, a day was enough for a full day’s work, and a generous gratuity for the last hour’s work. The word is found sixteen times in the New Testament. The unmerciful servant found one “which owed him an hundred *pence*,” Matt. xviii. 28. The householder “agreed with the laborers for a *penny* a day,” Matt. xx. 2, 9, 10, 13. The Herodians “brought unto him a *penny*,” Matt. xxii. 19; Mark xii. 15; Luke xx. 24. The disciples in the desert-place asked, “Shall we go and buy two hundred *pennyworth* of bread?” Mark vi. 37; John vi. 7. The ointment of spikenard “might have been sold for more than three

¹ Enimvero militiam ipsam gravem, infructuosam: *denis* in diem *assibus* animam et corpus aestimari: hinc vestem, arma, tentoria, hinc saevitiam centurionum et vacationes munerum redimi. At hercule verbera et vulnera, duram hiemem, exercitas aestates, bellum atrox aut sterilem pacem sempiterna. Nec aliud levamentum quam si certis sub legibus militia iniretur, ut *singulos denarios* mererent, sextus decimus stipendii annus finem afferret, ne ultra sub vexillis tenerentur, sed iisdem in castris praemium pecunia solveretur. An praetorias cohortes, quae *binos denarios* acciperent, quae post sedecim annos penatibus suis reddantur, plus periculorum suscipere? — Tacitus, *Annals*, i. 17. Ut denarius diurnum stipendium foret. i. 26.

hundred *pence*," Mark xiv. 5; John xii. 5. One of the two debtors "owed five hundred *pence*," Luke vii. 41. The good Samaritan "took out two *pence*," Luke x. 35. A voice in Revelation said, "A measure of wheat for a *penny*, and three measures of barley for a *penny*." Rev. vi. 6.

κεντυρίων — Latin *centurio*, from *centuria*, (*centum-vir*) a commander of a hundred men, a captain. The regular Greek word is ἑκατοντάρχης or ἑκατόνταρχος, which latter word is generally used in the New Testament. Mark uses κεντυρίων. At the crucifixion we read of "the *centurion*, which stood over against him," Mark xv. 39; also verses 44, 45.

κῆνος — Latin *census*, originally the property-list of the Roman people, from *censere*, to rate; φόρος would be the regular Greek word. The examples of its use are, "What thinkest thou, Simon? of whom do the kings of the earth take custom or *tribute*?" Matt. xvii. 25. "Is it lawful to give *tribute* unto Caesar, or not?" Matt. xxii. 17. So when Jesus said (verse 19), "Shew me the *tribute*-money, they brought unto him a denarius"; also Mark xii. 14.

κοδράντης — Latin *Quadrans-antis*, from *quatuor* four, i.e. the fourth part of an *as*; analogous to the English word with which it is translated, farthing, i.e. *fourth*-ing. "Thou shalt by no means come out thence till thou hast paid the uttermost *farthing*," Matt. v. 26. "And she threw in two mites, which make a *farthing*." Mark xii. 42.

κολωνία — Latin *colonia*, from *colere*, to cultivate, settle, occupy. The governments of the *coloniæ* were modelled after that of the parent city Rome. Hence, in a *colonia*, Paul, as a Rome citizen, had a right to expect fair treatment. Regular Greek word κληρουχία. "Philippi, which is the chief city of that part of Macedonia, and a *colony*." Acts xvi. 12.

κουστωδία — Latin *custodia*, originally a watching, then a guard, from *custos* a guard. Regular Greek word φυλακή. "Ye have a *watch* Sealing the stone and setting a *watch*." Matt. xxvii. 65, 66. "Some of the *watch* came into the city." Matt. xxviii. 11.

λεγεών — Latin *legio-onis*, from *legere* to gather. The Roman legion varied in number from three thousand three hundred to six thousand two hundred. "Thinkest thou that I cannot now pray to my Father, and he shall presently give me more than twelve *legions* of angels?" Matt. xxvi. 53. The unclean spirit said, "My name is *Legion*, for we are many." Mark v. 9; also verse 15, and Luke viii. 30.

λέντιον — Latin *lintheum*, a linen cloth, from *linum*, linen, which again was borrowed from the Greek λίνον. “He riseth from supper, and laid aside his garments, and took a towel and girded himself.” John xiii. 4; also verse 5.

μάκελλον — Latin *macellum*,¹ a meat-market. “Whatsoever is sold in the *shambles*, that eat.” 1 Cor. x. 25.

μεμβράνα — Latin *membrana*, a membrane, or skinny covering, from *membrum*, a portion of the body, then parchment. “The cloak that I left at Troas with Carpus, when thou comest, bring with thee, and the books, but especially the *parchments*.” 2 Tim. iv. 13.

μίλιον — Latin *mille*, a thousand, for *mille pasuum*, a thousand paces. “Whosoever shall compel thee to go a *mile*, go with him twain.” Matt. v. 41.

μόδιος — Latin *modius*, a peck-measure, from *modus*, measure. “Neither do men light a candle and put it under a *bushel*.” Matt. v. 15; parallel, Mark iv. 21; Luke xi. 33.

πραιτώριον — Latin *praetorium*, originally a general’s tent, later, especially in the plural, a ruler’s palace. From *praetor*, for *prae-i-tor*. “Then the soldiers of the governor took Jesus into the *common hall*.” Matt. xxvii. 27. “Into the hall called *Praetorium*.” Mark xv. 16. “Unto the *hall of judgment*, . . . the *judgment hall*.” John xviii. 28, 33; also John xix. 9. “Herod’s *judgment hall*.” Acts xxiii. 35. “My bonds in Christ are manifest in all the *palace*.” Phil. i. 13.

ρέδη — Latin *rheda*, of Gallic origin, a four-wheeled carriage. The enumeration of the merchandise of Babylon includes “horses and *chariots*, and slaves and souls of men.” Rev. xviii. 13.

σικάριος — Latin *sicarius*, from *sica*, a dagger. Regular Greek word φονεύς. “Art not thou that Egyptian, which before these days madest an uproar, and leddest out into the wilderness four thousand men that were *murderers*.” Acts xxi. 38.

σιμικίνθιον — Latin *semicinctium*,² from *semi*, half, and *cingere*, to gird. Regular Greek word ἡμιζώνιον. “From his body were brought unto the sick handkerchiefs and *aprons*.” Acts xix. 12.

¹ “Venio ad macellum, rogo pisces; indicant
Caros, agninam caram, caram bubulam,
Vitulinam, cetum, porcinam, cara omnia:
Atque eo fuerunt cariora; aes non erat.”

Plautus, *Aulularia*, Act ii., Scene 8, lines 3–6.

² Martial has the following epigram with the title “Semicinctium.”

“Det tunicam dives; ego te praecingere possum.

Essem si locuples, munus utrumque darem.” — xiv. 143.

σουδάριον — Latin *sudarium*,¹ sweat-cloth, from *sudor*, sweat. Regular Greek word καψιδρώτιον. The *sudarium* had as various use as our handkerchief, which means, literally, a head-cover carried in the hand, — (hand-couver-chief, from *couvoir* and *chief*, *chef*, head). Napkin is early English for handkerchief. The Emperor Nero used to appear in public with a *sudarium* about his neck, (Suetonius 51). “Lord behold here is thy pound, which I have kept laid up in a *napkin*.” Luke xix. 20. “He that was dead [Lazarus] came forth, bound hand and foot with grave-clothes, and his face was bound about with a *napkin*.” John xi. 44. “Seeth the linen clothes lie, and the *napkin* that was about his head.” John xx. 6, 7. “were brought unto the sick *handkerchiefs* and aprons.” Acts xix. 12.

σπεκουλάτωρ — Latin *speculator*, from *speculari*, originally a scout; under the emperors, a member of the body-guard, or adjutant. Regular Greek word σωματοφύλαξ. Herod, “the king, sent an *executioner*, and commanded his head to be brought.” Mark vi. 27.

τίτλος — Latin *titulus*, an inscription. Regular Greek word ἐπιγραφή, which is used both by Mark (xv. 26), and Luke (xxiii. 38). “And Pilate wrote a *title* and put it on the cross. . . . This *title* then read many of the Jews.” John xix. 19, 20.

φαινόλης (φαιλόνης) — Latin *paenula*, a wollen traveling cloak. “The *cloak* that I left at Troas with Carpus, when thou comest, bring with thee.” 2 Tim. iv. 13.

φραγέλλιον — Latin *flagellum*, diminutive from *flagrum*, a whip. Regular Greek word μάστιξ, which is used Acts xxii. 24 and Heb. xi. 36. “When he had made a *scourge* of small cords he drove them all out of the temple.” John ii. 15.

φραγελλώω — Latin *flagello*, to scourge, from *flagellum*. Regular Greek word μαστιγώω, which is generally used in the New Testament. “When he had *scourged* Jesus he delivered him to be crucified.” Matt. xxvii. 26; parallel Mark xv. 15.

χῶρος — Latin *Corus*, *Caurus*, the northwest wind. Regular Greek word ἀργέστης. “Which is an haven of Crete and lieth toward the southwest and *northwest*.” Acts xxvii. 12.

¹ Paenulam obsoleti coloris superinduit, adapertoque capite, et ante faciem obtento *sudario* equum inscendit.” — Suetonius, Nero, 48. “Ligato circum collum *sudario*.” — Nero, 51.

“Jam mihi nigrescunt tonsa *sudaria* barba.” — Martial, xi. 39. 3.

Such is the inventory of facts. Perhaps a little classification and comparison will put us in better possession of them.

1. These words are twenty-four in number. The whole New Testament vocabulary must contain between five and six thousand words. A rough estimate gives fifty-four hundred. When we think of our own language, which is indebted to the Latin for half its treasures, or of the Latin itself, which owed so much to the Greek, and think, also, of the length of time during which most of the Greek-speaking people had been under the sway of Rome — from about a century and a half before Christ — while even in the courts of law a Greek must speak Latin or employ an interpreter, we cannot but admire the power of literary resistance in the wonderfully self-sufficient Greek tongue, that Roman influence should force but one word in two hundred into this vocabulary. This impression is somewhat deepened by the small number of times each word is used. The following twelve, — *κολωνία*, *μάκελλον*, *μεμβράνα*, *μίλιον*, *ρέδη*, *σικάριος*, *σιμικίνθιον*, *σπεκουλάτωρ*, *τίτλος*, *φαινόλης*, *φραγέλλιον*, *χώρος* — are found but once. Of the rest, all but *δηνάριον* and *πραιτώριον*, are used from two to four times; but some of these are in parallel passages.

2. Classified grammatically, these words are all *nouns*, except one, *φραγελλώω*, which, indeed, is next door to a noun, being a denominative verb. This fact indicates that the reception of foreign words into the vocabulary was in an early stage. Nouns come in first. The purity of even Xenophon's diction was not sullied by the free admission of such foreign substantives as *παρασάγγης*, *δαρεικός*, *παράδεισος*, and *κάμηλος*. A new thing from abroad requires a new name, and none can be better than its own. The history of our own language is to the point. Back in the Anglo-Saxon we find nouns (but few verbs) from Latin and Greek, as, *sacérde*, *pund* (pound), *mynster*, *mynet* (mint); by and by comes in the flood of verbs, adjectives, adverbs, as well as nouns, and now and then a preposition and conjunction, until the only grammatical territory we have left without invasion

is the narrow one of pronouns. One can appreciate the condition of our New Testament vocabulary in this respect by looking on into later Greek, and finding such words as these — *πραισεντος* (*praesens*), *ἐκουίνους* (*equinus*), *οὐρβανός* (*urbannus*), *πραιπόσιτος* (*praepositus*).

3. As to the meanings of these words, only one has reference to personal character, *σικάριος*; one to a vehicle, *ῥέδη*; one to a place of trade, *μάκελλον*; one to the wind, *χῶρος*; two to writing, *μεμβράνα*, *τίτλος*; two to measures, *μίλιον*, *μόδιος*; two to punishment, *φραγέλλιον*, *φραγελλώω*; three to coins, *ἄσσάριον*, *δηνάριον*, *κοδράντης*; three to civil life, *κῆνσος*, *κολωνία*, *πραιτώριον*; four to military life, *κεντυρίων*, *κουστωδία*, *λεγεών*, *σπεκουλάτωρ*; four to articles of clothing and personal use, *λέντιον*, *σιμικύνθιον*, *σουδάριον*, *φαινόλης*. It will be seen from this that the remark of Winer, in his Grammar, that the Latin words in the New Testament are “mostly substantives denoting Roman judicial institutions, coins, or articles of dress,”¹ needs considerable modification; for not one of these words denotes a judicial institution, and those denoting coins and articles of dress are only a quarter of the whole number. Indeed, the absence of several Roman governmental terms is quite noticeable. Pontius Pilate, the procurator of Judaea, is *ἡγεμών*, not *προκουράτωρ* (Matt. xxvii. 2); the judgment-seat is *βῆμα*, not *τριβουνάλιον* (John xix. 13; Acts xxv. 6; Rom. xiv. 10, et al.); the colonial consul is *στρατηγός*, not *κῶνσουλ* (Acts xvi. 20); and his attendant lictor *ῥαβδούχος*, — rod-holder, — not *λίκτωρ*; Claudius Lysias, the military tribune, — modern colonel, — is *χιλίαρχος*, not *τριβοῦνος*. All of these Grecized Latin names are found in later Greek, and three of them in Plutarch, who lived but a half-century after the apostle John.

4. It may be well to distinguish the different *writers* of the New Testament in respect to the use of Latin words. *Κουστωδία* and *μίλιον* are used by Matthew only. *Κεντυρίων* and *σπεκουλάτωρ* are used by Mark only. Instead of *κεντυ-*

¹ p. 103 (Thayer's edition).

ρίων, Matthew and Luke always use ἑκατοντάρχης, or ἑκατόνταρχος. Κολωνία, σικάριος, σιμικίνθιον, and χῶρος are used by Luke only. Λέντιον, ῥέδα, τίτλος, and φραγέλλιον are used by John only. Μάκελλον, μεμβράνα and φαινόλης are used by Paul only. Κῆνσος, κοδράντης, and φραγελλόω are used by Matthew and Mark. Ἀσσάριον is used by Matthew and Luke. Σουδάριον is used by Luke and John. Λεγεών and μόδιος are used by Matthew, Mark, and Luke. Δηνάριον is used by Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John. Πραιτώριον is used by Matthew, Mark, Luke, John, and Paul. No Latin words are found in Hebrews, Peter, James, and Jude. The words are so evenly distributed, if we except Paul, that our most important inference is that there is nothing to infer. As to number, Matthew uses ten, Mark nine, Luke ten, John seven, and Paul four. The most marked case of difference between the evangelists is in the word κεντυρίων, which is avoided by Matthew and Luke; by the latter both in his Gospel and the Acts. The subject-matter of Paul's Epistles would naturally make the use of Latin words less frequent.

5. Let us now, for the sake of a little comparison, take just a glance into the pages of a secular writer of the Roman period. Polybius, born about 200 B.C., was both the first and foremost Greek writer of this period. Notwithstanding his experience of the iron hand of Rome, he became, under the fostering friendship of the younger Scipio, an ardent admirer of Roman institutions, and made it the great task of his life to compose the history of Rome. His subject would be likely to bring in all the Latin words which a legitimate vocabulary would allow; yet the consul is called ὑπάτος (or στρατηγός, as in the New Testament); in which, also, we find ἀνθύπατος for proconsul (Acts xiii. 7, et al.); the lictor, ῥαβδούχος; the military tribune, χιλίαρχος; the tribune of the plebs, δήμαρχος; the censor, τιμητής; the quaestor, ταμίας; the legion, στρατόπεδον; the senate, σύγκλητος or συνέδριον, not σενάτος, as in Plutarch. Two of the New Testament Latin words,—μιλίον and κεντυρίων,—and per-

haps others of them, are in Polybius ; but with *κεντυρίων* is found also *ταξιάρχος* ; and other designations of officers are duplicated, as *δεκάδαρχος* and *δεκουρίων*, *ὑπαρχος* and *πραίφεκτος*. Indeed, in the case of one word, which must have been very suggestive to Polybius and his Greek compatriots, — *Δικτάτωρ*, — we can almost trace its progress into the vocabulary. In the narrative of the Second Punic War, the author states¹ that the Romans had come to need a general with unlimited powers — *αὐτοκράτωρ στρατηγός*. In the next chapter he states that they appointed Quintus Fabius *Δικτάτωρ*, and goes on to explain the powers of this extraordinary officer. The Greek of Polybius, like that of the New Testament, was slow to admit the vocabulary of the Romans.

Without discussing these New Testament words further, we may ask : To what result are we led ? It is presumptuous to draw firmly a general conclusion from so narrow a line of investigation ; but any single course of inquiry has its direction, and this discussion points us to the *genuineness* of the Greek of the New Testament. Latin words so few, so unimportant, and so seldom used — and that too in circumstances where they would be likely to be used, — indicate that the writers of the New Testament could “speak Greek.” But there is another conclusion, of a more special character. The Latin element of the New Testament vocabulary indicates the *early composition* of the books of the New Testament. The Roman period of Greek literature extends from 146 B.C. to 330 A.D. ; but for the New Testament it would be more fair to substitute 60 B.C. for the former date. Our Latin test, then, would place these books early in the period thus limited. Their Latin is more like that of Polybius than it is like that of Plutarch even. It is not intended here to draw out this argument at length, or to hedge it about with due limitations. It is by no means forgotten that the New Testament is the product of Hellenistic writers ; but the Alexandrian or Septuagint dialect was subjected to the same Roman influence as the common dialect ; and a mere exam-

¹ Book iii. 86. 7.

ination of the lexicon will show that the long series of ecclesiastical Greek writers succeeding the apostles exhibit an increase of the Latin element similar to that found in the parallel series of secular writers.

This Article ought not to close without, at least, a bare list of the proper names borrowed from the Latin. A very few of the following, as *Ῥώμη*, first appear in literature in a Greek dress; but it must be remembered that *spoken* language is the only real language, i.e. tongue-product, and that these words were received by Greek writers from Roman lips. But one reference is given with each word, marking where it first occurs (if more than once) in the order of the books in our Bibles.

Ἀγρίππας, *Agrippa*, Acts xxv. 13. *Ἀμπλίας*, *Ampliatius*, enlarged, Rom. xvi. 8. *Ἀκύλας*, *Aquila*, eagle, Acts xviii. 2; *Ἀππίου Φόρου*, *Appii Forum*, Forum of Appius, Acts xxviii. 15; *Ἀπφία*, *Apphia*, Phil. 2; *Ἀὔγουστος*, *Augustus*, reverend, Luke ii. 1; *Γαλλίων*, *Gallio*, Gallic, Acts xviii. 12; *Δρούσιλλα*, *Drusilla*, diminutive of Drusus, Acts xxiv. 24; *Εὐροκλύδων*, or, *Εὐρακύλων*, *Euro-aquilo*, northeast wind Acts xxvii. 14; *Ἰουλία*, *Julia*, feminine of Julius, Rom. xvi. 15; *Ἰούλιος*, *Julius* Acts xxvii. 1; *Ἰουνίας*, *Junia*, youthful, Rom. xvi. 7; *Ἰοῦστος*, *Iustus*, just, Acts i. 23; *Ἰταλία*, *Italia*, Acts xviii. 2; *Καῖσαρ*, *Caesar*; long-haired, Matt. xxii. 17; *Καيسάρεια*, *Caesarea*, Caesar's city, Matt. xvi. 13; *Κλαυδία*, *Claudia*, limping, 2 Tim. iv. 21; *Κλαύδιος*, *Claudius*, limping, Acts xi. 28; *Κλήμης*, *Clemens*, kind, Phil. iv. 3; *Κορνήλιος*, *Cornelius*, Acts x. 1; *Κούαρτος*, *Quartus*, fourth, Rom. xvi. 23; *Κρήσκης*, *Crescens*, growing, 2 Tim. iv. 10; *Κρίσπος*, *Crispus*, curly-haired, Acts xviii. 8; *Λιβερτῖνοι*, *Libertini*, freedmen, Acts vi. 9; *Λούκιος*, *Lucius*, day-light man (*lux*) Acts xiii. 1; *Μάρκος*, *Marcus*, hammer, Acts xii. 12; *Νίγερ*, *Niger*, black, Acts xiii. 1; *Οὐρβανός*, *Urbanus*, city-man, Rom. xvi. 9; *Παῦλος*, *Paulus*, little, Acts xiii. 7, 9; *Πίλατος*, *Pilatus*, javelin-man (*pilum*), Matt. xxvii. 2; *Πόντιος*, *Pontius*, bridge-man, Matt. xxvii. 2; *Πόπλιος*, *Publius*, the people's, Acts

xxviii. 7; Πόρκιος, *Porcius*, swine-man? Acts xxiv. 27; Ποτίολοι, *Puteoli*, little wells, Acts xxviii. 13; Πούδης, *Pudens*, modest, 2 Tim. iv. 21; Πρίσκα, *Prisca*, old, 2 Tim. iv. 19; Πρίσκιλλα, *Priscilla*, little old woman, Acts xviii. 2; Ρούφος, *Rufus*, red-haired, Mark xv. 21; Ρώμη, *Roma*, Acts xviii. 2; Σεκοῦνδος, *Secundus*, second, Acts xx. 4; Σέργιος, *Sergius*, Acts xiii. 7; Σίλας, *Silas*, shortened from the following, Acts xv. 22; Σιλουανός, *Silvanus*, woodsman, 2 Cor. i. 19; Σπανία, *Hispania*, Rom. xv. 24; Τέρτιος, *Tertius*, third, Rom. xvi. 23; Τέρτυλλος, *Tertullus*, Acts xxiv. 1; Τιβεριάς, *Tiberius*, city of Tiberius, John vi. 1; Τιβέριος, *Tiberius*, Tiber-man, Luke iii. 1; Τίτος, *Titus*, 2 Cor. ii. 13; Τρεῖς Ταβέρναι, *Tres Tabernae*, three shops, Acts xxviii. 15; Φῆλιξ, *Felix*, happy, Acts xxiii. 24; Φῆστος, *Festus*, feast-day, Acts xxiv. 27; Φορτουνάτος, *Fortunatus*, fortunate, 1 Cor. xvi. 17.

Of this array of names the Christian mind dwells longest on one which, as we have it in English, hardly suggests a Roman origin, but is really a famous name in Roman history — Παῦλος. From the time of the Christian Fathers to the present, conjecture has done its best to answer the question, Why did Saul assume the name Paulus? and this in spite of the fact that it is nowhere affirmed that he *did* assume it, instead of receiving it from his father when he was “free-born.” The Greek text gives us the least possible information on this point. Σαῦλος δέ, ὁ καὶ Παῦλος (Acts xiii. 9) is all. If he did not get the name from his father, some have thought that he did from the proconsul, Sergius Paulus; others from his being *little* of stature; others from his humility, he being in his own estimation, “the *least* of all saints.” Probably most would accept in some form the conjecture that Paul’s new name had to do with his great mission to the Gentiles. For we may call it a new name, even if he received it at birth, because up to the time of his mission it lay unused. Saul, the Jew, was now to traverse the Roman world, and in being “all things to all men” was to be a Roman. If he was to assume a Roman name, Paulus would be recommended by three considerations: 1. It was an honored name. L. Aemilius

Paulus honored it at Cannae, to whom Horace applies the phrase *animae magnae prodigus*; and the conqueror of Macedonia, the father of the younger Scipio, sustained well the honor of his ancestor. 2. It was a name well-known in the East. The Paulus last mentioned bore as his agnomen "Macedonicus," and did more than any other one to make Greece a part of the Roman world. 3. It resembled Saul more than any other Roman surname. But whether any of these reasons are valid or not, the appearance of this name at the beginning of Paul's apostolic life justifies us in regarding it as his distinctively Christian and missionary name.

The foregoing list suggests one question in regard to the Epistle to the Romans. How many names in the last, the salutatory, chapter are Roman. Of the twenty-six who are greeted, only seven — Priscilla, Aquila, Junia, Amplias, Urbane, Rufus, and Julia — bear Roman names; while four such join in the greeting — Lucius, Tertius, Caius (Gaius), and Quartus.

ARTICLE VII.

RECENT ASSYRIAN DISCOVERIES.¹

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ONE of the notable events of the present century is the recovery of the language of the Assyrians and Babylonians, together with a great deal of their history and literature, things which but little more than thirty years ago were not known to exist. The ordinary reader who looks through the popular and unpretending volume of Mr. Smith can hardly realize the labors that cuneiform scholars must have undergone, the obstacles they must have removed, or the successes they must have achieved, before it was possible that the results of their studies could be presented in such an agreeable form.

INDIFFERENCE AND EVEN HOSTILITY TO CUNEIFORM RESEARCHES.

In order to call attention briefly to the opposition which Assyrian studies met with at first, and to the incredulity of some of the most eminent scholars of thirty, twenty, or even ten years ago, matters of great interest in a historical point of view, we will quote the language of Sir Henry Rawlinson, who has been identified with the discovery and decipherment of these records and with the progress of these studies from the beginning to the present hour. In his opening address as President before the Semitic Section of the Oriental Congress, which met in London in September, 1874, he said: "Educated Europe was very slow to admit the genuineness of cuneiform decipherment. It was asserted at first as a well-

¹ Assyrian Discoveries. An Account of Explorations and Discoveries on the Site of Nineveh, during 1873 and 1874. By George Smith, of the Department of Oriental Antiquities, British Museum. With Maps and Illustrations. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Co. 8vo. pp. xvi. and 461. 1875.

known axiom, that it was impossible to recover lost alphabets and extinct languages without the aid of a bilingual key, such as was afforded to Egyptologists by the famous stone of Rosetta. Our efforts at interpretation were therefore pronounced to be empirical, and scholars were warned against accepting our results. I have a vivid recollection, indeed, of the scornful incredulity with which I was generally received, when, in 1849, I first brought to England a copy of the Babylonian version of the Behistun Inscription, and endeavored to show that by comparing this version with the corresponding Persian text I had arrived at a partial understanding of the newly-discovered records of Assyria and Babylonia. I did not assume to have done more than break the crust of the difficulty, and yet I obtained no attention. Hardly any one in England, except Dr. Hincks and Mr. Norris and the Chevalier Bunsen, was satisfied of the soundness of the basis of inquiry; nor, indeed, did the study make much progress for a long time afterwards. Semitic scholars like M. Renan, accustomed to the rigid forms and limited scope of alphabets of the Phœnician type, were bewildered at the laxity of cuneiform expression, where phonetic and ideographic elements were commingled; and refused to admit the possibility of such a system of writing being applied to a Semitic language. Biblical students, again, were not favorable at first to the idea of illustrating the authenticity of the Hebrew records by comparing them with the contemporary annals of a cognate people, and for a time ignored our results; while the classicists of this country who followed the lead of the late Sir George Cornewall Lewis, calmly asserted the superiority and efficiency of Greek tradition, and treated the evidences to set up a rival school of historical criticism, derived from a barbarian source, almost with contempt. Struggling thus against disbelief and prejudice, our progress in this country was for many years slow and unsatisfactory; but at length as materials increased, and competing intellects, engaged in the study of the inscriptions, arrived at almost identical results, the attention of Europe was aroused, and Assyriologists

received a more respectful treatment.”¹ In this connection it may be added as a remarkable fact that the Edinburgh Review, “which claims *par excellence* to represent the liberal party, has, from first to last, consistently disparaged the labors of Egyptologists and Orientalists, and has sought in various ways to throw ridicule, both on the studies themselves and on the results obtained from them”; and from this source, though Sir G. C. Lewis is no more, “vials of scorn have been poured upon the heads of all those who have attempted to bring into notice and popularize the new learning.” A similar state of things has existed in France “with respect to hieroglyphical and cuneiform decipherment, and the knowledge derived from them. The various stages of utter incredulity, contemptuous indifference, doubt, inquiry, surprised awakening, have been gone through; and the public at last accepts, frankly, and without *arrière pensée*, the new knowledge.”² Now, when the science of hieroglyphical and cuneiform decipherment is no longer a matter of doubt, but rests on a solid basis, the opposition from influences in high places with which it has had to contend forms a chapter in

¹ Report of the Proceedings of the Second International Congress of Orientalists, held in London in 1874, p. 6. London: Trübner and Co. 1874.

² See Article on “Early Oriental History,” in the Contemporary Review for April, 1870, pp. 81, 82. — As to the opposition referred to, the reader would be surprised at the amount of prejudice, or perhaps wilful ignorance, displayed in chapters vi. and vii., of Sir G. C. Lewis’s *Astronomy of the Ancients*, published in London in 1862, especially on pp. 368, 379 et seq., 396, 430, 431, in regard to Egyptian and Assyrian studies and their results. As a specimen, he says: “If the hieroglyphical writings which have been interpreted have been interpreted correctly, and if they may be taken as a sample of the rest, we may be satisfied that there is nothing worth knowing” (p. 396). The same spirit appears in a review of the work just mentioned in the Edinburgh Review for July, 1862; also, in a very severe and unjust criticism of Prof. George Rawlinson’s *Ancient Monarchies* in the same periodical for January, 1867. See also, in the same for July, 1870, a review of Lenormant’s and Rawlinson’s *Manuals of Ancient History*. But besides the tone of the two chapters of Mr. Lewis’s work, and of the Articles in the Edinburgh Review, their scholarship with regard to the matters under discussion make them unworthy the name of the eminent author in the one case, or of the reputation of this leading Review in the other; and the student who takes either the one or the other, or both, as a guide, is sure to be misled.

its history that is both curious and suggestive. To-day we are not only able to decipher these records, but the Christian scholar is from this source enriching his store of knowledge by a study of national histories, languages and literatures, arts and sciences, that until recent years the world had almost entirely forgotten.

THE ABUNDANCE OF MATERIALS.

In order to corroborate the remark just made we will call attention to a fact with which the general reader may not be familiar; namely, the vast body of records that have been recovered already from the Assyrian and Babylonian mounds. The original collection which came to the British Museum was broken into more than twenty thousand fragments. For convenience they were divided into different sections, as, for instance, the section of historical tablets and cylinders, the bilingual section, the mythological section, the astrological section, etc. In his recent journeys, Mr. George Smith "obtained over three thousand inscriptions and fragments of inscriptions, besides many other objects," although, owing to hinderances from the Turkish officials, the actual time that he spent in excavating fell short of four months (p. 438). We may refer also to the admirable collection in the Louvre at Paris, discovered chiefly by M. Botta at Khorsabad, and to smaller collections in different parts of Europe. Although much has been brought to light, there is a vast amount yet to be unearthed. After all that has been done in these mounds by the French and English, it can be called only a beginning of the excavations that should be made. The ruins of Kalah Shergat have never been thoroughly explored, and important records are supposed to be buried beneath them.¹ One of the most important of Mr. Smith's new discoveries came from these ruins—a fine tablet belonging to Vul-nirari I., 1350 B.C. (p. 242). Judging from his own and former excavations on the site of the library of the palace of Sennacherib at Kouyunjik, Mr. Smith estimates that there remain at least twenty thou-

¹ See North British Review, April, 1870, p. 221.

sand fragments of this valuable collection buried in the unexcavated portions (p. 452). From inscriptions which he found, he learned that Assurbanipal established a library in Babylon as well as in Assyria (p. 380); and one of the tablets from this place, written in the Turanian and Semitic-Babylonian languages, he has translated (p. 395); and when we consider the multitude of mounds which line the Tigris and Euphrates, in many of which there are doubtless valuable records, and also the fact that large libraries were established in most of the royal cities, we are justified in saying that the proper excavations are as yet hardly begun, and that untold treasures of documents, records, history, and literature really exist which ought to be gathered as a rich contribution to the general store of human knowledge. These inscriptions embrace a wide range of subjects; as, for example, mythology, lists of gods, with their titles and attributes; astrology, witchcraft, evil spirits, and fables; astronomy, including lists of eclipses and stars, and records of observations; weather records and meteorological predictions; details pertaining to the calendar, months, days, "rest" or "holy" days, the new year, and the seasons, rules for determining when the intercalary month should be added; natural history, including lists of animals, birds, minerals, and choice woods; geography, with lists of countries, seas, rivers, and mountains; the Assyrian canon, also a synchronous history of Assyria and Babylonia, together with annals of the different kings; accounts of public revenues and revenues from foreign countries; lists of titles of honor, with definitive lists of rank of all the offices and dignities of the empire from the Tartan downwards, including lawyers; the details of business, such as leases, bills of sale, deeds of land or other property, laws, contracts, notes or contracts for money or valuables loaned on interest, letters, dispatches, etc.; accounts of buildings, forts, ships with their tonnage, and the different parts of a vessel; prayers, litanies, and hymns, which read like extracts from Job or the Book of Psalms; mathematical tables, including tables of square and cube root and of fractions; also fragments of grammars,

syllabaries, vocabularies, translations from ancient works, lists of roots and verbal forms, glosses, tables of variants, grammatical exercises for the construction of short sentences, lists of phrases in two languages, and we may say, without exaggeration, many other subjects.¹

EARLY STUDIES OF MR. SMITH, AND HIS TWO VISITS TO THE EAST.

Very many of the tablets in the British Museum were incomplete, and Mr. Smith by digging on the sites where they were chiefly obtained, has been able to supply many of the missing fragments, and thus to complete texts which we already possessed in an imperfect form. For the arrangement of the broken fragments and their classification by subjects and sections, for the restoration of many imperfect inscriptions, and the addition of large amounts of new material, and for the discovery of many important facts which throw light upon Biblical and ancient history, the world is indebted to Mr. George Smith of the British Museum, whose name we have already mentioned. In the Annual Report of the Royal Asiatic Society, made in May, 1868, we find this statement: "Sir Henry Rawlinson has been occupied during the past year in preparing for publication, *with the assistance of a very promising young student, Mr. George Smith*, a third volume of the Cuneiform Inscriptions of Western Asia" (p. xvi.). It is to the sentence which we have put in italics that we wish to call attention. In the second chapter of the work before us Mr. Smith gives an account of his independent discoveries, recognized by cuneiform scholars as discoveries of great importance, between the years 1866 and 1872. About the first year just mentioned he made the acquaintance of Mr. Rawlinson, who soon became interested in his independent researches, and proposed to the trustees of the British Museum that they employ him as his own assistant. "Thus," Mr. Smith, says, "in the beginning of 1867, I entered into

¹ George Smith's Assyrian Discoveries, 391, 406, 451, 452; Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1864-65, p. 244, note; Sayce's Assyrian Grammar, p. 18; Nichols's Handy-Book of the British Museum, pp. 233-237, note; and especially the three volumes of Cuneiform Inscriptions, published by the British Museum.

official life, and regularly prosecuted the study of the cuneiform texts" (p. 11). Notwithstanding his official position, and his occasional papers in connection with his studies, appearing chiefly in the *Zeitschrift für Aegyptische Sprache* and in the *Transactions of the Society of Biblical Archaeology*, and his exceedingly valuable *History of Assurbanipal*, published in 1871, which, however, owing to the nature of the subject, appealed to a very limited audience, counting together all who took any interest in it in both Europe and America, Mr. Smith remained a hard-working and obscure student until late in the year 1872, when, by his "lucky find" of the Deluge Tablets, he at once became deservedly famous. The labor required in putting together and reading these fragments of the Deluge Tablets was trifling compared with his prolonged and persevering labors of former years; still it sufficed to turn the popular attention in his direction; and as one result of this suddenly-awakened interest, the proprietors of the *Daily Telegraph* offered to advance the sum of one thousand guineas that Mr. Smith might, under leave from the British Museum, make new researches at Nineveh, in order to recover more of these interesting inscriptions (p. 14). The 20th of January, 1873, was an eventful day for this "promising young student," when he left London on a journey which was to result in very important discoveries in the Tigris and Euphrates valley. He left Mosul to return to England early in June, 1873, and arrived in London on the 19th of July. The work was at once taken up anew by the trustees of the British Museum who appropriated one thousand pounds for the purpose of continuing the explorations; and under their direction Mr. Smith left London late in November, 1873, and reached Mosul "about five in the morning of the first of January, 1874" (p. 134). On the 4th of April he started from Mosul on his return, and arrived in London on the 9th of June (p. 164). But the whole time actually spent in excavations, taking the two visits together, was, as we have before stated, less than four months. This was owing, in a small measure to the limited time and means at his disposal,

but chiefly to the obstacles thrown in his way by the Turkish officials. As Mr. Smith remarks, the Turks are not alive to their own interests (p. viii.). Nominally, the government pretends to favor explorations and archaeological researches within its own borders, but its ignorant agents hinder such efforts as far as possible. The conduct of Turkish officials in Asia who persist in opposing all real progress is a standing reproach to that nation. Mr. Smith is not the only person who has suffered from the ignorance and duplicity of such officials; and with regard to his own grievances he says: "I have stated those instances of bad conduct which I have mentioned as moderately and slightly as possible" (p. viii.). He speaks enthusiastically of "the noble work the American missions are doing in Asiatic Turkey," but shows how they need to receive constant official support from both England and America (p. viii.). Elsewhere he says: "People in England and America, who read every now and then in the papers that the Grand Vizier has issued an order for the protection of liberty of conscience and conceding justice to Christians, little know the useless character of such announcements. The grinding tyranny under which the Christians suffer, and the defiance of all solemn promises in places beyond the notice of the representatives of European powers, clearly show the nature of the Moslem rule. It is an astonishing fact that a Christian country like England upholds the Porte, and yet does not insist on justice being done to the Christians in Turkey. No end of promises are given; but any one conversant with Turkey knows the distance between promise and performance" (pp. 35, 36, 47). The officials want half of all that Mr. Smith finds, and would even break an inscription to gain it. They place a guard over him at one time, and at another forbid his excavating, and again seize his collection; and at the very last he has to give them a box in which to put smaller articles to prevent their being lost; a matter about which they seemed perfectly indifferent so long as they were certain that the proper division had been made (pp. 115, 117, 131, 137, 138, 152, 162, 163).

MR. SMITH AS A TRAVELLER.

As our object is chiefly to set before the reader the results of Mr. Smith's discoveries, we can do little more than call attention to the portion of his volume which is devoted to his travels. Between Alexandretta and Mosul he travelled mainly by one route in his four trips across the country. He calls our attention to many interesting facts connected with the country and people, and has the merit of being able to stop when he has said enough. At Biradjik he had some experience in an Oriental "police-court room." The occasion was some matter of insubordination on the part of his dragoon, which was corrected without great difficulty. But the picture of the court-room is interesting, where "all sat round the room on cushions, as is the custom in the East, and coffee and cigarettes were passed round before entering upon business" (p. 34). His attention was attracted by a "wandering holy man, or dervish, who was very dirty, very lazy, and very devout, and only interrupted his prayers to light his pipe or search for the vermin that annoyed him" (p. 111). Stopping over night at Tel Karamel, a place not far from Aleppo, "a crowd of natives came in as soon as we were settled, and stood all round us, to observe our manners and customs; and such was the curiosity of these people that they did not separate until they had seen us go to bed" (p. 32). His experiences with "backsheesh" (p. 104), with his horse that "had a queer pump-handle motion, and was inclined to drop on his knees on the slightest occasion" (pp. 115, 133), also on the wretched raft that took him from Mosul to Bagdad (p. 48), and his encounter with a remarkable woman at Dashlook, who was not only "the ruler of the village, but an inveterate smoker" (p. 112), are all interesting, if not specially new in Oriental life. His emotions when he first saw the Euphrates, by whose waters mighty empires once had their seat, and powerful monarchs had ruled (p. 33), his picture of the miles of gardens about Bagdad (p. 54), his account of the medicinal bituminous springs near Mosul — a summer resort

for its people (pp. 94, 96), of the glacial boulders along a certain portion of his route (p. 109), of the mining operations and the coal and bitumen in the Jebel Djudi, or Deluge Mountains (p. 108), and his occasional descriptions of scenery, or of the appearance of the Eastern heavens at night (p. 109), are by no means the least attractive or instructive paragraphs in his book. Attention should be called to his account of Aleppo (pp. 31, 32), and also — to come back for a moment to Europe — to his statements with regard to the Greeks of Syra, “who are active and enterprising, and are taking the lead all over the East” (p. 22).

MR. SMITH'S SERVICES AS AN ARCHAEOLOGIST.

But it is in Mr. Smith as an archaeologist, and not as a traveller, that we are chiefly interested. Everywhere he sees in this respect many things that others have overlooked. In his opinion, Biradjik is the Tul-Barsip of the Assyrian inscriptions, which was added to the Assyrian empire 856 B.C. (p. 34). Nisibin, also, now little better than a village, was a large Assyrian city, the seat of one of the governors, who took rank as an eponym; and there are extensive mounds and ruins attesting its former prosperity (p. 39). Here, also, he saw “the columns of a classical temple” (p. 110). At Orfa he finds “buildings of the Roman and Saracenic time,” and “inscriptions in Greek, Pehlevi, and Arabic, and many curious tombs cut in the rock” (p. 35). In Aleppo, “on a black, oblong stone, built into the wall of an old mosque now in ruins,” he made the important discovery of two lines, in relief, of what are called “Hamath Inscriptions,”¹ being thus named from the city where they were first discovered. The reader is doubtless aware that no clew has yet been discovered to the reading of these texts (pp. 164, 422). Then at Nisibin and elsewhere there were fine Latin inscriptions on fragments of large blocks of stone which the natives were taking from the mounds for building purposes. These inscriptions were being destroyed

¹ Are these the same as those noticed and copied by Mr. Drake, in Burton and Drake's *Unexplored Syria*, Vol. ii. pp. 185, 186?

because there was no one to look after them (p. 427). In Assurbanipal's palace at Kouyunjik were found several objects that had been brought from Cyprus, one of which had Cypriote characters upon it (p. 423); also a stone lion, with Egyptian hieroglyphics, representing the name and title of an Egyptian monarch, read by Dr. Birch as Ra-set-nub, the supposed leader of the Hyksos, and dating from about 1700 B.C. (pp. 420, 421); it was probably carried away during some conquest of Egypt by forces from the Euphrates valley. The principal foreign inscriptions discovered were Phœnician. These are contemporary with the cuneiform inscriptions, and are often found as dockets (or summaries of what the tablets contain) to the contract tablets of that period. The oldest which were found belong to the dynasty of Sargon, 722-609 B.C. One of these is a clay tablet containing a deed of sale of certain lands, with the price and the names of the buyer and seller given. This specimen is curious as illustrating the fact that witnesses often, and sometimes parties to a sale or contract, who did not possess the usual seals, were accustomed to impress their finger-nails on the document instead (p. 424). Another, dating from about 665 B.C., is in reference to the sale of some barley. And there are others of the same class (pp. 423-426). Among the tablets of the Parthian period, should be mentioned one of great interest and importance, as it fixes the date of the rise of the Parthian power, which has long been a point of doubt among chronologists. This tablet has a double date, namely, according to the Seleucian era, and according to the Parthian era also; the one hundred and forty-fourth year of the Parthians being equal to the two hundred and eighth year of the Seleucidae, thus making the Parthian era to have commenced 248 B.C. Justin and Eusebius, who are followed by Clinton, fix on the year 250 B.C.; Moses Chorenensis on two dates, 251 and 252 B.C.; and Suidas gives the year 246 B.C. This tablet, which was inscribed 105 B.C., seems to settle the question; and it is thought that proper researches at Babylon would result in discoveries which

would elucidate many other obscure points connected with Parthian history (pp. 389, 390, 449). The foregoing facts make it evident, if such evidence were necessary, how thoroughly fitted Mr. Smith is for archaeological researches outside of his special field of cuneiform inscriptions.

LATER CUNEIFORM INSCRIPTIONS.

Besides those already mentioned, Mr. Smith discovered numerous cuneiform monuments, which belong to the period between 626 B.C. and the end of the second century B.C. Most of these are dated, and we will refer to a few of them, tracing the line of history backwards for the sake of convenience. There are tablets dated according to the year of Seleucus 312 B.C. One belonging to Artaxerxes is noticed, with date corresponding to 427 B.C. Then there are several of the reign of Darius, dated, respectively, 491, 492, and 516 B.C. A peculiar black conical stone was found, with an inscription of Darius in three languages — Persian, Medo-Scythic, and Babylonian. There are others of Cambyses, dating from 525 and 528 B.C. Of the reign of Cyrus no new inscriptions were found. But there are several of Nabonidus, father of the Belshazzar of the Book of Daniel, bearing dates corresponding to 539, 540, 545, and 547 B.C. There is a tablet of Nergal-sharezer (Jer. xxxix. 3), who was a prince of Babylon in the time of Nebuchadnezzar, and ascended the throne on the death of Evil-merodach, in 560 B.C. The tablet is dated in this year. There is also one text of Nebuchadnezzar's son, Evil-merodach, who released Jehoiachim, king of Judah, from prison (2 Kings xxv. 27), which belongs to the year 561 B.C. Several small new texts of Nebuchadnezzar (605–562 B.C.) were also found, with dates corresponding to the years 568 and 585 B.C. In connection with these inscriptions, an interesting fact is brought out, which is worthy of our notice, namely, “that the kings of Assyria and Babylonia did not in general begin to count the years of their reign until the commencement of the new year following their accession.” During this fraction of a year they dated their

documents: "In the year of the accession to the kingdom of so-and-so." After the new year was past they said: "In the first year of the reign of so-and-so." This will illustrate 2 Kings xxv. 27. Besides the above, there are a few throwing some light on the last struggling years of the Assyrian empire, from 626 to 605 B.C. Part of a barrel-cylinder of Bel-zakir-iskun was found, who was probably the immediate successor of Assurbanipal, 626-620 B.C. The successor of Bel-zakir-iskun was Assur-ebil-ili-kain, a son of Assurbanipal, who reigned from 620 to 607 B.C. Several of his inscriptions were found; but they were duplicates of those already known. The fact that this king, on one of his monuments, states that when Assurbanipal died he did not ascend the throne immediately, but at a later period, leads Mr. Smith to suspect that there was civil war in Assyria about the close of the reign of Bel-zakir-iskun (pp. 381-390).

CUNEIFORM INSCRIPTIONS OF THE CLASSIC AND EARLIER PERIODS.

Mr. Smith was particularly fortunate in the discovery of new monuments which throw light on the period extending from B.C. 626 back to the twenty-third century before our era. For convenience we give from him the names and dates of the kings who flourished during the last century of the empire as follows: Tiglath Pileser II., 745-727 B.C.; Shalmaneser IV., 727-722 B.C.; Sargon, 722-705 B.C.; Sennacherib, 705-681 B.C.; Esarhaddon, 681-668 B.C.; and Assurbanipal, 668-626 B.C. Any account which we can give here will be meagre compared with the abundance of monuments which belong to the reigns of these different kings, and we must therefore content ourselves with calling attention to some of the more important facts. Assurbanipal, as is well-known, was one of the most celebrated of the Assyrian monarchs, who, in addition to his conquests and extensive building operations, was a great patron of literature, and founded libraries in different cities of his empire, in which were to be found records not only of contemporaneous history and literature, but collections of ancient documents, which reached back into the remote periods

of Assyrian, Babylonian, and Turanian times. The new monuments of this king are very numerous, some of which throw light on Egyptian affairs of that period. The long document which Mr. Smith calls "cylinder A," the text of which he has been able to correct in certain places from his new discoveries, is considered one of the finest Assyrian texts we possess, giving the official history of Assyria from the accession of Assurbanipal down to about 645 B.C. Of Esarhaddon several new and important texts were found; one of which gives an account of his conquest of Tirhakah, king of Egypt and Ethiopia, and of his terrible march through the desert to reach Meroe; and there are others which give a detailed account of his father's war in Chaldea, as well as other matters of historical interest. In connection with the new monuments which belong to Sennacherib we will call attention to one which speaks of his restoration of the city of Nineveh, because it shows of what a motley variety of nationalities the body of his workmen, who were captives, was composed. We find in this particular instance Chaldeans, Arameans, Mannians, people of Que and Cilicia, Philistines, and Tyrians (p. 308). Sennacherib, as is well known, was murdered by two of his sons, who afterwards fled into Armenia. Of Sargon there are many valuable documents. One gives us a new chapter in the politics and government of Media; another, an account of his campaign against Ashdod in 711 B.C., which strikingly illustrates and verifies Isa. xxi., and throws light upon the weakened condition of Egypt at that time, and also illustrates certain efforts which Hezekiah made for the defence of his city (p. 293). The monuments of Tiglath Pileser II. are especially valuable for the light they shed on biblical history. There are now in the British Museum five different versions of the annals of this monarch. In them we meet with the names Azariah and Jehoahaz (Ahaz), kings of Judah; of Menahem, Pekah, and Hoshea, kings of Israel; of Rezin, king of Damascus, and of Hiram king of Tyre; as well as with many facts which confirm and elucidate the Jewish history of that period (p. 287).

The new inscriptions which belong to the early Assyrian period are quite numerous between 812 B.C. and 1320 B.C., and some go up even to the nineteenth century B.C. There are tablets of Vul-nirari III., 812 B.C.; a number of Shalmanezzer II., 860 B.C.; and those of Assurnazirpal, 885 B.C.,¹ are numerous and important. The annals of Tiglath Pileser I., 1120 B.C., are partially recovered. The same is true of Assur-risilim, 1150 B.C. Also one monument of Mutaggil-nusku, 1170 B.C., was found in which he mentions his father Assur-dan I., 1200 B.C., and his grandfather Ninip-pal-eser, 1220 B.C. Then we have an important document of Tugulti-ninip I., 1271 B.C., who was one of the most memorable monarchs of that period. This document gives an interesting account of the relations between Assyria and Babylonia in the thirteenth century B.C. Of Shalmanezzer I., 1300 B.C., the father of Tugulti-ninip I., several monuments were found. It was previously known that Nineveh was a royal residence in the time of Assur-risilim, 1150 B.C.; but the new monuments of Shalmanezzer I. show it to have been such one hundred and fifty years earlier, or in 1300 B.C.. One monument belonging to this king gives an outline of the history of the Temple of Ishtar at Nineveh, showing that it was founded in very early times, and restored by Samsi-vul in the nineteenth century B.C., and was again restored subsequently by Assur-ubalid, king of Assyria, 1400 B.C. Then Mr. Smith had the good fortune to discover an important document of Vul-nirari I., king of Assyria, 1330 B.C. This contemporary document is of the highest value, as "it shows that Assyria at this time had already taken a leading place in the world, and was the most powerful state in Asia" (p. 246). The reign of this monarch was a prosperous one. The document here referred to gives the names of four successive Assyrian monarchs who

¹ With regard to the date of Assurnazirpal's accession to the throne, as well as with regard to the pronunciation of some of these royal names, we follow the volume before us. The Assyrian Canon, however, appears to make the date of Assurnazirpal's accession to be 883 B.C., which date we have adopted in a former Article; see *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Vol. xxxii. p. 326. This change might affect slightly other dates, but it is not essential that the matter be discussed here.

reigned in the fourteenth century B.C., namely, Vul-nirari I. (just mentioned), Budil, 1350 B.C., Bel-nirari, 1370 B.C., and Assur-ubalid, 1400. B.C.

Of the early Babylonian period we have a tablet containing one hundred and fifteen lines of writing belonging to Mero-dach Baladan I., 1320 B.C. In it are mentioned this monarch's father and grandfather. The name of the latter was Kuri-galzu, who reigned 1370 B.C. Inscriptions of this monarch, who was a great and successful prince, are among the new discoveries. Beyond this date, Mr. Smith found texts belonging to Rimagu, and others of Hammurabi, "who lived not later than the sixteenth century before the Christian era." In this period we begin to meet the bilingual inscriptions, one column of a tablet being in the Akkad language and the opposite column in the Semitic-Babylonian. Then, still earlier, we have a document of Dungi, an early Chaldean monarch, who is placed at 2000 B.C. These are contemporary documents. But Mr. Smith found *copies* of ancient texts which give important details of kings and cities and events far back to the twenty-third century B.C. One of these gives a list of six Babylonian kings of very remote times, which were not previously known. From this record we learn that at that early date the offerings made to the gods and their temples were costly and beautiful—robes adorned with gold and purple, and precious stones and diadems. We have been anxious to trace backwards, with great care, both the Assyrian and the Babylonian lines of documents, in order to show where contemporaneous records existed (and this without reference to those which we already possessed in the British Museum), for the reason that Assyriologists have been charged with creating kings and reigns according to their own caprice. Our dated contemporaneous documents go back to 1330 B.C. in one line, and very much farther than that in the other.

THE DELUGE RECORDS.

As it is to this portion of the volume that the majority of readers will turn at once, we therefore limit our notice of

these strange records to a very few lines, and devote our space chiefly to a grouping and elucidation of those facts which have a bearing upon cuneiform studies in general. These inscriptions consist of twelve tablets, of which Mr. Smith found important fragments additional to those already in the British Museum, and their composition belongs to the early Babylonian empire. The long account of these records is full of interesting details, from which we give one or two extracts, as a summary of what they teach. "It appears that at that remote age the Babylonians had a tradition of a flood, which was a divine punishment for the wickedness of the world; and of a holy man who built an ark, and escaped the destruction; who was afterwards translated and dwelt with the gods. They believed in hell, a place of torment under the earth, and heaven a place of glory in the sky; and their description of the two has in several points a striking likeness to those in the Bible. They believed in a soul, or spirit, distinct from the body, which was not destroyed on the death of the mortal frame; and they represent the ghost as rising from the earth at the bidding of one of the gods, and winging its way to heaven" (p. 205). The Chaldean account of the flood, when compared with the biblical narrative of the same, shows that the two stories in their main features essentially agree; "as to the wicked men of the antediluvian world, the divine anger, and command to build the ark, its stocking with birds and beasts, the coming of the deluge, the ark resting on a mountain, trial being made by birds sent out to see if the water had subsided, and the building of an altar after the flood." But an examination of the details shows many points of difference; "as to the number of people who were saved, the duration of the deluge, the place where the ark rested, the order of sending out the birds, and other similar matters" (p. 218). It is a curious fact that a city, named Surippak, which is often mentioned in these legends, situated near the mouth of the Euphrates, is called in another ancient inscription "the ship city," or "city of the ark"; and inscriptions as late as Hammurabi's time call this "the city of

the ark" (p. 212). Mr. Smith has recently discovered that the ancient name of Erech (Gen. x. 10) was *Anak*, or *city of the giant*, perhaps from some connection with Nimrod (p. 206).

NEW ILLUSTRATIONS OF ASSYRIAN ARTS, CUSTOMS, AND SOCIAL LIFE.

The recent discoveries furnish much new material which throws light on the Assyrians in their daily life. From the deeds of sale (B.C. 670) we learn that individuals could hold and convey real property without any reference to the government (p. 415). We find a petition presented to Sennacherib that repairs might be made on certain public buildings (p. 414). There are several illustrations of slavery as it then existed; one of which, dating from 687 B.C., is the sale of a girl by a woman to whom the girl belonged, and who signed the contract for the sale; the price is also stated (p. 417). One inscription, which is a copy of an ancient Babylonian original, shows how careful the people were with regard to justice, and that the king should both observe and enforce the laws (p. 410). The new fragments of syllabaries are among the most important that have yet been brought to light (pp. 101, 147, 418). Then we have also a variety of new smaller objects of interest, such as a beautiful crystal throne (p. 98); a bronze lamp with two spouts for wicks (p. 140); a curious terra-cotta lamp-feeder, in the shape of a setting bird, through the beak of which the oil was discharged into the lamp (p. 433); a bronze fork, which is described as a beautiful and unique specimen of Assyrian art (p. 147); bronze dishes and ladles, and a bronze bracket; also crystal and alabaster vases, beads, rings, seals, some enamelled bricks, which were painted over with war scenes (p. 79); and in some of the chambers at Nimrud "the walls were colored in horizontal bands of red, green, and yellow on plaster; and where the lower parts of the chambers were panelled with small stone slabs, the plaster and colors were continued over these" (p. 78). Among the bronze articles discovered was a *style*, with which it is supposed the cuneiform clay tablets

were impressed (p. 147; a representation of this is given on p. 434).¹ Among numerous other objects, we notice the two following: A statue of the god Nebo was found with the dedicatory inscription cut upon the pupil of the eye (p. 385). Then there was a curious tablet containing nine epigraphs for the use of the engraver, who was to put them over the particular sculptures to which they belonged, and which they explained (p. 411).

CONCLUSION.

The reader of Mr. Smith's book needs to bear in mind the fact that what new documents have been there given are but a small part of the inscriptions in the new collection. And especially must he remember that, although this new collection is large in itself, it is, in reality, very small compared with the vast historical treasures that yet remain to be recovered. Mr. Smith has pointed out many places where, doubtless, the results would richly reward the labor of excavation. These excavations must be made before we can complete the chain of history between the sixth and the twenty-fourth centuries before the Christian era. With regard to some of these centuries our knowledge is remarkably full and reliable, while with regard to others it is still defective. Perhaps only the specialist can appreciate the value of the materials which Mr. Smith has recently gathered. The line of firm historical ground has been removed much farther back into the ages than it was before; our knowledge of early Babylonian history has been especially enlarged; important additions have been made to the list of ancient Babylonian kings; we have learned that Assyria gained a prominent place in the world much earlier than was supposed;

¹ In connection with this *style* we may refer to the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Vol. xxxii. p. 338, where we showed, as clearly as it was possible to do without producing the implement itself, that such an instrument must have been used to inscribe the clay tablets; and this against the opinion of some scholars who claimed that the impressions on the Assyrian bricks must have been made with a stamp, as was the case with the Babylonian bricks. The discovery of this *style* is an important confirmation of what was said in the Article referred to.

important data have been brought to light which enable us to understand how the Assyrians and Babylonians arranged the year ; and their method of dividing the heavens ; and the names of some of the stars in the different divisions have been ascertained. Mr. Smith has been able, with these data, "to fix approximately, and in some cases to identify, about thirty of the principal stars." As these people had observatories in most of the large cities where professional astronomers regularly took observations, which were carefully recorded, it is to be expected that further researches will bring to light many curious and valuable facts illustrative of their knowledge of astronomical science. Furthermore, we get some insight into the myths and traditions which prevailed in the Euphrates valley in those remote times. The tradition of the Deluge is no longer the only important one ; but we have now with it a remarkable tradition concerning the Creation, and another concerning the Tower of Babel, and still another concerning the rebellion of angels in heaven. In this connection may be stated an opinion held by the majority of cuneiform scholars, and strikingly confirmed by the new discoveries, that the Semitic people, although very early established in the Euphrates valley, borrowed their civilization, literature, mythology, and science from an older and totally different people, who spoke a language quite distinct from that of all the Semitic tribes. In this region we find, at least two thousand years before the birth of Christ, a high state of civilization, which could not have arisen in a day. And when it is known that important records are still buried in the Assyrian and Babylonian mounds, which might throw light on the history of those remote centuries, the scholar is impatient for the necessary excavations to be made ; but until they are made, one can say that the recovery of Babylon, notwithstanding all that has already been done, is a work yet to be accomplished. The multitude of mounds scattered everywhere are evidences that this valley was once crowded with life. "This is the home of man's earliest traditions ; it is the land of the Deluge and of the Tower of Babel ; and it is the

birth-place of the great race of Israel, which has played so important a part in the religious history of the world" (pp. 1, 2). Professor Curtius, the historian of Greece, has written an elaborate paper showing that the armorial devices of the ancient Greeks came originally from Assyria.¹ Mr. Ferguson writes: "The Assyrian is an entirely new chapter added to our history of architecture, and certainly not one of the least in beauty, not only from its own intrinsic merits and the beauty of many of its forms, but because of its historic value, being the parent of all the Ionic forms we afterwards find so currently and so beautifully blended with the architecture of Greece."² The pre-eminence of Babylonia in the science of astronomy is universally acknowledged; and Mr. Smith says: "It is evident that in every way the classical nations of antiquity borrowed far more from the valley of the Euphrates than from that of the Nile; and Chaldea, rather than Egypt, is the home even of the civilization of Europe."³ Surely the Christian scholar who inquires as to the origin and moulding influences of the people who were the ancestors of his faith, must look away thoughtfully and reverently to this land where there can still be pointed out the birth-place of Abraham, and the site of cities whose history runs back to the days of the flood.

¹ Paper presented to the Academy of Science of Berlin in 1874.

² Illustrated Hand-Book of Architecture, p. 162. London, 1855. See Quarterly Review for Oct. 1859, Vol. cvi. pp. 289-293.

³ Assyrian Discoveries, p. 451.

ARTICLE VIII.

DECLINE OF RATIONALISM IN THE GERMAN
UNIVERSITIES.¹

BY JOSEPH COOK, A.M., OF BOSTON.

I. GOD IN GERMAN HISTORY.

STRAUSS is in his grave; Baur's doubts are solved in the unseen; Schleiermacher and Neander are asleep on the hill slope south of Berlin; Fichte and Hegel lie at rest beneath the lindens in a cemetery in the same city; Kant has a peaceful tomb at Königsberg; Richter, at Baireuth, among his native Fichtelgebirge; De Wette at Basle, at the edge of the Alps; Goethe, Schiller, and Herder, no disquiet wakes at Weimar; Tholuck and Julius Müller, each laden with more than threescore years and ten, draw near the end of their victorious journey; Austria has been humbled, Sedan fought, German unity accomplished.

The formation of the new German empire marks broadly the close of a great period in German history, extending from Frederick the Great to Bismarck, from Voltaire to Strauss, from the French Revolution to Sedan.

Curiously enough, the measurable political peace, coming after terrific struggle to the whole nation, coincides with the measurable intellectual peace coming after terrific struggle to the most cultivated classes. There have been deluges of unrest; but conclusions are being reached as to political unity, and also as to Christianity. The greatest questions in the mental and in the political life of Germany are approaching repose in the same period, and that our own.

It is an exceedingly suggestive sign of the times that, in

¹ A Lecture delivered before the Students of Andover Theological Seminary and of the Yale Divinity School, and repeated in Boston, Concord, and several churches of Eastern Massachusetts.

proportion to population, Great Britain has but one student in a course of higher university education where Germany has five.¹ In this age it is from Germany that decisions in momentous intellectual questions proceed. Every day the world grows more international. There are now no foreign lands. It has been said that in England one is never quite outside of London, because the city inflames the whole island. So, in science, one is never quite outside of the German universities, for they inflame the whole field of culture.

Suppose that there were to be lifted from the waste of some ocean a new continent, peopled by a class of men equal to the Greeks in intellectual power, and their superiors in candor and learning. Let moral culture abound in the family life of the nation, but let church life be weak; let political causes choke the church; let wars storm over the territory; let public discussion be free only in philosophy, theology, and art; let system after system of metaphysical speculation arise, reign briefly, and be superseded; let the universities of the nation lead the world in modern science; let Christianity, probed to the innermost by restless spirits, with no outlet in politics for their activity, take its chances among this people; let it go through many a struggle; let it ask no assistance, and fight ever at a disadvantage; let it be partially triumphed over in appearance; let it rally; let it prevail; let it come forth crowned: we should say, if God were to lift such a continent, with such a history, from the Atlantic, that he had spoken to men. But such a people, with such a history, he has lifted, in the last century, in Germany, from the deeps of time.

II. THE MISCHIEF OF FRAGMENTARINESS.

What have been the causes of the power of rationalism in Germany in the last hundred years?

What are the proofs of the decline of rationalism in the German universities?

¹ Arnold, Professor Matthew, *Higher Schools and Universities in Germany*, pp. 148, 149. London. 1874. Compare Hart, *German Universities*, p. 322. 1875.

Who are the dead, the wounded, and the living, after the battle of a century?

Chief among the difficulties with which faith in Germany has contended has been one-sidedness in the presentations of Christianity. Science without earnestness, or earnestness without science—these were the two halves of German theological thought a century ago. Most mischievous, almost fatal, was the fragmentariness of a cold, speculative orthodoxy, on the one side, and of a warm, unspeculative pietism on the other.¹ If Spener and Wolff could have been rolled into one man; if Francke and Semler could have lived in one head, perhaps English deism and Voltaire and his sceptical crew at Frederick's court had never stung, or, if they had stung, had never fly-blown, the fair, white, honest breast of Germany to fevers and eruptions.

Average German natures are not as well balanced as the English, although broader and more subtle intellectually, and deeper in nearly every phase of the inner life, except only those royal English traits, self-esteem and the love of power.

There are three types of German heads: that of Goethe, or the regular; that of Schiller, or the irregular; that of Bismarck, or the thick, high, and round. A head of the Schiller type in theology knows little of the pietistic side; a head of the Goethe type, little of the philosophic; only a head of the Bismarck type combines the two. The regular type is often, like Goethe, powerful in the intuitive and imaginative, and not so in the distinctively philosophical faculties.² The irregular type may have great imaginative and philosophical, but lacks intuitive, power. A German philosopher with the irregular head of a Schiller³ is sure to be one-sided, and yet may be as endlessly

¹ Compare Farrar's *Critical History of Free Thought*. Lecture vi. Hagenbach's *German Rationalism, its Rise, Progress, and Decline*. vii.-xi. T. and T. Clark. 1865.

² "Ein Kerl, der speculirt,
Ist wie ein Vieh, auf dürrer Heide
Von einem bösen Geist herumgeführt,
Und rings umher ist grüne Weide." — *Goethe*.

³ "His form at no time could boast of faultless symmetry. He was tall and strongly bowed, but unmuscular and lean. . . . His face was pale, the cheeks

acute and imaginatively brilliant as he is unbalanced. Heads of the Bismarck type naturally devote themselves to statesmanship or to positive science; and it will be found that a line of such brains, like Von Moltke in war, Trendelenburg, Nitzsch, Dorner, Tholuck, and Julius Müller in theology, Kiepert in geography, Lepsius in archaeology, and Curtius in history, have exhibited the balanced thought of the nation.

No one has read German history, if he has not illustrated the narrative by the portraits of the leaders of thought.¹ Eccentric systems, in Germany as elsewhere, have come from small or irregular brains, as in the cases of Strauss, Schenkel, and Schopenhauer.

III. DISUSE OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CONVERTED AND UNCONVERTED.

Fruitful, exceedingly, among the causes of the power of rationalism in Germany has been the absence, not from its religious doctrines but from its church forms, of that distinction between the converted and the unconverted so familiar in Scotland, England, and the United States.

"I regret nothing so much," said Professor Tholuck to me once, with the emphasis of tears in his deep, spiritual eyes, "as that the line of demarcation between the church and the world, which Jonathan Edwards and Whitefield drew so deeply on the mind of New England, is almost un-

and temples rather hollow, the chin somewhat deep and slightly projecting, the nose irregularly aquiline." — Carlyle, *Collected Works*, *Life of Schiller*, p. 223.

¹ "In all my poor historical investigations, it has been, and always is, one of the most primary wants to procure a bodily likeness of the personage inquired after; a good *portrait*, if such exists; failing that, even an indifferent if sincere one. . . . Every student and reader of history, who studies earnestly to conceive for himself what manner of fact and *man* this or the other vague historical name can have been, will, as the first and directest indication of all, search eagerly for a portrait; for all the reasonable portraits there are; and never rest till he have made out, if possible, what the man's natural face was like. Often I have found a portrait superior in real instruction to half a dozen written biographies, as biographies are written; or rather, let me say I have found that the portrait was as a small lighted candle by which the biographies could for the first time be read, and some human interpretation be made of them." — Carlyle, *Collected Works*, Vol. xi. pp. 241, 242.

known, not to the theological doctrines, but to the ecclesiastical forms of Germany. With us confirmation is compulsory. Children of unbelieving, as well as of believing, families must at an early age be baptized, and profess faith in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. Without a certificate of confirmation in some church, employment cannot be legally obtained.¹ After confirmation, the religious standing is assumed to be Christian; after that, we are all church members. Thus it happens that in our state churches the converted and the unconverted are mixed pell-mell together."

Is Bismarck a Christian? I asked once of an accomplished German teacher. "Why not? Is he a Jew? Is he a Mohammedan?" was the reply. To ask in Germany if a man is a Christian, in the English, Scotch, or American sense of that question, you must use expletives: Is the man a real, a shining, an exemplary Christian? for the unexplained word which in our colloquial use means that a man is converted, in Germany means only that he has been confirmed.

Pastoral care of the mass of the population is, of course, very inefficient under this vastly maladroit organization of the German state church; public and private devotional meetings languish; church discipline is often no more than a name.²

"We have no Sabbath-schools in Heidelberg," said a distinguished and Christian professor of the Heidelberg University to me once; "and, with exceptions not worth mentioning, there are none in Germany."³ We do not need them; for the instruction you give in America in Sabbath-schools, we give in the secular schools. In our common

¹ In a few of the cities of North Germany infamous licences were granted to women for an infamous employment, but only after the applicants for licenses had exhibited to the licensing officer their certificates of confirmation!

² Compare Schaff, Professor Philip, Germany, its Universities, Theology, and Religion, chap. xi. See also his instructive contrasts between German and American church life, in *Der Bürgerkrieg und das christliche Leben in Nord Amerika*. ¹Berlin. 1866.

³ "The rightly so-called *American Sunday-schools*, . . . since Mr. Woodruff visited us in 1863, have augmented to about one thousand, and the number of children therein instructed by more than four thousand young men and women to about eighty thousand." — Krummacher, Rev. Hermann, *Christian Life in Germany*. Report of Evangelical Alliance, p. 82. New York. 1873.

week-day school-instruction an hour is specially set apart for teaching the children the biblical histories and the catechism.¹

“But what you explain as a solemn public profession of faith on entrance into membership with a church, does not exist in Germany. The distinction which you say prevails in New England, and America generally, between persons who have made such a profession of faith and of a renewed character, and those who have not,—the former being called church-members, and distinctively Christians, while the latter are not,—is a distinction not in use with us. We are all confirmed in youth, and after confirmation are all members of the church, and all known as Christians.

“What you describe as a gathering among church-members for devotional purposes, or a prayer-meeting, does not exist with us, except among the very severely orthodox. Here in Heidelberg, among the higher orthodox there are small meetings called conventicles, held from house to house, in private rooms, but not in the church. Our theological students do not have prayer-meetings.

“What you explain as pastoral visitation is not practised with us, unless in a few country churches. You will find

¹ I copy from my notes written at Heidelberg some account of a favorable specimen of the religious teaching in German schools. “Friday, Nov. 22. This morning from eight to nine, I witnessed the religious instruction which is given to one of the upper classes in the Lyceum of Heidelberg. Twenty-six boys of about fourteen years of age were : 1. Questioned on the second chapter of Genesis ; 2. Furnished by their teacher with further explanations of the history ; 3. Made to take down in writing from dictation certain heads summarizing the instruction. Strauss himself could hardly have tripped up the explanations given by the teacher, whom I took for a young minister. The history was called ‘a symbolical representation of the ideal and actual state of man ; of the circumstances arising in the human dispositions under temptation ; of the action of conscience before, during, and after sin.’ The conversation of the woman with the serpent illustrated ; first, doubt as to the authority of the moral law ; secondly, the force of passion in presence of its objects ; lastly, remorse and shame. Symbolical representation of the action of conscience was what the history was explained to be. On the whole I was pleased with the exercise ; although the substitution of such instruction for Sabbath-schools leaves the churches very inert. There is in the Lyceum, this teacher told me, a Catholic, and also a Jewish religious exercise. The Protestant, such as I saw, occupies two hours a week. ‘Wir haben keine Sonntag Schulen,’ said this teacher, when I spoke of schools of that kind in America.”

something in books as to our theory of pastoral care; but it is by no means the general custom of our preachers to visit their people for the purpose of conversation on personal religion. Were a pastor to open conversation on the personal religion of a man, in the man's house, the reply would probably be: 'There is the door; you can go out, or I must.'

"If a student in the university were to lead a disorderly life here at Heidelberg, and yet were a member of Peter's Kirche where the most of the Professors worship, the church, as such, would do nothing to call him to account. You ask what the pastor would do in such a case: he preaches on Sunday, and nothing farther is within the limits to which he is expected to confine himself.¹ Family life in Germany would do what it could to bring to a sense of his duty any immoral person; but the church preaches, and does not visit or exercise discipline in such cases as you say often result in the exclusion of a person from church membership in New England. In very extreme cases, indeed, the university expels privately a disorderly student."

At Halle, at Berlin, at Leipzig, at Dresden, at Göttingen and at Heidelberg, I looked in vain for Sabbath-schools and prayer-meetings.

Halle has led the religious life of Germany for a hundred and fifty years; and yet, said Professor Tholuck to me: "There are no devotional meetings in our churches worth attending. It may be said that, according to the Scottish and New England idea, the state churches of Germany have no prayer-meetings. Once a week, in the churches of Halle, there is a biblical exercise. The pastor always leads; and the only remarks that are made, he makes. Sometimes, in this exercise, a Christian member of the audience offers a prayer; but this is all. Our theological students may know more Hebrew, Greek, and philosophy than yours; but most unfortunately, as they have had no training to such gatherings in the state churches, they do not come together in devotional

¹ Compare Tholuck, *Das akademische Leben des 17^{ten} Jahrhunderts*.

meetings as yours do. *Bene orasse, est bene studuisse*, you understand better than we. I have been subjected to no distress in my lecture-room greater than that caused by the fact that our churches leave unsupplied, in the minds of the students, that devotional seriousness and elevation which are the only fit preparation for scientific study of religious truth. I beseech you not to judge of the condition of religion in Germany by the condition of our state churches."¹

Most assuredly must an American maintain, however, that the health of religion in a nation depends on a *mens sana in corpore sano*; the universities are the mind, but the church training of the people is the body; and when the latter, as in Germany, is seamed through and through with weakness and disease, how can the former remain sound? The eye for religion is not cultivated by the training which in Germany usually precedes theological study. The moral atmosphere of the German universities exhales from broad marshes of confessedly stagnant state church life; and it is in the condition of the vapors which these neglected, steaming, batrachian flats cast up, that the wonders some German university telescopes have seen in the sky find an important explanation. Face to face with the nearly omnipresent lack of what New England and Scotland call spiritual cultivation, I, for one, did not, when in Germany, and meditating long on the banks of the Rhine, the Saale, the Neckar, the Ilm, the Spree, the Elbe and the Danube, feel impressed with a tenth part of the in-

¹ "Die veränderte Ansicht vom Verhältnisse der Kirche zum Staat hatte eine Veränderung der Stellung des Geistlichen zur Folge. Je mehr die Thomasiussche Ansicht vom Geistlichen als Staatsdiener sich verbreitet, desto mehr schwindet der religiöse Nimbus, mit welchem der geistliche Stand bisher umkleidet gewesen: er tritt in der Reihe die Staatsdiener." — Tholuck, Geschichte des Rationalismus, Erste Abtheilung, p. 167. "In the year 1808 all consistories, both upper and lower, were swept away; and until some considerable time after our war of deliverance, our evangelical church existed without even the breath of one single church institution or authority. The Government transacted all the former business of the consistories. . . . I see no help for German Christendom, save in the formation of churches. Yes, churches! That is my watchword — my loud, crying appeal to the Church of Germany, which needs churches. They are the sole condition of life for the church." — King Frederic William IV. Two Treatises. 1845.

tellectual respect for German scepticism which it is not uncommon to find in the minds of untravelled men in America.

A noble, but religiously neglected people, naturally honest and earnest, the German masses, as in the days of Tacitus, make a kind of religion of family life. Hegel was proud of the fact that *Gemüthlichkeit*, the name for what he considered the most characteristic trait of the Germans, is a word without any equivalent in French or English; ¹ kindness of nature, tenderness, *soulfulness* are, perhaps, the best English expressions for it; and this quality, conjoined with the renowned German sincerity, gives the nation a capacity for religious culture excelled by that of no other on the globe, and fit to make it the mission of Germany, as Hegel thought it was, to bear through the ages the Christian principle. But the capacity is as yet unoccupied.

Studying often and searchingly the faces of the common people in the market places of Europe, I used to think that to produce a salutary effect by speaking to them on religion, I should need a day with the Germans, and succeed on the merits of the case; an age with the English of the lower orders, and succeed only when my cause had become respectable among the upper classes; a millennium with the French, and succeed then only to expect a revolution of opinion every three days.

IV. CONTAGION FROM FRANCE.

Moral, intellectual, and social contagion from France must be mentioned with painful emphasis among the causes of the power of rationalism in Germany.

Voltaire and Frederick the Great at Sans Souci: you know the story made so brilliant by Carlyle.² From the time of Louis XIV. to that of Napoleon, the numberless petty courts of Germany took their ideas of morality and taste from

¹ Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, Part ix. sect. 1. chap. 1.

² "There is nothing in imaginative literature superior in its own way to the Episode of Voltaire in the *Fritzziad*. It is delicious in humor, masterly in minute characterization. . . . It is in such things that Mr. Carlyle is beyond all rivalry, and that we must go back to Shakspeare for a comparison."—Lowell, *Professor James Russell, My Study Windows, Carlyle*, p. 135.

Paris and Versailles, almost as slavishly as Frederick the Great took his literary fashions from Voltaire. Think, too, of the humiliations of Germany under Napoleon, when his personal rule extended from the Tiber to the Elbe, and when Leipzig and Berlin had passed into kingdoms dependent on France. Until Lessing's day, French taste ruled German literature; there was no German literature. Even Goethe thought his country unwise in resisting Napoleon; and the war of liberation, by the colossal blows of Leipzig and Waterloo, only fractured a yoke which it is to be hoped that Sedan has broken completely in twain.

In Halle, in 1872, I found in a large circulating library, in the best bookstore of the city, patronized by respectable people, and within a bow-shot of the university, a complete set of eighteen or twenty volumes of the works of an infamous French writer, whose productions, if exposed for sale in London, Edinburgh, or Boston, would be seized by the police, or would ruin the reputation of vender and purchaser, — a great exception, no doubt, in Halle,¹ — but the books were worn black by use.

I had not been in Paris a week before I was permanently cured of all intellectual respect for French scepticism. Tacitus says the ancient Germans whipped the adulteress through the streets and buried the adulterer alive in the mud.²

¹ The wise and patriotic Frederick Perthes wrote, in 1826: "When I was a child enlightenment occupied the place of religion, and freemasonry that of the church. Men of culture knew the Bible only by hearsay. . . . During the first ten years of my establishment at Hamburg, I sold not a single Bible except to a few bookbinders in the neighboring country towns; and I remember very well a good sort of man who came into my shop for a Bible, and took great pains to assure me that it was for a person about to be confirmed, fearing, evidently, lest I should suppose it was for himself. . . . Since the French Revolution, the rod of divine chastisement has not been wielded in vain on our lacerated country. The sensual, godless frivolity of the last century wanders about only as a dusky, obsolete ghost." — Perthes, Frederick, *Memoirs*, Vol. ii. pp. 243, 246.

² "Inesse quin etiam sanctum aliquid et providum putant; nec aut consilia earum aspernantur aut responsa negligunt. . . . Quamquam severa illic matrimonia, nec ullam morum partem magis laudaveris. Nam prope soli barbarorum singulis uxoribus contenti sunt. . . . Paucissima in tam numerosa gente adulteria; quorum poena praesens, et maritis permissa: accisis crinibus, nudatam, coram propinquis expellit domo maritus ac per omnem vicum verbere

But Julius Caesar speaks of polygamous practices among the Gauls, and describes them as showy, cruel, and volatile.¹ Thomas Carlyle calls Paris the city of all the devils.² "Poor Paris," I heard him say once in his study at Chelsea, "they have done nothing there but lie for eight hundred years." Bismarck, speaking with facetious seriousness, says, that if you take from the average native Parisian—not the Frenchman, who is a different character—his tailor, the hair-dresser, and the cook, what is left is Red Indian. These men ought to know France; but, if their representations fit this century less well than the last, in the city which is the play-ground and sewer of Europe, it is yet certain that average Paris is politically and morally the city of little boys. For ethical and ethnological reasons, it is of no consequence what is thought of theology by Paris. There are several chambers lacking in the typical Parisian brain. In Germany can be found everything good but elegance; in France, nothing good but elegance. Eternity is not visible from Paris.

V. SUFFERING OF GERMANY IN EUROPEAN WARS.

Demoralization of the people by protracted and almost incessant European wars, deserves a high rank among the causes of the power of rationalism in Germany, even in the last century.

"Scratch a Russian," said Napoleon, "and you will find beneath the surface a Tartar." Scratch peasant-life in Central Europe once, and you find the wars of the first Napoleon; twice, and you find the Thirty Years' War; thrice, and you find the Middle Ages.

After the sack of Magdeburg, Tilly cast six thousand bodies of the citizens into the Elbe, and the river was choked by the mass. Soldiers in the Thirty Years' War were largely foreigners and mercenaries and paid, from necessity and on

agit. *Publicatae enim pudicitiae nulla venia. Non forma, non aetate, non opibus maritum invenerit.*—Tacitus, *Germaniae* 8, 18, 19. Cf. Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, vi. 21.

¹ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, iii. 19; vi. 16-19.

² Carlyle, *The French Revolution*, *passim*.

principle, in beauty and booty. Cossacks, Walloons, Croats, Italians, Irishmen, and Turks fought with Scots, Dutchmen, Danes, Swedes, Laplanders, and Finns. Germany for a generation was a howling hunting ground for the rabble of all nations. One hundred years, to a day, after the Augsburg Confession was promulgated, that is, on June 24, 1630, John Winthrop was sailing into Boston Harbor and Gustavus Adolphus was landing fifteen thousand men in Pomerania. For a hundred years after that date, the plundering bands of Wallenstein did not disappear. From fear of starvation, a Swedish general, in the second half of the war, refused to lead an army through the once fat plains of the Oder and the Elbe, from the Baltic to the Saxon Switzerland. When Louis XIV. stole Strasburg, in 1681, the dead German empire was too feeble to resent the robbery. The Turks, at the instigation of the French king, swarmed far up the Danube, and laid down forty-eight thousand lives in a nearly successful siege of Vienna. The Thirty Years' War gave to death half of the population of Germany. It left her divided into more than three hundred petty states, each with the right to declare war and make peace; and into fourteen hundred yet pettier political fragments, each with the same right, and each depending upon a peeled peasantry for the means of feeding the ostentation and leprosy of courts filled with nobles often unable to read or write, and combining with soundly orthodox belief incredible coarseness, dullness, and savagery. Shivering the once orderly and majestic German constellation into asteroids, it left in existence no central sun. It allowed merely asteroid princes to acquire such power that for two centuries national unity was impracticable. It subjected all Germany to the inroads of French armies. It brought into fashion French manners. Switzerland and the Netherlands, at one time a part of the empire, were given up at the Peace of Westphalia. In Switzerland Germany lost its best fortress, and in the Netherlands its best port; in the former, its surest defence against attack by the Romance nations; in the latter, its surest means of influence

on the sea and in remote regions of the world. Great before, for two centuries after the close of the Thirty Years' War, Germany founded no colony on any shore and showed no flag on any ocean.¹

When the French, in 1689, blew up the towers of Heidelberg; swung a fire-brand up and down both shores of the Rhine; filled the Palatinate with the hungry, the naked, and the frozen; scattered to the winds, at Spires, the splintered coffins and violated dust of the German emperors; and at Treves, Jülich, and Cologne compelled the peasants to plow down their standing corn, Louis XIVth's plan was to protect himself from Germany by making the Palatinate, and the middle region of the Rhine, a desert.

With Frederick the Great came war on war; with Napoleon, war on war. Caesar's robe was not so full of dagger-rents as is German soil of battle-fields. In German-speaking lands lie Magdeburg, Lützen, Nordlingen, Prague, Rossbach, Hohenlinden, Austerlitz, Eylau, Aspern, Erlingen, Wagram, Jena, Leipzig, Waterloo, Langensalza, Sadowa, and Königgrätz:

“Poor dumb mouths, . . .

Mark how the blood of Caesar followed them.”

VI. POLICE CHRISTIANITY AS THE ALLY OF ABSOLUTISM.

Support given by state churches to absolutism in politics, and the consequent alienation of the masses of the population and of the more progressive of the educated class, ought to be named early in any enumeration of the causes of rationalism in Germany.

Too often in Europe the cause of infidelity is that the Bible has been forced down the throats of the people with a bayonet, or food taken from starving lips by aristocracies whose throttling and thievish action a state church has blessed. “I daily thank God,” said Chevalier Bunsen, on his dying bed, “that I have lived to see Italy free. Now twenty-six

¹ Compare Bancroft, *History of the United States*, Vol. x. p. 83. Menzel, Wolfgang, *Geschichte der Deutschen*, 5 Aufl. 1856. (Eng. trans., in Bohn's Library). Menzel, Karl Adolf, *Neuere Geschichte der Deutschen*, 2 Aufl., 6 Bde. 1856.

millions will be able to believe that God governs the world.”¹ Red republicanism as yet makes white republicanism impossible in Europe. Still in the trance of perpetuated horror of the French Revolution, church and state in Germany in 1848 united in resisting the demands of the people for political reforms. Until very lately, any too marked agitation for German unity itself has been choked with a strong hand, and the churches applauded the act. Christlieb says, ‘that for two centuries the law of German history has been that infidelity grows strong under oppressive, and weak under just, civil regulations.’² Evil exceedingly is that day in a nation when religious and political interests flow in opposite directions; these opposing currents make the whirlpool that impales faith on the tusks of the sea. The German population of the ruder sort look on the preacher as merely a governmental agent, and scoff at his teaching as “Police Christianity.” It must never be forgotten that the Romish is in Germany one of the state churches, and by compact organization and religious loyalty to the subtle creed that the church governs the world, the pope the church, and the Jesuits the pope, has almost power enough to disintegrate the new empire. As Bismarck and Gladstone³ are at this moment proclaiming, patriotism and Jesuit ultramontaniam, now as of old, mingle no better than water and fire.

VII. LIMITATIONS AND STIMULATIONS OF THE UNIVERSITIES.

Limitation of free discussion, in the universities and elsewhere, to philosophy, theology and topics not connected with the civil life of the nation, has a prominent place among the inciting causes of German rationalism.

Political discussion is not free inside or outside of the

¹ Bunsen, *Memoirs of*, Vol. ii. p. 562.

² “Nothing like the old bureaucratic system to produce and foster rationalism. . . . Since the reawakening of political life, the popular favor towards materialistic theories seems to have sensibly diminished.” — Christlieb, Professor Theodore, of the University of Bonn, *Modern Doubt and Christian Belief*, p. 18 (Eng. trans.). 1874.

³ Gladstone, Hon. W. E., Pamphlets on “The Vatican Decrees,” and “Vaticanism.” 1875.

universities in Prussia. Politics absorb an exceedingly small portion of the talent of educated men. Compared with the swirling, devouring whirlpool of political discussion in England or America, German civil life is an unruffled sea.¹ Great waves, unknown here, roll there in science, philosophy and theology. Look into the bookstores at the Leipzig fairs, or into the university lecture lists to get reports of this commotion among the educated class, and not into the newspapers. Under a vigorously paternal government, newspapers have little power, and so attract little talent. Accordingly there are no newspapers in Germany; at least, none at all comparable for ability or influence with the leading sheets of the English or American press. The universities in Germany absorb that huge amount of intellectual activity which America and England diffuse through an awakened and multitudinously throbbing public life. General enthusiasm in politics does not exist in Prussia, still less in the smaller states of the empire.

It is only upon scientific, philosophical, and literary topics that discussion in the universities is fully free. In the absence of great political and social themes, the stream of intellectual activity, which never runs shallow in Germany, shut off from one of its natural channels, turns its whole force upon philosophy, science, and theology. If the result has in many respects been excellent, in many also it has been unfortunate; for the very current that has made the channel deep, has borne with it a drift-wood of utterly secular, turbulent, and intriguing spirits, whose natural outlet would have been politics, and who had no calling, except from necessity, to discuss any other theme.

The brilliancy of a German professor's success depends

¹ "A disinterested love of truth can hardly co-exist with a strong political spirit. In all countries where the habits of thought have been mainly formed by political life, we may discover a disposition to make expediency the test of truth. . . . It is probable that the capacity of pursuing abstract truth for its own sake, which has given German thinkers so great an ascendancy in Europe, is in no slight degree to be attributed to the political languor of their nation."—Lecky, *Rationalism in Europe*, Vol. ii. p. 145.

much on the size of his audience ; and he is under no inconsiderable temptation to secure hearers by novelty of doctrine.

The professor is chosen for his merit as a specialist ; he attracts hearers by his fame as a specialist ; his rank is estimated according to the extent of the additions he has made to knowledge as a specialist ; his ambition for scholarly renown leads him to seek perpetually to find or invent some new thing as a specialist.

Competition for hearers is intensely keen at times under the operation of the peculiar system of the university lectures, supported largely by the fees paid by students who voluntarily subscribe to hear certain courses.

There is rivalry between the professors of the three different orders — regular, extraordinary, and candidate. The *Privat Docent* of a German university is really a candidate professor, and one of his offices is to keep the regular professors strenuously wakeful by competition.

This rivalry is intensified by the custom in Germany of assembling in circles of instructors at the universities always a majority of the brilliant men of learning of the whole country. In England one may count among those in the last fifty years distinguished for learning, at least a score who had no connection with universities ; but in Germany one can find in that period hardly any such. Macaulay, Carlyle, Mill, Grote, like our own Prescott and Irving, never were professors in a college. But in Germany, if any learned person has anything to say, he is usually provided by the government with a chance to say it in lectures to students at some university centre.

Undoubtedly the German universities, on all topics within their range, have at present more power than the German nobility to set the fashions of public thought.

No one can enter the civil service or a learned profession in Germany, except through the gate of a state examination, at the close of a university course of study. The secret of the national power of the German universities is in this close connection with the state. “The university,” says Bismarck,

“exists for imperial purposes.” The American and the English universities do not rest on state preparatory schools, or end in the state service. The German university rests on the state gymnasiums and ends in the civil service and learned professions.¹

America governs by majorities, England by an aristocracy, Germany by universities.

All life in Prussia has an organization so utterly different from that in New England, that although in Edinburgh, Glasgow, Oxford, or London, an American feels himself yet hardly out of America, he will not have that feeling in Germany, not even in the highest places of learning. Modern German society is a spiritual landscape, with stagnant flats and reedy marshes extensive as those of the Baltic provinces themselves; but also with wide tracts thrown up, like South Germany, into Thuringian hills and Saxon Switzerlands, or even into Alpine peaks, on which day strikes first and lingers longest. Examined more closely, however, the novelties which surprise an American are seen to be arranged in a most definite order. Prussian society consists of these seven parts: the king, the civil service, the army, the universities, the nobility, the tradesmen, the peasants. I assign the universities a rank as a class, and that rank next higher than the nobility; for such is now, according to the best German critics, their relative position.² Acting in the eye of the nation, and on this elevated stage of public respect, German professors are stimulated as no other university teachers in the world are, both to excellence and to rivalry.

¹ “The French university has no liberty, and the English universities have no science; the German universities have both.” — Arnold, *Professor Matthew, Higher Schools and Universities in Germany*, p. 166. London. 1874. Compare also, Hart, *German Universities*. New York. 1875.

² “After the Reformation nearly all eminent men in Germany — poets, philosophers, and historians — belonged to the Protestant party, and resided chiefly at the universities. The universities were what the monasteries had been under Charlemagne, the Castles under Frederick Barbarossa — the centres of gravitation for the intellectual and political life of the country. . . . The intellectual sceptre of Germany was wielded by a new nobility . . . that had its castles in the universities.” — Müller, *Professor Max, German Classics*, Preface, xxvi.

I find in these circumstances the explanation of the fact that the German universities are the best now in existence, and also of the circumstance that among the multitude of their productions they have given to the public some most wild and perishable systems of thought.¹

VIII. RISE AND FALL OF PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS.

Complete or partial overthrow of many celebrated schools in philosophy on which theology had unwisely been made to depend, is a recent cause of the power of rationalism in Germany, especially of the later materialistic phases of unbelief, which sneer at metaphysics as an impossible science. Never since Plato and Aristotle has so much metaphysical ability been displayed as by Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel; but in Germany Fichte and Schelling are obsolete; Hegel, obsolescent; Kant, only, has foundations upon which this century dares to build.

A Herbart, a Beneke, a Rothe, a Trendelenburg, a Schopenhauer have come and gone; but, for twenty-five years no commanding system of philosophy has arisen in a land which in philosophical gifts possesses the primacy of the world. A return to Aristotle and Kant has distinguished the later German metaphysics. To-day, in the hands of a Kuno Fischer, the history of philosophy is made to attract almost as much attention as philosophy itself;² and in those of a Hermann Lotze,³ metaphysics and physics are jointed together as the opposing ribs of a new vessel, which perhaps is destined to endure the shock of wind and wave where fleets ribbed with metaphysics only, went down, even with Schellings, Fichtes, and Hegels at the helm. But neither Lotze nor Fischer pre-

¹ "Professorial knight-errantry still waits for its Cervantes. Nowhere have the objects of learning been so completely sacrificed to the means of learning; nowhere has that Dulcinea, — knowledge for its own sake, — with her dark veil and her barren heart, numbered so many admirers; nowhere have so many windmills been fought, and so many real enemies left unhurt, as in Germany, particularly during the last two centuries." — Müller, Professor Max, *German Classics*, Preface, xxvii.

² *Geschichte der neueren Philosophie*, 6 Bände.

³ *Mikrokosmos*, 2 Bände. Leipzig, 1872.

tends to undertake, what was the joy of older admirals, the circumnavigation of the yet uncircumnavigated globe of philosophy. These giants, among costly wrecks, pace to and fro sadly on the ocean shore. They do not set sail; and yet they perform for thought an incalculable service, by keeping the world in view of the limitless horizons. Meanwhile, out of sight of the sea, in the marshy interior of a grovelling materialism, a Moleschott and a Carl Vogt can assert that there is no ocean; and even the pigmy Büchner, from lack of height of outlook, through twenty editions of a shallow book, can proclaim the impossibility of both metaphysics and religion.

IX. DOCTRINAL UNREST OF THE AGE.

The doctrinal unrest of the age in most, from the acquisition of new facts in many, departments of thought, is a chief force in all modern history, and has been exceedingly efficient among the causes of German rationalism. Nearly every other branch of human inquiry besides theology has been supplied with a new method and new materials within a century; and it was neither to be expected nor desired that scholars would not seek a new method for the latter science; and it was to be expected, though not desired, that when they could not find copious new materials for it, they would invent them. Really new materials, however, have been brought to theology in the last century from the department of exegetical research. An age of new truths and facts is necessarily a period of unrest as to old ones. Although ultimately it may be found that the old and the new agree, acquisition of fresh materials for belief and the crystallization of those materials around ancient beliefs are processes which do not succeed each other without an intervening space of investigation and uncertainty. It is upon precisely these intervening spaces in history that scepticism has seized as battle-fields, only to lose them one by one, in a long line of defeats reaching now through eighteen centuries. But there never was a more important intervening space of this sort than the last age in Germany, except the first age of Christianity in Asia and Europe.

X. STATE AID TO RATIONALISTIC SECTS.

State aid to rationalistic churches I class among the causes that have given rationalism power to make a noise in Germany. If a majority in a church at Heidelberg, for instance, vote for a rationalistic preacher, they can have him, and yet retain state aid. In America, under the voluntary system, rationalistic organizations soon disband, for they have not earnestness enough to pay their own expenses. But, in Germany, loaves and fishes keep them together under the endlessly vicious practical arrangements of the state churches.

There are three methods of arranging the relations of church and state : separation, or the American plan ; exclusive establishment of one confession, or the English plan ; concurrent establishment of several confessions, or the German plan. Catholics, Lutherans, and Calvinists had equal civil rights secured to them by the Peace of Westphalia. Even in Prussia, Romanists to-day have larger gifts from the public treasury than Protestants. Confessional equality, a great watchword, having in it the agonies and blisses of German religious life for centuries, is a cry never hypocritically uttered by the lips of Prussia.

But, although dissenters from the three recognized confessions have had no formal help from the state, it has been the theory of each establishment that the whole population must be baptized. Until very lately, every family, believing or unbelieving, was obliged to cause its children to profess faith and pass the rite of confirmation, or incur for the children the gravest civil disabilities. Thus, in practice, all dissenters have been really within, and not without the church. In many of the smaller principalities, individual churches have become predominantly rationalistic, and yet have retained their income from the state.¹

¹ "Half, at least, of the destructive power of European infidelity in past generations has been due to the presence of the party within, instead of without, the church." — President Warren, of the Boston University. Evangelical Alliance Report, p. 253. New York. 1873.

XI. CATHOLICISM IN SOUTH GERMANY.

Catholicism, covering all South Germany and stimulated to act the part of mere reactionary Romanism by influences from beyond the Alps and the Rhine, I rank as a powerful cause of German rationalism, for it has prevented half the German people from seeing what a church can accomplish; made the lives of vast peasant populations a prolonged childhood; disgusted scholars by its absurdities of doctrine; resisted the progress of the nation toward Protestant unity; and seeks now to destroy an empire whose power is the best guarantee of both peace and progress in Europe.

Pope Boniface wrote to Philip the Fair of France: 'Boniface to Philip, greeting: Know thou, that thou art subject to us both in spiritual and temporal things.' The king replied: 'Philip to Boniface, little or no greeting: Know thou, O supreme fool, that in temporal things we are not subject to any one.' Such would now be the answer of America or England or Scotland to similar pretensions; such is to-day the answer of Germany. If necessary, this answer would be given by Great Britain or the United States through the cannon's mouth; if necessary, it will so be given by the German Empire. Ultramontanism against nationality is the simple issue between the pope and Bismarck. First a Catholic and then a citizen, or first a citizen and then a Catholic, is the ancient question Berlin debates with Rome. In the long struggle between the civil and ecclesiastical power, England stood three hundred years ago where Germany stands to-day. By the celebrated bill passed in 1581 'to restrain her majesty's subjects in their due obedience,' parliament asserted in principle all that now causes outcry against the sternness of Prussia toward Romanists of the disloyal type. Summarizing with fairness the history of Ultramontanism for five hundred years, Bismarck said once to the Prussian parliament that "the goal which, like the Frenchman's dream of an unbroken Rhine boundary, floats

before the papal party — the programme which, in the time of the mediaeval emperors, was near its realization — is the subjection of the civil power to the ecclesiastical.”¹ William I. writes to Pius IX. that Catholic citizens of Germany, at the instigation of Ultramontanism, conspire against the unity and peace of the Empire. Pius IX. replies: “Every one who has been baptized belongs to the pope in some way or other.”²

Henry IV., in smock and barefoot, stood three days in the snow before the palace of pope Hildebrand at Canossa, imploring absolution. In 1872 Bismarck said of the German Empire: “We are not going to Canossa, spiritually or physically.” But it was by barely a majority of one that great, rich, Romish Bavaria was brought to the aid of the rest of Germany in the war of self-defence against Napoleon III. France echoed the scorn of Philip the Fair in his famous answer of contempt to the pope; she is to-day governed by Ultramontanism. Canossa is not the goal of the centuries; but the feet of one hundred and ninety millions of the human race yet tread its snows.

XII. SUMMARY OF CAUSES.

These, then, in my judgment, are the ten chief causes of the power of scepticism in Germany in the last century:

1. Fragmentary presentations of Christianity in the spirit of earnestness without science, or of science without earnestness.

2. Maladroit organization of the German state church; first, in the use of compulsory confessions of faith at the confirmation legally required of the whole population, whether believing or unbelieving; and secondly, in the absence of the familiar American and English distinction between the converted and the unconverted, and in a consequently stagnant church life.

3. Moral, intellectual, and social contagion from France.

4. The demoralization arising in Germany from its having been the principal theatre of European wars.

¹ Bismarck, Speech in the Prussian House of Lords, March 10, 1873.

² Letter of Pius IX. to the Emperor William, Aug. 7, 1873.

5. Support by the church of a popularly odious absolutism in politics.

6. German university life in its peculiar limitations and stimulations of free discussion.

7. The overthrow of several celebrated German systems of philosophy.

8. The doctrinal unrest of the age in most, from the acquisition of new facts in many, departments of thought.

9. State aid to rationalistic organizations.

10. Roman Catholicism in South Germany.

I am aware how difficult it is to present in proper perspective a complicated array of causes and effects extending through an hundred years; and that, for patriotic and political reasons, even candid German writers do not always arrive at a frank admission of the power of some of these causes. But whoever has read between the lines in European history, and listened to the whispered as well as to the spoken and printed thought of Germany, will recognize in this analysis her own unpublished judgment of herself. On such authority, it is well to be able to assure the superficial sceptic, that, in the most learned land on the globe, rationalism had several other sources of influence besides its own intellectual merits.¹ In view of these enumerated causes, it is not surprising, nor to a scholar's faith is it intellectually annoying, that scepticism has had power in Germany, and that it yet retains power among the slightly educated.

XIII. EMPTY RATIONALISTIC AND CROWDED EVANGELICAL LECTURE ROOMS.

In the German universities the incontrovertible fact is that the rationalistic lecture-rooms are now empty, and the evangelical crowded; while fifty or eighty years ago the rationalistic were crowded, and the evangelical empty.

Lord Bacon says that the best materials for prophecy are

¹ As was to be expected, one of the places in Boston where information on the decline of rationalism in the German universities appears to be needed, is the Radical Club, yet misled by Hegel, on whom Transcendentalism built so arrogantly and incautiously forty years ago.

the unforced tendencies of educated young men. Take up any German year-book, look at the statistics of the universities, ascertain which way the drift of educated youth is now setting in the most learned circles in the world, and you have before you no unimportant sign of the times.

But, in looking for this, you come upon another sign no less important, namely, that the leading universities of Germany are now, and eighty years ago were not, under predominant evangelical influence.

Berlin, beyond doubt the university of first importance, and hallowed by the great names of Schleiermacher, Neander, and Trendelenburg, is theologically led by Dorner, Semisch, Steinmeyer, and Twisten — staunch defenders of evangelical faith.

Leipzig, with Kahnis and Luthardt and Delitzsch — and lately with Tischendorf — among her professors, contests with Berlin for the first place, and in the opinion of many deserves that rank, and is the renowned traditional seat of an orthodoxy which at some points New England and Scotland — agreeing in the main with the present attitude of Berlin — might consider excessive.

Halle, whose theology permeates Germany, both from the university and from Francke's famous Waisenhaus, has in it Tholuck, and Köstlin, and Kähler, and Guericke, and Jacobi, and Schlottmann, and Julius Müller, known throughout the world as antagonists, and as successful antagonists, of the subtlest forms of scepticism. It is not uncommon to hear Julius Müller spoken of as the ablest theologian of Germany.

Tübingen itself, where Strauss put forth one of his earlier works, and Baur founded a theological party, has had in it for years no Tübingen school, but, through the professorships of Beck, Palmer, and Landerer, is permeated by vigorous evangelical influences.

Heidelberg, under the theological leadership of Schenkel, Hitzig, Gass, and Holtzmann, is to-day the only prominent university of Germany given to views that can be called rationalistic.

Now, which of these institutions is most patronized by

German theological students? Halle and Berlin may be compared, in a general way, as to their theology, with Andover and New Haven; Leipzig, with Princeton; and Heidelberg, with the Unitarian portion of Cambridge.

I found Dorner's, Müller's, and Tholuck's lecture-rooms crowded, and Schenkel's empty. In 1872-3 there were but twenty-four German theological students at Heidelberg; and I have heard Schenkel often, and never saw more than nine, eight, or seven students in his lecture-room. Against twenty-four German theological students at Heidelberg, there are one hundred and thirty-two at Leipzig, two hundred and fifty-seven at Halle, two hundred and thirty-nine at Berlin. But, counting both the native and the foreign theological students in these institutions, the whole number at rationalistic Heidelberg is thirty-four; at evangelical Halle, two hundred and eighty-two; at evangelical Berlin two hundred and eighty; at hyper-evangelical Leipzig, four hundred and twelve.¹

It must be remembered that German students often change universities, as occasionally American students change theological schools, passing one period in one and another in another, according to the attractions of different professors. It is immaterial to the German student where he hears lectures, provided he is prepared to pass with credit the severe final examinations. When a professor is called from one university to another, a large number of his hearers often follow him. Thus it is a fair test of the direction of the drift of educated youth in Germany, to point to the fact that they give their patronage to evangelical, rather than to rationalistic, professors, and this in the overwhelming proportion of ten to one.

XIV. TESTIMONY OF THOLUCK, DORNER, CHRISTLIEB, SCHWARZ, AND KAHNIS.

"By far, by far," is Professor Tholuck's constant answer, when asked by foreign students if orthodoxy is not stronger in Prussia than fifty or eighty years ago.

¹ Meyer, *Deutsches Jahrbuch*. Erster Jahrgang, p. 1002.

In 1826, at Halle, all the students except five, who were the only ones that believed in the Deity of our Lord, and all the professors of the university united in a petition to the government against Tholuck's appointment to a professorship there, and the opposition rested solely on the ground of his evangelical belief.¹ The students at Tübingen, not far from the same date, ceremoniously burned the Bible. "When I came to Halle," said Professor Tholuck to me once, as he walked up and down that famous, long, vine-clad arbor in his garden where his personal interviews with German and foreign students have exerted an influence felt in two hemispheres, "I could go twenty miles across the country and not once find what, to use an English word, is called an experimental Christian. I was very unpopular. I was subjected to annoyance, even in my lecture-room, on account of my evangelical belief." "His adversaries are bold and cunning. A baptism of fire awaits him at Halle," wrote Frederick Pérthes of the young Professor, in 1826.²

Contrast these murky threats of Tholuck's morning with the clear sky of his westering sun. In December, 1870, he had completed so much of a half century of work at the University of Halle that three days were given by his friends to the celebration of the event. There were social gatherings and suppers and speeches at the hotels. All the halls and staircases of Tholuck's residence were crowded with guests. The Emperor William sent to him the star of the red eagle. Court preacher Hoffmann brought to him the salutations of the ecclesiastical council as to a veritable church father of the nineteenth century. The various universities of Germany were represented by their ablest professors. Pastors of different cities sent delegations. A letter to Tholuck was received signed by theologians at that hour in the army before Paris. An immense torch-light procession of students filled a night with Luther's hymn :

"Ein feste Burg ist unser Gott."

¹ Tholuck, Letter to the New York Meeting of the Evangelical Alliance. Report, 1873.

² Perthes, *Memoirs*, Vol. ii. p. 268.

"No one can deny," Professor Tholuck would say to me repeatedly, "that since the death of Frederick the Great, or the French Revolution, or the opening of the century, or even since fifty or forty years ago, there has been a great reaction in Germany against infidelity and rationalism.

"You are right in pointing to the impotence of the edict issued in favor of orthodoxy by Frederick William II. on the death of Frederick the Great, as proof that it has not been the favorable attitude of the state towards orthodoxy that has caused the reaction. Frederick the Great had no influence to promote scepticism in the lower and middle, but he did mischief among the upper classes.

"Frederick William III. and Frederick William IV. were favorable to orthodoxy; and William I., our emperor, is thoroughly so. Much depends on the attitude of the court at Berlin in respect to the churches. In Weimar, however, a preacher without belief in the Deity of Christ, and with denial of miracles, may be connected with the state church. In respect to orthodoxy, Weimar is one of the most lax of all the provinces of Germany. It would probably not be true to say that in the small territory of Weimar, infidelity is less powerful than fifty years ago, although that is most certainly the case in Prussia.

"Hagenbach has written a History of the Rise, Progress, and Decline of German Rationalism, and his book I put first into the hands of foreign students coming to Germany and asking information from me. I am myself writing a work on the same subject.

"As to men of science and professors in the philosophical faculties with us, they are often uninformed concerning theology; but materialism makes much less noise in Germany than in England. If a man is a materialist, we Germans think he is not educated."

On account of their having little freedom to discuss political, German professors are intensely jealous of their liberty to discuss literary, scientific, philosophical, and theological topics. Whoever has breathed the quickening oxygen of the

atmosphere of a German university will understand very well that it is by no means the changed attitude of the state toward orthodoxy that has brought about the reaction against rationalism. Scepticism had its greatest power under Frederick William II. and Frederick William III., who opposed, as much as Frederick the Great had favored, rationalism. In Germany it is almost a proverb that the soul of a university is made up of *Lehr Freiheit* and *Lern Freiheit*.

"No," said Professor Dorner in his study at Berlin, when I mentioned Professor Tholuck's opinion of Weimar; "rationalism even in Weimar and Thuringia was quite as strong fifty years ago as it now is."

"That is nothing" (*Das ist nichts*), he remarked emphatically, and added no more, speaking of the rationalism of Renan.

"The writers who discuss materialism," he said, "are in Germany more anti-dogmatic than ethical. As to the rationalists themselves, we have more who agree with Channing than with Parker.

"The mass of our preachers are genuine believers, but among the populace one can sometimes find infidelity. The mass of our divines are convinced; but they are too contentious. In Prussia, unbelief is much weaker than fifty years ago, or in the time of Frederick the Great. Then rationalism was the loyal theology. Most certainly, most certainly, rationalism in Germany, taken as a whole, is plainly and by far weaker than fifty years ago."

"The proposal," says Professor Christlieb, "to implore the divine blessing and assistance on the deliberations of the Frankfort parliament in 1848 was received with shouts of derisive laughter." "For the last thirty years," he writes, "in spite of all hostilities, a truly Christian science has begun victoriously to lead the way, by new and deeper exegetical researches; by historical investigation; by pointing out the remarkable harmony existing between many new archeological, ethnological, and scientific discoveries. In the pulpits of by far the greater number of the German churches, and

in the theological faculties of most of the universities, it has so completely driven unbelief out of the field, that the latter has been compelled to retire, in a great measure, into the divinity schools of adjacent countries — Switzerland, France, Holland, Hungary. When compared with these and other countries, Germany shows that unbelief has a greater tendency to insinuate itself into, and to make its permanent abode among, half-educated, rather than thoroughly educated, communities.”¹

“So much is to be confessed,” says Court preacher Schwarz of Gotha, author of the acutest² of the histories of recent theology: “Schleiermacher’s work has been incomparably more enduring, and quietly and inwardly transforming, than Hegel’s. Schleiermacher’s influences yet advance, while those of Hegel are exhausted and dead.”³

“It is spring,” says Professor Kohn of Leipzig, in 1874. “The period since the wars of liberation represents the conflict of the newly quickened heat of the German mind with the masses of snow and ice of the *Aufklärung*. Until to-day the conflict endures; but ever mightier grows the sun, ever weaker the winter.”⁴

This testimony of German professors to the fact of the decline of scepticism in the German universities I might make voluminous; but it is enough to show the accord of confidential and colloquial with printed testimony, and the agreement of five such authorities as Tholuck, Dorner, Christlieb, Schwarz, and Kohn.

XV. SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE.

Both the Prussian Constitution and the fundamental

¹ Christlieb, Professor Theodore, *Modern Doubt and Christian Belief*, pp. 18, 63.

² Farrar, A. G., *Critical History of Free Thought*, Bampton Lectures, Preface, xxv.

³ Schwarz, Dr. Carl. *Oberhofprediger und Oberconsistorialrath zu Gotha, Zur Geschichte der neuesten Theologie*, Vierte Auflage, 25. Leipzig. 1869.

⁴ Kohn, Professor K. F. A., *Der innere Gang des deutschen Protestantismus*, Dritte Ausgabe. Zweiter Theil, 162. Leipzig. 1874. These four are the best recent works on German Rationalism.

statutes of the German Empire alike declare that the evangelical church shall be free to manage its own internal affairs. Schleiermacher himself, in 1803, drew up for the king a sketch of a church constitution which foreshadowed much that is now becoming law. The cabinet order of Frederick William III. gathered, in 1817, the Lutheran and Reformed churches into an evangelical union. The contest with Romanism has now obliged Prussia to give to that union as much independence of the state as Romanists enjoy. The eight provinces of the old Prussian kingdom, that is to say, nearly all the Protestants of North Germany, are being drawn together under one church constitution, of which the principle is essentially Presbyterian. The effects are likely to prove inauspicious to rationalism, which has steadily resisted the abolition of the bureaucratic management of the ecclesiastical and religious life of the nation.

Church and state in Germany are slowly separating; the bureaucratic tutelage and bondage of the church are becoming things of the past; a determined purpose is exhibited, on the part of both government and scholars, to call out a regulated religious activity among the masses of the people. As the German peasantry and middle class have never been taught to give money freely for religious organizations managed by themselves; as the rationalism outgrown in the universities has only too much power with the populace, especially in the large towns; as Sabbath-schools and prayer-meetings, and all the machinery of the voluntary system in church affairs, are in Germany conspicuous by their absence, the separation of church and state in the Empire will not occur without many most painful temporary disadvantages.¹

¹ "In many sections of Germany, especially the northern regions, where Lutheranism prevails, the congregations are almost as passive, dependent, and incapable of self-government as in the Roman Catholic church, and Luther's complaint of the want of material for elders and deacons must be repeated in this nineteenth century after Protestantism has been in operation for more than three hundred years. The people are only expected to be ruled, and hence they have no chance to learn individual and congregational self-government, which must be gradually acquired, like every other art." — Schaff, *Professor Philip, Germany, its Universities, Theology, and Religion*, pp. 112, 113.

The poorer clergy will starve for a time ; and there will be wide tracts of baptized torpor and unbaptized indifference and paganism in the religious life of the lower classes. Ultimately, however, when the dangers of allowing religious marshes to go undrained have become sufficiently evident and alarming, and the impotence of rationalism to drain malarious soil has received adequate illustration, German sagacity and honesty will cause the stagnant fens of German church life to wake with currents, which, it is to be hoped, will one day make of its green, sedgy, and pestilential pools a clear, flashing, and brimming river.

XVI. GERMAN PRIMACY IN EUROPE.

Immense commercial, political, and moral advantages accrue to Germany from her unity, sought in agony for two hundred years. Schiller did not hesitate to say that Europe was sufficiently compensated for the horrors of the Thirty Years' War by an increased sense of the interdependence and need of union among its nations.¹ At Sadowa, in 1866, at the close of the battle which gave to Central Europe Prussian and Protestant, instead of Austrian and Romish, leadership, and ended a struggle which Frederick the Great began, the sun came forth from under heavy clouds in the low west, and the united armies of North and South Germany, struck by the omen, gathered around their commander, and sang :

"Now all thank God!"

In that late hour the Reformation first became politically an assured success in the land of its birth. Sadowa is Germany's best hope of internal, Sedan her best hope of external, freedom from war.

But whenever Germany, beaten down almost constantly under the hoofs of military strife, has had time to catch

¹ "Aber Europa ging ununterdrückt und frei aus diesem fürchterlichen Krieg, in welchem es sich zum erstenmal als eine zusammenhängende Staatengesellschaft erkannt hatte ; und diese Theilnehmung der Staaten an einander, welche sich in diesem Krieg eigentlich erst bildete, wäre allein schon Gewinn genug, den Weltbürger mit seinem Schrecken zu versöhnen."—Schiller, Geschichte des dreissigjährigen Kriegs, Sämmtliche Werke, v. 2.

breath, she has shown a recuperative power that has astonished all Europe. In the thirty years after the battle of Waterloo, her soil was not once touched by war, or by the tread of foreign troops. Her historians assign to that period her first real recovery from the effects of the Thirty Years' War. In 1818, bold, wise, indefatigable Prussia abolished all duties upon goods in transit through its own territories. For commercial purposes Germany became a unit in 1828. Even under the imperfect league of the Zoll Verein her navy was the third in extent in the world. Agriculture grew prosperous. Capitals of princes were not the only cities distinguished for wealth and culture. At the mere dawn of that national unity and peace, of which the full sunrise was at Sedan, commerce in Germany awoke from the dead. The rapid growth of Cologne, Breslau, Magdeburg, Nuremberg, and Berlin amazed Vienna and wounded Paris. The overshadowing and swiftly increasing prosperity of Germany and her approaches to political unity drew upon her the attack of Napoleon III. Sedan opened to Victor Emmanuel, Rome ; to the angels Peace and Union, entrance on German soil ; to Napoleon, his grave ; to contagion from France, an antidote. At last Germany has military and political, as well as intellectual, primacy in Europe. Versailles leads her fashions no more. Voltaire is not asked to be her tutor.

On those very grounds of Sans-Souci, where Frederick the Great and Voltaire had called out to the culture of Europe, "Ecrasez l'infame !" King William and his queen lately entertained an Evangelical Alliance gathered from the Indus, the Nile, the Danube, the Rhine, the Thames, and the Mississippi.

XVII. BAUR, STRAUSS, AND RENAN.

But who does not know the history of the defeat of sceptical school after sceptical school on the rationalistic side of the field of exegetical research ? The naturalistic theory was swallowed by the mythical theory, and the mythical by the tendency theory, and the tendency by the

legendary theory, and each of the four by time. Strauss laughs at Paulus, Baur at Strauss, Renan at Baur, the hour-glass at all. "Under his guidance," says Strauss of Paulus, "we tumble into the mire; and assuredly dross, not gold, is the issue to which his method of interpretation generally leads."¹ "Up to the present day," says Baur of Strauss, "the mythical theory has been rejected by every man of education."² "Insufficient," says Renan of Baur, "is what he leaves existing of the Gospels to account for the faith of the apostles."³ He makes the Pauline and Petrine factions account for the religion, and the religion account for the Pauline and Petrine factions. "Criticism has run all to leaves," said Strauss, in his bitter disappointment at the failure of his final volume.⁴

Appropriately was there carried on Richter's coffin to his grave a manuscript of his last work — a discussion in proof of the immortality of the soul; appropriately might there have been carried on Strauss's coffin to his grave his last work, restating his mythical theory, if only that theory had not, as every scholar knows, died and been buried before its author.⁵

¹ Strauss, *New Life of Jesus*, (Eng. trans.), p. 18.

² Baur, *Krit. Untersuch. über die canonischen Evangel.*, 121, 40-71.

³ Renan, *Etude d'Hist. Rel.*, 168.

⁴ "Baur acknowledged the four leading Epistles of Paul to be genuine, and to have been written before A.D. 60. Now this admission is fatal to the sister theory of Strauss; for these Epistles prove that Jesus was not an ordinary man, around whose idolized memory his disciples, in the course of a century or so, wreathed mythical fictions, not knowing what they did; but that the culminating facts of his life, the leading traits of his character as given in our so-called mythical Gospels, were familiar to the Christian world within twenty-five years after his death." — Thayer, *Professor J. Henry, Boston Lectures*, p. 372. 1871.

⁵ Zeller, the admiring biographer of Strauss, says: "As a point of weakness in his last volume, 'The Old and New Faith,' he designated in one of his letters the beginning of the fourth section on morals. 'Here,' he writes, 'immediately after the appearance of the work, a couple of solid beams have still to be inserted, and if you could supply me with a few oak or even pine stems, you would deserve my sincere thanks.' The public discussions of the work were almost without exception disapproving. . . . Average theological liberalism pressed forward eagerly to renounce all compromising association with Strauss after he published this last statement of his mythical theory. He was deeply grieved,

XVIII. SUMMARY OF PROOFS.

Among the proofs, then, that scepticism in Germany is declining in power with those whose special study is theology, are the facts :

1. That in the German universities the rationalistic lecture-rooms are now empty, and the evangelical crowded ; while fifty or eighty years ago the rationalistic were crowded, and the evangelical empty.

2. That histories of the rise, progress, and decline of German rationalism have been appearing for the last fifteen years in the most learned portions of the literature of Germany.

3. That such teachers as Tholuck, Julius Müller, Dorner, Twisten, Ullmann, Lange, Rothe, and Tischendorf, most of whom began their professorships with great unpopularity in their universities, on account of their opposition to rationalistic views, are now particularly honored on that very account.

4. That every prominent German university, except Heidelberg, is now under predominant evangelical influences, and that Heidelberg is nearly empty of theological students.

5. That the attitude of the general government at Berlin has destroyed the force of many of the political causes of disaffection with the state church.

6. That the victory at Sedan and the achievement of German unity diminish the chances of demoralization from European wars, and by contagion from France.

7. That in the field of exegetical research, while rationalism has caused the discovery of many new facts, and the

and it required some days before he could regain his calm composure."—Zeller, Professor Eduard, of the Heidelberg University, *Strauss in his Life and Writings* (Eng. trans.), pp. 135, 141, 143. London, 1874. "The idea of men writing mythic histories between the time of Livy and Tacitus, and St. Paul mistaking such for realities !" — Bunsen, *Arnold's Life*, Letter cxlix. Strauss "bezeichnet nicht sowohl eine Epoche als eine Krise, nicht sowohl einen Anfangs-als einen Schlusspunkt. . . . Die Einseitigkeit des Strauss'schen Geistes, welche bei allem Glanz seiner Detail Kritik in den neuesten Werke besonders auffallend hervortritt, ist ein doppeltes Vacat, ein Mangel an geschichtlichem Blick und religiösem Sinn." — Schwarz, *Geschichte der neuesten Theologie*, 3, 557.

adoption of a new method, the naturalistic theory by Paulus, the mythical theory by Strauss, the tendency theory by Baur, and the legendary by Renan have been so antagonistic to each other as to be successively outgrown both by Christian and by rationalistic scholarship.

XIX. RESULTS OF SCIENTIFIC CRITICISM.

Beyond controversy are many great results of the theological discussions in Germany for the last hundred years; nor have the attacks of rationalism been an unmixed evil.

A doctrine of the intuitions, basis of all ethical and metaphysical research, has been established by Kant.

A doctrine of conscience, growing up from the Kantian theory of the intuitions, is acquiring a height of outlook, from which the far-sighted already descry the scientific inference of the necessity of an atonement.

A doctrine of sin, built on the doctrine of conscience, has been made by Julius Müller to unlock all theology.

A doctrine of the personality of God has been founded upon the Kantian analysis of the intuitions, and has already supplied the chief deficiencies of Kant's own system, besides undermining the pantheism of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel.

A system of criticism has grown up in relation to everything historical in Christianity; and exegetical research has been placed upon a thoroughly scientific basis.

A vindication of the historical evidence of the supernatural has followed from an application of the new system of criticism.

A series of discoveries has been made, illuminating at important points the records of the origin of Christianity, and carrying back the date of the chief documents a full half of a century, narrowing by so much the previously too narrow space used by the sceptical theory to account for the growth of myths and legends, and so shutting the colossal shears of chronology upon the latest deftly-woven web of historical doubt.¹

¹ "Twenty years ago it used to be thought that the earliest proof of the reception of New Testament writings as of similar authority to the Old was to be

A Life of Christ is now the most natural form in which belief, resting upon a system of criticism common to sacred and secular history, expresses and defends its credence.

XX. CHRISTIAN TREND OF THE CENTURIES.

Whoever ascertains the trend of the historic constellations through long periods, obtains a glimpse of the hem of the garment of Almighty God. What Providence does, it from the first intends. A sifting of Christianity has taken place in this last age by a prolonged contest of unbelief with faith, each armed with the best Damascus blades the world furnishes either to-day ; and the result has been a defeat of doubt on all central points. It is, therefore, now certain that it was divinely intended that there should be a sifting of Christianity in this last age, and that a defeat of doubt should be the result. Prolonged historic tendencies are God allowing portions of his plan for the government of the world to become humanly comprehensible.

When the completion of a cycle of events reveals what the plan of the cycle was from the first, it behooves men, co-ordinating latest with earliest cycles, to ascertain the trend of the movements in the sky ; and to gaze, more solemnly than upon the stars themselves, upon that Form loftier than the stars, which passes by in the darkness behind them, its out-found about the year 180 ; but recent discoveries furnish indubitable evidence that even the Gospels had acquired such a reception more than half a century earlier. . . . These discoveries, by carrying back for half a century the indubitable traces of the Gospels, prove such theories as those of Baur, Strauss, and Renan, to be pure theories, . . . not only unsupported by the facts of history, but in opposition to the facts of history. . . . As a sect in biblical criticism, the Tübingen school has perished. Its history, even, has been written, and that in more than one tongue." — Thayer, Professor J. Henry, *Criticism Confirmatory of the Gospels*. Boston Lectures, pp. 363, 364, 371. 1871. "Schenkel, Renan, Keim, Weizsäcker, and others equally removed from the traditional views, unite in insisting that the fourth Gospel could not have appeared later than a few years after the beginning of the second century. They found this opinion on irrefutable grounds. But if this be so, the key-stone falls from the arch. The course of development which the Tübingen critics describe, extending for a century from the death of Paul, and requiring this time for its accomplishment, is swept away. There is no room for it." — Fisher, Professor George P., *Essays on the Supernatural Origin of Christianity*, xxxviii. (new ed.), 1870.

lines not wholly visible; but the direction not unknown in which it is moving the constellations.

I commend this German theological battle-field to the timid and the hopeful who go out to walk and meditate in the world's eventide. Goethe could say that the only real, and the deepest, theme of the world's and of man's history, to which all other subjects are subordinate, is the conflict between faith and unbelief.¹ We are the ancients, as Bacon said. But the inscription written by history, which is God's finger and no accident, before the sad eyes of the bruised and staggering ages, on the trophy erected after the severest intellectual battle of this oldest and newest of the centuries, is : *Via Crucis, Via Lucis* !

I do not respect any proposition merely because it is ancient, or in the mouths of majorities. But I do respect propositions that have seen honest and protracted battle, but not defeat. The test of the soundness of scholarship is that it should contend with scholarship, not once or twice, but century after century, and come out crowned. But the intellectual supremacy of Christianity in the nineteenth century is not a novelty. There are other battle-fields worth visiting by those who walk and meditate, on which Christian trophies stand, more important, as marks of the world's agonies and advances, than any that ever Greek erected for victory at Salamis or Marathon. I lean on church history. I go to its battle-fields and lie down on them. They are places of spiritual rest. Gazing on their horizon, I see no narrow prospect, but a breadth of nineteen hundred victorious years. Looking into the sky, as I lie there, I hear sometimes the anthem : As it was in the beginning, is now, and ever shall be, world without end. I obtain glimpses of a heaven opened ; and behold a white horse, and he that sits on him is called the Word of God, King of kings, and Lord of lords. He is clothed in a vesture dipped in blood ; but his eyes are as a flame of fire, and on his head are many crowns.

¹ Goethe, Werke, Abhandlungen zum westöstlichen Divan.

ARTICLE IX.

DR. BURTON ON METAPHYSICS.¹

BY REV. ENOCH POND, D.D., BANGOR, ME.

MOST of the authorities speak of Dr. Burton as having been born at Preston, Conn. He was born at Stonington, in 1752; but at the age of two years removed, with his parents, to Preston, where he lived for the next ten or twelve years. He graduated at Dartmouth College in 1777, — only eight years after the founding of that institution. As the war of the Revolution was then in progress, much alarm was felt in college in expectation of an attack from hostile Tories and Indians. Young Burton often spent his nights on guard; and when he graduated, the usual exercises were dispensed with, on account of the peculiar state of the country. It was during his college life that he became a subject of renewing grace, although he did not become satisfied on this point for several months. After he had graduated, he spent some considerable time at college reading and studying with a view to the ministry; when, with very little ceremony, he was licensed to preach by the Grafton Presbytery. In 1778 he received a call to settle with the church in Thetford, and was ordained the following year.

His field of labor was, at the time, very unpromising; but this was a recommendation of it, rather than otherwise, to Mr. Burton. He resolved to enter it, and to keep on laboring until he should see a brighter day. And here he continued to labor till the end of life. He witnessed several revivals of religion, one of them of years' continuance, and of great power, which entirely changed the aspect of things about him, and transformed the desert into a fruitful field.

For thirty years together Dr. Burton had theological students under his care, in which time he must have assisted not less than sixty in their preparation for the gospel ministry. In general these were able and faithful men, a few of whom still remain; but the most have followed their beloved teacher to a better world. He continued sole pastor of the church in Thetford, until he had passed his threescore years and ten, and died, in 1836, at the age of eighty-four.

Dr. Burton was an instructive, though not an eloquent, preacher. His

¹ Essays on some of the First Principles of Metaphysics, Ethics, and Theology. By Asa Burton, D.D., Pastor of the Church of Christ in Thetford, Vt. Portland. 1824.

sermons were so neatly written and so full of thought, that upon the intelligent and reflecting hearer they could hardly fail of producing an effect. The late Dr. Channing of Boston, after hearing him on some public occasion, remarked: "With all his metaphysics, he is anything but a dry preacher."

With regard to the character of his mind, we quote the following from one of his pupils: "Dr Burton was a man of uncommon intellectual powers. He had a clear, penetrating, comprehensive mind. By severe discipline he had so schooled his understanding that he was capable of taking the most profound and discriminating views of any subject that occupied his attention. Though his library was small, and his reading not extensive, he was familiar with the best writers on metaphysical science. He was not accustomed to stop in the investigation of a subject until he supposed he had reached the legitimate boundary of human knowledge. As an instance of this great perseverance he used to say: "I have spent more than three months of intense study upon the three words *free, moral, agency.*"

In the year 1824 Dr. Burton published the volume of Essays now before us. It was written some twenty years previous to this time, probably for the use of his theological students. The style is unadorned, but perspicuous and direct, and it displays throughout a Christian spirit. Its principal object was, without doubt, to vindicate what from him has been called "the Taste Scheme," in opposition to "the Exercise Scheme" of Dr. Emmons.

The work before us is, in the main, original. The author tells us that he first "read with attention the most distinguished authors he could find on the subject of pneumatology, expecting by studying them to digest a true system. But, instead of finding increased light, his mind was more darkened and perplexed than before. Failing of success in this way, he determined to lay aside authors, and make an attempt, by the exertion of his own powers, to arrange his thoughts systematically on the principles and operations of the human mind. In this way he has succeeded, in some good measure, to his own satisfaction."

In entering as a minister upon his theological inquiries, Dr. Burton soon discovered that he could make no satisfactory progress without first settling some of the great principles of mental science. And every student of theology finds the same. For some of the main points of Christian theology are so intimately connected with the human mind, that the former cannot be well understood without a knowledge of the latter. The subjects, for example, of moral agency, regeneration, the Christian virtues, are subjects pertaining to the mind, and cannot be understood without a right understanding of the mind itself. Indeed, both the salvation of the gospel and the destruction from which it delivers are subjects which require an accurate knowledge of the mind. This is the view which Dr.

Burton took, and accordingly the first half of his Essay is purely psychological, rather than distinctively theological.

Dr. Burton commences with insisting that the human mind has a substantial existence, and has different faculties, in opposition to those who regard it as but a succession of ideas and exercises. The reference here is, without doubt, to Dr. Emmons; although the author does not name him. On this point Dr. Emmons has been misunderstood. He nowhere affirms that the mind is a mere succession of ideas and exercises, but only that these are all of which we are conscious. Anything beyond these is a matter not of personal consciousness, but of inference, and Dr. Burton says the same: "We know not what the essence of mind or spirit is. We are acquainted with its operations, and the effects they produce; and this comprises all our knowledge, at present, of spiritual existence" (p. 20).

Dr. Burton differs from most of the older metaphysicians, in considering the human mind under three great departments or faculties,—the understanding, the sensibilities (which he calls taste), and the will. If we were to make any criticism on this division, it would be to prefix another department of mind, the sensational, making four in all. Our sensations are the impressions made upon our minds, through the external organs of sense. In these, we are entirely passive. When the external organ is in a healthy state, and is approached through its appropriate medium, sensation will be produced, whether we will or not.

Sensation has sometimes been confounded, though improperly, with external perception. It is through our sensations, or by means of them, that the intellect perceives external things. Sensation is directly connected with external perception, though distinct from it.

Our sensations have also been confounded with our emotions or feelings; but this cannot be true. Our sensations and consequent perceptions often excite emotion—strong emotion; but the sensation itself is not emotion. What can be more different than the sensation of sight, and the feelings awakened by what we see; or than the sensation of hearing, and the feelings excited within us by what we hear?

But we need not dwell on this particular. That the old division of the human faculties into understanding and will is defective, and has been a source of mistake and error to all who have adopted it, is indubitable. That there is a wide region of feeling between the understanding and will, which cannot be classed with either, is certain; and Dr. Burton is to be commended for making it prominent.

The statements of Dr. Burton with regard to the intellectual department of mind are generally sound. He rejects the idealism of Berkeley and the transcendentalists: "A material world does exist, distinct from the mind; and all objects of which we obtain a knowledge through our bodily senses are real existences. It is objects, as they exist, which we see; and not images or representations of them" (p. 22).

Dr. Burton regards memory and imagination and judgment and reason, as not distinct faculties of mind, but as belonging to the understanding. He regards conscience, too, as belonging to the understanding; it being no more than a judgment as to the moral quality of actions. This may be accepted, in part, as a just view of conscience; but it does not comprehend it all. Conscience, in the full sense of the term, denotes a complex mental operation, involving not the understanding only, but the sensibilities. It is not only a judgment as to the moral quality of actions, but a *feeling* in view of them — a feeling of approbation or disapprobation, according as they are perceived to be right or wrong.

In speaking of conscience we sometimes refer to one part of it and sometimes to the other. The phrases "*enlightened* conscience," and "*mis-guided* conscience," have reference to it as intellectual; while the expressions, "*a seared* conscience" and "*a tender* conscience" refer to the sensibilities.

We sometimes see the different parts of conscience existing in different degrees of perfection. We see a conscience that is enlightened, but not tender; or a conscience that is tender and quick to feel, but not greatly enlightened.

These different parts of conscience require, also, very different kinds of cultivation. The intellectual conscience, like everything else pertaining to the intellect, requires to be instructed and informed. The sentient conscience requires to be cherished, yielded to, and habitually obeyed.

Dr. Burton strangely errs in the matter of conscience, by saying that it "respects our own character and conduct, and not that of others" (p. 39). This surely cannot be true. We judge of the right and the wrong of others' actions as well as of our own, and often feel as keenly in view of them. We do not, indeed, feel the sting of remorse in view of the guilty acts of others, but we may feel strong disapprobation and sorrow. Every parent knows this when compelled to witness the guilty conduct of a child, or of others whom he loves.

The department of feeling, or the sensibilities, Dr. Burton properly places between the understanding and will, and insists that there is no approach of influence from the former to the latter, but through this region. He would say, with Professor Upham: "Strike out the sensibilities, and you excavate a gulf of separation between the intellect and will, which is forever impassable."

This faculty of feeling Dr. Burton unfortunately calls *taste*; and its operations — even those of a highly spiritual nature — are denominated *appetites*. They are placed in the same category with our bodily appetites, such as hunger and thirst. This faculty he also calls *the heart*, and makes it the seat of all moral good and evil in the man. It is not only an active principle, but "the most active principle in existence, and the primary cause, in moral agents, of all the effects ever produced in the

universe." He further says that "the faculty of taste is the most important property of the mind. It is the seat of all our pleasures and pains; contains all the principles of action that govern men; it is the foundation of vice and virtue; and, according to its nature, such is the moral character of men, and of all intelligent beings. According to its nature, when we bid farewell to life, such will be our endless state beyond the grave." — pp. 234, 253.

In order to make good these representations, Dr. Burton is under the necessity of ascribing to this faculty of taste two distinct classes of mental operations — classes belonging to different departments of the mind, viz. the *sensibilities* and *will*. It is the seat not only of feeling, but of our *desires* and *wishes*. He is the more excusable in this mistake, because our English word "desire" is really an ambiguous one, sometimes denoting mere feelings, but more frequently a large class of internal, voluntary exercises. Thus the appetites and natural affections, which belong exclusively to the sensibilities, are not unfrequently called desires. So, also, are our universal, instinctive desires, as the desire of knowledge and the desire of happiness. But that in the larger part of those exercises which are commonly called *desires* or *wishes* we are voluntary, there can be no doubt. The thief deems it possible to obtain a sum of money by stealth; he earnestly desires to obtain it; he resolves that, if possible, he will obtain it; and he enters on a course of measures accordingly. Now, it would be difficult to show that the thief was not as voluntary and as criminal in his desires as in his subsequent resolutions and endeavors. Indeed, may not the foundation of all his guilt be traced to the indulgence of these guilty desires? David Brainerd deemed it possible, by much sacrifice and toil, to bring the American Indians, or a portion of them, to a knowledge of the truth. He earnestly desired the accomplishment of this object; he resolved that he would attempt its accomplishment; he formed his plans, and entered on a course of measures accordingly. Now, was there nothing morally excellent and holy in these benevolent desires of Brainerd? And was he not as voluntary in them as in those resolves and efforts by means of which his desires were accomplished?

Our desires, in the sense in which we here use the term, are, in reality, *choices*, *preferences*, and differ from our simple choices chiefly in respect to their objects. Their objects are not immediately attainable. If they were so, the desires would become simple volitions, fastening upon the chosen objects, and securing them at once. But, as these objects are not immediately attainable, what would otherwise be volitions assume the form of abiding wishes or desires to secure the objects in question as soon as practicable.

The error here detected in Dr. Burton's classification is a very important one, and goes far towards upsetting all that is peculiar in his theory of moral action. Mere feelings are not action, but are powerful motives to

action, constituting the entire class of internal, sentient motives, through which alone external, objective motives can reach and influence the will.

Dr. Burton seems to have suspected that he had included more under his faculty of taste or feeling than properly belonged to it; since he calls it a "compound faculty," and says that "an affection or passion is a compound of either painful or agreeable sensations, with desires to avoid the painful, or obtain the agreeable, object" (pp. 222, 234).

In this passage, and some others, Dr. Burton comes near to acknowledging — what his theory would not allow him to acknowledge — the existence of complex mental affections, made up of the sentient and the voluntary. That several of our religious affections are of this nature, there can be no doubt. Thus, repentance is a complex affection, made up of sorrow for sin, which is chiefly sentient, with a turning from sin, which is voluntary. Paul says that "godly sorrow worketh repentance unto salvation." Of course, it does not constitute the whole of it. Faith, too, is a complex mental affection, involving an intellectual assent to the doctrine of Christ, and a voluntary committing of the soul to his hands. Indeed, many of those affections which are enjoined upon us in the scriptures are complex. "Rejoice with them that do rejoice, and weep with them that weep." The affections here enjoined are chiefly sentient; and yet they are so far under the direction of the will as to render them proper subjects of command. Without a knowledge of these complex affections, it is impossible to understand or to vindicate many of the commands of scripture.

Dr. Burton describes the will as a distinct faculty, whose office-work it is to put forth volitions — to choose and refuse. The will, he says, is moved, not as material bodies are, by physical force, but by motives. And he correctly divides motives into two general classes — the external and internal. "External motives include all objects which either please or disgust us. Every object which pleases us excites to those actions which are necessary to obtain the agreeable object; while those objects which displease excite to those actions which are necessary to avoid them." By internal motives he understands the feelings — "everything in the heart or taste which stimulates to action" (pp. 139, 140). As before remarked, he holds that these two classes of motives must operate conjointly, in order to move or influence the will. He also holds that the will is always as the strongest motive, or as that which appears the strongest or is most pleasing at the time. To do as one pleases is to yield to the strongest motive; and this is liberty — all the liberty which a rational being can desire.

But although, on these points, we might be willing to accept what Dr. Burton teaches respecting the will, on others we feel constrained to differ. He says there is but one class of voluntary exercises, and these are simple, executive volitions — those which stand connected with overt action. "They do not admit of any subdivision, or of being resolved into specific classes" (p. 92).

If we believed this, we should say, with our author, that the exercises of the will, instead of being the seat and source of moral character, have in themselves no moral character. For, certainly, we do not attribute a moral character to mere external executive volitions, considered as distinct from the desires, the purposes, the intents out of which they grow, more than we do to the muscles which are moved by them, or to the instruments which our hands employ.

But what are we to think of the position that these executive volitions are the only exercises of the will — that there is nothing of a voluntary nature beneath them, by which they are prompted, and which they go to execute? Here are our resolutions, our purposes, our plans of life, all formed under the influence of motives, and as truly voluntary as our simple choices. Here, too, are our intents, our preferences, our desires and wishes — all of them exercises of the will. It is these internal exercises, the most of them purely voluntary, and into all of which the voluntary element enters more or less, which are the subjects of divine command or prohibition; which go to constitute our moral characters; which render us holy or sinful, praiseworthy or blameworthy in the sight of God. They are not, like our simple volitions, evanescent and transitory, but remain, in most instances, long upon the mind, sometimes life-long, and impress upon it a permanent character, either good or bad.

It is affirmed by Dr. Burton, and by many others, that these internal affections are not exercises of will, because they cannot be produced by an exercise of will. "A person, by willing, can no more produce love to God in his heart, than he can produce a world by willing it. If any one is not convinced of this truth, let him make the experiment" (p. 90). We admit that no person can produce love to God in his heart, simply by willing it; and no more can he produce, in this way, any other voluntary exercise, not even a simple, executive volition. This is not the way in which voluntary exercises are produced. They are exercises of the will, and not the creations of such exercises. They are excited, put forth, under the influence of motives, and not caused, produced, one by another.

I have before said that Dr. Burton makes moral freedom, or liberty, to consist in choosing and acting as we please; or (which is the same) in acting from what is, at the time, the strongest motive. And we should have no objection to this, did he not couple with it another idea, viz. that when we thus act we have no natural ability to act otherwise. He denies the distinction between natural and moral ability, and holds that men have no ability of any kind to act differently from what they do (p. 182). But we ask, does not this contradict the common sense, the common apprehensions of all men? Does it not conflict with the very idea of freedom? Do we not all know that we *can* act differently from what we do, and that, in thousands of instances, we ought to act differently? It is not enough to say that we can do differently, *if we will*; in the sense of natural

ability, we can do differently *if we do not will*. And in every case of sin we ought to act differently, whether we will or no. Thus much, it seems to us, enters into the very idea of freedom.

We believe, indeed, with Dr. Burton, that men always do act from what is to them, at the time, the strongest motive; that it was certain to the mind of God, from all eternity, that they would so act; and that this certainly constitutes a moral necessity, which is not at all inconsistent with human freedom, but the rather implies it. On this ground we hold, as he does, that the doctrine of predestination, unconditional election, and the perseverance of saints, are all of them consistent with the free-agency of man. Still, this representation conflicts not at all with the idea of a natural ability, which consists solely in possessing the requisite faculties and opportunity, to act differently from what we do.

With Dr. Burton's theory of morals we are even more dissatisfied than with his philosophy of the human mind. He teaches that "happiness is the only absolute good, and that the greatest sum of happiness is the highest possible good" (p. 147). "Holiness is not an absolute but a relative good. Indeed, without happiness, why not as well be without holiness, as to have it? Of what value is a universe, however holy, if there be no happiness?" (p. 149). "Why do we consider holiness, with all its operations and exercises, to be a good? Because they promote happiness. This is their motive and tendency" (p. 152).

Holding these views, Dr. Burton cannot admit that the difference between right and wrong lies in the eternal nature, fitness, and relations of things; but only in their tendencies to produce happiness or misery. Nor can he admit that there is any standard of right and wrong, out of the mere will of God, to which he is under obligations, as a moral agent, to conform his will. And all this he expressly concedes (p. 361).

We have no time to discuss these positions here. We consider them as not only false and absurd, but as striking at the foundation of morals and religion. Of course, the venerable author did not so think or intend; but we can come to no other conclusion. All the commands of God require us to be holy; thus showing that holiness is the supreme and ultimate good; and when Moses besought the Lord to show him his glory, he said, "I will make all my *goodness* to pass before thee" (Ex. xxxiii. 19). That holiness tends to promote happiness, there can be no doubt; but does not this prove that there must be something excellent in the very nature of holiness, to give it such a tendency? And the kindred position, that there is no independent standard of right in the very nature and relations of the Supreme Being, to which his holy character is conformed, goes to annihilate his moral character.

The mistakes of Dr. Burton on these vital topics led to others equally strange and unaccountable; such as that "liberty is not necessary to virtue and vice"; and that "natural and moral evil are in nature the same" (pp. 131, 154).

Dr. Burton has an "Essay on Regeneration." In this he uses the words "heart" and "taste" to denote both the faculty of feeling, and the *appetencies* and *motions* of this faculty. But in whichever sense the words are used, they denote the seat of the change in regeneration, — a change in which the subject of it has no voluntary concern.

In the conclusion of this Essay, which seems to have been originally a sermon, the author calls upon his impenitent readers or hearers to consider "how inconceivably stupid, blind, and mad they are. You travel the road to hell with pleasure, and are every day treasuring up wrath against the day of wrath. To excuse and justify yourselves, you often say that you cannot help it. Yet nothing but attention is wanting in order for you to see your vileness, your danger, your just desert of death, and your dependence on sovereign mercy; and if you saw all this, could you live a secure and quiet life? Would not your dependence increase your fears, and cause you to cry aloud for mercy? Look, then, and learn, that you are deaf, blind, naked, dead, and lost, and are dependent on Christ for help. Then will you begin to beg and cry for mercy. And till you do thus see your ruined state and your dependence on unmerited grace, and do come and cry for mercy, there is no hope for you" (p. 349). Here is no direction like those of the sacred writers, "Repent and be converted, that your sins may be blotted out"; "Make you a new heart and a new spirit"; "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and ye shall be saved." But "come to a knowledge of your situation; feel your dependence, and cry to God for help." And as the object of the prayer is to obtain a new heart, it must, of course, proceed from the old heart of sin. And to the cry of such a heart where in the Bible is the promise of deliverance made?

The great error of Dr. Burton's system, so far as this matter of preaching to the impenitent is concerned, lies in his unfortunate classification of our mental exercises and affections. He is right in supposing that there is in the human mind a department or faculty of feeling,—a faculty of great importance, and quite indispensable to moral agency. But he errs in ascribing to this faculty whole classes of affections which are not feelings, — desires, aversions, aspirations, preferences, which belong, obviously, to the will. Indeed, he ascribes to it all the different classes of internal voluntary exercises, — our resolutions, purposes, wishes, intents, — leaving to the will proper only the putting forth of simple, executive volitions.

He seems to be sensible, at times, that he is putting too much upon the faculty of feeling—that he is ascribing to it exercises which have no place there. Hence he calls it, as we have seen, a "compound faculty," and an "active faculty," and speaks of its feelings as prompting desires. Still, he cannot give over its active exercises to the will, where they properly belong, and hence can, with no logical consistency, call upon the unrenewed sinner to love, repent, and obey the gospel.

After all, the advocates of the Taste and Exercise Schemes are probably nearer to each other, on this point, than they think they are. They differ chiefly in classification and names. The new relish or the taste in man is but a new love—an internal exercise of the will—which the Bible calls upon the sinner not to produce by a previous executive volition, but actively to put forth, under the influence of motives, and thus come at once into the embrace of the gospel.

ARTICLE X.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

Want of space compels us to defer two lengthened communications on the Life and Writings of Professors Tischendorf and Ewald; also several Notices of German and English publications.

UHELMANN'S SYRIAC GRAMMAR. Translated from the German, by Enoch Hutchinson. With a Course of Exercises in Syriac Grammar, a Chrestomathy, and brief Lexicon, prepared by the Translator. Second Edition, with additions and corrections. 8vo. pp. 459. New York: D. Appleton and Co. 1875.

The first German edition of this Grammar was published in 1829; the first American edition in 1855. It has been adopted as a text-book in several of the highest institutions of learning in this country and in Great Britain. It is the *standard* Grammar of the Syriac language. It is translated with great care and skill. The first edition richly merited the encomiums which it received (see *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Vol. xii. p. 383); the second edition has still higher claims to our praise.

VOICES OF THE PROPHETS. Twelve Lectures Preached in the Chapel of Lincoln's Inn in the Years 1870–1874, on the Foundation of Bishop Warburton. By Edwin Hamilton Gifford, D.D., formerly Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge, and Head Master of King Edward's School, Birmingham; Rector of Walgrave, Honorary Canon of Worcester, Examining Chaplain to the Bishop of London. 12mo. pp. 264. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 1874. Special edition imported for use in this country by Scribner, Welford, and Armstrong. \$2.50.

Dr. Gifford rightly considers the biblical prophecies as miraculous. He defends the doctrine that miracles are possible, and that they have occurred, and that they can be proved. The old objection to the possibility of proving miracles is, "that testimony can reach only to external facts, not to a supernatural cause; and that of such external facts as are alleged in

the case of miracles none but an accomplished physical philosopher is a competent judge." The reply of Dr. Gifford is a very sensible one. He takes the case of a resurrection from death to life. First, we can prove the reality of the death. Strauss, in his *Leben Jesu*, says, with derisive scorn, that we need not trouble ourselves to prove that Jesus was dead; our only trouble is to prove that Jesus rose again. Secondly, we can prove that the person who was dead has returned to life. Lazarus as a living man was seen by his friends and enemies after he had been seen as a dead man. They knew that he as living, was the same man whom they had seen as dead. He, himself, was conscious of his own personal identity. If he rose from the dead, he must have risen by a miraculous power. The philosopher and the sceptic ought to be the last to question this fact. "To *them*, surely, it is a natural law that the dead rise not. All the boasted certainty that the widest experience, the most careful experiment, and the surest induction can give to any physical law, belongs most fully to this; and if in any case it can be proved by certain evidence of the senses that this natural law is overruled, it is no assumption, but a necessary inference of reason, that the cause is supernatural" (pp. 38, 39). This is a specimen of Dr. Gifford's style of reasoning. It is the logic of common sense. We commend his volume to all lovers of revealed truth.

A DICTIONARY OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE, for Popular and Professional Use; comprising full Information on Biblical, Theological, and Ecclesiastical Subjects; with several hundred Maps and Illustrations. Edited by Rev. Lyman Abbott, assisted by Rev. T. J. Conant, D.D. 8vo. pp. 1074. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1875.

This volume is well printed and well edited. The style in which it is written is eminently perspicuous, neat, and chaste. It is delightful to read a theological work which is so transparent, and often elegant, in its diction.

HEBREW HISTORY, from the Death of Moses to the Close of the Scripture Narrative. By Rev. Henry Cowles, D.D. 12mo. pp. 418. New York: D. Appleton and Co. 1875.

Dr. Cowles is anything but a timid champion of the scriptures. He has no doubt of their divine origin or of the reality of miracles; and has no hesitation at all in avowing and defending his belief. He treats sceptics fairly and candidly, but makes no unwise concessions. This history is every way a valuable one for its purpose. The author, beyond doubt a man of learning, makes no parade of erudition. He gives us results instead of processes of thought. The work is very much compressed, more so at times than we could wish. It is vigorously and lucidly written, but with no claims to elegance of style. It cannot fail to do good.

SYNOPTICAL LECTURES ON THE BOOKS OF HOLY SCRIPTURE. Second Series: Isaiah—Acts. By Rev. Donald Fraser, D.D. 12mo. pp. 307. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers.

The object of these Lectures is to survey each book of the Bible so as to give an idea of its general scope and contents. They are not by any means exclusively homiletical. They discuss various questions of interest in regard to the books treated of; such, for instance, as the authorship of certain portions of Isaiah. While they do not aim to satisfy the wants of the professedly biblical scholar, they perform a work perhaps not less important in many respects, that of giving to the general reader a better insight into the scriptures. In this point of view, they may be very confidently and warmly recommended to the attention of the reading public.

THE MEMORIAL HOUR; or, The Lord's Supper, in its Relation to Doctrine and Life. By Jeremiah Chaplin, D.D., author of "The Evening of Life," etc. 12mo. pp. 283. Boston: D. Lothrop and Co.; Dover: G. T. Day and Co. 1874.

This is a very useful book; one of a class of which we can hardly have too many. We see in it no traces of a denominational spirit. We are pleased that it insists so earnestly on the necessity of belief in a historical Christ, and in certain supernatural facts in order to the perpetuity of Christianity, and of any theory, indeed, deserving the name of religion.

CHRIST AND OTHER MASTERS: an Historical Inquiry into some of the Chief Parallelisms and Contrasts between Christianity and the Religious Systems of the Ancient World. With Special Reference to Prevailing Difficulties and Objections. By Charles Hardwick, M.A., Late Archdeacon of Ely, and Christian Advocate in the University of Cambridge. Third Edition, edited by Francis Procter, Vicar of Witton, Norfolk, formerly Fellow of St. Catherine's College, Cambridge. 12mo. pp. 573. London: Macmillan and Co. 1874.

Mr. Hardwick, the author of this work, died in 1859 at the early age of thirty-eight. During his brief life he published a large number of important works; most of them on subjects related more or less directly to the history of religion. The object of the work, whose title is given above, is to furnish an account of various systems of religion which have at different times prevailed in the world, such as Brahmanism and Buddhism, the religions of Persia and Egypt and America; with the particular purpose in view of detecting any correspondences to Christianity which may be found in them. This object is a very important one, and the work cannot be read otherwise than with profit; especially if the reader does not forget that we must wait probably many years before an entirely adequate answer to the question of the connection between Christianity

and other forms of religion can be furnished. The reader, we judge, must accept with caution the conclusions to which he is conducted by this work, as well as all others on the same topic ; for these relate to a field of thought which as yet has been but imperfectly surveyed. Mr. Hardwick is a hearty adherent of the Christian faith, and writes altogether in the interest of Christianity. The work affords decisive proof of thorough scholarship. We take notice that it is spoken of by Max Müller, in the " Chips from a German Workshop, " in terms of high but discriminating commendation.

THE WORKS OF WILLIAM E. CHANNING, D.D., with an Introduction. New and complete edition, Rearranged. 8vo. pp. 924. Boston : American Unitarian Association. 1875.

No intelligent reader requires a commendatory notice of the works of Dr. Channing. We are glad to see this quite full edition of them. One cannot but mourn that the author seems to have been hindered from cordially accepting the distinctive doctrines of the evangelical system, less by anything positively repulsive in these doctrines themselves, than by the erroneous notions which have so often obscured their real character. What Dr. Channing calls the moral argument against Calvinism is an argument against a distorted, rather than a real, Calvinism.

SINGERS AND SONGS OF THE LIBERAL FAITH ; being Selections of Hymns and other Sacred Poems of the Liberal Church in America, with Biographical Sketches of the Writers, and with Historical and Illustrative Notes. By Alfred P. Putnam. 8vo. pp. 556. Boston : Roberts Brothers. 1875.

This volume contains many graceful and beautiful hymns. The biographical sketches are very interesting. It is impossible that a volume should be destitute of high merit which contains poems from such men as John Quincy Adams, John Pierpont, Andrews Norton, Henry Ware, Jr., William Cullen Bryant, F. H. Hedge, H. W. Longfellow, E. H. Sears, Thomas Hill, T. W. Higginson, and others, several of whom enjoy a higher poetic fame than some whom we have just mentioned.

SERMONS AND SONGS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE. By Edward H. Sears, author of " The Heart of Christ, " " Regeneration, " and " Foregleams of Immortality. " 12mo. pp. 334. Boston : Noyes, Holmes, and Co. ; Philadelphia : Claxton, Remsen, and Haffelfinger. 1875.

We have read these sermons with no little gratification. They are well written, and bring out many views which have the merit of freshness, and are at the same time edifying. The author's knowledge of the biblical system is, in our view, defective ; yet there is nothing in the sermons positively offensive to the evangelical believer. The poetry interspersed through the work is often very beautiful.

THE EARTH AS MODIFIED BY HUMAN ACTION. A new edition of *Man and Nature*. By George P. Marsh. 8vo. pp. 644. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Co. 1874.

This is a second edition of a work, under the title *Man and Nature*, published in 1863. It is designed to give an account of the various changes which the surface of the earth has undergone through the agency of men. It is not, by any means, written exclusively for professedly scientific readers, but is adapted to the average intellect. The practical reader will find in it much that is instructive, and no one can fail to be entertained by it.

ON SELF-CULTURE, INTELLECTUAL, PHYSICAL, AND MORAL. A *Vade Mecum* for Young Men and Students. By John Stuart Blackie, Professor of Greek in the University of Edinburgh. 18mo. pp. 116. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Co. 1874.

It is seldom that a more valuable book for its purpose falls into our hands than this. Under the three heads of intellectual, physical, and moral culture, it gives counsel to young men and students such as no one can neglect with other than the worst consequences. We most earnestly desire that this book may be most carefully studied by all those to whose benefit it is particularly devoted, and its wise directions be carefully followed.

THE STRAITS OF MALACCA, INDO-CHINA, AND CHINA ; or, Ten Years Travels, Adventures, and Residence Abroad. By J. Thomson, F.R.G.S., author of *Illustrations of China and its People*. Illustrated with upward of sixty wood engravings by J. D. Cooper, from the author's own sketches and photographs. 8vo. pp. 537. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1875.

This is a valuable book. The countries which the writer went over are every year becoming more and more accessible to other nations ; and with China especially the connection of our own country is likely to become increasingly intimate. It is quite evident that the policy of exclusion which the Chinese have maintained so long, will, before many years, have to be abandoned ; and on this account a book, which, like the one before us aims to give trustworthy accounts of the state of things in China, is very welcome. Of more than ordinary interest is that part of the volume which relates to Cambodia and the island of Formosa, and especially the account of the ruins of ancient temples and traces of ancient civilization in the former region.

REMAINS OF LOST EMPIRES: Sketches of the Ruins of Palmyra, Nineveh, Babylon, and Persepolis, with some Notes on India and the Cashmerian Himalayas. By P. V. N. Myers, A.M., Associate Author with H. M. Myers, of "*Life and Nature under the Tropics*." Illustrated. 8vo. pp. 531. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1875.

In a volume no larger than this it could hardly be expected that the

sketches given of the ruins of so many cities would even approach completeness. The sketches are, no doubt, correct, but superficial. They are such as might, without any very great difficulty—though we have not the slightest idea that such was the case—have been prepared had not the writer personally visited the scenes which he describes. The reader misses not a little the maps and plans with which such a work ought always to be accompanied. The work gives plain marks of careless composition by ill-chosen words and clumsy sentences, which there is, indeed, no merit in avoiding, but much that is worthy of blame in allowing to exist. We have discovered some inaccuracies which certainly ought to have been avoided. “Lebanon and *Anti-Lebanon*” are nowhere spoken of in the Bible. The relation of Babylonia to Jerusalem is not well stated. The purpose of the book is good, and it deserves to be read. The account given of the far-famed Vale of Cashmere is particularly entertaining.

JOURNAL OF SOCIAL SCIENCE. No. VII. Published for the American Social Science Association. pp. 221. New York: Hurd and Houghton.

Social Science is, we suppose, that body of knowledge which shows men in what ways they can live together so as mutually to promote their best well-being. This appears to cover three main departments. First, the creation and the nurture of an intention to live together in such ways. Second, education in correct principles, and the formation of correct general plans. Third, the simplest and surest methods, in detail, for carrying out such plans.

Of these departments the first has seemed often to be wholly forgotten, by those prominent in the movement. It has been tacitly assumed that the intention exists; and that we have only to enlighten it, in order to secure the best social order. Whereas, if we do not mistake, it is precisely here that the main difficulty meets us. People are not sufficiently interested in mutual efforts for the well-being of each and of all, to use the knowledge they have, to see what is before their eyes, or to act upon even the most pathetic appeals to other senses. Does any one suppose that our people do not know how to abate nuisances, do not understand that it is not wholesome to live in a swamp, that it is a bad plan to have male and female convicts under the roof of the same prison, or to put young boys into the same “Reform” school with those older boys whose criminal propensities are in the very spring-time and rankness of their growth? And surely it is not want of knowledge that farmers, when working out a highway tax, shovel soil instead of gravel into the ruts.

The truth is, that the establishment of a right intent as a personal habit of mind throughout the body of the people, lies at the very basis of the great system of reforms at which “Social Science” aims, and for a great many of these reforms the generous and Christian intention is all that is wanting. This important point we desire to commend to the con-

sideration of all those interested in the highest well-being of their kind. In what manner are we to inspire ourselves and our fellow citizens with the one, all-inclusive, and ever-noblest purpose?

The copy of the "Journal" before us embraces a paper by Dr. Woolsey on "The Exemption of Private Property upon Sea from Capture"; an account of the "Conference of Boards of Public Health," at New York, in 1874; "Sanitary Papers," read at the general Meeting; "The Social Science Record"; "Prison Reform in Europe and America"; "The work of the American Association"; and "Reports of Committees." These papers embrace most valuable and stimulating suggestions, and are well worthy the consideration of all thoughtful men and women.

Among the many topics of present value, and which invite to immediate action, we would call attention to that presented by Dr. J. Foster Jenkins, in a paper of remarkable interest upon "Tent Hospitals." It would really seem, that if we wish our sick friends to recover, whether from fevers or from hurts, we should nurse them in tents, winter and summer alike. "The experience of the British forces in India, that contributed by the recent war of the American Rebellion, and by the campaign of the French, German, and Italian armies since 1866, with the discussions that have followed, have rendered it well-nigh certain that coming generations of men, when they look upon hospitals endowed hereafter by the benevolent, need not be forced to lament that the pious intentions of founders should be frustrated by the ignorance of builders." The fact seems to be, that the walls and floors of old hospitals have become impregnated with seeds of disease; whereas the tent is perfectly pure, and allows such a continual percolation of air through its roofs as to secure a wholesome atmosphere.

The article on "Training Schools for Nurses," and the extended discussion of questions of "Prison Reform," are most seasonable,—as are also others, which we lack room to specify. But we invite attention to all the publications of this Society, and to the great cause to which it is devoted.

D. P. N.

THE PERIOD OF THE REFORMATION, 1517 TO 1648. By Ludwig Häusser. Edited by Wilhelm Oncken, Professor of History at the University of Giessen. Translated by Mrs. G. Sturge. 12mo. pp. 695. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers. 1874.

"The Period of the Reformation" extends from 1517 to the close of the Seven Years War in 1648. A concise view of English affairs is given until the death of Oliver Cromwell. We regard this book as a very interesting one, more particularly to American readers, who, we imagine, are not generally very familiar with the history of this period. We are far from being certain that it would have been possible for Charles V., by allying himself with the religious sentiment enkindled by Luther, to unite

the German states into one kingdom ; but one cannot but mourn that, at least, the attempt was not made. Full justice, we are glad to see, is done to the character of Oliver Cromwell. Had he been permitted to reign a few years longer, and to transmit his authority to a line of worthy successors, how different would have been the character of the subsequent history of Great Britain.

THE REEF, AND OTHER PARABLES. By Edward Henry Bickersteth, author of "Yesterday, To-day, and Forever." 12mo. pp. 322. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers. 1874.

By means of a series of interesting stories, — parables, as they may be fitly termed, — much important instruction is conveyed in this little book. There can be no need for us to recommend to public favor a book from the pen of Mr. Bickersteth. His name is a sufficient guarantee of merit.

LIFE AND LABOURS OF MR. BRASSEY, 1805–1870. By Sir Arthur Helps, K. C. B. With a Preface to the American Edition by the Author. 8vo. pp. 386. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1874.

The life of this eminent railway contractor is adapted to interest greatly the American public. While George Stephenson is the inventor of the locomotive, more than any other man, Mr. Brassey may be regarded as the founder of the present railway system. The work describes in a graphic and interesting manner Mr. Brassey's progress, from the time when he built his first railroad to the period when he was universally acknowledged to be the foremost railway builder of Europe. He constructed a great number of railroads in England, and during the latter part of his life built railways in France, Italy, Austria, Australia, India, and South America. One cannot become familiar with this memoir without acquiring at the same time many curious and interesting facts with regard to the construction of those railways which have so changed our modern civilization. A higher interest is imparted to the work by the personal character of Mr. Brassey. The picture given of his intense application, tact, methods of managing men, and high moral character is adapted to delight and instruct the reader. The work is written in a modest and simple but very beautiful style. The book is clearly printed on good paper, and its appearance reflects much credit on the publishers.

THE SUPERHUMAN ORIGIN OF THE BIBLE INFERRED FROM ITSELF. By Henry Rogers, author of the "Eclipse of Faith." 12mo. pp. 423. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Co. 1874.

We are inclined to regard the arguments, like those of Mr. Rogers in favor of the inspiration of the Scriptures, as more effective than what are denominated the external evidences in overcoming sceptical doubts. He has established quite satisfactorily the points which he undertakes to main-

tain; that there are certain peculiarities not found in the Bible which would be found there if the Bible was of human origin; and, on the other hand, there are certain peculiarities to be found in the Bible which could exist only in a book of divine origin. The argument is conducted, on the whole, in a very skilful manner. It strikes us as being one excellent characteristic of the work, that it does not multiply arguments by pressing into the service those which are comparatively feeble, thereby producing the impression that the position to be maintained is really weak, and stood in need of every support that can be contrived. As the case is, one feels all along that not all is said which might have been said.

We must say a word concerning one or two minor faults. Why does not Mr. Rogers always write, as he is so capable of writing, in a pure, easy English style? If he wishes to speak of the "overthrow" of anything, why not say overthrow rather than "touteversement." When he has occasion to assert that two things agree with each other, what is the utility of saying that they "osculate" each other.

THE PARACLETE: An Essay on the Personality and Ministry of the Holy Ghost, with some reference to Current Discussions. 8vo. pp. 402. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Co. 1875.

The object of this book is not what one before reading it might possibly conjecture. It does not aim so much to prove the existence and personality of the Holy Ghost as to describe the work which he accomplishes on the earth, and to show it to be of such a nature that it could be accomplished only by a divine agency. The work is fitted to do much good. Whatever we may think of the absolute force of some of the reasoning in it, we can certainly affirm, that it is equally conclusive with that used in favor of antagonistic opinions; and on this account is of altogether more practical force. This is specially true of the argument in favor of theism as opposed to atheism; and of spiritualism as applied to materialism.

We are not pleased with the style of this book. Besides being at times coarse and undignified, it strikes us as hard and labored, betraying what looks like a severe effort to attain originality in the form of expression, rather than in the thought.

THE MISTRESS OF THE MANSE. By J. G. Holland. 12mo. pp. 245. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Co. 1874.

This poem has the merits and the defects of Dr. Holland's other poems. Some passages in it breathe the true spirit of poetry. There are verses between the one hundred and thirty-fifth and the one hundred and forty-first page which will not soon be lost. The volume contains many just and ripe thoughts on what is called "the sphere of woman." We cannot say of the poem, "Infinite riches in a little room." We wish that the author would condense his writings, and avoid his expletives, repetitions, and circumlocutions.

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